Tsunami Recovery in Batticaloa District, Eastern Sri Lanka: Livelihood Revival and the Performance of Aid
Delivery Systems in the Fisheries Sector
A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Science (Management of Natural Resources and Sustainable Agriculture).
By Camilla Marie Risvoll, May 2006
Norwegian University of Life Sciences
Department of International Environmental and Development Studies
The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.
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Title picture: Fisherman in Kattankudy (photo: Camilla Marie Risvoll)
© Camilla Marie Risvoll, May 2006 [email protected]
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Declaration
I hereby declare that this is my own original work, and applications of all other material are acknowledged. This thesis has not been submitted to any other University than UMB for any type of academic degree.
Signature: ____________________
Date: ________________________
Camilla Marie Risvoll, May 2006
Dedication
I dedicate this work to the Tamil and Muslim fisher folk in Batticaloa District, Eastern Sri Lanka
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I wish to give special thanks to Professor Ian Bryceson for his guidance, very helpful comments and encouragement throughout this work. I am also very thankful to Professor N.
Shanmugaratnam for his advice and comments throughout the research period. Special thanks go to Gunnar Album, Coastal Campaign, who has provided me with insightful information and assistance during this work. I am very grateful to Dr. Steve Creech, for helpful comments as well as providing me with very useful information while in the field.
I remain very grateful to the Development Fund for their financial support, which assisted me throughout the period of field work.
I thank my interpreter Ravichandran Amarasingham for all the help, both in translating interviews but also familiarising me with the local area. My local supervisor Dr. P Vinobaba deserves special thanks, for connecting me to key informants as well as providing useful comments while in the field. Thanks go to Arnulf Sandvik and Mr. K. Tharmaseelan for their generosity while I was in Sri Lanka. Thanks go to Dr. Marit Haug, who provided me very generously with literature throughout my time in the field. Finally, I thank my family and friends for all their support during this work.
Abstract
Coastal communities in Batticaloa District, eastern Sri Lanka were severely impacted by the December 26, 2004 tsunami as well as being victims of the protracted war that has been ongoing for over two decades. This paper examines processes of post-tsunami livelihood revival, at household and community levels in two fishing villages in Batticaloa District. The performance of the aid delivery systems in relation to the fisheries sector were also examined.
Data was collected through semi-structured interviews of households engaged in fishing, and of external actors involved in the post-tsunami recovery process in Batticaloa District. A conceptual framework for social-ecological resilience including elements of the livelihood approach, and particularly the concept of vulnerability was used as a tool when analysing the collected data. The study reveals that the livelihoods of affected fisher folks in the studied villages are far from recovered, one year after the tsunami. Several disadvantaged groups of affected fishers have been marginalised in the recovery process, including part-time fishers, fish workers, non-members of Fisheries Cooperative Societies and fishers only owning nets before the tsunami. Fishers adapted to the changes after the tsunami by diversifying their fishing practices. External actors’ responses in the recovery process have to a large extent failed, often contributing towards exacerbating the already stressed social-ecological situation. NGOs have distributed an oversupply of canoes in Batticaloa District which is likely to erode resilience because, firstly, it will increase the pressure on already threatened fish resources near shore, and secondly, the recovery of income generating activities for the affected fishers will stagnate as fish