The United States in the Paris Agreement negotiations: international leadership built on fragile domestic ground? A case study of the Obama administration's bid for international climate leadership.

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The United States in the Paris Agreement negotiations: international leadership built on

fragile domestic ground?

A case study of the Obama administration’s bid for international climate leadership

Nathalie Wik Lystad

Master’s thesis

Department of Political Science UNIVERSITETET I OSLO

Spring 2018 34 526 words

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The United States in the Paris Agreement negotiations: international leadership built on fragile domestic ground?

A case study of the Obama administration’s bid for international climate leadership

Nathalie Wik Lystad

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Copyright Nathalie Wik Lystad 2018

The United States in the Paris Agreement negotiations: international leadership built on fragile domestic ground? A case study of the Obama administration’s bid for international climate leadership

Nathalie Wik Lystad http://www.duo.uio.no

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Abstract

The US utilized leadership in the Paris Agreement negotiations in several and important ways. In particular, the bilateral cooperation with China was pivotal and helped securing the Agreement’s broad participation. That being said, a successful international climate

leadership depends on two conditions: a direction and design that overlaps with the US’

interests, and the ability of the US to make credible domestic policy commitments. Indeed, the US succeeded in shaping the design and the direction of the outcome of the negotiations.

The Paris Agreement reflects all of the key US’ objectives: an agreement where both developed and developing countries set forth contributions to mitigate climate change, and where each country determines its own targets and contributions, but where the contributions are subject to periodically reviews in order to ensure transparency. However, the US was not successful in fulfilling the second condition: to make credible domestic policy commitments.

This was due to domestic hurdles and constraints, such as the polarization in the Congress and the domestic opposition to the Obama administration’s climate regulations. Overall, there was no strong domestic will to enforce domestic climate policy. Also, the executive climate actions risked being rolled back by other political developments, such as a new (Republican) president. Thus, the US’ leadership was built on fragile domestic ground.

This qualitative case study explores the US’ leadership in the Paris Agreement negotiations through combining leadership theory with an assessment of the prospects for domestic policy change and the credibility of the pledge the US brought to the Paris negotiations. A

combination of these two levels of analysis, contributes to an enhanced understanding of the US’ prospects for international climate leadership.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to Tora Skodvin for suggesting me to use the leadership theory perspective, and for introducing me to Guri Bang (at CICERO) - who became my supervisor. I am very thankful for Guri’s valuable inputs throughout the whole process - through her constructive feedback, tips on literature, as well as her overall engagement, knowledge, and positive spirit. I would also like to thank all of the informants for taking their time and for providing valuable insights into the process of the international climate negotiations.

And thanks to all the wonderful people I have had the pleasure of getting to know throughout my years at the University of Oslo - from the members of the great and super-productive colloquium “The FireHeads” to the crazy and enthusiastic founders of the swimming club

“Badeklubben”. Also, a big thanks to all the great people - from all corners of the world - I have met during my two semesters abroad, in Hong Kong and in Tokyo.

Last, but really not least, thanks to all my nearest friends and family for keeping me sane during this “insane” period of writing a master’s thesis. To my parents for always supporting me and believing in me. To my brother for always making me laugh. And to my grandfather for being an inspiration due to his lifelong dedication to his work. Plus, for being 84 years old and still joining me in the ski slopes.

Oslo, April 19, 2018 Nathalie Wik Lystad

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Abbreviations

CAA: Clean Air Act CAP: Climate Action Plan

CBDR: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities COP: Conference of the Parties

CPP: Clean Power Plan

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency GHG: Greenhouse Gases

GHGE: Greenhouse Gas Emissions

IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change INDC: Intended Nationally Determined Contributions NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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1 Introduction: The US and international climate leadership

In his official statement welcoming the Paris Agreement in 2015, President Obama expressed that the Agreement was a “turning point for the world” and a “tribute to American

leadership”, and that his administration had “transformed the United States into the global leader in fighting climate change” (White House 2015c). Two and a half years earlier, in June 2013, President Obama had rolled out his Climate Action Plan (CAP). An important part of this plan concerned the US’ ambition to lead international efforts at addressing climate change (White House 2013b). The US had also stated in its official submission to the Paris Agreement negotiations that it was committed to playing a leadership role on the climate issue (US 2013b:1).

The US’ bid for international climate leadership is the point of departure of this thesis. The US’ international climate leadership depends on two conditions: i) the ability of the US to make credible domestic policy commitments, and ii) a direction and design of the

international climate agreement that overlaps with the US’ objectives (Bang 2015b:219;

Parker and Karlsson 2015). Therefore, this thesis explores the US as a climate actor at both the domestic and the international level. The aim is to make an overall and comprehensive assessment of the US’ leadership in the Paris Agreement negotiations and explore why and how the US could offer leadership in the negotiations.

One of the main findings of the thesis is that the US utilized leadership in the Paris

Agreement negotiations in several and important ways. The US’ leadership was instrumental in helping to secure an agreement in Paris. Also, the US succeeded in shaping the direction and design of the Agreement in line with key US’ objectives, such as and non-binding nationally determined contributions and a softening of the strict differentiation between developed and developing countries. However, the leadership was built on fragile domestic ground – due to the domestic polarization on the climate issue and the opposition to the Obama administration’s executive climate regulations.

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1.1 Research question

The main research question is:

- In what ways did the US utilize leadership in the Paris Agreement negotiations?

In order to answer this question, I assess the US as an actor at both the domestic and the international level. An analysis at both these levels allows a more comprehensive understanding of the US’ leadership in the Paris Agreement negotiations – and in the

international climate negotiations in general. By exploring what constraints and opportunities the US faces at the domestic level, we can enhance our understanding of the US as an actor at the international level.

The US is a pivotal actor in international climate cooperation – being the world’s largest economy and the second largest emitter. Thus, the participation of the US in an international climate agreement is crucial. It is therefore interesting to explore the US’ role and position in the international climate negotiations. Historically, the US has not been a very constructive actor in this area. However, with the Obama administration - and especially in its second term - the US did indeed become a more constructive actor on the climate issue. This thesis seeks to explore what factors were behind this development and what domestic constraints the Obama administration faced in its bid for international climate leadership.

Limitations

The scope of a master’s thesis has its limitations. I choose to focus mainly on the Obama administration’s second term, more specifically from 2013 and leading up to the COP21 in Paris 2015 (the 21^st Conference of the Parties). The thesis is also limited by a focus on one actor, namely the US. The thesis could have benefitted from an extensive and thorough analysis of other international actors, such as China – being the world’s largest emitter.

