Governance transformed into Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR):
New governance innovations in the Canadian oil sands
Tarje I. Wanvik
DepartmentofGeography,UniversityofBergen,P.O.Box7802,N-5020Bergen,Norway
ARTICLE INFO
Articlehistory:
Received2November2015
Receivedinrevisedform25January2016 Accepted25January2016
Availableonline4February2016
Keywords:
CSR Governance Post-political
Stakeholdermanagement
ABSTRACT
InthecontestedspaceofenergyproductioninCanada,tensionandaseriesofdisputesoverlandand rightshavearisenbetweenthestate,industryandlocalAboriginalcommunities.Canadiangovernments havelongexploitedthebountifulnaturalresourcesoftheland,whileatthesametimeattemptingto reconcileadifficultrelationshipwithitsAboriginal communities. Thiscase studyrevealshowthe governmenthasyieldedresponsibilitytoindustrytoresolvethemanygovernancechallengesofCanada’s extractivehot zone.Throughsubstantialdelegationofgovernancedutiestoindustry,theCanadian GovernmenthasplacedlargepartsofitsregulatorytoolboxinthehandsofmultinationalCorporate Social Responsibility(CSR)departments,andhenceturnedsocial andenvironmental planningand programmingintocorporatestakeholdermanagement.Thisarticlesetsouttoexplainthesedramatic changesingovernancepowerplayandpracticebyexaminingthecaseoftheextractivehotzonein Alberta, accordingtothreedistinctbut interlinkedtrajectoriesin governanceandCSRscholarship, namely thechangefrom “government”to“governance”,theemergenceofaclaimedpost-political conditionandtheevolutionofCSRpracticestowardsstakeholdermanagement.
ã2016TheAuthor.PublishedbyElsevierLtd.ThisisanopenaccessarticleundertheCCBY-NC-ND license(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1.Introduction:GovernancetransformedintoCorporateSocial Responsibility(CSR)
Inboththemanagementliteratureandotherareas,thegrowing body of research into Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) indicates a field that has become rather polarized between proponentsandopponentsofaconceptthatoverthepast20years hasbeentransformedfromanirrelevantandoftenfrowned-upon ideatooneofthemostorthodoxandwidelyacceptedconceptsin thebusinessworld(Lee,2008).Asalways,orthodoxyshouldbe treatedwithcaution,andbyexploringcasestudiesresearcherscan elaborateonandscrutinizetheroleofCSRanditsimplications.
Fordecades,encountersbetweenglobalenterprisesandlocal communitieshavebeenrepresentedingeographical terms,and thisarticleisnoexception.ThecasestudyhereoftheNorwegian oilcompanyStatoilanditsventuresintheextractivehotzoneof Canadaprovidesinsightsintotheworkingsofsocial,materialand historical realities, challenging theimage of CSR and its wider implicationsforsocietalgovernance.
The globalenergy market in general and the extractivehot zones more specifically are fertile ground for governance innovations;hence,theyareexcellentsitesforstudyingemerging
governancepractices.Theactivitiesoftheextractiveindustryhave had a great impact on the social, cultural and environmental realitiesinthesezones(Gamu etal.,2015;LeClercandKeeling, 2015;VeltmeyerandBowles,2014;Virah-Sawmy,2015).Although therehavebeenimmensebenefitsforCanadiansociety,theburden shouldered by local ecosystemsand Aboriginal communities is substantial, which adds up to a prolonged historical conflict between theCrown and itsAboriginal citizensover rights and entitlements (Cairns, 2000; Veltmeyer and Bowles, 2014). The reciprocalarrangementbetweenindustryandgovernmentonthe onehandandlocalcommunitiesontheotherhasbeenobservedto beskewed,withinsufficientcontributiontolocaldevelopmentand fulfilmentofAboriginalrightsandentitlements(Dembicki,2012;
Dow,2012;Foster,2008;Kellyetal.,2010).
Historically,thegovernancestructureofCanada’sextractivehot zones has been dominated by two groups of actors, namely governmentsatalllevelsandindustry(HobergandPhillips,2011).
Hugeeffortshavebeeninvestedbythesetwosectorsindeveloping a previously uneconomic energy commodity (bitumen) into a highly profitable enterprise, resulting in a thriving industrial venture(Sherval,2015).However,thishasnotcomewithoutcost;
bitumen extraction hasreinforced pastgrievances among local Aboriginalcommunities,whichhaveonceagainbeingdeprivedof their hard-earned access to traditional territories (Blacket al., 2014;HusemanandShort,2012;Jamasmie,2014).
E-mailaddress:[email protected](T.I. Wanvik).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2016.01.007
2214-790X/ã2016TheAuthor.PublishedbyElsevierLtd.ThisisanopenaccessarticleundertheCCBY-NC-NDlicense(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect
The Extractive Industries and Society
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s ev i er . c o m / l o c a te / ex i s
To cope with these potentially destabilizing conditions, the Crown has facilitated the emergence of flexible governance innovations, comprised of three tangible measures, namely consultation, environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and impactandbenefitagreements(IBAs)(Griffin,2012;Harveyand Bice,2014;LemosandAgrawal,2006;Reich,2008;Solomonetal., 2008).Thesemeasuresarebasedonthefollowingobjectives.All concernedparties(stakeholders)aretobe(1)consultedandshould makevaluablecontributionstogovernanceprocesses;(2)invited to participate in assessments of planned interventions; and (3) expectedtoreachagreementsbasedoncertainminimumlevelsof consensus,so-called positive-sum games or win–win solutions (Jacobsson and Garsten, 2012).Only throughgovernancestruc- tures based onpragmatic “what works” criteria—the discourse goes—can proper management of the extractive hot zones be exercised(Jones,2008).
Accordingly, industryhasbeendelegatedextensiveresponsi- bilitiesfor theuseofgovernanceinstruments.Consequently,by encouragingcompaniestocomplywithinternationalCSRstand- ards,andbyfacilitating“beyondcomplianceactivities”,theAlberta governmenthasputprivateinterestsin thedriver’sseatofthe governanceframeworkoftheextractivehotzone.