catches are poor near shore due to damaged corals and depleted resources. The Sri Lankan Government employed a centralised approach whereby the principle of subsidiarity was neglected. Participation in planning and decision-making by the affected people at local level was practically absent, despite various attempts at creating ad hoc village committees. Such committees appeared to create further room for inequity in the aid delivery. Some effective responses by a few exceptional organisations contributed positively towards ameliorating the stressed situation and these were based upon learning and experience, whereby the local people participated in their own livelihood recovery. This paper concludes with highlighting the need for strengthening local people’s multiple livelihood strategies, firstly as a risk-spreading mechanism for the fishers and secondly to prevent over- exploitation on pressurised resources. This is because a return to primarily depending on the fisheries sector appears in this case to be an ecologically unsustainable and economically
Table of Contents
DECLARATION... III DEDICATION... IV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...V ABSTRACT...VII TABLE OF CONTENTS... IX LIST OF FIGURES... XI LIST OF TABLES... XI ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS...XII
1.0 INTRODUCTION... 1
1.1STUDY OBJECTIVES... 3
1.2CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK... 3
1.3PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY... 7
2.0 BACKGROUND ... 9
2.1THE DECEMBER 26,2004TSUNAMI... 9
2.2THE CONFLICT – IN RETROSPECT... 9
2.3THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA... 11
2.4FISHING ACTIVITIES IN SRI LANKA’S COASTAL AREAS... 14
2.5IMPACTS ON THE SECTOR... 16
2.6SOCIAL STRUCTURES... 17
2.6.1 Fisher folk... 17
2.6.2 Sri Lanka’s administrative system- in retrospect... 18
2.6.3 The role of the state in the tsunami aftermath and the structure of coordination... 19
2.6.4 Aid delivery actors... 22
2.7LAND ISSUES... 23
3.0 METHODOLOGY... 25
3.1STUDY SITES... 25
3.2METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION... 27
3.3SAMPLING DESIGN AND PROCEDURE... 27
3.4PRIMARY DATA... 28
3.5SECONDARY DATA... 28
3.6DATA ANALYSIS... 29
3.7LIMITATIONS TO STUDY... 29
4. 0 RESULTS ... 31
4.1FISH PRODUCTIVITY... 31
4.2THE FISHERIES SECTOR... 31
4. 2.1 Livelihood revival ... 32
4.2.2 Aid delivery... 36
5.0 DISCUSSION ... 43
5.1VULNERABILITY CONTEXT... 43
5.1.1 Dynamic Pressures ... 46
5.1.2 Unsafe Conditions ... 47
5.2ACTORS RESPONSES IN THE RECOVERY PROCESS... 50
5.2.1 Ineffective response ... 50
5.2.2 Counter productive response... 60
5.2.3 Learning towards effective response ... 67
6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS... 75
7.0 REFERENCES... 77
APPENDIX 1INTERVIEWS... 81
APPENDIX 2.SELECTED PICTURES OF VESSELS USED IN EASTERN SRI LANKAN FISHERIES. ... 92
List of Figures
FIGURE 1RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS FOLLOWING THE TSUNAMI.ADAPTED FROM BERKES ET AL.(2003)... 5
FIGURE 2VULNERABILITY PROGRESSION ADAPTED FROM WISNER ET AL.(2003). ... 6
FIGURE 3THE PROHIBITED ZONE.REGULATION... 13
FIGURE 4MAP OF SRI LANKA SHOWING COASTAL AREAS AFFECTED BY WAR AND TSUNAMI... 14
FIGURE 5ILLUSTRATION OF ACTOR’S POSITIONING IN THE RECOVERY PROCESS (ADAPTED FROM AMARASINGHE 2005)... 20
FIGURE 6MFAR’S DISASTER MANAGEMENT SCHEME (AMARASINGHE 2005)... 21
FIGURE 7PRESENT STRUCTURE OF RADA(SOURCE:CPA2006). ... 22
FIGURE 8MAP AND SATELLITE IMAGE SHOWING THE STUDY SITES IN BATTICALOA DISTRICT.TEMPORARY SHELTER CAMP AND PROPOSED LAND FOR TRADITIONAL PALAMEENMADU RESIDENTS (SOURCE: MEARCH.ORG 2005&GOOGLE EARTH ACCESSED 17MAY 2006). ... 26
FIGURE 9A TYPICAL FISHER’S HOUSE WITH APPARENTLY UNUSED CANOES. ... 37
FIGURE 10BOAT REPAIRED BY CEYNOR, WITH ENGINE LEFT UNREPAIRED, AND... 63
FIGURE 11INCOMPLETE REPAIR WORK BY CEYNOR AFTER THE TSUNAMI,... 63
FIGURE 12FRP BOATS SUPPLIED BY SAVE THE CHILDREN (GB) WAITING TO BE DELIVERED TO... 64
FIGURE 13REBUILDING HOMES IN KATTANKUDY IN A FLOOD-PRONE AREA... 64
FIGURE 14TEMPORARY SHELTERS IN A FLOOD PRONE AREA WITH STAGNANT WATER. ... 65
FIGURE 15THIRAIMADU TEMPORARY SHELTER CAMP WITH SEVERAL HOUSES MADE... 66
List of Tables
