As a result of all the premises set above, it can be concluded that, indeed, men and women have different behaviours when making decisions.
If they must make the distribution decision themselves, males decide to be more egalitarian with the receiving party while the women are less egalitarian.
By contrast, when they have to delegate, both genders are more selfish and choose the agent who reports a greater benefit. The only difference is that while men act like this from the start, women take a few more rounds to choose the most selfish agent. Delegation is therefore an effective tool to generate inequalities.
Analysing the subjects as agents, women are more equitable and make more fair allocations. This finding corroborates the previous literature that warns that female agents make fairer allocations despite the fact that this suppose less benefit to them because they are chosen fewer times (Bottino, García-Muñoz, &
Kujal, 2016). Male agents, make decisions that favour their principal and thus guarantee them a greater benefit by being chosen more times.
Regarding the application of these results to the business environment, we can conclude that depending on the business model, promotion options will vary:
in a company that wants to boast of the figure of “leader” concerned with the welfare of those who takes part, the female figure is more likely to ascend. Her concern for equitable allocations can make her an ideal candidate for promotion.
On the other hand, in companies where the figure of the authoritarian boss persists, concerned about the reported profit and not so much for those who make it possible, it is likely that the male gender has more options for promotional success. His ability to report greater profits to those who have delegated on him will be what makes you climb positions.
As a final conclusion, in a changing and modern business environment that seeks to adapt to social needs and where the authoritarian figures are less
19 and less likely, it is expected that the options of assuming leadership positions of women grows. Not surpassing male but reaching the same level.
Furthermore, the social environment increasingly concerned with gender equality and this is an important factor to change how female is projected in all environments.
20 9. References
Albert López-Ibor, R., Escot Mangas, L., Fernández Cornejo, J. A., & Palomo Vadillo, M. T. (2010). ¿Tienen las políticas de conciliación un sesgo femenino? El caso de las empresas familiarmente responsables. CLM.
Economía. Revista Económica de Castilla La Mancha, (17), 141-168.
Azmat, G., & Petrongolo, B. (2014). Gender and the Labor Market: What Have We Learned from Field and Lab Experiments? Labour Economics, 30, 32-40.
Booth, A. L., Francesconi, M., & Frank, J. (2003). A sticky floors model of
promotion, pay and gender. European Economic Review 47(2), 295-322.
Bottino, E., García-Muñoz, T., & Kujal, P. (2016). Gender Biases in Delegation.
Buedo Martínez, S. (2015). Mujeres y mercado laboral en la actualidad, un análisis desde la perspectiva de género: genéricamente empobrecidas, patriarcalmente desiguales. RES, Revista de Educación Social.
Choy, A. K., Hamman, J. R., King, R. R., & Weber, R. A. (2016). Delegated bargaining in a competitive agent market: an experimental study. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2(1), 22-35.
Comisión de Igualdad y Diversidad de CEOE;. (2019). Análisis de la brecha salarial de género en España. España: PricewaterhouseCoopers Asesores de Negocios, S.l.
Contreras Torres, F., Pedraza Ortiz, J. E., & Mejía Restrepo, X. (2012). La mujer y el liderazgo empresarial. Diversitas: Perspectivas en Psicología, 8(1), 183-194.
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender Differences in Preferences. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(2), 448-74.
Ezquerra, L., & Kujal, P. (2019). Deciding to Delegate: On Distributional
Consequences of Endogenous Delegation. ESI Working Papers, 19-22.
Fershtman, C., & Gneezy, U. (2001, Summer). Strategic delegation: An experiment. RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 352-368.
Garofalo, O., & Rott, C. (2018). Shifting Blame? Experimental Evidence of Delegating Communication. Management Science, 64(8), 3911-3925.
Gneezy, U., Leonard, K. L., & List, J. A. (2009). Gender differences in competition: Evidence from a matrilineal and a patriarchal society.
Econometrica, 77(5), 1637-1664.
21 Hamman, J. R., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, R. A. (2010). Self-interest through
delegation: An additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship.
American Economic Review 100(4), 1826-46.
Lamas, M. (2007). El género es cultura. Retrieved from V Campus de Cooperación Cultural.
http://www.oei.es/historico/euroamericano/ponencias_derechos_genero.
php:
http://www.oei.es/historico/euroamericano/ponencias_derechos_genero.
php
Martín Llaguno, M. (2007). La mujer en la industria publicitaria. La segregación vertical en la comunicación comercial: techo de cristal y suelo pegajoso.
22 10. Appendix I: BL Treatment development by sessions
In the first session of Baseline only one of the three Principal players are a man. Analysing the average allocation of the twelve rounds we can affirm that women have not share, on average, the 61,25% of the amount that must be distributed while men have not shared the 68,07%. In the next table one can see the roles assignment for the first session and in the following figure the average earning for principals by gender.
Session 1
Female Male Total
Players 5 1 6
Principals 2 1 3
Recipients 3 0 3
Table 4. Role Assignment in BL at first session.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
Figure 12. BL: Average amount earned by Principals in session 1.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
During the first session, while female gender allocates a more or less constant amount of resources to its recipient, the male gender decides to share alternately none resources or half part of them to its recipients in each round.
For the second session, randomly the same number of men and women participate as a Principals. The following table shows the role assignment.
2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average amount earned by principals
Periods
Female Male
23
Table 5. Role Assignment in BL at second session.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
The results of this session shows that this time is women who decides to allocate themselves a higher percentage of resources (67,78%) while men keeps themselves the 60,62%.