Tounderstandhowthesegovernanceinnovationsemerged,and whattheirimpactandconsequenceshavebeen,wemustexamine recent developments in three different but related strands of thoughtingovernanceandCSRscholarship.Thefirstrelatestothe conventionalshiftfromgovernmenttogovernance,adevelopment characterized by a move from hierarchical, representational government by institutions under majority rule, to more networked, egalitarian stakeholder relations based on alleged consensus(seeforexampleBinghametal.,2005;Braithwaiteand Levi,2003; Jessop,1997; Jones,1998; Rhodes,1997,2007).The second development relates to the first, but goes further by identifyingaradicallyinterpreted,particularpost-politicalcondi- tion,namelytheemergenceofamanagerial,elitistspaceemptied ofpoliticswheredecisionsarebasedonpragmatic“whatworks” criteria (see for example Agamben et al., 2009; Brown, 2005;
Crouch, 2000; Mouffe, 1999, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2005, 2011;
Žižek,1999).ThethirdfeatureistheincrementalevolutionofCSR towards stakeholder management. This change in corporate practices can be viewed as a response to changing governing preferences,together withanincreasedmaturity inCSRimple- mentation, primarily among multinational companies, where traditionalphilanthropic,standardizedandimage-basedCSRhas beenreplacedbyanallegedlycollaborative,performance-driven and integratedpractice (Brammer et al.,2012; Dentchev et al., 2015;PorterandKramer,2006;Schereretal.,2014;Solomonetal., 2008; Visser, 2013). This is in line with what scholars have identified as a more “inclusivebusiness model” (Virah-Sawmy, 2015).
ByfollowingStatoil’s1journeyintothevastprairiesofAlberta,I showhowcompanieshavebecomeanintegral partof thenew governancestructureofCanadathroughtheirpragmaticquestfor a social licence to operate. Multinational companies have encounteredahighlypoliticizedspaceintheextractivehotzone, andfromamixofformalconsultations,corporateself-assessments and bilateral negotiations, we see the emergence of hybrid
governance structures, and more specifically theemergence of governanceascorporatestakeholdermanagement,inwhichindustry playstheleadingrole.
Thisarticleisbasedondatacollectionandextensivefieldwork conductedfrom2014to2015intheextractivehotzoneofAlberta, inaverychallengingresearchenvironmentwhereinformationis difficulttoaccess,andvitalpartsofthegovernancepracticeare
“outofreach”tooutsiders(Jenkinsetal.,2015).Thisparticularcase evolvedfrommygainingaccesstosomevitalkeyinformantsinan operating company (Statoil), a multi-stakeholder institution (CEMA) and some key local communities in the study areaof interest:fromFortMcKayinthenorthtoColdLakeintheeast,and fromMétisCrossinginthewesttoCalgaryinthesouth.Interviews wereconductedwithAboriginal communityleaders,eldersand representatives, government officials, consultants, lawyers and CSRofficersandmanagers.2Fortunately,twoAboriginalcommu- nitiesprovidedaccesstoimportanttraditionallandusestudies.
Additionally,countlesspagesofEIAs,manuals,guidingprinciples, strategiesandSupremeCourtdecisionsonAboriginalrightsand titlewereanalysed.ThisillustrativecaseofStatoilinAlbertacould have been conducted with other companies and stakeholders elsewhereinsimilarcontexts,andservesheretoshedlightonthe pragmatic adaptive processes of companies responding to changing governance preferences in the relationship between theextractiveindustryandsociety.
2.TheextractivehotzoneofConklin,Alberta
TheoilsandsregionofCanadaisprimarilysituatedinthenorth- easternpartof theprovinceof Alberta,untilrecentlyrelatively sparselypopulatedbyvariousAboriginalgroupsofFirstNationsor Métis3 origin.Asinmanyextractionzones,theoil sandsregion encompassestraditionallandsofAboriginalpeople.Today,inthe midst of the Athabasca bitumen area is Conklin, the closest community to where Statoil operates. Conklin is a small communityofMétispeopleinthemunicipalityofWoodBuffalo, Alberta(Fig.1).
Despite its isolation, Conklin is a community that is at the centreoftheoilsandsdevelopment.Here,theMétispeoplehave practised trapping, hunting, fishing and harvesting for over a hundredyears,livingofftheland.Steam-assistedgravitydrainage operations combined with ancillary high-voltage transmission lines and bitumen pipelines have greatly impacted the area.
Accordingtothecommunity,thetraditionalharvestingterritoryof theConklinMétiscoversabout10,000km2,stretchingfromWiau andGristLakesinthesouthtoAlgarandGordonLakesinthenorth (Fig.2)(GolderAssociates,2011).Thetraditionalwayoflifebased onhunting,fishing,trappingand gatheringisquicklybecoming impossible forthe Métisof Conklin (Conklin MétisLocal #193, 2012).
Today, community members find it increasingly difficult to access traditional lands. Old trails have been destroyed or upgradedintoroadsfortrucking,numerousnewseismiccutlines have been created throughout formerly intact lands and long- standingrouteshavebeenrestrictedorblockedbyoildevelopers (ConklinMétisLocal#193,2012:36).Developmenthascauseda rapiddeclineinthenumbersofanimals,berriesandplants,aswell asadecreaseinairand waterquality(ibid:72).Inaddition,the
1StatoilCanadaLtd.(Statoil)developedandoperatestheKaiKosDehseh(KKD) leases,whichcontain morethantwo billionbarrelsofestimatedrecoverable resources.Statoilemploysmorethan800people,withitsheadquartersinCalgary, Alberta.EstablishedbytheNorwegiangovernmentin1972,Statoilhasgrownto becomeoneofEurope’sleadingoilandgascompanies.Thecompanyoperates60%
ofallNorwegianoilandgasproduction(in(VaalandandHeide,2008)),andis Norway’slargestsinglecompanywithanetoperatingincomeofNOK110billionin 2014(in(Statoil,2014)).