TABLE 1SUMMARY OF DESTROYED, REPLACED CRAFT AND PLEDGES, BY CRAFT TYPE, IN BATTICALOA DISTRICT AS OF NOVEMBER 2005. (REPRODUCED FROM CREECH 2006)... 17TABLE 2AVERAGE FISH CATCH, TIME SPENT FISHING, FISHING INCOME, FISH CATCH PER EFFORT AND AVERAGE PRICE OF FISH PER KG. BEFORE AND AFTER THE TSUNAMI... 32
TABLE 3FISHING EQUIPMENT REPLACED AFTER THE TSUNAMI... 33
TABLE 4MEMBERSHIP IN FCSS AFFECTING AID ASSISTANCE... 34
TABLE 5TYPES OF FISHING NETS USED FOR SEA FISHING BEFORE THE TSUNAMI... 38
Abbreviations and Acronyms
CBO Community Based Organisation CFA Cease Fire Agreement
CPA Center for Policy Alternatives
DOFAR Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources DS Divisional Secretary
EPRLF Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations FCS Fisheries Cooperative Societies
FRP boat Fiber Reinforced Plastic Boat
GA Government Agent
GN Grama Niladhari
GS Grama Sevaka
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation IPS Institute for Policy Studies
JHU Jathika Hela Uruma
JVP Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MOFAR Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources NEP North Eastern Province
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation PDS Planning and Development Secretariat
P-TOMS Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure SLMM Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission
TAFLOL Task Force for Logistics, Law and Order TAFREN Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation TAFRER Task Force for Rescue and Relief TELO Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization TRO Tamil Reconstruction Organisation
UN OCHA United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
1.0 Introduction
Despite efforts by a myriad of actors involved in the post-tsunami recovery process in Batticaloa District in eastern Sri Lanka, the livelihoods of affected fisher folks are far from recovered. Coastal communities in this region were severely affected by the December 26, 2004 tsunami. Many people that depended upon fisheries as their livelihood activity are struggling to recover in the aftermath of the tsunami, partly due to lack of fishing equipment to carry out income generating activities, although an oversupply of vessels have been brought to the district. This situation is exacerbated by declining near shore resources which is partly a result of coral reefs that were damaged by the tsunami, but also due to inappropriate and unsustainable disaster-recovery measures. These problems are linked to responses that emerged locally, nationally and internationally after the tsunami. A few attempts of adaptive approaches to remedy ineffective and counterproductive responses have contributed somewhat towards ameliorating the otherwise stressed situation. In order to examine post-disaster recovery in Sri Lanka it is essential to take account of the impacts of two events, the tsunami that struck the coast of Sri Lanka, and the protracted war which has been ongoing for more than two decades.
Elements of the livelihood approach are combined with the concept of social-ecological resilience. The livelihood approach focuses on livelihood strategies adapted by households and individuals, and the context for such adaptation (Shanmugaratnam 2006). Vulnerability is a key concept in the livelihood approach and is useful in the assessment of affected fisher- folk’s capacities to cope with and recover from the stressed social-ecological situation. Social and ecological vulnerability to disasters such as the tsunami are influenced by eroding resilience both before and after the tsunami struck. Resilience refers to the capacity of related social-ecological systems to cope and adapt through experience and learning as recurrent changes occur through disturbances i.e. the tsunami, the protracted war and increasingly depleted natural fish resources (Adger et al. 2005). In order to grasp the resilience of the system in the tsunami aftermath, certain key indicators such as property rights, access to resources and institutional change were explored (Adger 1997). Such focus was complementary with the objectives of the study which are illustrated under heading 1.1 below.