However, to my best effort I seek to increase an understanding of the China as an actor in the international negotiations, by assessing its bilateral cooperation with the US. The thesis could have benefitted from further exploring China as a climate actor. But this was not done - due to the limited scope of a master’s thesis, as well as considerations such as language barriers.

Also, I focus mostly on developments at the federal level. But realizing that developments at the subnational level are important to this case, I have also included the subnational level in

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the analysis. However, the thesis could have benefitted from a more thorough analysis of developments at the subnational level.

The negotiations taking place within the climate change regime are not the only arena where it is possible to exercise climate leadership, but it is the most important one, and hence I decided to focus on the actions undertaken in the run-up to and during these high profile international negotiation sessions. The focus is on the international negotiations that led to the breakthrough in Paris at COP21 but restricted to the time scope 2013-2015.

In order to put this thesis in context, and thus give an argument for the choice of my

approach, the following section gives a brief overview over the existing literature on the US’

position and leadership in international climate negotiations.

1.2 Previous research

A number of studies have dealt with the US’ position in international climate negotiations, and the existing literature can be roughly divided into three strands¹. The first strand adopts a systemic, international level perspective, and focus on the US’ position and strategies in the international negotiations (see: Andresen 2017; Andresen and Agrawala 2002; Buchner and Carrao 2006; Chasek 2007; Parker and Karlsson 2018). The leadership theory approach belongs to this strand (see the next section for a brief discussion on the current literature on leadership). The second strand has its point of departure in the domestic level. In this

approach, the focus is mainly on the interaction between the legislature and executive, as well as on the influence of interest groups (see: Averchenkova et al. 2016; Bang 2010, 2011, 2015c; Bang and Schreurs 2011; Bang and Skodvin 2014; Chiou and Rothenborg 2003;

Fisher 2004, 2006; Gerrard and Welton 2014; McCright and Dunlap 2003; Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003; Skodvin 2010; Skodvin and Bang 2014; Victor 2004). A third approach, which is also the point of departure for this thesis, is to combine the two levels (see:

Agrawala and Andresen 2001; Bang 2011; Bang and Schreurs 2017; Bang, Froyn, Hovi, and Menz 2007; Hovi, Sprinz and Bang 2010; Lisowski 2002). My thesis contributes to this strand, by combining the two levels of analysis through using domestic politics theory and leadership theory.

1Note the word “roughly”: The distinction between the strands is roughly made. The different strands are partly overlapping. Also, several of the contributions could be put in two or all three strands.

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Combining leadership theory with a domestic politics approach

The past research utilizing a leadership theory approach has provided important insights for understanding global climate leadership and the individual leadership roles of specific countries in the shaping of the negotiation outcomes (see: Andresen and Agrawala 2002;

Christoff 2010; Dong 2017; Karlsson, Hjerpe, Parker, and Linnér 2012). However, with some key exceptions (see: Hovi and Skodvin 2008; Hovi et al. 2010; Kelemen and Vogel 2010;

Parker and Karlsson 2018; Victor 2011) the majority of the most recent climate leadership scholarly literature has (disproportionately) focused on EU’s climate leadership (see:

Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Grubb and Gupta 2000; Gupta and Ringius 2001; Oberthür and Groen 2015, 2017; Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe 2017; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2010;

Wurzel, Liefferink and Connelly 2017a, b). This thesis aims to address this gap, by exploring various aspects of the US’ bid for international climate leadership.

The thesis combines the international-level approach of leadership theory with a domestic level approach – where the credibility of the US’ Paris pledge is analyzed. No previous studies have, to my knowledge, combined these two perspectives in analyzing the US’

position in the Paris Agreement negotiations. Also, few studies specifically and explicitly evaluate the credibility of the US’ Paris pledge (see: Averchenkova and Bassi 2016;

Averchenkova et al. 2016). By combining the two levels of analysis, we get a richer and more comprehensive understanding of the US as an actor in international climate negotiations.

Theoretical approach

Chapter 4 is fully dedicated to outlining the theoretical approach of the thesis. However, in the following section, I will briefly lay out the theoretical foundation for the thesis, as well as discuss some limitations. The thesis utilizes an international level perspective and a domestic level perspective. The theory is used to structure and organize the collection of data as well as a tool for conducting the analysis.

In order to gain a rich and comprehensive understanding of the US in the Paris Agreement negotiations, the thesis analyzes at both the international and domestic levels. Rather than viewing the state as a unitary actor derived from wider societal forces, such a combination of analytical levels allows to illustrate how the state’s policy priorities and interests develop and change in interplay with domestic institutions, policy processes, and actors (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2015:xxiii). The thesis utilizes theories about domestic policy change, primarily

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drawing on contributions from Kingdon (2003) and Averchenkova and Bassi (2016). In addition, I use leadership theory, drawing on a number of influential leadership scholars. An extensive presentation of the theories is made in chapter 4. Other theoretical perspectives could have contributed to an even richer and more comprehensive understanding of the US as an actor in the international climate negotiations, such as regime theory, or norm theory.

However, a researcher has to set the limits of the scope of the thesis at some point.

The structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 discusses the research design, the choice of data and methods, as well as

considerations such as validity and reliability. Chapter 3 gives an overview of developments in the international cooperation on the climate issue, with an emphasis on the US’ role.

Chapter 4 presents the theories that will be used as a point of departure for the analysis.

Chapter 5 makes an assessment of the domestic climate policy in the US, with a main focus on the credibility of the US’ Paris pledge. By analyzing the US at the domestic level, we are better equipped to understand the US as an actor at the international level – which is the focus of chapter 6, where an assessment of the US’ leadership in the Paris Agreement negotiations is made. By way of closing, the final chapter reflects on main findings, and makes a few remarks regarding further studies.

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2 Research design

The aim of a research design is to connect the collected data to the research question(s). In the following I discuss the choice of data and methods. In this, I reflect on crucial

considerations regarding validity and reliability, as well as limitations of the study.