2 Someintervieweesremainanonymous,accordingtotheirwishesandingeneral considerationofthevulnerabilityofcertaincontributorstothisstudy.
3 TheMétisarerecognizedintheConstitutionActof1982asoneofCanada’s threeAboriginalpeoples.ThetermMétisdidnothaveaprecisedefinitionuntilthe latterhalfofthe19thcentury,whenitclearlydescribedpeopleofmixedFrenchand nativeancestry.
social and cultural challenges experienced within the small community are devastating, with substance abuse, alcoholism, highcrimeratesandpoorlivingconditionstakingaheavytollofits inhabitants(interviewwith headof ConklinResourceDevelop- mentAdvisoryCommittee,2015).
ThehistoryoftheConklinMétisisamicrocosmofthecomplex history of the Métis (and otherAboriginal peoples) in Canada, which has been characterized throughout modern Canadian historyby recurringcycles ofsettlement,displacement, dispos- sessionanddispersionofMétispeoplefromtraditionalhomelands andmovementstonewlands(ConklinMétisLocal #193,2012).
Theprovinceof Albertaand theregionalmunicipalityofWood Buffalo struggle togovern this complex landscapeof industrial developmentsandtraditionalwaysoflife.
3.Governancetheoriesandcorporateresponses
Inthegovernanceofcomplexsocieties,itappearstobeatruism that there are a multitude of concerned parties. Theories of complexsystemsandnetworkshaverecentlyformedthebasisof appliedgovernanceapproachestotheparticipationofconcerned partiesorstakeholders(Dentchevetal.,2015;Dickenetal.,2001;
HarveyandBice,2014;JacobssonandGarsten,2012;Jones,1998;
Reich,2008;Sunley,2008).Thepartiesinsuchformsofgovernance participate(orareallowedtoparticipate)inthesedecision-making relationalnetworksbecause oftheir“stakes” in theissues that theseformsofgovernanceareintendedtoaddress(Swyngedouw, 2005: 1995). In the following sections, we revisit three basic notions behind the emergence of what I term governance as corporatestakeholdermanagement.Tounderstandthesechanging features of governance, we must examine three different but interrelateddevelopments in the governance and management
literature,combinedwithsubsequentchangesamongCSRpracti- tioners.
3.1.Fromgovernmenttogovernance
Theconceptof“governance”isusedinmanysubdisciplinesof the social sciences. Common elements emphasized are co- operation toenhance legitimacy,the effectivenessof governing societies,newprocessesandpublic–privatearrangements(Kooi- man, 2003).Traditionally, governing is what governments do— theycontroltheallocationofresourcesbetweensocialactors,and provideasetofrulesandoperateasetofinstitutionstodoso.Thus, governinginvolvestheestablishmentofabasicsetofrelationships betweengovernmentsandtheircitizens,whichdifferfromhighly structuredandstate-controlledhierarchicalarrangementstothose egalitarianor“plurilateral”society-drivenonesthataremonitored onlylooselyandinformally,ifatall(Howlettetal.,2009).Inits broadestsense,“governance”isatermusedtodescribethemode of increasedgovernment co-ordinationexercised bypublicand privateactorsintheireffortstosolveproblemsofcollectiveaction inherentingovernmentandgoverning(DeBruijnandErnst,1995;
Klijn and Koppenjan,2000;Kooiman, 2000;Rhodes,1996).The drivingforcebehindthisdevelopmentissaidtobetheincreased recognitionofsocietalcomplexity,andagrowingawarenessthat governments are not the only crucial actor to address major societalchallenges(KooimanandVanVliet,2000).
GovernanceoftheextractivehotzoneofAlbertacanbesaidto beaprocessbywhichanever-widerrangeofactorsisdrawninto governing processes thought to be characterized not by rules, regulations and the exercise of hierarchical authority, but by informal networks claimed to be egalitarian that focus upon partnerships and networks and theblurring of the boundaries betweenpublicandprivatesectors.
Fig.1.ConklinMétiscommunitysurroundedbyindustrialdevelopments(“BylawNo.13/024,RegionalMunicipalityofWoodBuffalo,”2013).
3.2.Thepost-politicalcondition
Although governance hasgained considerableattention and endorsement, an influential group of scholars has strongly criticizeditsallegedcripplingeffectsondemocracyandparticipa- tion(Mouffe,2005;Rhodes,2007;Swyngedouw,2005,2010).As Lemke(2007)pointsout, forallthepositive aspectsassociated withtheshifttowardsgovernance,therearealsoquestionsabout itsabilitytoimprovedemocraticprocesses,notleastabouthowit canpotentiallymarginalizeconflictsbetweengroupsorunderplay contradictionsbetweenpoliticalobjectivesandactions—acondi- tionreferredtoas“post-political”(Swyngedouw,2010).
Thepost-politicalconditionisheldtobeonewherecontesta- tion and conflict are supplanted by consensus-based politics (Butleretal.,2000).CentraltothisviewisMouffe’sdistinction between the “political” as the space of power, conflict and antagonismwithinhumansocieties,and“politics”,describedas
“thesetof practicesandinstitutionsthroughwhich anorderis created, organizing human coexistence in the context of con- flictualityprovidedbythepolitical”(Mouffe,2005:9).
Post-politicalanalysisofferspotentiallyusefulinsightsintothe framingofrecentchangestogovernancesystems,especiallywhat is understood to bewithin theremit of governance, and who engageswithasystemandunderwhatterms(Allmendingerand Haughton, 2012). According to Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw (2010),thenewformsofgovernmentalitythathavearisenoverthe past decades have formed with the consensus—despite often conflictingagendasandlifestyles—thatmanagerial–technological apparatusesshouldpermitthenegotiationofconflictsinsucha
wayastoarriveatmutuallybeneficialpolicyformulations.This amountstocolonizationofthepoliticalbymanagerial–technolog- icalgovernancethathaserasedthegapbetweenthepoliticaland policies,resulting in depoliticization(Oosterlynck and Swynge- douw,2010).