Some root causes in conjunction with dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions contributed towards the vulnerability context that was embedded in society before the tsunami struck, or became causes for vulnerability among certain groups of people after the tsunami. Particularly the civil conflict, but also the unequal ownership of land and uneven development among different groups of people in society, were important root causes of vulnerability. Some disadvantaged groups of people such as previous net owners, part-time fishers and non- members of Fisheries Cooperative Societies (FCS) were left marginalised in the recovery process and this contributed to the poor recovery rate within the studied households. There were many reasons for such erosion of resilience to occur, and the responses generated by the various actors contributed to patterns of vulnerability. The Government’s approach in the tsunami aftermath was characterized by politicisation and centralisation. The enforcement of the buffer zone was a Government regulated policy with severe impacts on the people affected by it. Moreover, inertia among Government sectors created delays and further marginalisation of affected people. Aid agencies such as national and international non- governmental organisations (NGOs) provided valuable initial assistance to the affected communities. However the large number of agencies, with varying levels of experience, created an uncoordinated recovery process with many flaws. In order to build resilience after crisis of a magnitude such as the tsunami, certain conditions for adaptive responses and co- management are important, such as entail knowledge and learning, adhering to the principle of subsidiarity, cross-scale transparency, coordination and facilitation of information flows through social networks, enabling legislation that creates social space for sustainable and viable fisheries management as well as establishing arenas for collaborative learning of fisheries management (Olsson et al. 2004 in Othman 2005).
The United Nation’s Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the German Development Cooperation in Collaboration with the Sri Lankan Ministry of Nation Building and Development, the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) are some of the institutions that have carried out research in order to gain knowledge on the successes and failures of the post- tsunami recovery responses nationally and in Batticaloa District. The research conducted so far in regards to the topic investigates the national and district level, and include research of institutions such as community-based organisations (CBO) as well as group interviews of affected people at the village level. However, knowledge reflecting households and
individuals perceptions on ground realities appear to be lacking as limited research is conducted at household level.
1.1 Study objectives
There were two objectives to this study:
• Examine processes of fisheries production and livelihood revival after the tsunami at household and community level in two fishing villages: one of Tamil and the other of Muslim origin.
• Examine the performance of aid delivery systems in the fisheries sector in the tsunami aftermath.
This study investigates the shift in access to and allocation of resources, including land, fishing equipment and social networks. The study also examines actors’ responses in the post- tsunami recovery process and how they impact on the stressed social-ecological situation after the tsunami hit the region in December 2004. Although the coastal communities in Batticaloa District are affected both by war and the tsunami, and it is vital to consider both, the objectives of this study focus on the recovery process from the impacts the tsunami had on fishing communities.
1.2 Conceptual framework
A livelihood has been defined in many different ways but this study takes Ellis’ (2000) definition of a livelihood as comprising “the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household”.
The livelihood approach identifies assets as key to the households’ choice and ability to undertake activities (and thus the living so gained). The approach recognises the importance of the assets and the activities to which they are put. The conceptual framework used here combines elements of this approach with the concept of social-ecological resilience.
Resilience is central for achieving sustainability and loss of resilience decreases the ability to deal with change (Berkes and Folke 1998).
Smith (1992:25) in Wisner et al. (2003) defines resilience as ‘the measure of the rate of recovery from a stressful experience, reflecting the social capacity to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a hazardous event’. Social systems create the conditions in which hazards have a differential impact on various societies and different groups within society. Broadly, three aspects define a system’s resilience: (1) the amount of shock it can absorb and remain in the given state; (2) its ability to reorganise self; and (3) learning and adaptation capacity (Milestad and Darnhofer, 2003). The shock may take any form, notable here is taking the form of an external disturbance such as the December 2004 tsunami, which through the resulting shock and stress increased peoples’ proneness to livelihood insecurity. It is important to recognize that the Batticaloa District has also faced over twenty years with armed conflict, which has disrupted peoples’ livelihood in which both social and ecological resilience has been and still is affected.
Coastal people in the fishing villages of Palameenmadu and Kattankudy have traditionally depended on fisheries for their livelihood. The fisheries are their natural capital and through use of physical assets such as nets, canoes, and boats household members undertake fishing as an income generating activity. Village members with enough financial capital to buy fishing gears participated in fishing and/or employed others to fish. As such the fisheries were a main source of livelihood to majority households.
