"For They Have Sown the Wind and They Shall Reap the Whirlwind"
The Politics of Norwegian Wind Factories and Their Implications for Lived Experiences in Saepmi
Shayan Shokrgozar
Master's Thesis in Development, Environment and Cultural Change
Centre for Development and the Environment UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
May 2021
i
Abstract
Over three decades since the publication of the Brundtland Report, the world is witnessing changing patterns in forest fires, hurricanes, temperatures, and biodiversity loss at a pace without a previous analogy. These historical events have led many in the public and private sectors to advocate for a "green" future accomplished through technocratic and
bureaucratic solutions such as transitioning to lower-carbon energy infrastructures, such as wind energy development. By drawing upon fieldwork conducted in the territory of the Southern Saami peoples (in Saepmi), the Åfjord municipality in western Norway, this thesis explores claims of land grabbing, green colonialism, and infrastructural harm. While powerful domestic and international forces, such as the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the European Union, advocate the expansion of wind energy
infrastructures, Saami herders confront pastureland dispossession, while conservationists fear the "industrialization of the mountains." This article explores how the domestic policies for de-carbonization through "electrifying society" and international agreements for trading energy and climate goals interact with socioecological challenges caused by land-use change. By arguing that an Ecomodernist and "green" growth approach has led to the needs of industrial capitalism taking precedence over the lives of human and more- than-human worlds, this thesis explores—following Achille Mbembe—an energy necropolitics in Norway which determines who may live, socioculturally, and who is let die. It concludes that when evaluated within a whole system approach, the assaults inflicted on the environment by industrial-scale lower-carbon energy infrastructures are not unlike conventional energy sources, questioning whether the Fosen Vind project can claim it is producing renewable energy. These findings demonstrate the need for solutions beyond reformist frameworks such as a "just transition" and thus calls for decolonial Degrowth pathways for combating the climate crisis and building a just, equal, convivial, and joyful society.
Keywords: land grabbing, necropolitics, renewable energy, Post-Development, Degrowth, climate change
ii
Acknowledgments
Writing this thesis has been a journey unlike any other. Dozens of people from all walks of life have been a vital part of this work. From my classmates, supervisor, and various research groups who have read and extensively commented on my draft to all the research participants who have taken precious time out of their days to meet with me.
To begin with, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my Supervisor, Dr.
Alexander Dunlap. They have gone above and beyond their responsibilities to help me every step of the way. Whether it was hours-long conversations and phone calls or emails, texts, and audio memos at any hour of the day or night, they had heaps of wisdom to share.
They have taught me not just what kind of a researcher I would like to be but who I want to be as a friend and a colleague. Thank you, Xander.
The research participants in this project have been a crucial part of writing this thesis. They were generous with their time, trusting with the information they shared, and often times vulnerable by opening up. They have invited me to their homes, introduced me to their communities, and at times saved me from precarious situations—whether it was a broken bike or thunderstorm. To protect their identity, I will not name their names, but you know who you are!
My partner, Erika Scheibe—to whom this thesis is dedicated—has been a source of love, comfort, and encouragement through prosperity and adversity. From moving to Oslo to give me company and greeting me with delicious cakes after a long day to accompanying me in fieldwork and reading my drafts, Erika has made this process a joy. Thank you, Boo.
The Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) has been generous in providing me with a monthly stipend, an office, and excellent feedback. Even in the harshest days of COVID-19
restrictions, FNI extended an exception to allow me to use my office. My contact person at FNI, Dr. Tor Håkon Inderberg, has been a mentor and a source of unconditional support, inspiration, and feedback. Thank you, Tor.
The Include research center granted me a scholarship for this thesis and played an essential role as a platform for feedback and encouragement throughout my thesis process. My
iii
fieldwork would not have been possible without their generous support; I am grateful for the opportunity. Furthermore, The Arne Næss Programme on Global Justice and the
Environment, my colleagues, and especially my mentor, Dr. Nina Witoszek, have been like family and the most inspiring setting for exchanging ideas. Nina, Alex, and Martina, thank you for sharing your wisdom and your great company.
The Center for Development and the Environment (SUM) has been a home. I spent enough time at our research center for my friends to tease me about canceling my lease and moving in so I can avoid the unnecessary 900-meter walk to my flat! The text labs have been a constant encouragement and a source of critical dialogue. Tyler and Kristian did an incredible job running the workshops, and my friends, Aggie, Ryan, Camilla, Lars, and Sindre, dubbed the Dream Team, who endured reading my unfinished and unrefined drafts.
My parents, Reza and Raheel, and my brother, Daryoush, have been a source of support, encouragement, and warmth. I would not have had a fraction of the opportunities I have been extended without their love, compromise, and dedication. Though the nature of international politics has kept us apart for many years, their guidance has never ceased to push me in the right direction. I am sending my love to you.
Last but not least, I would like to thank the Stoic Gods for giving me the strength and patience not to moan and complain in the face of hardships in the past couple of years. And to Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, Socrates, and Epictetus for guiding me in my work and life.
iv
Foreword: A Letter to the Reader
Like most middle-class families in Iran's capital city, Tehran, my family often embarked on road trips up north to the Caspian Sea on holidays. Along the way, there is a cozy town called Manjil, known as the "windy city of Iran." It owes this reputation to its position within a cleft in the Alborz mountain range. According to ancient Persian mythology, the mountain range is the dwelling place of the eschatological Zoroastrian figure, Peshotanu.
Manjil is also known as the town where two rivers join to form the splendid Sefīd-Rūd (white river), allowing for a regional economy built on olive groves to flourish. The wind here is harnessed by the Manjil and Rudbar Wind Farm, the country's largest. And the water, by the Sefidrud Dam, formerly known as Shahbanu Farah Dam, named after the last empress consort of Iran before the 1979 revolution.
As a young boy, I was amused by Manjil's landscape and often insisted we make a stop along the way. I relished the opportunity to run in the wind and look into a horizon filled with strange-looking yet amusing wind turbines. Little did I know that one day, I would spend many of my waking hours trying to understand why wind power is growing in prominence and what it implies about our societies. The journey from those childhood days in Manjil to biking within wind "farms" for a month in western Norway was not direct but seen in retrospect, one that is sensible!