2.1 Data

This thesis is based on primary and secondary sources, as well as interpretation of empirical evidence - i.e., analysis of public opinion polls. Of primary sources I use interviews, public documents, reports, statements, speeches, press releases, as well as public opinion polls. In order to uncover the US’ objectives and visions for a new climate agreement, I examine the US’ submissions to the UNFCCC process, as well as official statements made by key US representatives. In order to examine if and how the US was able to utilize leadership, I assess to what extent the US’ objectives and visions were reflected in the final Paris Agreement (and related documents, such as drafts and appendixes). Adding to this, I conduct semi-structured interviews with informants who - in different ways - were involved in the Paris Agreement negotiations². Three of the informants were present at the negotiations at the COP21 - either in capacity of negotiating directly, or via observation and other forms of participation. Two informants were not present at the COP21 but have been heavily involved (by being part of the Norwegian delegation) in the negotiations - leading up to, or after the COP21. One of these two informants is currently a climate advisor at the Norwegian Embassy in Washington D.C., whereas the other informant previously had that position. Of secondary sources I use already available analysis, books, research papers, articles, and news articles. To my best effort I validate the findings of the study by drawing on a wide range of sources – both primary and secondary sources.

2.1.1 Validity and reliability

In order to assure that the research findings are relevant, it is necessary that the use of data has high validity and reliability. The reliability of the data is determined by how the data is collected and by its verifiability (Hellevik 1999). The reliability is enhanced if the research

2The interview guide is enclosed in Appendix 2.

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design, data collection, and analysis is transparent. Thus, as a researcher I enhance the reliability by being clear and open about my methodological choices (i.e., data collection, analysis, and the overall methodological approach) (Andersen 2013:14). To my best effort I take such reliability concerns into account throughout the whole thesis, and particularly in this chapter about research design.

The validity of a study is determined by the relevance of the empirical data to the research question(s). In this, clearly defined and relevant theoretical concepts improve the validity of the research (Hellevik 1999:51-52). Central theoretical concepts in this thesis are leadership and credibility. In chapter 4 I discuss the operationalization of these concepts. To

operationalize is to redefine or convert (relatively) abstract theoretical notions into concrete terms that allow us to measure what we are after. In other words, an operationalization is an explicit and measurable definition of the more abstract concepts (Manheim, Rich, Willnat, and Brians 2006:6). By clarifying the theoretical framework and thus the interpretative departure point of the study, I reveal the premises and the assumptions that underlie the collection and analysis of the data (Andersen 1997:30). Both the validity and the reliability are enhanced by the operationalization of central concepts.

Another way one can seek to enhance the validity of a study is to use a variety of sources and methods to analyze the collected data (Yin 2003:98). Thus, in this thesis, I draw on a variety of sources. By drawing on a wide range of sources, primary as well as secondary, I allow a form of triangulation of the sources (Bradshaw and Stratford 2010:77). This combining of different data sources strengthens the analysis because the different findings are tested against each other (Kjelstadli 1999:190).

Limitations

Secrecy and restricted access to meetings and documents is deeply embedded in the international diplomacy’s modus operandi. Clearly this limits a case study of the US’

leadership role in the Paris Agreement negotiations. That being said, I have conducted interviews with informants who participated in and followed the Paris Agreement

negotiations closely and thus could provide valuable insights into the climate negotiation process. However, due to limits on time and resources I have only interviewed informants from my own home country, Norway. Ideally, I would have conducted interviews with delegates and participants from a variety of countries. However, the interviews are not the

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main data source of this study, but rather function as supplements to the other sources. That being said, several of my informants have followed and studied international climate negotiations and the US climate policy closely for several years and are therefore valuable and valid sources for the study.

In addition, and especially with regard to the assessment of the US’ domestic politics, the validity of the study would have been enhanced if I interviewed key people in the US (such as politicians, policymakers, and other influential people and decision makers). However, due to limited time and resources, as well as other considerations (such as the current political situation in the US), this could not be prioritized within the limits of a master thesis³.

2.2 Method: Case study

I conduct a qualitative single case study. A case study is an intensive study of a single case⁴ (Andersen 2013:14; Gerring 2007:20). I have chosen this type of method as it allows going into depth of an issue through the focus on a particular case (Yin 2003:13). By collecting qualitative and quantitative data from a wide range of sources and by analyzing the data through the lenses of existing theories, as well as drawing on already existing research on the field, I aim to conduct an in-depth analysis of the US’ leadership in the Paris Agreement negotiations. And, to be more specific, I carry out what Lijphart (1971:692) calls a

“theoretical interpretative case study”. This approach is motivated by a curiosity and interest in a specific case. At the same time, the study of the specific case is regarded as a typical case of one (or several) classes of phenomena that we already have some knowledge about

(Andersen 1997:68; Andersen 2013:18). The main purpose of such a study is not necessarily to test hypotheses or to develop new theory, but to use existing theory to structure and analyze empirical material and shed light on a specific empirical case (Andersen 1997:69).

The theoretical point of departure of this thesis is leadership theory and domestic politics theory (more specifically, policy change theory). I use the theories to organize and understand a complex case (Andersen 2013:18). Also, the theoretical frameworks offer a

3 That being said, the American political system is transparent, and many important documents are public and can be found via the Internet.

4 Nonetheless, the purpose is also - in part - to generalize and shed light on a large class of cases (i.e., a population) (Gerring 2007:20).

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structure to the analysis. The approach of the thesis is deductive since I chose the theories before I collected the data. However, this does not mean that I test hypotheses. The theory is primarily used as a tool for analyzing and interpreting the case (Andersen 1997:30).

Deduction as a process enables the researcher to use theories to explain real-world phenomena and events. In this, the theory helps us to understand the event of interest by giving reasons for why it is as it is. Deductive reasoning moves from abstract theoretical statements about general relationship to more concrete statements of specific phenomena and behavior. In other words, the deductive process provides a link between theory and empirical observations. If we can show, through the deductive process, that some observed empirical event can be (logically) predicted from a set of theoretical assumptions, then that particular theory provides an explanation for the event (Manheim et al. 2006:18).

Implications

The use of a theory-guided approach has its limitations. Such an approach can limit the researcher’s understanding of the event, since the researcher looks at the evidence through a

“conceptual lens”, and thus may overlook important aspects or interpretations (Allison 1969:689). However, by adding several and different theoretical approaches one is able to look at several aspects of a case. Therefore, in this thesis, I try to my best effort to use several conceptual lenses in order to catch the complexity of the case. By combining several

theoretical contributions, one can enhance the theoretical validity. The theoretical validity considers whether the theoretical approaches catch the essence of the phenomena of interest (Hellevik 1997). And, by combining several theoretical contributions - or: explanatory models, if you will - one can enhance the study’s internal validity. Internal validity is about the study’s quality and credibility. Internal validity is often emphasized as the strength of the case study since the use of many different types of data provides detailed insight into the case (Andersen 2013:14). The researcher can enhance the study’s internal validity by constantly reflecting on alternative, even conflicting, approaches. This is particularly crucial to have in mind when collecting the data. The researcher should also look for evidence that does not support the theoretical departure of the study. The internal validity can also be enhanced if the empirical material is consistent with the patterns the theory predicts (Yin 2003:111-116).