The December 26, 2004 tsunami killed people, destroyed settlement infrastructure, canoes, boats and nets. It also impacted directly on the ecological systems by killing fish and damaging corals. Thereby it disrupted the communities’ livelihood that was based primarily on the coastal fisheries. Apart from the direct disruption of the social system through the many deaths and destruction of houses, dismantling the fisheries itself had far reaching consequences since the sector is the main livelihood of these coastal people. Both the social and ecological systems were challenged to cope with and adapt to the new conditions. Coping and adaptation are two related concepts that relate to vulnerability but while coping capacity is more directly related to an extreme event such as the December 2004 tsunami, adaptive capacity refers to a longer time frame and as such entails learning either before and/or after an extreme event. Enhancement of both is thus necessary to reduce vulnerability and to increase social-ecological resilience of households such as in the Batticaloa District after the tsunami.
Three generic responses to the crisis, which followed in the tsunami aftermath, are possible and are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 Responses to the crisis following the tsunami. Adapted from Berkes et al. (2003).
In order to assess the resilience of the ecological and social systems in the aftermath of the tsunami it is important to recognise the factors that determine the event to become such an unprecedented human disaster. The concept of vulnerability aptly helps to identify the level of
resilience held by the people and elements of the “Pressure and Release” model (PAR) adopted by Wisner et al. (2005) is used as a tool to illustrate this. The adapted model identifies three stages that contribute to the vulnerability context that may be embedded in the society before the tsunami occurred. These stages consist of ‘root causes’, ‘dynamic pressures’ and ‘unsafe conditions’ (Figure 2), which act as determinants in the progression of vulnerability.
Figure 2 Vulnerability progression adapted from Wisner et al. (2003).
Livelihood recovery in the tsunami aftermath is perceived in different ways. One stream of thought is to attempt to reconstruct the pre-tsunami scenario: in relation to the fisheries sector, this implies replacements of fishing equipment and vessels to pre-tsunami levels alongside reserecting old structures and trends.
Another approach would be to look beyond returning to the previous status and to promote new developments. In doing so it is essential to link development with peace-building due to the protracted war that has been ongoing for the past decades. Recognizing the impacts the war has had upon societies is essential because of the significant unevenness that has been created amongst people in society, whereby certain groups of people and regions within the country have been victims of discrimination. This inequality is an important determinant and reflects where different groups of people are positioned, thus must be considered in the
assessments of people’s needs. In relation to such an approach, seeking to enhance people’s wellbeing in terms of livelihood and human security, non-discrimination, freedom, justice and improved opportunities are central (Shanmugaratnam 2005). In terms of development it is important to increase opportunities for diversification and adaptive livelihood strategies amongst people, whereby one must address root causes of vulnerability in society. Resilience is central in this regard as it determines peoples potential to cope with shocks and utilizing opportunities available to them. Building resilience is to partly reduce dependency upon natural resources for livelihood revival as well as to promote diversified livelihoods (Pomeroy et al. 2005). While considering avenues for generating opportunities, it is also important to be aware of possible challenges that may arise. To overcome such challenges and to avoid erosion of resilience, it is necessary to consider aspects such as the level of political will, the vision apparent in regards to long term sustainability of the country’s revival and the institutional and organisational context (Shanmugaratnam 2005).
1.3 Purpose and Scope of Study
The purpose of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the post-tsunami recovery of fisher folk’s livelihoods, alongside responses generated by involved aid agencies and the Sri Lankan Government in the tsunami aftermath in Batticaloa District.
A myriad of actors were involved in the post-tsunami recovery, however this study is limited to deal with a selection of INGOs, NGOs, CBOs and Government bodies alongside fishing households in two fishing communities. The fishing households affected by the tsunami in Batticaloa District have also been war victims to varying degrees. Due to the complexities of the civil conflict in Sri Lanka this dimension is only briefly considered in this study, whereby the principal focus is placed on issues directly affecting the fishers’ livelihoods after the tsunami. However, in order to grasp the situation to a fuller extent a deeper and more integrative study of the complexities related to the civil conflict is required, particularly because there are strong linkages between war-displaced and tsunami-displaced victims. Both have significant impacts on the vulnerability context within the social-ecological systems.