Fast forward to 2017. As an exchange student at Linköping University, I spent a semester studying the history, politics, and society of Sweden, which involved a field trip to Saepmi and a South Saami family near Åre. In Åre, we talked about the effects of assimilation policies on Saami culture, language, and tradition. We furthermore discussed how various infrastructural projects in recent years had led to the loss of reindeer pasturelands. I came away from that trip and exchange semester with a desire to live in the Nordics and understand the role of infrastructural development on the lives of nomadic and agrarian communities. So naturally, when the Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM) offered me the opportunity to do precisely that as a Master's student, the decision was obvious.
v
Established during the tenure of Prime Minister Brundtland, in response to the ambitions of the World Commission, SUM was to provide the science necessary for realizing
"Sustainable" Development. This historic backdrop transforms our center, SUM, into an important element in the history of modern climate politics. If that was not enough, SUM is also a result of the absorption of the Council for Nature and Environmental Studies at the University of Oslo. The council came from a tradition of Deep Ecology and counted amongst its members' philosophers such as Arne Næss. The Arne Næss Programme on Global Justice and the Environment, of which I am one the grant holders, is, in many ways, a continuation of that contemplative tradition at SUM.
With my personal history and the tradition of my department in mind, I set off on an effort to write a thesis that drew inspiration from an ecological and contemplative spirit. One that examined the strengths and weaknesses of a technocratic and bureaucratic approach to climate change mitigation while simultaneously being eager to explore alternative futures.
In response to making iteration progress to infrastructures considered "necessary implements for modern life," the philosopher Ivan Illich instead called for research on alternatives to the products that now dominate the world. Such a profound shift requires a new sociocultural framework, perhaps even a new collective understanding of human life.
Following Erik Gómez-Baggethun and through rejecting pragmatism and embracing Romanticism—in its more profound sense of a worldview and not the literary movement—
this thesis argues in favor of creating what the scholar Joan Martinez Alier refers to as concrete utopias.
As Xander, a friend and mentor, once said when assigning a text to our class:
"read it for the barricades, not the bureaucracy"
All my best to you Shayan
vi
Abbreviations
CAS: Critical Agrarian Studies
CBPP: Commons-Based Peer Production CCS: Carbon Capture and Storage CDM: Clean Development Mechanisms CEJ: Critical Environmental Justice
CREE: Community Renewable Energy Ecologies EC: European Commission
EEA: European Economic Area EJ: Environmental Justice
ETS: Emissions Trading Schemes GHG: Green House Gases
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change KLD: Ministry of Climate and Environment
NVE: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate OED: Ministry of Petroleum and Energy
PBA: Planning and Building Act PE: Political Ecology
RES: Renewable Energy Directive TEQ: Tradable Carbon Emissions Quota TLE: Total Liberation Ecology
vii
Table of Contents
Abstract ________________________________________________________________________ i Acknowledgments ______________________________________________________________ ii Foreword: A Letter to the Reader __________________________________________________ iv Abbreviations __________________________________________________________________ vi Introduction: When Growth Takes Precedence Over the Material and Spiritual Worlds _______ 1
Addressing the Climate Crisis ____________________________________________________________ 3 Aim, Objectives, and Research Questions __________________________________________________ 6 The Wind to Blow ______________________________________________________________________ 7 Chapter 1: From Climate Goals to Rotator Rolls: Understanding Norway ___________________ 9
Norway: An Overview _________________________________________________________________ 10 Majority Society in Saepmi _____________________________________________________________________ 11 Energy Transition in Norway ____________________________________________________________ 14
Transnational Commitments ___________________________________________________________________ 16 Norway's Energy Sector ________________________________________________________________ 17
Energy Generation ___________________________________________________________________________ 18 Energy Production Mix and Support Schemes ______________________________________________________ 20 Energy Trade ________________________________________________________________________________ 24 Licensing and Environmental Impact Assessments __________________________________________________ 25 Fosen Peninsula and the Åfjord Municipality _______________________________________________ 28
The South Saami in Fosen ______________________________________________________________________ 28 Åfjord Municipality: An Overview _______________________________________________________________ 29 Fosen Vind __________________________________________________________________________________ 31
Chapter Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________ 32 Chapter 2: Infrastructural Developments and Their Entangled Histories __________________ 34
The Liberatory Potential of Technology ___________________________________________________ 35 The Wind Industry and Indigenous Rights _________________________________________________ 39 Ecological Degradation _________________________________________________________________ 43
viii
Fosen Vind as Infrastructural Brutalism ___________________________________________________________ 44 To What End ________________________________________________________________________________ 46
Chapter Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________ 48 Chapter 3: From Energy Democracy to Anarchist Geography ___________________________ 50
Environmental Justice __________________________________________________________________ 51 A Few Notes on Decolonial Literature ____________________________________________________________ 52 Energy and Environmental Justice _______________________________________________________________ 53 Political Ecology and Critical Agrarian Studies ______________________________________________ 58
Land Grabbing, Green Grabbing, and “Land-use Change.” ____________________________________________ 59 Direct Action and Political Ecology _______________________________________________________________ 60
Chapter Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________ 62 Chapter 4: Conducting Fieldwork and the Implications of Research ______________________ 64
Positionality __________________________________________________________________________ 65 Ethical Considerations __________________________________________________________________ 66 Research Methods, Participants, and the Site _______________________________________________ 67 Participant Observation _______________________________________________________________________ 67 Unstructured Interviews _______________________________________________________________________ 69 Semi-structured Interviews _____________________________________________________________________ 70 Surveying ___________________________________________________________________________________ 70 Research Participants _________________________________________________________________________ 72 Reflections on Qualitative Study _________________________________________________________________ 72 Site Selection ________________________________________________________________________________ 73 Limitations ___________________________________________________________________________ 76
COVID-19 ___________________________________________________________________________________ 76 Language Barrier _____________________________________________________________________________ 77 Duration ____________________________________________________________________________________ 77
Chapter Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________ 78 Chapter 5: The Necessity of Wind Power and What Cultural Patterns May Live ____________ 79
Creating Surplus Value _________________________________________________________________ 81 Energy Transition ______________________________________________________________________ 82 Local Developmental Projects ___________________________________________________________ 86 Jobs _______________________________________________________________________________________ 87
ix
Chapter Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________ 89 Chapter 6: Wind Power Conflicts and What Cultural Patterns Are Left To Die ______________ 91
Participation, Responsibility, and Procedural Justice ________________________________________ 91 Saami Struggles for Liberation and Land Rights _____________________________________________ 95 Is It Possible to “Co-Exist?” _____________________________________________________________________ 96
Conservation of Nature ________________________________________________________________ 99 Public Opinion and the Controversial Nature of the Projects _________________________________ 102 Chapter Conclusion ___________________________________________________________________ 106 Chapter 7: What Awaits Beyond the Church of Technology ____________________________ 108
Degrowth and Post-development _______________________________________________________ 109 What is Renewable Energy ____________________________________________________________ 112 Ownership _________________________________________________________________________________ 114 The Technology Element _____________________________________________________________________ 118
Chapter Conclusion ___________________________________________________________________ 122 Conclusion: From Bureaucracies to Barricades ______________________________________ 123
Gone With the Wind __________________________________________________________________ 123 Conclusion __________________________________________________________________________ 124 References___________________________________________________________________ 130 Appendices ____________________________________________________________________ a
Appendix I ____________________________________________________________________________ a Appendix II ___________________________________________________________________________ b Appendix III ___________________________________________________________________________ c Appendix IV ____________________________________________________________________________ f
x
For Erika, whose love has been a source of encouragement in prosperity and adversity
Conducting fieldwork in the Fosen Peninsula, August 2020
1
Introduction: When Growth Takes Precedence Over the Material and Spiritual Worlds
People live here [the Åfjord Municipality] for more or less one main reason—in my opinion—because it is so lovely to live here. It is so splendid to wake up in the morning and hear the birds down by the sea, to watch the moon right above these untouched mountains, like God created them. And now we [at Åfjord] go fucking that up … I often lose my temper when I discuss this issue with people that think this [Fosen Vind project] is a good thing. And, I could have lived with this if it was for the better good, but it is not. All they [companies] do is to rape Mother Nature around us, everywhere.