A central aim of this thesis is to trace the different links between explanatory factors (the US’

leadership) and the observed outcome (the Paris Agreement) (George and Bennett 2005:5). It can be a challenge to trace causal mechanisms in qualitative studies (King, Keohane, and

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Verba 1994:76). First, investigating the effects of one variable while holding all other variables constant is often impossible in case studies (Gerring 2007:172-173). Second, one can risk omitting important variables. However, all studies - qualitative as well as

quantitative - contain uncertainties and risks of omitting important variables. Also, the uncertainties do not suggest that one should avoid any attempts at causal inference (King et al. 1994:76). In order to determine causal mechanisms and minimize uncertainties in case studies one should link together contextual evidence from various levels of analysis (Gerring 2007:172-173). Therefore, I have analyzed the US at two different levels - the international and the domestic level. This allows a more comprehensive assessment of the phenomenon than an analysis conducted at only one level would have allowed.

A common critique of the case study is its difficulty of (empirical) generalization because it only studies a few units - resulting in impaired external validity (Andersen 2013:14). External validity is a matter of how representative the findings are for a larger population (Gerring 2007:43). However, the primary aim of this case study - a study of the US’ leadership in the Paris Agreement negotiations - is not to generalize, but to increase understanding of, and shed light on, that particular case. Nevertheless, as Yin (2003:32-33) argues, a case study allows for analytical generalization by comparing the results of analysis with the predictions of the theory. Thus, a case study allows the researcher to discover omitted variables, causal mechanisms, hypotheses, and interaction effects (Andersen 1997:72; George and Bennett 2005:110). In this, the researcher might discover phenomena that could not be described in light of existing theories, and this will allow for new theoretical contributions (Andersen 1997:72).

2.3 Semi-structured interviews

Interviewing as a method of data collection offers the advantage of providing comprehensive and in-depth information about a subject. Thus, it can be a very important source of

information in a case study (Yin 2003:86-89). However, there are challenges with using interviewing as a method, especially regarding the data established in the interview situation, as well as the choice of interview type, and the implications such a choice have for the external validity. Also, informants may emphasize their own role, or rationalize, especially in matters that create strong feelings, or that are very complex (Andersen 2006:292-296).

Another challenge related to interviewing is the “interviewer effect”: if the questions are

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poorly formulated it may give bias in the data or result in reflexivity, i.e., the informant gives the answer he or she thinks the interviewer wants to hear (Yin 2003:86). To enhance the validity of the data collection, the information from interviews should be supported by other sources of data. Also, the credibility of what the informants say may be enhanced when informants with different backgrounds say the same (Andersen 2006:294).

I conduct semi-structured interviews. In preparation for the semi-structured interviews, I designed an interview guide that served as a guide for carrying out the interviews. An interview guide is a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered. The emphasis is on how the informant understands and frames the events and issues, rather than a structured survey where the researcher has made the response categories in advance. The informant has a great deal of leeway in how to reply. The interviews follow a script to a certain extent but are flexible and respond to the direction in which the informant takes the interview. For instance, questions originally not included in the interview guide may be asked as the interviewer picks of on things said by the informant. Also, questions may not follow on exactly in the way outlined in the interview guide. However, by and large, all the questions are asked, and a similar wording is used from interview to interview (Bryman 2012:471).

The informants were chosen on the basis of their position and role in the negotiations. In other words, the selection method is “strategic” (Tansey 2007). I strategically selected participants from the two largest and most important categories of COP participants:

members of party delegations, such as government representatives and negotiators; and (researchers and) NGO representatives (Parker and Karlsson 2018:527). In order to exercise effective leadership, an actor needs to be recognized as a leader first and foremost by key participants - such as the Party delegates - since they determine the outcome of the

negotiations. It is therefore crucial to find out how the US’ leadership was perceived by the official delegates. In addition, it is important to be recognized as a leader by other important actors: e.g., interest organizations, media representatives, and researchers, as they may have power to influence the overall picture of an actor’s standing and importance in terms of leadership. That being said, the delegates are the key actors. As insiders to the negotiations they are in position to make well-grounded assessment on which actors played a leading role in the Paris Agreement negotiations (Parker and Karlsson 2018:528-529).

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The advantage of strategic selection is that the researcher has control over the selection process, and thus the most important informants can be included. The method is especially useful if the purpose of the study is to reconstruct or gain insight into a certain process (such as the Paris Agreement negotiations). On the other hand, a strategic selection implies that the selection is not necessarily representative, and thus the chances of generalizing to a wider population are reduced (Tansey 2007:769). However, the aim of this thesis is to explore and assess specific factors that led to a specific outcome. In order to gain insight into the process of interest, it was important to interview key actors with thorough knowledge on the subject.

Strategic selection of informants ensured that actors who possessed the information and knowledge I was looking to inspect, made it to the selection. The selection method is therefore based on basis of the research question.

I would like to note that the information gained from the interviews may be biased by the informants’ (or the organization or government they represented) goals, values, and beliefs.

Therefore, information on the informants’ background can be found in the Appendix 1 (the informants gave me permission to use this information in my thesis). Also, by interviewing informants from different organizations and capacities, the validity of the data can be checked by comparing the information from the different informants.

The interviews lasted for about 25-45 minutes. Two interviews were conducted via Skype, since both informants live in the US (at the current time). The interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. All the informants granted me permission to use information from the interviews. The interviews brought forward some useful terms and explanations that shed light on how negotiators themselves “theorize” the process they are part of. Several of the terms are employed in the analysis in the following chapters.

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3 Background: Climate change and the US

This chapter provides an overview of the context surrounding the international climate negotiations. In the first part, climate change and international climate cooperation is discussed. Then, the focus is on the US’ participation and objectives in the international climate negotiations. The final sections lay out the developments in the international climate negotiations in the last years - leading up to the Paris Agreement in 2015. The chapter aims to provide a context for understanding the US’ international climate leadership.