This paper starts with a presentation of the background of issues that are underlying causes contributing to the present situation in Batticaloa District. This includes the history of the civil
methodology identify methods used for interviews for fisher households and various actors engaged in the recovery process, some limitations to the study, followed by the theoretical framework used.
2.0 Background
2.1 The December 26, 2004 Tsunami
The tsunami waves that hit the coast of Sri Lanka on December 26, 2004 were results of an earthquake off the west Coast of northern Sumatra that measured 8.9 on the Richter scale. The tsunami waves also led to widespread catastrophe in India, Maldives, Indonesia, and Thailand particularly but also caused damaged in Malaysia, Bangladesh, Somalia and Seychelles (recoverlanka 2005). The tsunami killed over 30,000 people in Sri Lanka and affected many more through displacement and destroyed assets. The international community and INGOs were practically overloaded with funds and deadlines for relief and recovery, and they appeared to be insensitive to the protracted conflict in Sri Lanka, which was reflected in their approaches to tsunami relief (Philipson & Thangarajah 2005).
2.2 The conflict – in retrospect
The features of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka can be explained to some extent by the conflict structures existent in Sri Lanka before independence. Such conflict structures reflect Sri Lanka’s historical formation of the ethnic society, and were between castes within the same ethnicity groups or between the highland and the lowland Sinhalese. Prior to independence, the identity of both Sinhalese and Tamils was weak, however numerous Sinhala dominated policies that arose after independence, triggered an emerging conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese people. Conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese has appeared since the mid-1950s and is grounded in rivalry for recognition and power alongside disputes over post-colonial directions as well as distribution of resources. Following independence, the Tamils responded to attacks on their positions using democratic approaches (Sorensen 2001).
In the early stages of the Tamil struggle, the objective went from expansion of Tamils’
regional autonomy, to gradually transforming into conversion of the singular state structure to become a federal state (Fujita et al. 2003). However, during the economic depression in the 1970s, frustration grew among Tamil people and the vision of a separate state became strong for many Tamils (Sorensen 2001). Their rational for such agenda was that an autonomous entity was the only possibility for their political and economic rights to be protected, thus they increasingly accentuated their rights to self-determination (Nithiyanandam 2000). The first
step was the formation of the Tamil United Front, which later was transformed to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which attained the status of the main opposition in the Sri Lankan Parliament. While such development took place at a parliamentary level, frustration towards both the Government and the Tamil political elite grew strong among the Tamil youth, who moved towards the same vision of a Tamil state, through militant means.
Armed conflict between the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) started in 1983 with the killings of 13 Sinhalese soldiers in an ambush, which triggered further violence between the Sinhalese majority (74% of population) and the Tamil minority (18%). The results were further polarisation between the two ethnic communities and displacement of hundreds of thousands Tamils. The war has primarily been between the Sri Lankan army forces and militant Tamils, however prior to the war and the first part of it reflected internal power struggles among several active militant groups. These were such as LTTE, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), whereby LTTE after annihilating the other groups, ended up as the dominant organisation challenging the Sri Lankan state by representing the battle for Tamil Eelam. The war in Sri Lanka escalated markedly in 1990 and lead to more than 1 million people being displaced in the North-East. Brief peace-talks were initiated in 1994 with agreements of a cease-fire in order to start peace negotiations, however this fell through and LTTE withdrew. Between 1995 and 1999 the Sri Lankan Government carried out several attempts to weaken LTTE in the north by carrying out military operations throughout an adopted strategy called ‘War for Peace’. This resulted in many more displacements of Tamil people (Sorensen 2001). Attempts were made to end the war, and in 2002 a cease-fire agreement was enforced which, although very frail, is still intact in 2006. A result of the war is a dual power structure in the North Eastern Province (NEP) which is a convergence between the Sri Lankan state and a de facto LTTE state.