– Heimdall1, A conservation activist in Åfjord
As we enter the third decade of the 21st century—almost 60 years since the publication of Rachel Carson's (2002/ 1962) groundbreaking book, Silent Spring, and over 30 years since Our Common Futures (UN, 1987)—earth's climate continues to undergo a rapid change in
"a state without previous analogy." (Crutzen & Steffen, 2003, p. 253). Forest fires and hurricanes are growing in strength and frequency, and record-breaking temperatures are exceeding Yesteryear expectations one year after another (Wallace-Wells, 2019). It is common to encounter articles documenting how climate change is leading to birds "falling out of the skies" (Weston, 2020) and plummeting insect numbers threatening the collapse of nature (Carrington, 2019). Human and nonhuman animals are living through a period in earth's history that many scientists describe as the Great Acceleration, comprising "the most rapid transformation of the human relationship with the natural world in the history of humankind." (Steffen et al., 2015, p. 82). Others describe it as the age of the
Anthropocene2, which in no small part is a result of "an unprecedented upsurge in energy
1 All research participants in this thesis have been assigned pseudonyms to anonymize their information. See Appendix I for a list of names and more information on research participants
2 See conclusion for a nuanced discussion of the Anthropocene
2
mobilization: first with coal, then with hydrocarbons and uranium" (Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2017, p. 9). These events impose the threat of long-term severe environmental concerns leading to anthropogenic climate change, ozone depletion, and ocean acidification, threatening the lives of humans and more-than-human worlds, leading to catastrophic effects on societies and ecosystems (Wallace-Wells, 2019).
The onset of the Anthropocene and its associated climate events have heightened the necessity of confronting the climate crisis. As a result, numerous international agreements, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC, 1992), were implemented through the Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1997) and later superseded by the Paris Agreement (UN, 2015a). These agreements acknowledged that climate change is taking place, CO2 is the leading cause, and the parties to the agreement are willing to reduce their emissions. The reduction in emissions is primarily carried out through carbon capture and storage (CCS), tradable carbon emissions quota (TEQs), and clean
development mechanisms (CDMs) (Anker, 2018). These developments should come as no surprise, as some of the most prominent scientists, such as a member of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), report that to limit increases in global temperatures to 1.5°C—compared to pre-industrial times—80% of our energy must be produced through renewable sources by 2030 (IPCC, 2018). Alongside the IPCC, to address concerns regarding the environmental and political issues surrounding conventional energy sources, many policymakers (e.g., Ministry of Climate and
Environment, 2020) and Environmental Non-governmental Organizations (ENGOs) (e.g., Bellona, Zero) advocate for a transition to renewable energy sources.
Ever since the Brundtland administration, Norway has been a key player in international climate diplomacy through a technocratic and bureaucratic approach. This thesis explores why Norway has embarked on expanding its lower-carbon energy infrastructures in addressing the climate crisis by studying the Fosen Vind project. In the following paragraphs, this chapter will set the stage for understanding climate change mitigation efforts in recent years, describe the aim, objectives, and research questions of this thesis, and provide an overview of the upcoming chapters.
3
Addressing the Climate Crisis
As the historical event associated with climate change unravels, Norway seeks to be the
"driving force" for environmental change (Ministry of the Environment3, 1989). Prime Minister Brundtland, for example, established a foreign policy agenda of making Norway the country that will chart the path to a sustainable future and, according to the state secretary, Jan Egeland, cement "Norway as a humanitarian superpower" in the world (quoted in Østerud, 2006, p. 303). Fast forward a few decades, and Oslo being crowned by the European Commission (EC) as the green capital of Europe in 2019 should come as no surprise (EC, 2019a).
Much of this effort towards a "green" and sustainable future was established by employing lower-carbon energy infrastructures, investments and research in carbon capture and storage, and implementing carbon taxation. This was the start of what is now known as the Green Economy (Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2017), which seeks to further human well- being and growing income "while significantly reducing environmental risks and
ecological scarcities" (UNEP, 2011, p. 16). The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), along with Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank, are three of the foremost proponents of "green" growth. As
summarized by Hickel & Kallis (2019), these entities, despite disagreeing on certain subtleties, believe that "technological change and substitution will improve the ecological efficiency of the economy, and that governments can speed this process with the right regulations and incentives." (p. 2).
The proponent of sustainable development and "green growth" has often been argued that the economic, social, and environmental poles can be negotiated alongside one another (Asafu-adjaye et al., 2015). In attaining this effort, the corporate world has added a "green"
division to its structure, celebrating ecosystem services, which many critics argue has transformed the natural world into a mere financial commodity (Sullivan, 2013; Bonneuil
& Fressoz, 2017). The institutions that pursue the ideology of "green" growth and
3 Now referred to as the Ministry of Climate and Environment or Klima- og miljødepartementet (KLD)
4
"sustainable" development are encouraged and spearheaded by a vocal group of people called Ecomodernists. The Ecomodernists, in their widely distributed manifesto, call for a technological and innovation-based response to the climate crisis (see Asafu-adjaye et al., 2015). Ecomodernists advocate for the movement of people into cities to allow for less land use. They furthermore call for modern energy infrastructures (including nuclear energy) to decouple development from nature. Moreover, they call for the preservation of
"wild nature for aesthetic and spiritual reasons" (p. 27)—describing meaningful climate mitigation as "fundamentally a technological challenge" (p. 21). Ecomodernists believe significant government spending to fund the research necessary for making the crucial technological breakthroughs required in these times is essential (Kallis & Bliss, 2019).