3.3.ChangingCSRframeworks
Thesechangingspacesofgovernancecorrespondwithdevelop- mentswithinthefieldofCSR.Thebasicconceptof CSRisthat corporationsareavitalpartofsociety,andthattheyhaveboththe powerandtheresponsibilitytoconducttheiraffairsinwaysthat satisfynotonlyshareholders,butalsootherconstituenciessuchas employees, customers, theenvironment and the community at large (Eijsbouts, 2011). Since the 1950s, CSR has increasingly becomeabuzzwordincorporate–community relations.CSRhas especiallytakenholdwithinextractiveindustries,firstasatool usedbyNGOstopolicemultinationalminingorenergycompanies operatingintheGlobalSouth(Dupuy,2014;Harvey,2014;Virah- Sawmy, 2015). Later,business gained control over its own CSR activities,leadingtoaproliferationofbusiness-ledCSRinitiatives, concerningboth international CSRstandardsand CSRreporting (Frynas,2005;Harvey,2014).
IntheCSRliterature,theprincipleofvoluntarismispredomi- nantandrequiresresponsiblebusinessactivitiestobevaluebased (Bowenand Johnson,1953),discretionaryandtoextendbeyond legal requirements(CarrollandShabana, 2010;Dentchev et al., 2015; Eijsbouts, 2011; Lee, 2008). Among the many critics of voluntarism, Rajak (2011) states that CSR has evolved from a Fig.2.ConklinMétisLocal#193harvestingarea(basedonGolderAssociates,2011).
movementamongcampaignerstocompelcompaniesto“cleanup their act” to a discourse of unity and partnership led by corporationsthemselves.Describing thehistorical development from activist-oriented naming and shaming of multinational companiestoamoreindustry-led,self-inflictedsocialconscious- ness, Rajak claims that the moral economies of responsibility, generosityandcommunity—andthesocialbondsofaffectionand coercionthatthesecreate—havebecomenottheweaponsofthe weak,buttheweaponsofthepowerful(ibid.).
Atransformativeconceptwithinthiscriticaldevelopmenthas beenstakeholdermanagement,atermfirstcoinedbyFreemanin 1984(2010).Maintaining“alicencetooperate”isperceivedtobea constantchallenge(Harvey,2014;Jenkinsand Yakovleva,2006;
Virah-Sawmy,2015),andfortheextractiveindustries,CSRisabout balancingthediverse demandsof awidearrayofstakeholders, withtheever-presentneedtomakeaprofit(Jenkins,2004).The stakeholdermodelofCSRwasdevelopedmainlybymanagement scholars whowere frustratedby the lackof practicality of the previoustheoreticalmodels.Astakeholderreferstoanyindividual orgroupthatmaintainsastakeinanorganizationinthewaythata shareholderpossessesshares.Furthermore,astakeholderhereis definedasanygrouporindividualthat“canaffectorisaffectedby the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 2010:46). Within the stakeholder framework, the difference betweenthe social and economic goals of a corporation is no longer relevant, because the central issue is the survival and successofthecorporation(Harvey,2014;Lee,2008;Virah-Sawmy, 2015).Survival ofa corporation assuchis affectednotonlyby shareholders, but also by various other stakeholders such as employees,governmentsandcustomers(DonaldsonandPreston, 1995).Jones(1995)correctlypredictedthatthestakeholdermodel hadgreatpotentialtobecomethecentralparadigminthefieldof CSR.
In summary, I argue that the foundation upon which the governanceinnovationsintheextractivehotzoneinAlbertahave been constructed is based on three distinct but interwoven developments: (1) the theoretical and empirical evolution of governanceas a multi-stakeholderapproach that is more than government;(2)thesubsequentcriticalidentificationofwhathas been termed a pragmatic, consensus-seeking, post-political condition;and(3)theparallelemergenceofCSRasstakeholder management.Byadoptingthesetheoreticallensesofanalysisin thefollowing casestudy,Iprovideaframeworktoexplainhow governanceinnovationistakingplaceintheextractivehotzone.
4.Governingtheextractivehotzone
Historically,thegovernancestructureofCanada’sextractivehot zoneshasbeendominatedbytwogroupsofstakeholders,thatis, governmentsatalllevelsandindustry(Rummens,2009).Overthe pasttwodecades,tensionshaveincreasedbetweenlocalAborigi- nalcommunitiesand theCrownbecauseof theproliferationof industrialactivities.The authorities haveexplored a numberof avenues tofacilitate a smooth transitionfor peripheral, heavy- impacted,ruralcommunities, butwithoutmuch success.In the early1990s,severalofthesmallerhamletsintheextractivehot zoneofNorthernAlbertamergedwiththeurbangrowthcentreof Fort McMurray toestablish the regional municipalityof Wood Buffalo.Thedistributionoftheincreasedtaxrevenuesresulting from the merger has been controversial, and several of my informantsreporteda formulathatwas skewedbetweenurban andruralareas:“Thesmallerhamletsbearingtheheaviestburdens [industrial impact] suffer from strong competition for limited public funds and attention” (interview with consultant, 2015).
Withthreeruralrepresentativesonthecouncil,comparedtoseven fromurbanareas,itisevidentthattheopportunitiesareslimfor
remote areas; they are left to their own devices, to fend for themselves:“Thereisagreatdifferencebetweenthecommunities with representation and those of us who have none. Without representationyougetnothing”(interviewwithFortMcKayMétis communityleader,2015).