The Muslim fraction in Sri Lanka never identified themselves with the vision of a Tamil Eelam, and tried to retain a neutral position in the conflict. However, such position became increasingly difficult after the 1990 attacks by the LTTE, firstly in a massacre in a mosque in Batticaloa, and later expelling the Muslim population from Jaffna. Such actions reflect LTTE’s objections to including the Muslims as part of their vision of Tamil Eelam, and have contributed towards the adverse relationship between Muslims and Tamils. Moreover, young
Muslims were in the early 1990s recruited by military intelligence to inform on LTTE activity, which exacerbated the tension between Tamils and Muslims (Fujita et al. 2003).
The Eastern province has been the most unstable region throughout the war, and has been a contested site of intra-Tamil rivalry. The defection of Colonel Karuna, an Eastern Tamil who represents the East’s resentment of LTTE’s bias towards the North, has made the East undergo military, political, social and economic difficulties. The picture of who is supporting who within the Tamil communities in the East is very unclear, which has created extensive suffering among the civilian population (Philipson & Thangarajah 2005).
International engagement in the North-East
India is the single most important actor in the North-East of Sri Lanka and has a comprehensive commitment through trade, cultural and diplomatic relations, and intelligence activity (Philipson & Thangarajah 2005). Norway, with other Nordic countries, is monitoring the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), through the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
Norway’s role in SLMM has been accused of having a conflict of interest between mediation and monitoring, and also ignoring the need to include other interest groups into consultations i.e. Muslims.
2.3 The protracted conflict in Sri Lanka
The protracted war in Sri Lanka has affected different parts of the country unevenly in regards to spatial and socio-economic measures and in regards to development (Shanmugaratnam 2005). This was a continuation from the post-independence policies by the Sri Lankan Government which discriminated Tamils. Such pro-Sinhalese policies were reflected in language policies, irrigation projects, university entrance, settlement projects and development investments. The NEPs contribution to the country’s GDP in relation to production activities dropped from 15% to 4% from the start of the war until 1997. In socio- economic terms, the North-East experienced more than 65,000 deaths due to the conflict and several more became refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). Forced emigration resulted in considerable losses of human capital and has altered the demographic structure in the North and East. In many instances, displacement has for instance separated fishermen
unions, credit societies and made many social networks dysfunctional (Fujita et al. 2003). It is estimated that about 60% of the coastal communities in the North-East are poor, referring to the ‘dollar-a-day’ income criterion. The fact that more than 80% of Sri Lanka’s industries are in the Western Province (WP) contributes to such scale of poverty, which is illustrated in Figure 4 below. As the war has become protracted it has generated a war economy which has been favourable for particular groups, however more significantly it has lead to further conflicts affecting larger segments of the Sri Lankan people, whereby the North-Eastern coastal communities are among the worst affected (Shanmugaratnam 2005). The Tsunami struck particularly hard in these regions making the situation for these people utterly severe.
While the war has created a fragmented polity and ethnically divided society, the tsunami created some hope of unity in its wake. Such opportunity for reconciliation was however short lived and divisive political forces soon appeared to conquest. In the tsunami aftermath there were emerging conflicts over the coastal zone resources and widespread suspicion whether the Government will promote privatisation and commercialisation of the coastal areas (Shanmugaratnam 2005). The buffer zone policy fuelled such suspicions. The enforced buffer zones differed between the different parts of the country, whereby the buffer zone in the East for instance was 100 metres wider than it was in the south. This is evidence on measures introduced by the Government that contributes to the unevenness that is apparent in society, which in terms weakened the capacities of many tsunami survivors to cope with effects of the tsunami.
The civil conflict in Sri Lanka has vast implications on the people’s livelihood on almost all aspects of their lives. Obvious impacts are on human security and its contribution to the fragmented landscape of uncertainty and vulnerability that it creates amongst the people, but it also has direct impacts on the daily livelihood activities of fisher folk in form of imposed restrictions on fishing, which at present is denying them from carrying out livelihood activities. Beside large numbers of people from the NEP being displaced during the war, particularly the North has been affected by long-term bans and restrictions on fishing.
However recently this also became the case for communities along the East coast. On March 28, 2006 the Sri Lankan Government introduced a ban on fishing with vessels over three tonnes and exceeding 28ft, through the Emergency Regulation No. 1 of 2006, which consists of the establishment of a Prohibited Zone covering around 70% of Sri Lanka’s entire coastline (Figure 3).