These technological, financial, and innovation-based developments, advocated by some of the most prominent institutions globally, have come instead of social and ethical
alternatives for transforming societies and human life. For example, socioecological alternatives such as Degrowth and Post-development, which call for a reorientation of life around less energy and material throughput, have been pushed to the wayside (see chapter 7). Degrowth, Hickel (2020) argues, is "a planned reduction of energy and resource
throughput designed to bring the economy back into balance with the living world in a way that reduces inequality and improves human well-being" (p. 2). Degrowth, unlike limits to growth that came before it, "emerged largely via grassroots activists critical of
globalization and capitalism, who lived and advocated simpler living" (Demaria et al., 2019). Degrowth aims to work towards disaccumulation, decommodification, and
decolonization (Hickel, 2020). Deep Ecology and Degrowth come from similar critical and radical traditions; one could argue that Degrowth is the continuation of the spirit of Deep Ecology (Dunlap et al., in preparation).
Norway's decision to sideline Deep Ecologists and pursue a bureaucratic response stem from how Norwegian politicians, starting with the Brundtland administration, increasingly looked to technology to be both a climate pioneer and petroleum producer (Anker, 2018).
The Norwegian philosopher, Arne Næss, and other Deep Ecologists described these
"green" growth efforts as a form of shallow ecology which consists of "a reform oriented, technocratic outlook that seeks accommodation with the existing corporate economic and
5
interest-group political system." (Somma, 2006, p. 37). The debate amongst those who favor social and ethical modifications to our lives and societies and those who think more technology will solve the problems caused by technology goes back many decades. The Club of Rome and their publication Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1974) is one event that brought this debate to the forefront.
In the midst of these transformations, infrastructure has turned into a critical political question. According to Wakefield (2018), there are two paradigms of liberal infrastructure;
the first is "modern infrastructure and its project of mastery, order, progress, and the second, contemporary paradigm of infrastructures of resilience, ruins, and survival" (p. 2).
Technological efforts, at their core, consistently face the dangers of unintended side effects such as solving one problem while creating another—known as the hydra effect (Kerschner et al., 2018). This includes deployment in ways that harm others or exert power over them.
Thus many scholars, especially within the Degrowth and Post-development tradition, call for a conscious minimization of technology use in our lives (Kerschner et al., 2018). One such technology is industrial-scale lower-carbon energy infrastructure, of which wind energy is one. As Stephens and colleagues (2008) point out, the past few decades have witnessed an immense focus on economic and technical elements of lower-carbon energy;
however, the social and political factors have been less thoroughly explored. The lack of research has led to resistance towards deployment and lower than expected new energy generation (Betal, 2018). In Norway, for example, Buen (2006) argues attempting to
develop a wind industry has been a significant problem due to a lack of local acceptance, as almost every NVE approval immediately received numerous challenges, including from local ad hoc NGOs (also seen Blindheim, 2013).
In the face of the climate crisis, this thesis evaluates Norway's cost of confronting the climate crisis by examining the new wind energy development in Åfjord municipality in western Norway. It will investigate how wind energy implementation came to be and what they mean for the local community. With its long tradition of environmentalism, Norway, and the Åfjord municipality, being located in indigenous territory, is an illustrative case for studying the costs of a technological and innovation-based response to the climate crisis, as opposed to one based on the principles of a Degrowth Society.
6
Aim, Objectives, and Research Questions
This thesis is titled after Hosea 8:7, symbolizing how mistakes backfire in multiples; just as a kernel corn leads to a new ear, so does the wind transform into a whirlwind. The verse captures the spirit of our modality, which prioritizes growth and accumulation over the human and more-than-human worlds (Sullivan, 2013; Sullivan, 2017). On the one hand, Norway is praised for being an international pioneer in human rights and environmental standards, and still, on the other, it has consistently received criticism for its position on Saami4 rights by various international bodies (e.g., Anaya, 2011). Nilssen (2019) claims that within Norway, "objections raised by the Saami appear to be treated like background noise" (p. 172). The Fosen Vind project in Åfjord has led to numerous lawsuits, including a forthcoming hearing by the Norwegian Supreme Court on Saami land rights after the court of appeals ruled that the wind factories in Fosen mean the South Saami pasture land is "lost as a late winter grazing area" (NTB, 2021). The Roan and Storheia wind "farms" each comprise 30% of the northern and southern reindeer herding district's winter pasture (Stranden, 2021).
Following a thorough investigation—consisting of participant observation, 15 semi- structured and a dozen informal interviews, windshield surveying, and desk-based research—this research aims to investigate claims of infrastructural harm, green colonialism, and land grabbing concerning wind energy development in Saepmi. Its objectives consist of examining whether touting utility-scale wind energy development as the solution to the climate crisis has failed to see it as a source of social fragmentation and ecological and climate degradation. Furthermore, the thesis evaluates whether "energy transition" through a fair and equitable process—often referred to as "just transition"—has been attained in the Fosen Vind projects. Finally, given Fosen Vind's transnational
connections and Norway's international energy commitments, it seeks to evaluate the links between international energy commitments and climate goals with land-use change.
4 A group of diverse indigenous peoples who historically occupy an area in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia referred to as Saepmi.
7
Through balancing the socioecological outcome of the Fosen Vind project and investigating public perceptions of the project, this thesis asks:
1. What has led to the existence of the Fosen Vind projects? And what does it imply for the Åfjord municipality?
Furthermore, this thesis argues that an uncritical acceptance of "renewable" energy production may lead to deceiving the public, concealing harms, and misguiding
environmental policy. However, given Illich's (2001/1973) call to "guard against falling into the equally damaging rejection of all machines as if they were works of the devil" (p.
14), and following Dunlap's (2021a) call to study "how humans can reconnect and develop alongside pre-existing patterns and cycles of renewable energy flows" (p.15), this thesis also asks:
2. What is renewable energy? And can Fosen Vind claim they are generating it?
Inspired by Kerschner and colleagues (2018) and the fieldwork findings, this thesis calls for a prosperous, just, equal, convivial, joyful, and sustainable society in solidarity with human and more-than-human worlds and following the values of a Degrowth Society.
The Wind to Blow
This thesis begins its efforts by exploring Norway's unique energy politics, economics, and history. Chapter 1 provides an overview of Norway and Saepmi. It then discusses the various legislations, debates on energy, and the structural setup that shapes Norway's energy sector, especially following the Norwegian Energy Act of 1990. Chapter 1, furthermore, describes some of the regional energy markets and transnational incentives, such as the Green Certificates market with Sweden. Chapter 1 then provides a brief overview of South Saami history and the various important events that have taken place within Saepmi in the previous decades before finally introducing the Åfjord municipality.