InandaroundConklin,whereStatoilhasitsactivities,thelevel ofcriticismisrising,pointingtotheabsenceofmunicipalsupport andpresence:
“Theregionalmunicipalitydoesnotdoanything.Wehaveto fightfor everysingleproject;last time itwas themultiplex (communityactivitycentre).Weneeda multiplextogetour kidsoffthedrugsandquitdriftingaroundlookingfortrouble, butwehavehadtofightthemunicipalityateveryjuncture.Not eventhenewlyinstalled waterfacilityis forthecommunity.
Theysellthewatertoindustry”(interviewwithheadofConklin ResourceDevelopmentAdvisoryCommittee,2015).
This critical situation represents a rich opportunity for alternativeactorstofillthevoid,andforalternativegovernance innovationstoemerge.
4.1.Governanceinnovationstosolvetensions
Tocreateamorestablerelationshipbetweenthecomponent partsof theextractivehotzone,thegovernmenthasdeveloped flexiblegovernanceinnovations,withthreerecognizablefeatures, namelyconsultation, EIAsandIBAs. Inthefollowing sections, I elaborateonthegenealogyofthesedifferentgovernanceinstru- ments, and how they can be said to constitute governance innovationreformulated ascorporate stakeholder management.
Eachfeaturehasitsownacademicandjuridicalliterature,butthe scopeofthispaperdoesnotallowmetoengagewithallofthem.
Hence,Iofferonlyabrief,schematicoutlineoftheircharacteristics, beforeelaboratingontheirempiricalmanifestations.
4.2.Thedutytoconsult
AlbertaextractivehotzonesgeographicallyoverlapAboriginal traditionallandsandtreatyareas.Thedutytoconsultistriggered byanapparentviolationofanexistingAboriginalortreatyright recognizedandaffirmedbytheConstitutionAct(1982),orincases where Aboriginalcommunitiesassertrights thathaveyettobe formally recognizedby a courtof lawor treaty(Jacobsson and Garsten, 2012).ThiscommonlawdutystemsfromtheCrown’s fiduciaryobligationtowardsAboriginalpeoplesandSection35of theConstitutionAct(1982),whichareinterrelated(Delgamuukw, 1997; Eyford,2015;Gogalet al.,2005; LawrenceandMacklem, 2000).Anumberofcourtcaseshavedebatedandelaboratedthe infringementsofAboriginalrightsinrelationtonaturalresource extraction, each contributing to the increasingly complex and multifacetedregulatoryenvironment oftheCanadianextractive hotzone(Gogaletal.,2005).
In most cases, this duty toconsult is delegated to industry proponents. Crownpolicy often requires a private company to consultwithadverselyaffectedFirstNationsorotherAboriginal communities (Delgamuukw,1997; Haida, 2004;Sparrow,1990;
Tsilhqot’in, 2014). This delegation is pragmatically justified because the proponent has better insight into project details, and is also best positioned to compensate for infringements (Alberta Government, 2014; Fidler, 2010; Gogal et al., 2005;
Lawrence and Macklem, 2000). This practice of delegation is confirmedand backed bythe SupremeCourtof Canada (Gogal etal.,2005),andisalsosupportedbylocalstakeholders:“Most communities wouldrathernegotiatewithcompaniesthanwith the government or municipality” (interview with consultant, 2015). Although this is partly because of the historically bad
relationshipbetweenindigenouscommunitiesandtheCrown,itis alsobecausethemunicipalityhasnoresourcestospare.
However,theduty toconsultdoesnotapplytoConklinand manyotherMétishamletsbecauseoftheundecidedconsultative statusofMétiscommunitiesinAlberta.4Albertarecognizesaduty to consult with some Métis communities when Crown land managementandresourcedevelopmentdecisionsmayadversely impacttheirtraditional uses. “Currently,theprovince doesnot haveaMétisconsultationpolicybuthasputinplaceaninternal processtoguideconsultationwithMétiscommunitiesonacase- by-case basis where there is a credible assertion of Métis Aboriginalrights”(emailcorrespondencewithcommunityassoci- atedlawyer,2014).
InthecaseofConklin,thefactthatconsultationisdelegatedto industryisimportant:“Ourstakeholderfocusisoncommunities within30kmofthefacility”(StatoilCanada,2007).Industryisless concernedaboutformalitiesregardingAboriginalstatus,andmore worried about pragmatics: who are the stakeholders that can influence, or be influenced by, our performance? “We firmly believethatcommunityconsultationisastartingpointforbuilding thelong-termsustainablerelationshipsweneedforsuccessfuloil sandsdevelopment”(StatoilCanada,2013).
4.3.EIAs
The secondgovernance featurein theAlbertaextractivehot zoneisEIAs.Inpractice,anEIAhasamuchbroaderscopethanthe dutytoconsult,butitcontainssomesimilarcharacteristicsrelated togovernance.Asakeycomponentofenvironmentalmanagement overthepast40years,EIAshavecoincidedwiththeincreasing recognitionofthenature,scaleandimplicationsofenvironmental changebroughtaboutbyhumanactions(Haida,2004).Asforthe dutytoconsult,EIAsaredelegatedtocompanies(Morgan,2012), but are carried out in close collaboration with government agencies.
Environmental disruptions are evident in theextractive hot zones,andlocalstakeholdersreportthematerialconsequencesof theindustrialoperationswithinthezone(ChipewyanPrairieDené FirstNation,2007;ConklinMétisLocal#193,2012).5Thematerial consequencesaresignificantforAboriginalcommunities, which aresurroundedbylogging,exploration,developmentandproduc- tionactivitiesbybothforestryandhydrocarbonindustries:“It’sno use,itwillnevergetbetterorgetbacktothewayitwasbefore.The fishintheriveraregone,thegamehasbeendrivenoutofthese areas,and thefewcatcheswegetaresometimesrotteninside” (interviewwithelder,FortMcKayMétisCommunity,2015).