3.1 The severity and complexity of the climate issue

The global climate is changing and getting warmer as a result of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE) caused by human activity through combustion of fossil fuels (such as oil, coal and gas) (Hovi and Underdal 2008:113). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)⁵ has been convening and inviting natural scientists and other experts to write

scientific assessment reports on the newest and most relevant climate change research every 5-7 years since 1990. Each assessment has strengthened the message: climate change is human-caused, and climate change is growing rapidly. Also, as IPCC reports, weather extremes are more frequent, and glacial ice caps are melting (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2015:xvii; Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016:143; IPCC 2014a).

Climate change is global in scale: most of the greenhouse gases (GHG) accumulate over periods of time and mix globally, and as such the emission of GHGs by one actor affects all the other actors. To achieve effective mitigation of emissions it is therefore necessary to have international cooperation on climate policy (IPCC 2014b:5). Also, effective mitigation requires substantial changes in our fossil fuel-based economies (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016:145; Lachapelle and Paterson 2013:566). GHGE is intimately linked to the rise of industrial capitalism and to modern time’s economic activity and globalized pattern of production and energy consumption (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2015:xvii; IPCC 2014a,b).

Thus, climate change calls into question the ways in which we have come to conduct and organize social and political life (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2015:xvii). This is one of the

5IPCC is a scientific and intergovernmental body under the auspices of the United Nations.

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reasons why climate change has been a challenging issue to deal with politically. Nearly all economic activity and many social habits might be affected by policy to mitigate climate change (Harrison 2000:90). Particularly, a reduction of GHGEs will require substantial changes in fossil fuel production and use, as well as in manufacturing (Harrison 2000:90).

In addition, climate change has proven to be inherently difficult to govern because of complicated spatial and temporal dynamics. While the causes and effects of climate change are local and directly tied to everyday modern life, the biochemical drivers of a changing climate are global and stretched over longer time periods (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand

2015:xvii). The benefits of mitigation of the climate change are diffuse, intangible, and long- term, whereas the costs are concentrated, tangible, and immediate. Climate mitigation policies will benefit the population in the future in ways that are not yet clear. Whereas, the costs of mitigation are borne here and now - and especially by industrial actors such as fossil fuel producers (Harrison 2000:106).

3.2 International climate cooperation and the US

Although the scientific evidence of the seriousness of climate change has continued to accumulate there has been little effective policy action to address the issue (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016:142). Why has so little yet been achieved in solving this issue? The answer, in part, is that a mere acknowledgement of a common global challenge that needs to be addressed urgently is not sufficient for the actors to join forces and forge sustainable solutions (Parker and Karlsson 2013:580). International cooperation may still be hard to establish, because reaching international agreement and appropriate solutions presents a number of vexing problems that are not easy to overcome (Underdal 1994; Young 1991).

The inherent difficulty of slowing the climate change, and eventually stabilize it, has discouraged states from taking (the costly) actions since it has seemed doubtful that others will follow suit (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016:145). In other words, international cooperation is compounded because the countries feel uncertain as to whether the other countries will actually stick to the commitments they make. In addition, the fear of

competitive disadvantage in the global economy will often mean that states are unwilling to act in the absence of international agreements requiring similar commitments from the other countries (Parker and Karlsson 2013:581). International cooperation has also been

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compounded by differences among the countries in the costs of actions due to different energy mixes and endowments (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016:145). The issue of climate change has indeed turned out to be a major source of contention between countries. The countries often have different views on how the issue should be defined and what strategies and should guide efforts to reach solutions (Parker and Karlsson 2013:581). Particularly, there have been political disputes over time frames and goals; over differentiations between developed and developing countries; and over voluntary versus mandatory guidelines

(Sussman 2004:362). Another obstacle to cooperation relates to the fact that the countries are

“complex collective entities” (Young 1991:303) which arrive at the international negotiations with their fixed preferences and tied hands as result of domestic constraints (Christoff

2010:643).

Despite the difficulties, the international negotiations have come a long way in terms of dealing with climate change. The following section provides an overview of the international climate negotiations - from its beginnings in the late 1980s/early 1990s until the Paris

Agreement in 2015, and with a focus on the role of the US in the negotiations.

The United Nations Framework on Climate Change

The international negotiations on climate policy began in the late 1980s, and in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit, 154 nations concluded the first ever global climate agreement - the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Today, nearly 200 nations have ratified the Convention, including the US. The UNFCCC created a secretariat and forum for

international negotiations on climate change, and elaborated principles for future global climate cooperation (Purvis, Belenkey, Lefton, and Langley 2015:4). The UNFCCC does not involve any concrete binding commitments, but an agreed and committing target is to achieve global stabilization of concentration of GHG to a level that will prevent dangerous human induced climate change (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 2). The IPCC recommends that the global temperature increase should not be over 2°C, and that in order to achieve this target there has to be substantial worldwide mitigation (IPCC 2014a, b).

The UNFCCC summits, called the Conference of the Parties (COP), is the main channel for international cooperation and negotiation on policy measures to limit climate change (Dong 2017:35; Hovi and Underdal 2008:115). For several years, the negotiations strived for an

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international agreement on emission reduction (Fløttum and Drange 2017:130). And in 2015, at the 21st COP of the UNFCCC, the negotiations succeeded in reaching this goal - with almost all of the world’s states agreeing to the Paris Agreement on climate change (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016:142).

3.2.1 The US’ participation in international climate cooperation The US is a pivotal actor in the international climate negotiations because of its large

economy and its high share of the total global GHGEs (Bang 2015c:213; Bang and Schreurs 2017:240; McGee 2015:137). No global climate agreement can be successful in the long-term without participation of the US. Thus, the US is an extremely powerful player in the

negotiations. The US has the ability to be a structural leader or a structural blocker of international climate action (Bang and Schreurs 2017:240). Indeed, the US’ participation in the climate negotiations has vacillated considerably over time and been marked by phases of leadership alternating with phases of abstention and disengagement (Bang and Schreurs 2017:239-240; Biedenkopf 2016; Kelemen and Vogel 2010).

The US played a leading role in the negotiations of the UNFCCC in the early 1990s, under President George H.W. Bush (sr.) (Kienast 2015:315; Parker and Karlsson 2015:193;

Percival 2014:139). During the Bill Clinton administration the US utilized leadership and actively negotiated and then signed the Kyoto Protocol (in 1997) (Parker and Karlsson 2018:523; Schreurs 2016:221). The Kyoto agreement owes much of its content to the US’

input (Wirth 2016:162). For instance, the US demanded flexible mechanisms such as emission trading, and this helped in bringing Kyoto to a successful conclusion (Bang and Schreurs 2017:240). However, the Protocol also included elements that did not suit the US’

objectives. The Kyoto Protocol included a top-down model of timetables and targets, where reductions targets were negotiated internationally with little input from domestic politics (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016:145). In addition, the Protocol explicitly called for mandatory and quantified cuts in GHGEs for developed nations, whereas developing countries were exempted from any obligations of GHGE reduction (Purvis et al. 2015:4).