Following a discussion on various issues such as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and licensing, Chapter 2 explores the history of energy infrastructures globally. Next, it delves into topics regarding the social and political implications of infrastructural development and "energy transition," discussing infrastructural harms, internal
8
colonization, and the consequences of a technocratic and bureaucratic response to the climate crisis. Finally, chapter 2 will also reflect on Saami land rights and the history of energy development in Saepmi.
Chapter 3 directly connects socioecological struggles to theories and literature stemming from the disciplines and subdisciplines of Political Ecology, Environmental Justice, and Critical Agrarian Studies. It questions the role of the state in inflicting infrastructural harm and managing its consequences. Chapter 3 furthermore discusses the importance of
decolonial literature for Environmental Justice and direct action for Political Ecology.
Finally, chapter 3 reflects on land grabbing and green grabbing by drawing inspiration from Critical Agrarian Studies.
Chapter 4 begins with a reflection on my positionality and subjectivities. It then evaluates the role of research in society and reflects upon historical sensitivities to consider in working within Saepmi. Chapter 4 also describes the details of the fieldwork, such as the interviews, surveying details, and data analysis. It finally points out some of the limitations present in this project.
Chapters 5 and 6 are the findings of the fieldwork and interviews. They prioritize offering research participants the space to make their case and speak to the issues they care about.
The chapters are similar in structure and layout; however, they are thematically different.
The former is dedicated to understanding which forces and voices are strengthened by Fosen Vind, such as the developmental projects and the jobs. The latter focuses on the forces and cultural patterns that the wind factory weakens.
By drawing from the literature, history, and the findings, Chapter 7 offers a critical
engagement with the understandings established and offers alternative futures to the current modality. It explores Degrowth movements and how they can be implemented for
providing a more convivial path to socioecological sustainability. Chapter 7 will explore various forms of ownership, new socioeconomic priorities, and how energy technologies can be reconfigured to serve people in attaining solidarity and kinship.
Finally, the conclusion will summarize the chapters, reflect on some of the most important themes discussed in this thesis, and directly address the research questions.
9
Chapter 1: From Climate Goals to Rotator Rolls:
Understanding Norway
The climate crisis knows no borders. That's why we, as the European Union, along with our closest partners, will continue to lead the global work to combat it. Only by working together can we live up to our responsibilities to promote peace and
stability, protect our planet, and ensure that future generations do not pay the highest price.
– Federica Mogherini, Norway's representative for Foreign Affairs
The introductory chapter briefly described the essential elements of this thesis while situating the importance of Norway in the international climate change mitigation discourse.
Addressing the objectives of this thesis—which, among others, consists of examining whether industrial-scale wind energy development is a source of social fragmentation and ecological degradation—can benefit from developing an understanding of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which follows Norway's Planning and Building Act (MPE, 2008) and licensing processes. The former is carried out by the developer, and the latter by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE). Moreover, a reflection on Norway's climate goals, which consist of an effort to be carbon-neutral by 2050, can further assist in understanding the role of wind energy and the objectives of this thesis.
Furthermore, Norway's climate change mitigation manifests itself within Norway's energy sector, which has undergone significant modifications since the Norwegian Energy Act of 1990, yet another crucial aspect. Similarly, international commitments (e.g., EU Energy Directive) and markets (NordPool) affect national policies, leading to new targets. Finally, understanding the history of Åfjord as a municipality, its politics and decision-making structure, its main industries, and how local companies and businesses have been involved in the project will help better understand the coming chapters. However, to begin with, this chapter will provide a brief overview of Norway and Saepmi.
10
Norway: An Overview
Norway is a Nordic5 country with a population of 5.3 million inhabitants (SSB, 2018), about half of whom live in the far south region, near Oslo (Britannica, 2021). Nearly half of Norway is covered by mountains, plateaus, and bogland (SSB, 2020a), with long coastlines, fjords, and about 50,000 islands, making Norway an ideal country for wind energy development.
Economically, crude oil and natural gas comprise the largest chunk of Norway's exports, currently accounting for over 40% of Norway's exports, followed by the Fishing industry, comprising nearly 15% of Norway's exports (SSB, 2020a). Norway's GDP per capita is among the highest globally, 51% above the EU average in 2018 (SSB, 2020a). Over the past 30 years, Norway has had a surplus trade balance, mainly due to exporting crude oil and natural gas. In 2018, EU countries and the UK accounted for 80% of Norway's exports, with Nordic countries, UK, Germany, and the Netherlands being some of the most
important trade partners (SSB, 2020a). These variables are amongst the reasons which have allowed Norway to maintain the Nordic Welfare model, universal healthcare, and a
comprehensive social security system, with the world's largest pension fund, currently at about 11 144 trillion NOK (NBIM, 2021), while maintaining a high level of
competitiveness in the international markets (Einhorn & Logue, 2010). Furthermore, as Einhorn & Logue (2010) point out, a robust civil society, values of Scandinavian popular movements, such as agrarian and labor movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have played a key role in allowing Norway to maintain the Nordic Welfare model while remaining competitive in the international markets.
Politically, Norway is a constitutional monarchy with a single legislative house, called Stortinget, consisting of 169 elected members. Norway drafted its constitution in 1814, around the time it left a centuries-long forced union with Denmark. Soon after and following a 14-day war, Norway entered into a 91-years-long forced union with Sweden, which only dissolved in 1905. Traditionally, Norway has aimed for national sovereignty
5 Along with Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland
11
and state control of industries and resources, owning approximately 30 percent of the Oslo stock exchange market value (NFD, 2014). More recently, in the past two decades,
however, transnational capital has grown more influential in setting the policy agenda (Skjærseth & Jevnaker, 2018). Norway's political economy falls within the Varieties of Capitalism Theory, more specifically a coordinated market economy (Skjærseth &
Jevnaker, 2018); which is "characterized by institutions that promote strategic interaction among firms and other actors, informal contracting in the legal system, high rates of
unionization, equal income distribution, incremental innovation and policies that encourage collaboration among firms" (Skjærseth & Jevnaker, 2018; p. 148). These facets are
witnessable to various degrees within the set-up of Norway's emerging wind energy industry and the Fosen Vind project, which is joint among three entities.
This political, economic, and social backdrop is the foundation on which the emerging wind industry is built. Alongside the Norwegian nation, Norway is also a land to the Saami peoples, with the Norwegian population living together under a sovereign Norwegian state.
However, this co-existence has not been without its challenges (Normann, 2020).