Thesechangeshaveaffectedsubsistencepracticesandgreatly impactedthefreedomofAboriginalcommunitymemberstomove aboutthelandfortraditionallandusepurposes.Thecommunityis nolongerfreetohunt,trap,fishorgatherberriesandplantsasit was previously (Chipewyan Prairie Dené First Nation, 2007;
ConklinMétisLocal#193,2012;ConnacherInc.,2010).Thelawyer workingcloselywiththeConklincommunityconfirmedthis:
“Although there is no doubt that fewer Conklin residents sustainthemselvesbyhuntingandtrappingthandidsoevenas recentlyas 40years ago,these traditionalpursuits havenot beenreducedtothelevelofhobbies.Mostresidentsstilltake partinhuntingandfishingforfoodaswellasgatheringplants,
herbsandberriesforbothfoodandmedicinalpurposes.Itis actuallythegatheringactivitiesthataremostsensitivetothe environmentaleffectsofdevelopment”(emailcorrespondence withcommunityassociatedlawyer,2014;).
Thismixedindigenouseconomyisinlinewithsimilarfindings by other scholars: “For Aboriginal communities, the mixed economyisdynamicandintrinsicallyboundtotheenvironment, makingthe long-termimpacts of industrialdevelopmentespe- ciallycritical”(LeClercandKeeling,2015:17).
TheStatoilEIAforitsConklinprojectstates:
“Toensureopennessandtransparencyinthecommunity,the companyhasundertakenaregionalEIAthatfullydisclosesthe commercialdevelopmentintheapproximately12townships6 ofbitumenleasesheldbythecompany.ThisapplicationandEIA discloses the development over the life of the project. The regional EIA regulatory approach was developed through consultation with provincial regulatory agencies” (Statoil Canada,2007).
A commonthemein mostscholarlydiscussions ofEIAsis a critique of therationalistmodelof governance,pointing tothe needtoexploreanddevelopmodelsthatembracenewthinking about planning and decision-making processes in their wider social,cultural,politicalandeconomiccontexts(AlbertaGovern- ment,2013).Thishasencouragedthepromotionofdeliberative and collaborative approaches to planning and decision-making processes, including EIAs themselves, such as bringing stake- holders and communities into the processes, emphasizing the importanceofcommunicationasameansofnegotiatingconsensus solutionsthatcapturethevaluesofthoseparticipants,andmoving theprofessionaltechnocratsfromacontrollingroletoafacilitating role in thedecision-making process(Bartlett and Kurian,1999;
Richardson,2005;Wilkins,2003).Thisviewisconfirmedbythe Statoil EIA: “Several of the EIA programs, such as the wildlife monitoringforcaribou,mooseandwolf,weretailoredtoactively engagethelocalstakeholdersand addresstheirspecificissues” (StatoilCanada, 2007). EIAs are commonly criticized for being biasedin favourof proponents,andlackingpeer-reviewed data analysis (Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, 2015; Davidson and MacK- endrick,2004;Fidler,2010;O’Faircheallaigh,2007;Wilkins,2003).
AlthoughStatoil’scariboumonitoringproject hasbeenoneofa rarecollectionofpeer-reviewedEIAprograms,ithasalsobeenthe subject of substantial criticism for being too limited and unscientific(Boutinetal.,2012).
However, an EIA in itself is not constructed to mitigate or mediateenvironmental orsocialdisturbancesofplannedindus- trialoperations.Forthatpurposetherehasbeenaproliferationof EIAfollow-upinitiatives,suchasenvironmentalagreementsand other negotiated agreements, that are intended to reduce the widespread difficulty of ensuring effective follow-up of EIAs regardingbothanticipatedenvironmentalimpactsandtheiractual appearance (Elling, 2009; Wilkins, 2003), as well as to ensure monitoringtopreparefortheunexpected.Inowfocusonthemost commontool inrelationtosocial impactsin theextractivehot zones,thatis,IBAs.
4.4.IBAs
IBAs are privatelynegotiated agreements, typically between extractiveindustriesandlocalcommunities,wherebygovernment isrelegatedtoanexternalobservationalrole.IBAsarecommonly viewedasagreementsthatestablishformalrelationshipsbetween signatories,mitigatenegativedevelopmentimpactsandenhance
4Although,initsJune 2007MétisHarvestingPolicy, Albertaconceded that Conklin is a rights-bearing community with harvesting rights (lawyer,legal analysis,Appendixtotraditionallandusestudies,ConklinMétisLocal#193).
5ThesesourcesaretraditionallandusestudieskindlyprovidedbyChipewyan PrairieDenéFirstNationandConklinMétisLocal#193.Thesourcescontaindata collectedfromeldersinthetwocommunities,basedoninterviews,fieldtripsand
storytelling. 6 Astandardgeographicalunit.
positive development outcomes for Aboriginal communities (O’Faircheallaigh, 2007). The agreements primarily focus on employment and economic benefits, while more recent IBA constructions acknowledge the need for greater flexibility and diversityofcommunity involvementinindustrial decisionsand the need for social and cultural programs, dispute resolution mechanisms, revenue-sharing provisions and environmental restrictions(CaineandKrogman,2010;Diges,2008; Dreyerand Myers,2005;Gibson,2008;SosaandKeenan,2001).
IBAsaresigned betweenextractiveindustriesandAboriginal communitiesinCanadaingeneral,andmorespecificallyinAlberta, to establish formal relationships betweenthem, to reduce the predictedimpactofanindustrialoperationandtosecureeconomic benefitsforaffectedcommunities(Galbraithetal.,2007;Gibson, 2008;SosaandKeenan,2001).IBAsdonotfallunderthepurview ofthestateandthusfallwithina historicallyuncontested,grey areaoflegality,oftenreferredtobylawyersasquasi-legal7(Sosa andKeenan,2001).