This idea built on the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) of developed and developing countries, and the need for the developed countries to take the first step in reducing their GHGEs before the developing countries would be asked to follow suit (Clémençon 2016:4). However, at this time, major developing countries such as

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China and India had become major sources of GHGE. The exemption of such developing emitters - especially China, which was becoming a major exporter of goods to the US - became a key reason for the US Senate’s reluctance to ratify the Protocol (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016:146).

In July, 1997, shortly before the endorsement of the Protocol by President Clinton, the US Senate had expressed its objection to the agreement in the Byrd-Hagel resolution by a vote of 95-0, referencing two objectives: the Kyoto Protocol’s failure to identify GHGE targets for developing countries (such as China and India); and an anticipated harm to the US economy (Bang 2015b:213; Sussman 2004:363; Wirth 2016:162). Since any treaty requires Senate ratification, the sentiment in the Senate is regarded with respect (Harrison 2000:104-105).

And, because of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, the Clinton administration had little expectation of obtaining the required advice and consent to ratification of an international treaty by a two- thirds majority in the Senate (US Constitution, Article 2, Section 2; Wirth 2016:162). Also, ratification would have required passage of a federal enabling legislation that would demand cuts in the emissions of large domestic stationary sources and put a price on carbon. Powerful interest groups (with influence on the senators) such as coal, oil, manufacturing, and utility industries feared that such legislation would hurt them economically (Bang 2011:69). Thus, it would not be possible to gather a majority of senators to vote in favor of either the Kyoto Protocol or an enabling legislation (Bang 2015c:215). Nonetheless, The Clinton

administration ended up signing the Protocol, presumably expecting that the composition of the Senate would shift in a direction more receptive to the agreement. However, in the end, it was never submitted to the Senate (Wirth 2016:162).

Anyway, after George W. Bush (jr.) took office in January 2001, the US reversed its

leadership course and pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol two months later (Parker and Karlsson 2018:523; Schreurs 2016:221; Wirth 2016:162). When the US pulled out of Kyoto, the agreement’s viability and effectiveness was threatened (Bang and Schreurs 2017:240). One of the main reasons offered by Bush in justifying the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol was that emerging economies such as China and India were excluded from binding commitments (Agrawala and Andresen 2001a:vi), and that participating in the Protocol would put the US at a competitive economic disadvantage (Bang and Schreurs 2011:237). Overall, under the Bush administration, the economic costs of climate action were emphasized, the views of climate skeptics were highlighted, and the need to strengthen energy security through developing

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domestic fossil fuel sources was pushed (Bang and Schreurs 2011:235, 248). During the Bush presidency, the administration did all it could to protect the fossil fuel-industry from having to change the status quo, and consequently: the US GHGEs continued to increase (Harris 2016:xxv).

President Obama and climate leadership

When Barack Obama entered office in 2009, he signaled intentions to assume a renewed US leadership in the international climate negotiations (Parker and Karlsson 2015:193; Schreurs 2016:221). Obama personally attended and actively participated at the COP in Copenhagen in 2009 (Harris 2016:xxvii). The last time a US president had been present at one of the

international climate conferences was back in 1992 when Bush (sr.) attended the Rio Earth Summit (Schreurs 2010:177). However, in Copenhagen, Obama was not in a position to enter an agreement with binding commitments, nor could he sign an agreement unless major developing countries also accepted verifiable commitments. But China made it clear it had no intention to accommodate that demand (Parker and Karlsson 2015:194).

Difficulties in forging compromise in the Senate hampered the US’ participation (Bang 2011:72). Obama had sought to pass climate legislation in the Congress which would introduce a cap-and-trade system for regulating GHGEs. The understanding was that such a legislation would pave the way for a US participation in a new climate agreement (Bang 2011:71-72). However, political obstacles to climate legislation were insurmountable, even with a Democrat majority in both houses of the Congress (Kienast 2015:317)⁶. Senators - both Democrats and Republican - from oil- and coal-producing states opposed the cap-and- trade bills (Schreurs 2010:187). The Republican minority, as well as the Democrats voting against the party line, had enough power to block the bills in the Senate (Bang 2011:72). The mistake of the Clinton administration in Kyoto was that they signed a treaty without securing they had support in the Senate for ratification at home. The Obama administration was aware that such a mistake had to be avoided (Bang and Schreurs 2011:247).

At the international level, however, and especially among environmentalists, the hopes had been set high for a conclusion of a binding and comprehensive global agreement in

6President Obama was the Democrat leader. Democrats are generally more positive to climate action than Republicans.

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Copenhagen. In that regard, the conference was a failure (Bang and Schreurs 2017:244).

Neither the US or China would sign on to such an agreement, and the conference instead ended up “taking note” of a three-page non-binding political agreement (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2015:xviii; Interview 2). However, the US succeeded in pushing for a new design and direction of international climate cooperation. For the first time, developing countries and major emitters committed to participate in future climate agreements limiting their GHGEs - in line with the objective of the US (Bang 2015b:219-220; Christoff 2016:767).

The US also had signaled that it was not signing on to a comprehensive agreement with binding commitments (Parker and Karlsson 2016:456). And, what emerged from

Copenhagen was a political agreement reflecting the US’ objectives: namely, a bottom-up approach with voluntary and nationally-determined climate action pledges (Parker and Karlsson 2016:5, 456). The following section will further elaborate on the US’ climate cooperation objectives.

The US’ objectives in the international climate negotiations

Two long-standing US’ objectives in international climate negotiations have been to: i) break the strict differentation between developed and developing countries, and ii) to get an

agreement where emission commitments will be non-binding and tailored to the individual circumstances of each country (Harris 2016: xxiii-xxiv). When the US has been a laggard in the international climate negotiations and agreements (e.g., in the Kyoto Protocol), it has blamed its non-participation on lack of participation by other major emitters (such as China) and flawed treaty design (the US has not wanted to accept binding emission targets) (Bang, Hovi, and Skodvin 2016:214). A key argument the US has made is that nothing developed countries do will matter unless the large emerging economies also are held accountable for their (rapidly growing) emissions (Clémençon 2016:5). And for domestic political reasons (domestic opposition in the Congress), the US has never been in a position to accept an international climate agreement based on binding emissions (Clémençon 2016:5).