Majority Society in Saepmi
Those peoples [Saami6 herders], who do not wish to leave the nomadic life, must necessarily stay at a lower cultural level, give way to the more civilized, settled peoples and finally, after a slow decline, die out.
- Knut Olivecrona, Swedish Supreme Court Justice, 18867
In recent centuries, starting with discovering the Arjeplog silver mine in modern-day Sweden in the 15th century, a new process developed which irreversibly altered Saami societies. This discovery of the mine followed other mines and the use of forests for timber, control of waterways through damming for hydropower facilities, military practice zones, cabins, and now industrial-scale wind parks. In Fosen, before the Fosen Vind project, there
6 The indigenous Saami peoples are often spelled as Sámi or Sami, but Saami is the closest spelling to the South Saami language, which is most directly connected with this thesis
7 (Lawrence, 2014, p. 7-8)
12
were artillery ranges built in the '70s in grazing areas (Nilssen, 2019). Reindeer herding, which is at the heart of Saami culture, has not been immune to these developments due to conflicts over land and natural resources (Lawrence, 2014). Many South Saami believe reindeer herding is an essential carrier of their culture, and the loss of pastureland is a threat against the entirety of their culture (Nilssen, 2019).
The indigenous Saami, with a few exceptions, such as parts of Finnmark County, are a minority population in Saepmi; this has been brought about by a combination of forced migration, settlersim, and assimilation, among other colonial policies (Kuhn, 2020).
Furthermore, as pointed out by the Saami legal scholar, Øyvind Ravna, unlike the North American context, which consisted of treaties between settlers and the native peoples, in Saepmi, there were no such treaties. Thus, the nation-states expanded into Saami areas over time (Kuhn, 2020).
Norweginization, which aimed to transform the Saami peoples into a culturally and ethnically uniform Norwegian population, was carried out from the 1850s until the end of the second world war, during which time assimilation was an official state policy (Minde, 2003). Since there is no overall registration of the Saami population, their exact population is unknown; however, estimates suggest approximately 80,000 people, with about half living in Norway. The South Saami, who primarily live in Trøndelag County8, are affected by the Fosen Vind project and have an estimated 2,000 people (NOU, 1984).
Despite being considered an international pioneer in human rights, Norway has consistently received criticism from various UN bodies for its position on Saami issues (e.g., McGwin, 2020; Anaya, 2011). Thus, a combination of Norwegian politics, history, and society, alongside its internal colonization9 of the Saami peoples (Fjellheim, 2020), make Norway a context that can test the strengths and weaknesses of the efforts towards a "just transition"
as a response to the climate crisis—providing the backdrop on which Norway's climate goals should be considered.
8 Trööndelage in Southern Saami
9 See chapter 2
13
Norweginization and the continuation of unique struggles faced by the indigenous Sami have led to three contemporary processes in Norway. Firstly, it has led to the creation of the truth and reconciliation commission. Furthermore, it has intensified conflicts between Norwegian commitments to mitigate climate change and Saami rights to cultural survival.
And finally, Norway has turned into a setting for debates on the decolonization of the academy (Normann, 2019). The development of wind power comes into direct interplay with the second process.
The Sami act of 1987 (regjeringen, 2007, n.p.) was enacted in response to some of these struggles. It is meant to enable "the Sami people in Norway to safeguard and develop their language, culture, and way of life." It established the Sameting (Saami Parliament), elected by the Saami peoples, which has an advisory role and not a regulatory one, allowing the Saami the "opportunity to express an opinion" for other public bodies to consider. The act also afforded the Saami language an equal status to the Norwegian language and led to the development of the Saami flag. Finally, an annual report from the Sameting is sent to the King (regjeringen, 2007). In 1997, King Harald V of Norway officially apologized for policies of Norweginization while standing before the Norwegian Saami Assembly, stating:
Today, we must apologise for the injustice previously inflicted upon the Sami people by the Norwegian authorities—through a hard assimilation policy. The Norwegian State, therefore, has a particular responsibility for facilitating the Sami people's ability to build a strong and viable society. This is a historical right based on the Sami's presence in their cultural regions, which stretches far back in time.
(Dahlmann, n.d., n.p.)
Thus with (1) the Saami Act, (2) Norway becoming a party to the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169) through the Finnmark act of 2005, and (3) the official royal apology, there is now a new backdrop to assess Saami participation in new energy
development projects. Ones that compared to earlier struggles such as the Alta Conflict (see chapter 2) have a new legal, social, and political weight around them.
14
Energy Transition in Norway
Norway has been an essential part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992), the Kyoto Protocol (1997), and the Paris Climate Agreement (2015). Norway's climate policy measures are incremental and rely on
technological innovations and financial tools (Skjærseth & Jevnaker, 2018). As a result of these agreements along with EU commitments, over the past three decades, Norway has embarked on an effort to use lower-carbon energy infrastructure, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), and carbon taxation to transform into a lower-carbon economy as a response to the global climate crisis. According to the Ministry of Climate and the Environment (KLD), the main elements within Norway's climate policy are cost- effectiveness, carbon taxes, solutions abroad, and research and innovation within lower- carbon technologies for domestic purposes (Hübner, 2019). The Polluters Pay principle is a central element in Norway's climate framework as taxes on mineral oil, and petrol was introduced in 1991, and CO2 taxes on natural gas and LPG went into effect starting in 2010 (Hübner, 2019). A large part of the efforts, however, have been placed abroad, as the energy use domestically has been on the rise, so have domestic emissions, primarily due to offshore oil and gas production, which has lead to an 83% increase since 1990 (Skjærseth
& Jevnaker, 2018). As Anker (2018) points out, much of the beliefs about carbon taxes, trading carbon, and technological solutions is a central part of Norwegian (official) thinking towards reconciling patterns of growth, Petro-fueled wealth, and consumption with its "Green" and Nordic profile. In this regard, wind power is no exception.
Despite this rise in domestic emissions, by the year 2050, Norway aims to be a carbon- neutral country. To accomplish this goal, Norway must study the roles of the national energy mix, the national energy balance, and the expected energy consumption growth.
Given Norway's on-shore energy mix, which is almost purely based on lower-carbon infrastructure, ambitious targets to increase their share in the mix will not necessarily contribute to meeting domestic targets for reducing Green House Gas (GHG) emissions (Blindheim, 2015, p. 208). Almost all of Norway's on-shore electricity use is already based on lower-carbon infrastructure, in large parts, thanks to a long tradition of using
hydropower. Simultaneously all the offshore energy used for oil and gas production in the
15
North Sea is based on fossil fuels. Blindheim (2015) points out that if Norway wants to reduce its domestic emissions, it must consider using its surplus energy in oil and gas fields in the North Sea instead of exporting it. Blindheim (2015:231) argues,
[T]heoretically, approximately 25% of the carbon-based consumption on the production platforms could be replaced with renewable energy. The percentage could be even higher due to the poor energy efficiency of the offshore electricity generating units.