Toindustry,theseIBAsrepresentanopportunitytoovercomea complicated situation resulting from the difficult relationship betweenthestateanditsAboriginalpeople:
“Governmentandtheregulatorygovernmentforourindustry;
it’s horrible, and it’sgot a lot of history to it. You have to appreciate that we [industry] are in the middle of this relationship, a nation-to-nation relationship. When they [Aboriginalpeople]arenotbeingrecognized,allofthatcomes intothemixwhenindustrytriestooperate.Andwehaveour own interests in doing things right” (interview with CSR manager,StatoilCanada2015).
Thisattitude resonateswellwithotherpartsoftheindustry, which claim that there may well besome very good business reasonsfortheextractivecompaniesoperatinginfrontierregions towanttopayattentionandcontributetosocialdevelopmentin theirbackyard.Companiesshouldtunetheiroperatingmodelsto help alleviate poverty, generate self-sustaining economic con- ditionsthatwilldrivethecompany’scostsdownovertime,and avoidcommunityunrestandcriminalbehaviour(Harvey,2014:8).
Conklinhasnegotiatedanumberoflong-termagreementswith industry: “These agreements have provided communities with directfundingsupportforphysical,social,andhuman infrastructure, aswellascontractingopportunitiesforcompanybusinessesanda processtoaddressenvironmentalissuesinvolvingfuturedevelop- ments” (email correspondence with community lawyer, 2014).
Clearly,IBAsaverttheissuewithregardtotheconsultativestatusof the Métis, making IBAs arguably the most useful of the three governance features for the Métis communities of Conklin and elsewhere.Since2009,Conklinhastakenanaggressiveapproachto assertingitsAboriginalrights.Thus,theagreementssignedbythe communityarecomparableintheirtermstothosesignedbylocal FirstNationspeople.Theagreementsdonotdealwithcompensation fortheinfringementofAboriginalrights,becausethatisamatterfor whichtheCrowniscompletelyresponsible:“Rather,themoneyand businessopportunitiesreceivedfromindustryareintendedtohelp thecommunity copewithandrespondtothemassivechangethatoil sands activity is imposing on it” (email correspondence with communityassociatedlawyer,2014).
Thisapproachisechoedinthestatementsfromthecompany:
“Weusealotofresourcesinsocialinvestment,andIfeelwe have a good understanding of the situation that way. We operateintheirbackyard,sotospeak,andwanttobeagood neighbour.Wetrytointeract,andcompensatethosewhoare affectedbyouroperationsinanadequatemanner.Therewerea
lotofsocialproblemsinConklin,andmanywerethrilledwhen wearrived”(interviewwithCSRmanager,StatoilCanada,2014).
OnsigninganIBA,anAboriginalgroupacceptsrestrictionsto theexerciseoftheirtraditionalrightsand Aboriginaltitle.They provideindustrywithaccesstotheirlands,andgivetheirsupport to the resource development project. In return, they accept a
“package of measures” that include economic benefits and the minimizationofnegativeimpactsontheenvironmentandpeople.
Additionally,mostIBAscontainprovisionstoensureconsentand co-operationfromtheAboriginalcommunity,andconfidentiality and non-compliance clauses (Caine and Krogman, 2010; Diges, 2008;Gogaletal.,2005;Keeping,1999).Prno(2007)arguesthat Aboriginalpeoplesfindtheseagreementsappealingbecausethey lendlegitimacytoAboriginalclaimstolandandrights(Caineand Krogman,2010).Mostcommunitiesrecognizethattheregulatory processisbiasedinfavourofdevelopment,andcommunitiesseek economicandcontractingbenefitsbecause“thechoicestheyare facedwithareeitherhavingdevelopmentproceedandreceiving somebenefitfromit,orhavingdevelopmentproceedandreceiving nobenefitatallfromit”(emailcorrespondencewithcommunity associatedlawyer,2014).
BecauseofthegreyareaoflegalityconcerningIBAs,there is someambiguityregardingtheclaimedconfidentialitysurrounding these agreements. Some claim that “these agreements are generally kept confidential at the request of industry, since companies view them as business contracts, which under our legislationareentitledtoconfidentiality”(emailcorrespondence withcommunityassociatedlawyer,2014),whileindustryclaims that “Statoil will continue to honour our agreements with communities, and out of respect, that would include their confidentiality”(emailcorrespondencewithCSRmanager,Statoil Canada,2015).AccordingtotheGovernmentofAlberta’sAborigi- nal Consultation Office (ACO), social agreements (IBAs) have nothingtodowiththeirdutytoconsult.Theyareconfidentialin natureandthereisnothingthatcompelscompaniesorcommuni- tiestodivulgethisinformation(emailcorrespondencewithhead ofACO,2015).However,Statoilnoted:“Ouragreementscoverareas suchassocialinvestment,consultation,economicandworkforce development. Our commitmentsare fairlygenericand describe howwewishtoworkwithourcommunities”(emailcorrespon- dencewithCSRmanager,StatoilCanada,2015).“Wereallywantto linkittobusinessrisk.Itismuchmorethanbeingperceivedasa goodcitizenoftheworld,thereisabusinessrationalebehindit” (interviewwithCSRadvisor, Statoil Norway,2015). “If wehave healthierlocalcommunitiesbenefitingfromourprograms,they are more loyal” (interview with CSR manager, Statoil Canada, 2015). These findings resonate well with similar claims from industry:“Suchoutreachprogramscanworkwondersforawhile with people who have known little previously in the way of moderncomforts”(Harvey,2014:9)andpublicservices.
Insummary,therationaleforAboriginalgroupstoenterinto theseagreementsincludesovercomingmarginalization,strength- eningregionaleconomicandpoliticalsovereigntyandincreasing controlofresourcestoensureregionalbenefitflowsreturningto communities affected by development. Resource development proponentshaveanincentivetoenterintoIBAswithAboriginal groupstoobtainconsentfromstakeholderstoaccessthelandfor resource development, obtain labour locally and create a co- operativeworkingrelationship(CaineandKrogman,2010).