For about two decades since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the international negotiations were predicated on the idea that since the developed countries are the ones responsible for the

“lion’s share” of past GHGEs, they should take the burden of addressing climate change (Deese 2017). Thus, the design and direction of the international climate cooperation was focused on specific emission cuts targets for developed countries, whereas the developing countries were left without any commitments - in accordance with the UNFCCC principle of

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“common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) (Bang 2015c:219). However, by the end of the last decade the rigid differentiation between developed and developing countries outlived its usefulness. As the economies of developing countries such as China and India grew rapidly, the US, and other developed countries, could not justify to their citizens an acceptance of limits on GHGEs when major emerging countries were doing nothing. When China overtook the US as the world’s largest GHG emitter in 2007, it became clear that the developed countries could not solve the climate issue alone (Deese 2017). The following section will discuss how the rigid differentiation between developed and developing countries were softened in the negotiations leading up to Paris - in line with the US’ objectives.

3.2.2 The negotiations towards Paris: a new direction and design of the climate cooperation

Since Copenhagen in 2009, most of the developed countries joined the US in demanding that a new climate agreement would apply for all countries - both developed and developing - since many of the developing countries represented increasingly large shares of the total GHGEs (Bang 2015c:219). Picking up the pieces from the failed Copenhagen conference, the Durban conference in 2011 adopted a mandate to “develop a protocol, another legal

instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Conventions applicable to all Parties” (Clémençon 2016:8) (emphasis added). This mandate - called the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action - provided a departure point for a process to be finalized at the 21st COP, which was to be held in Paris. In this, a general consensus emerged that a new climate agreement needed to address: i) a long-term direction and vision for avoiding global warming over 2°C or less; ii) a binding process to periodically review pledges; and iii) a transparent reporting and monitoring on the countries’ national emissions (Clémençon 2016:8).

At the COP in Warsaw in 2013, the countries were invited to prepare and submit “Intended National Contributions” (INDCs) before the COP in Paris, 2015. This marked a key moment in the international climate negotiations. Up until then, there had been an architectural battle between those favoring a top-down prescriptive agreement and those favoring a bottom-up facilitative agreement. The Warsaw decision firmly posited the bottom-up approach

(Rajamani 2016:495). The new mechanism for international climate cooperation would rely on a framework of country-level “contributions” driven by domestic realities (Gerrard and Welton 2014:124). The framing of the contributions - including their coverage, stringency,

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and scope - was to be left solely to the discretions of the countries (Rajamani 2016:495).

Such a bottom-up approach was in line with the US’ objective. In addition, the Warsaw decision - in line with the US’ objective - did not differentiate among the countries and all parties were required to submit their contributions (Gerrard and Welton 2014:124).

The negotiations towards Paris accelerated even further at the COP in Lima in 2014

(Christoff 2016:772). There was awareness among the negotiators that the Lima conference would be crucial for setting the framework for the COP to be held in Paris the year after, where it was anticipated that a new international agreement would be concluded for cutting GHGEs after 2020 (Harris 2016:xxiii). The Lima conference produced the elements of a draft negotiating text for Paris and called for the countries to submit their 2025 or 2030 mitigation contributions (the INDCs) to the UN Secretariat well before the Paris conference would begin in late 2015 (Christoff 2016:772). These pledges would then become part of the new climate agreement to be drafted in Paris (Harris 2016:xxiv). The hope was that this process would facilitate a comprehensive agreement in Paris since the countries’ contributions would already be known (Clémençon 2016:5). The agreement that emanated from the Lima conference - the Lima Accord - did not contain any legally binding requirements for

countries to cut GHGEs. The countries were instead to craft their own pledges for how much each of them would reduce their GHGEs after 2020. In other words, the emission

contributions were to be tailored to the individual circumstances of each country - in line with a long-standing US objective (Harris 2016:xxiv).

The Paris Agreement

The 21st climate conference (COP21), held in Paris in December 2015, was the culmination of the string of conferences that defined the mandate for the Paris Agreement (Clémençon 2016:7-8). The negotiations in Paris in many ways broke new ground in the international climate talks. It ended over two decades of the approach of establishing binding emission reductions (Falkner 2016:1107). After series of repeated failures to produce a global climate agreement on climate change over the past decades, almost all of the world’s countries agreed to the new climate agreement adopted in Paris (Dimitrov 2016:8; Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016:142). The 195 countries committed themselves to an ambitious, long-term mitigation goal of trying to limit the global temperature rise well below 2°C (above pre-industrial levels), and to undertake efforts in trying to limit it to a 1.5°C temperature rise, and to

achieve as soon as possible a peak of global GHGEs (UNFCCC 2016; Wurzel et al. 2017a:8).

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A major strength of the Paris Agreement is its broad participation (Bang et al. 2016:211). It represented a universal agreement to tackle the climate issue. Never before in the 25 years of climate negotiations had there been this kind of momentum from so many countries

(Clémençon 2016:17-18). The Paris Agreement negotiations succeeded in bringing together long-divided protagonist from the developed and the developing world in support of a new climate agreement (Bodansky 2016; Dimitrov 2016; Rajamani 2016) and was seen and applauded as a pivotal event in responding to the climate challenges (Fløttum and Drange 2017:130). In advance of the Paris conference, the countries had put forward their pledges (INDCs - which in the Paris Agreement are referred to as NDCs - nationally determined contributions) for action on climate change mitigation to be undertaken by 2030

(Averchenkova and Bassi 2016:6). Countries at every stage of economic development joined the race (Deese 2017). Every developed country and emerging economies - including China and India - came forward with new climate action plans (Purvis et al. 2015:3). This meant that, unlike in Copenhagen, the countries came to Paris agreeing that they would all have to reduce their emissions in order to meet the climate challenge (Deese 2017). Indeed, the Paris Agreement is the first global agreement on climate change that contains policy obligations for all countries (Dimitrov 2016:2).

The Paris Agreement marked the beginning of a new phase in the international efforts to promote climate mitigation and adaptation (Schreurs 2016:219). It marked a decisive break from the Kyoto regime. Instead of collectively agreed and binding emission reduction targets for (only) developed countries, it established a pledge-and-review system where all countries would offer their nationally determined and non-binding pledges to reduce their GHGEs (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016:142; McGee 2015:138). The Paris approach allows for the countries to determine the level and strength of their own climate contributions. This has been a way for developed countries, such as the US, to weaken the strict differentiation between developed and developing countries on obligations on GHGE reductions (McGee 2015:138). The politics of Paris were clearly different from the previous negotiations. The countries reached political consensus. This was largely driven by the fact that both the US and China took a leadership role and showed commitment and political willingness (e.g., through a bilateral announcement on climate) (Dong 2017:32). This thesis will further explore the US’ leadership role in the Paris Agreement negotiations.