Though Norway can phase out its gas turbines, they cannot be entirely replaced as they also fulfill heating needs. Furthermore, replacing the energy source of offshore platforms with onshore energy is neither cost-effective nor has the necessary enthusiasm by the oil and gas producer (Blindheim, 2015), though using onshore electricity or building offshore wind
"farms" would help substantially reduce Norway's carbon emissions. The Hywind offshore wind project with its floating turbines is one of the efforts in this direction (equinor, n.d.).
The limitations of lower-carbon energy infrastructure and carbon taxes in reducing
domestic emissions have led Norway to explore CCS technologies, recently investing 16.8 NOK billion for the world's first full-scale CCS project, dubbed Longship, inspired by Viking ships. It will pump CO2 emissions to a reservoir beneath the sea using pipelines (regjeringen, 2020). Longship and the transport and storage elements dubbed Northern Lights will be a joint project between the three fossil fuel giants Equinor, Shell, and Total (regjeringen, 2020). In a press release about the project, the Minister of KLD, Sveinung Rotevatn, said:
For the world to achieve the goals that we have committed ourselves to in the Paris Agreement, we need large-scale carbon capture and storage. Not all emissions can be cut by applying renewable energy. In several industrial processes, such as the production of cement, CCS is the only technology that can cut emissions. With Longship, Norway will support the development of climate solutions for the future.
(regjeringen, 2020, n.p.)
Beyond financial tools, technological solutions, and investments in lower-carbon
infrastructure, Norway has been using carbon trading abroad. These strategies stem from
16
the focus on cost-effectiveness principles, with the basic premise being that the money spent abroad would be more effective (Skjærseth & Jevnaker, 2018). As a result, domestic efforts will fulfill two-thirds of the 2050 goals, with international mechanisms and quotas addressing the rest (Skjærseth & Jevnaker, 2018).
Transnational Commitments
Alongside Norway's domestic goals, as a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), Norway contributes towards the EU's 2030 climate goals, consisting of a 55% reduction of emissions. These reductions are attained by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) regulation, and the Effort Sharing Regulations. In addition, and most importantly, for new energy infrastructure, the
Renewable Energy Directive (EC, 2021). The RES was established in 2009 to increase the share of lower-carbon infrastructure to 20% by 2020 in the EU countries, to which Norway is also a party. The RES requires member states to contribute towards the EU attaining a minimum of 20% of its total energy needs from lower-carbon sources by 2020 through setting various individual national targets (EC, 2021). It came to be after EU member states agreed to a 20% decrease in GHG emissions, a 20% increase in efficiency, and a 20%
renewable energy mix, which was formalized by the RES. Heating and cooling, the electricity sector, and transportation are the areas the RES targets. These regional
agreements have led to new Norwegian sectors being subjected to carbon pricing. It also led to the disbanding of Gassforhandlingsutvalget—which allowed for preferential treatment of Norwegian companies in licensing (Skjærseth & Jevnaker, 2018).
A quick reflection on some of the main themes discussed so far in this section reveals that domestic and international commitments, combined with preferences for cost-effectiveness, have led to carbon taxes, CCS, and lower-carbon energy infrastructure, such as wind
"farms" as important climate policies. These choices bring about the question of the effectiveness of further expanding wind energy as a climate measure, more specifically, where the Fosen Vind project fits in.
17
Norway's Energy Sector
Norway's energy sector up until the late '80s was heavily regulated and operated by a centralized public sector, with significant investments in hydropower allowing for the emergence of strong energy-intensive industries. The surplus created by these industries allowed for the strengthening of the Norwegian welfare state (Boasson, 2017). However, gradually starting in the late 1980s, Norway started to liberalize its energy sector (see Bye and Hope, 2005 for an overview). In 1986, Statkraft became independent of the NVE and transformed into a state-owned utility. Transmission grids were outsourced from Statkraft to Statnett, which now became the new Transmission Systems Operator. As discussed in Blindheim (2013), they led to a new setup for the onshore wind energy sector, consisting of:
1. On a strategic level: Stortinget
2. On a tactical level: The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE), NVE, and ENOVA10
3. On an operational level: The developers (e.g., Statkraft) and Statnett (grid operator) Together, these actors implement Norway's wind energy infrastructure, combined with other formal and informal actors (see Inderberg et al., 2019 for an overview) around them.
The Norwegian Energy Act (MPE, 1990) deregulated the electricity market with the core goals of separating generation and distribution. It also established a more competitive market for supplying and generating electricity, including fluctuating hourly consumption prices based on supply and demand. The Energy Act also introduced new principles for electricity grids, such as securing access of third parties to the grid.
Other Nordic countries also followed suit in the ensuing years, abandoning self-sufficiency measures to favor a trade-based electricity supply (Magnus & Tennbakk, 2020). These variables combined with heavy financial losses in the Norwegian energy sector in prior years led to creating a new market for trading electricity with Sweden in 1996, dubbed the NordPool. Later, Denmark and Finland joined the Nordic electricity market, leading to the
10 state-owned enterprise tasked with supporting renewable and energy efficiency projects
18
world's first integrated electric power market (Bye and Hope, 2005). Nasdaq OMX
acquired NordPool in 2009. During this decade, engineers started losing central positions in the Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Directorate (NVE) to economists who now prioritized economics and cost-efficiency above achieving technological improvements.
These market-based systems set the field for the changes that have been taking place in Norway's energy sector ever since. For example, in 2008, the European Power Exchange (EPEX) SPOT was founded as an electric power exchange, of which Norway is a member.
These markets have transformed electricity into a commodity for generating surplus value.
The heavy investments in electricity before the '90s, though not cost-efficient, had led to energy supply far exceeding demand in the '80s (Bye and Hope, 2005), partly due to wrong estimates. However, the existence of surplus energy and the heavy reliance of Norway's energy mix on hydropower proved to be a challenge in 1996 when prices peaked due to a dry winter, leading to a shortage of energy. The liberalization of the energy markets and following the logic of supply and demand led to the fluctuation of energy prices and the need for importing electricity. These two factors caused concerns across the political spectrum upon dependency and the necessity of importing electricity (Boasson, 2017).
These concerns set in motion the effort to construct new energy infrastructure and the necessary support schemes for their construction. At this time, multiple methods for energy generation were under debate.