Figure 13. BL: Average amount earned by Principals in session 2.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
In this second session both gender carry out a more equitable distribution of resources. Although women have been more selfish in the thrd period compensating the altruism of the firs one. Men have shown their altruism on the eleventh period.
The role assignment for the third session is shown on the next table.
Session 3
Female Male Total
Players 2 6 8
Principals 1 3 4
Recipients 1 3 4
Table 6. Role Assignment in BL at third session.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
Three of the four participants are men and there is only one women in the group. Female, on average, have been more selfish on this session and keep for
24 herself the 62,39% of the resources. On the other hand, men have maintained in their pockets the 56,78% of the amount.
Figure 14. BL: Average amount earned by Principals in session 3.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
In this third session the decision of allocation of men and women are more equated; in all rounds both genders distribute with more equality their resources between themselves and their recipients. Although genders act similarly, the distribution is not symmetrical, and they continue allocating less resources that what they assign to themselves.
On the last round (the fourth) the number of participants as Principals increases to 9. In the following table one can see that 6 of this 9 are women. They decide to stay, on average, the 74,33% of the resources, the highest percentage seen until now. On the other part, the men decide to appropriate only the 53,59%
of the import, the lowest percentage of all sessions.
Session 4
Female Male Total
Players 10 8 18
Principals 6 3 9
Recipients 4 5 9
Table 7. Role Assignment in BL at fourth session.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
Although they demonstrate a certain selfishness, the behaviour of women in this session is more constant than the behaviour of male gender.
2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average amount earned by principals
Periods
Female Male
25
Figure 15. BL: Average amount earned by Principals in session 4.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average amount earned by principals
Periods
Female Male
26 11. Appendix II: CD Treatment development by sessions
11.1. Principal’s point of view
On the first session, as seen in the following table, all Principals are women (remember that roles are randomly assigned).
Session 1
Female Male Total
Players 7 3 10
Principals 4 0 4
Agents 1 1 2
Recipients 2 2 4
Table 8. Role Assignment in CD at first session.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
Figure 16. CD: Average amount earned by Principals in session 1.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
Due to the absence of male in this session, we can only conclude that Principals receive on average £7,78 per round back from their agents.
On the next session, the second one, the number of participants and the roles assigned to them are more mixed: Principals are two men and two women.
See the following table:
2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Aveage amount earned by Principals
Periods Female
27
Table 9. Role Assignment in CD at second session.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
The average allocation for Principals does not differs a lot related to gender: men receive from the Agent they chose an average percentage of 64,35% while women receive an average of 64,68% of the amount that Agent distributes.
Figure 17. CD: Average amount earned by Principals in session 2.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
On the following sessions, the third and the fourth one, the number of participants is reduced to 8. The number of Principals is reduced to 3 and this implies that for sure the number of male and females that are enrolled as
Table 10. Role Assignment in CD at third session.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
28 On the third session, the agent strategy is to return the maximum to his/her Principals, so the profit they get are almost the 100% of the amount distributed in all rounds. The report will show, when it analyses the Agent's point of view, that this strategy works and only one of the two Agents of session 3 is chosen for all rounds.
Figure 18. CD: Average amount earned by Principals in session 3.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
On the last session the number of Principals is one more time fully female as indicated in the following table:
Session 4
Female Male Total
Players 6 2 8
Principals 3 0 3
Agents 1 1 2
Recipients 2 1 3
Table 11. Role Assignment in CD at fourth session.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
On this last session for the first time the report shows that Principals receives no return in one round. The amount on £10 is fully assigned to recipient.
Even so, the rest of rounds the amount assigned by the Agents to the Principals is significant. On average, the earnings for Principals are £7,68 per round.
2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Aveage amount earned by Principals
Periods
Female Male
29
Figure 19. CD: Average amount earned by Principals in session 4.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
11.2. Agent’s point of view
The development of the sessions from the point of view of the agent happens as explained below.
In the first session the male agent is choose 28 times while the female agent only 20. In the following graph we can see how much resources each agent assigns (remember they are different genders) to the main ones:
Figure 20. CD: Average amount returned by Agents in session 1.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
Although they differ in time, the drawings of both genders are similar.
Perhaps it is necessary to highlight that the female agent remains in constant
2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Aveage amount earned by Principals
Periods Female
2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average amount allocated by agents to principals
Periods
Females Males
30 ranges except in period 6 while the changes in male agent's choices are more aggressive.
On the second round the behaviours of the agents are completely opposite although the numbers of times they have been choose are similar: the female Agent is elected 25 times and the male 23.
Figure 21. CD: Average amount returned by Agents in session 2.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
In the third session the female agent has no opportunity to allocate resources: Principals are according to the distribution method of the male agent and continue to delegate to him. This is understood, since it allocates practically in all rounds 100% of the amount to its dictator.
Figure 22. CD: Average amount returned by Agents in session 3.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average amount allocated by agents to principals
Periods
Females Males
2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average amount allocated by agents to principals
Periods
Females Males
31 On the fourth and final round both agents participate again although the male agent is still chosen over the female agent: 12 times for the female agent against the double, 24, for the male.
Figure 23. CD: Average amount returned by Agents in session 4.
Source: Middlesex University. Own elaboration.
The return of the agents to the principal demonstrates the reason for this difference: the constant and significant assignment of the male agent makes him continuously selected in the last rounds of the session.
2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average amount allocated by agents to principals
Periods
Females Males