5.Conclusion:theemergenceofgovernanceascorporate stakeholdermanagement
Theextractiveindustryactivitieshavehadagreatimpactonthe social, culturalandenvironmental realitiesin theextractivehot
7 Althoughtheymaybecomelegallybindingifthepartiesinvolvedagreetothis.
zone of Alberta in general and in Conklin in particular.
Environmentally,as wellas socially and culturally, the burden shouldered bylocal ecosystemsand Aboriginal communities is substantial, and has added to a prolonged, historical conflict betweentheCrown and its Aboriginal citizens over rights and entitlements. This complex relationship has led to substantial challengesforallstakeholdersintheextractivehotzone.
In response tothesechallenges, thefederalduty toconsult, alongwithprovincial EIAsand locallynegotiated IBAs,haveall been delegated to industry, representing component parts on differentlevelsofanestedgovernancestructure,wherecorporate responsesintheformofCSRand stakeholder managementare positionedasanimportantcentre-piece.Thisdelegationhasbeen legitimizedonpragmaticgrounds,underscoringindustry’sbetter positioningtoconsultthestakeholders,assessitsownimpactand negotiatecompensationandbenefitagreements.Ihaveidentified an interrelated, nested and multiscalar governance structure emergingfromthesefourdistinctgovernancefeatures(Consulta- tions,EIAs,IBAs,CSR)thatcanbeviewedasajointmobilizingeffort by government, extractive industry proponents and Aboriginal communitiestorealizeaworkable,win–winregulatoryenviron- mentintheextractivehotzone(Fig.3).
Theseareallrecognizablefeaturesinthegovernanceregimeof the extractive hot zone, where the emphasis is on a smooth transitionfroma highlypoliticalspace—understoodasMouffe’s spaceofpower,conflictandantagonism—togovernance,orrather processes,instrumentsandnarrativessuchas“multi-stakeholder- ism”, “community” and “partnership” (For elaborations on this issue,seeEyford,2015; Gogalet al.,2005; Kennett,1999).This structure is designed togovern the extractivehot zone, where agreements are claimed to be in the mutual interest, where communities and corporations are rhetorically inseparable and wherethe survivalof a companyand theindustry becomethe commonobjectiveforallstakeholders:“Withouttheoilsands,the community loses everything!” (Fort McKay Métis, 12.10.2015, socialmediaupdate).Hence,notionsofthisgovernancepracticeas apositive-sumgamearereinforced;theconfidentialnatureofthe
IBAsensuresthatthisclaimedmutualinterestisupheld,turning localcommunitiesintosilent,complacentstakeholders.
Consequently,theAlbertagovernmenthasputprivateinterests inthedriver’sseatinthegovernanceoftheextractivehotzoneby encouragingcompaniestocomplywithinternationalCSRstand- ards,andbyfacilitating“beyondcomplianceactivities”throughthe combinationofdelegatingconsultationwithAboriginalcommu- nities tothe companies,ensuring environmental impact(self)- assessments conducted by the companies, and letting the corporations negotiate IBAs bilaterally with the concerned communities. This incremental change in corporate practices canbeviewedasaresponsetochanginggoverningpreferences, wherenegotiations,consensusandpositive-sumgamesakintoa post-politicalconditionarepreferredtopoliticalcompetitionover resources.Thisisbasedonacorrespondingincreasedmaturityin CSRimplementationamong primarilymultinational companies.
Here,traditionalphilanthropic,standardizedandimage-basedCSR hasbeenreplacedbyallegedlycollaborative,performance-driven and integrated practice.However,empirical evidence fromthis casestudyshowsthatriskmanagementremainsthecentraldriver of CSR and stakeholder management. Future research must determinewhetherindustryhastheresourcesandcompetencies tocarrythisacquiredresponsibilityforlocaldevelopmentactively andovertime,andwhathappenswheninvestmentsdryupand industryleaves.
Furthermore, although there may be sound arguments for thisemerging, pragmaticgovernancestructure centredaround CSR (and I humbly believe this article represents one such argument), there are serious pitfalls related to the lack of transparencyandpotentiallyinadequateparticipationofcertain vital stakeholders in the process. These pitfalls are partly reflected in the remaining strongoppositional voices raisedin theextractivehotzone,particularlyamongindigenouscommu- nitiesandinterestgroups(Blacketal.,2014;Dow,2012;Foster, 2008; Le Billon and Carter, 2012; Nikiforuk, 2010). More importantly, this governance cum CSR corresponds with the generaltrendofapost-politicalconditionwithintheextractive hotzoneofAlberta.Wecanpredictsomepotentialshortcomings in the governance structure, particularly from its consent- producingIBAs.Withlucrative,confidentialbusinessagreements waiting at the end of a resource-demanding and tiring governanceprocess,thepossibilityofbiasinfavourofindustry developmentishighamongtheAboriginalcommunitiesinboth consultationsandEIAs.
Theroleofgovernmentasregulatorinthisgovernancetriangle isseverelychallengedbythesebilaterallynegotiated,confidential IBAs between industry andcommunity. A first step towardsa moretransparentprocessshouldbetoestablishtripartiteforums for these negotiations, where the local communities, the municipality responsible for local service delivery and the companysitdowntoagreeonsocialinvestmentneedsandjoint socialprogramming.
However,thevitalimportanceofstakeholderleverageinsuch negotiations also results in increased focus on documenting traditional land use amonglocal Aboriginal communities. This documentation is considered in conjunction with claims of cumulative environmental impact by existing and planned industrial developments: “Monitoring of prospect licensing by thegovernmentandmappingofhistoricandpresenttraditional land use practicesare important partsof our activities today” (interview with consultant, 2015). Together with competence buildingrelatedtonegotiations,theseactivitiesareallpartofthe newrealityofAboriginalcommunities.Hence,thecommunities themselves are calibrating their participatory role in the emerging governance processes in the extractive hot zone to strengthentheirnegotiatingpower.Inthisway,theyunderscore Fig.3. GovernancetransformedintoCSR(author’sowngraphic).