Energy Generation
In the 1950s, Norway constructed its first nuclear facility, primarily for research purposes, but nuclear plans were later set aside in the 1970s (Boasson, 2017). A task force by the government in 1998 concluded that solar energy would not be an essential part of Norway's energy; to date, Norway does not have a large solar energy plant. A couple of years later, in 2001, Prime Minister Stoltenberg declared that the era of large hydropower had ended.
Discussion about the possibility of adding gas-power, which would have added a fossil-fuel source to the almost purely lower-carbon energy infrastructure in Norway, was under consideration but controversial. Opponents argued it would increase national emissions, but proponents claimed it would replace Swedish nuclear energy and Danish coal. This debate goes to show the domestic vs. international tension in the climate discourse. What ensued
19
was that a minority coalition in power at the Storting opposed the gas power plans, and increasingly it grew more controversial (Boasson, 2017). In 1998, a new alliance (Liberal, Center, and Christian Democratic) took power in the Stortinget, and with that, the gas plans were temporarily set aside. This development was met with resistance by the industry and rejected in the Storting. In the late 90s, Naturkraft submitted a license request to build two gas-power generation plants. In 2007 and 2009, with a few thermal plants at oil and gas terminals, some of the natural gas efforts came to fruition.
Alongside natural gas plans, the desire to have a more diverse energy mix led Stortinget in 1999 to adopt a 3 TWh wind power generation plan and a 4 TWh renewable heating plan, to be completed by 2010 (MPE, 1999). Being heavily reliant on hydropower in years with low rainfall was a risk and made Norway dependent on Energy imports. However, by 2010 only 1 TWh wind energy production was taking place (Blindheim, 2013). For a country with wind resources estimated by the NVE in 2005 to be at 250 TWh (Blindheim, 2013), ambitious emission goals, and the financial resources to implement them, this outcome is surprising. However, about half of the wind energy capacity is in the far north within Finnmark County11. At the same time, most people live in the southern part, and grid capacity for transferring this power is currently limited. Expanding grid capacity and energy infrastructure in this region will prove a political challenge since it goes through numerous reindeer herding districts and receives condemnation from conservationists (Mimir). Furthermore, implementing onshore wind power even in the southern regions has proven to be controversial. Finally, complications with the design of renewable support investments limited ENOVA's ability to award investment grants to projects, limiting implementation (Boasson, 2017; Blindheim, 2013). Alongside these domestic factors, the decade preceding 2010 saw a depressed electricity price between 2000-2005 (Nordpool, n.d.), which led toa low engagement with developing new technologies, including wind power. Førsund and colleagues (2008) worried that phasing wind power in the Norwegian power system would further lower prices, create problems in the grid, and increase water
11 Finnmark is the Northern most county in Norway. In January 1st 2020 it was dissolved and combined with its neighboring county Troms, forming the new Troms og Finnmark county
20
loss in the hydropower system. These variables combined indicate that for those who had a stake in the hydropower business, wind power was regarded as a threat and not an
opportunity (Blindheim, 2013). A wind industry representative, Mimir, told me:
What lacked before 2010, when we had the targets of 3 TWh of wind by 2010, is it was not backed by a regulatory framework to make sure that happened. Back then, we needed subsidies. There were no subsidies in place. We had an investment- backed scheme. It was bureaucratic; it was working sufficiently efficiently to make all changed when we got the green certificate scheme which we joined forces with Sweden back in, when signed the deal in 2011 and went to effect in 2012.
In 2011, the Norwegian government put a commission called Energiutvalget together to study the effects of the deregulations in the 1990s. In brief, the commission found that they led to 1) convergence of prices across various domestic regions, 2) higher security of supply, 3) better utilization of energy resources, and 4) less environmental impact due to lower investments stemming from a market with a surplus of energy (Magnus & Tennbakk, 2020). The commission also presented the government with a list of recommendations.
These were based on the assumption that a market-based energy system is a competitive advantage for Norway. The lower cost of investments in lower-carbon energy infrastructure in Norway was expected to allow Norway to have a lower energy price relative to other nations. Furthermore, because of increasing carbon-pricing schemes, Norwegian lower- carbon energy producers would benefit. Finally, the expected transition to a lower-carbon economy would benefit Norwegian hydropower producers due to its need for flexibility (Magnus & Tennbakk, 2020). As cited in Magnus and Tennbakk (2020:3), the commission argued:
The main challenges for the Norwegian energy policy would be to keep the security of supply in the Norwegian power system at a sufficient level, increase value creation based on Norwegian energy resources, protect the environment, adequately address climate problems, and stimulate more efficient domestic energy use.
Energy Production Mix and Support Schemes
With electricity accounting for heating, cooking, and transportation, Norway has one of the largest electricity consumptions per capita in the world (Our World in Data, 2019),
21
consuming twice its neighboring country, Finland (odyssee-mure, 2021). However, easy access to hydropower and wind power has made it possible for high-energy consumption levels with lower emissions. Currently, 89% of Norway's onshore electricity is from
hydropower, and increasingly higher levels are coming from wind power, currently nearing 10% (SSB, 2021). Norwegian hydropower is primarily publicly owned; however, 80% of Norwegian wind "farms" are owned by foreign capital (Motvind, 2020). Compared to many other Western European countries, Norway has historically had a significantly lower level of wind energy generation. However, this dynamic has been rapidly changing. Due to an international push towards lower-carbon energy infrastructure and the Green Certificates with Sweden—a scheme that supports the most mature technologies (Energifakta Norge, 2019)—wind power projects have been expanding substantially over the past decade. In addition, domestic variables to diversify Norway's energy sources have also been
significant. As of May 2021, there are 53 wind "farms" in Norway, producing 13.1 TWh of energy (NVE, 2021). These figures are striking, as wind power production just a couple of years earlier was at 5.5 TWh, and it took about 20 years to attain that number (NVE, 2019a).
Though the renewable goals for 2010 were an important moment for the development of wind energy in Norway, with the liberalized energy market and the prioritization of cost- effectiveness, a new support scheme was necessary to make wind power development feasible. What ensued was a decade of heated debate on the nature of the support scheme, spearheaded by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) and ENOVA. Moreover, since Norway is not a member of the EU or a member of the RES until 2009, there were unique complexities regarding international trade certificates and the design of the energy certificates.
Norwegian policies are characterized by "corporate interests, particularly coalitions and alliances between interest groups, industrial interests, employer organizations, and trade unions" (Skjærseth & Jevnaker, 2018, p. 159). As a neo-corporatist country, many non- state interests participate in all phases of governmental policy. These alliances exert a substantial influence on the subsequent energy and climate policies. With this backdrop, an industry association, now known as The Norwegian Energy Companies Association (EBL),