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4 Theory: Domestic policy change theory and leadership theory

This chapter sets out the theoretical framework for the analysis conducted in chapter 5 and 6.

The first main part is dedicated to domestic politics theory, whereas the second main part presents the leadership theory. In both parts, the theories are first discussed at a general level, and then concrete theoretical terms and analytical tools are presented. These terms and tools will be used as point of departure for the later analysis.

4.1 Domestic politics and policy change

An international leadership can be little more than a symbolic leadership when it is not followed up with substantive domestic action (Wurzel and Connelly 2011:278). Thus, the US’ international climate leadership depends on the ability of the US to make credible domestic policy commitments (Bang 2015b:219; Parker and Karlsson 2015). In this thesis, I use domestic policy theory to understand what constraints and opportunities the Obama administration faced in its efforts at domestic climate policy change. For clarification, policy is here defined as an officially expressed intention backed by a sanction - which can be a punishment or reward. Policies are coercive, and can take the form of a rule, a law, a statute, an order, an edict, or a regulation (Lowi and Ginsberg 1998:596). And, climate policy is referring to policy that has the explicit aim and/or significant effort of reducing GHGEs below what they otherwise would be⁷. This definition covers regulations and laws, as well as plans and other non-legal instruments (Averchenkova et al. 2016:12).

First, this part about domestic theory discuss the general constraints and opportunities for policy change in the US, drawing on different theoretical contributions, but primarily on John W. Kingdon’s (2003) policy change theory. Then, I move on to discuss climate policy in particular, and specify key determinants that influence climate policy in the US. The key determinants will be used in chapter 4 to analyze the credibility of the policy pledge that the US brought to Paris (i.e., its INDC).

7The definition also captures policy that may have other primary objectives (e.g., air pollution reduction or energy security) (Averchenkova et al. 2016:12).

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Policy change

Policy change may come about as response to shifts in the political stream⁸, such as changes in public opinion⁹ or in interest group configurations, or as a function of shifts of important participants - i.e., an influx of new legislators in the Congress or a change of the

administration. For instance, the people in and around the government sense a change in the public opinion - i.e., a notion that a rather large amount of people in the country think along certain common lines¹⁰ (Kingdon 2003:146). A shift in public opinion may allow for new policy proposals that have previously not been viable. Consequently, advocates of the newly viable policy proposal find a receptive audience, and an opportunity to push for their ideas (Kingdon 2003:149). In similar ways, decision makers listen to the soundings in the sea of interest groups configurations and anticipate the costs they would pay if those interests were to take on well-organized opposition (Kingdon 2003:152-153). A perception that the balance of support is tilting against a policy proposal may not necessarily prevent that particular proposal from being considered but nevertheless indicates the price to pay for attempting to push the idea forward. Conversely, if the balance of support is tilting in favor of the proposal it allows for the proposal to be pushed forward (Kingdon 2003:150).

Further, policy change may come about when incumbents in positions of authority change their priorities and push new policy agendas; or when the personnel in those positions changes and brings new priorities to the agenda by the virtue of the turnover. A turnover can be a new administration or a shift in partisan or ideological balance in the Congress (Kingdon 2003:153-154). Policy change may also come as a result of battles over turf or jurisdictional disputes between different governmental actors (e.g., between congressional committees and administrative agencies). Jurisdictional disputes often lead to stalemate, but probably at least as frequent, battles over turf actually promote the rise of a policy proposal on the

governmental agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:240; Kingdon 2003:155-157).

All of the actors, not just the politicians, judge whether the balance of the forces in the political stream favors policy change and action. The political stream may both support or

8The political stream is composed of such things as public opinion, campaigns of interest groups, partisan or ideological distribution in Congress, election results, and changes of administration (Kingdon 2003:145).

9Kingdon (2003) uses the term “national mood” for “public opinion”.

10For our purpose, what is important is the fact that policy makers have a strong perception of a certain public opinion, and not whether or not this perception is true (Kingdon 2003:147).

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undermine policy change (Kingdon 2003:163-164). And, the chances of a given subject rising on the agenda are enhanced if it is connected to an important problem (Kingdon

2003:198). Much of the policy process is determined by the coupling of solutions to problems (Kingdon 2003). There are three streams of processes: problems, policies, and politics. Times come when these three streams are joined and combined into a single package: solutions are hooked to problems, proposals are hooked to political momentum, and political events are hooked to policy problems (Kingdon 2003:182, 201-202). Significant change is more likely if problems, policy proposals, and politics are all coupled in one package (Kingdon 2003:20).

The complete joining of all the three streams dramatically enhances the likelihood for a subject to become firmly fixed on the decision agenda. A decision agenda is a list of subjects that is moving into position for an authoritative decision (Kingdon 2003:201-202).

Each of the processes - recognition of problems, generation of policy proposals, and political events - may serve as both impetus and constraints. As an impetus, the items are promoted to a higher agenda prominence. For instance, this could happen when a new administration makes possible the emergence of a new set of proposals. As a constraint, the items are prevented from rising on the agenda. For instance, some items may not rise on the agenda because of opposition of powerful interests, the financial costs, or because the items are less pressing than others in the competition for attention (Kingdon 2003:18). Also, the role of the president can be decisive. No other single actor can change the motivations of such a great number of actors, or focus attention as clearly, as the president (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:241). However, the forces of policy change are not created or controlled by any single individual or group. Rather, they are the results of multiple interactions among: political leaders seeking new issues on which to make their name; agencies seeking to expand their jurisdictions; groups seeking to propose new understanding of issues; and the voters reacting to it all (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:237).

Theoretical predictions as point of departure for empirical analysis

In this thesis, Kingdon’s and Baumgartner and Jones’ theoretical predictions about policy change in the US are used as a point of departure for the analysis of the US’ domestic climate policy leading up to Paris - see chapter 5. Also, the analysis in chapter 5 utilizes theoretical predictions about climate policy in particular. The following sections present the specific theoretical predictions about climate policy and the credibility of climate policy

commitments.

The United States in the Paris Agreement negotiations: international leadership built on fragile domestic ground? A case study of the Obama administration's bid for international climate leadership.