Figure 3 The Prohibited Zone. Regulation
No. 1 of 2006. (source: Sinhalaya.com 29.03.2006).
Figure 4 identifies the coastal areas affected by the war and the tsunami, and shows that almost two-thirds of the areas affected by the tsunami are also war-affected areas, which is in the NEP. Coastal communities in the high intensity conflict areas within the NEP, such as Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Mullaitivu and the Jaffna peninsula, were among the worst affected by the tsunami.
Figure 4Map of Sri Lanka Showing Coastal Areas Affected by War and Tsunami (Reproduced from Shanmugaratnam 2005, Country map from RecoverLanka 2005).
2.4 Fishing activities in Sri Lanka’s coastal areas
Sri Lanka’s coastal districts inhabit 31% of the population. There are 1,337 fishing villages with about 123,970 fishing households and 703 landing sites (Shanmugaratnam 2005). The coastline of Sri Lanka is about 1,585 km and supports ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangroves, sea grass beds and marshy lands. Well-developed coral reefs exist along much of the Sri Lankan coast line and along the east coast they exist for instance between Batticaloa and Kalmunai. The coral reefs in Sri Lanka are important sources of natural resources, whereby export of sea cucumbers, ornamental fish and spiny lobsters have contributed significantly to the foreign exchange earnings (Dharmaretnam & Ahamed 2005). Fringing coral reefs along the coast near Batticaloa were severely affected by coral bleaching in 1998 and large-scale coral mortality had occurred prior to the tsunami (Rajasuriya 2005). Recent research identified extensive damages of Pasikudah reef (live coral < 25%) and moderate
damages of Thennadi bay area reef with 50% live coral (Fairoz pers. comm.). Furthermore the shallow fringing reef at Palchenai consists of live coral within a range of 5% on the shallower inshore edge to 30% on the deeper outer edge. Moderate quantities of smothering by debris and/or sediments have occurred, predominantly on the shallower, fringing reefs where extensive beds of dead coral rubble were present (Meynell & Rust 2005).
Fish is the main source of protein for the people from eastern Sri Lanka, and fishing is the main livelihood activity for 12 per cent of the people from the NEP (NESOHR 2006). Sri Lanka’s fisheries resources are divided into three categories: (1) marine resources, (2) inland resources and (3) brackish-water resources (Amarasinghe 2005). In Batticaloa District the tsunami affected communities rely both on marine resources and brackish-water resources as the district is right on the coast and the Batticaloa lagoon is covering large parts of the district with only a short stretch of land separating it from the sea. Lagoon fishing is also important throughout Sri Lanka including Batticaloa District where it provides a major source of livelihood activity for many people.
Sri Lankan marine resources are divided into two sub-sectors: coastal fishery and offshore and deep-sea fishery (Gupta & Sharma 2004). The marines sector accounts for 85 per cent of the fisheries sector’s employment and about 98 000 people are directly engaged in fishing.
Many more are engaged in activities related to fishing, e.g. marketing. Prior to the last three decades fishing was carried out using non-motorized crafts such as canoes and catamarans (Rajasuriya et al. 1995). The actual fish catch in the sea was already by year 2000 approaching the estimated potential exploitable limit of around 90 000 tonnes. Deep-sea fishing commenced in the late 1980s in Sri Lanka and fishing expanding to outside Sri Lanka’s EEZ commenced in the early 1990s. Multi-day boats is the main fishing craft used for deep-sea fishing, employing techniques such as large-meshed gill netting, long lining and trolling. About 75 per cent of the Multi-day boat owners are of non-fishing background, thus a remarkable entry of non-fishers into the Sri Lankan fisheries sector occurred with the commencement of deep-sea fishing, which dramatically altered traditional patterns of labour recruitment and employer-employee relations (Gupta & Sharma 2004). Fish workers employed on Multi-day boats are vulnerable due to the dangers associated with deep-sea fishing as well as absence of employment contracts between boat owners and fish workers, thus lacking legal provisions on acceptable working conditions.
Following the onset of globalisation, commenced a significant growth of Sri Lanka’s contemporary mechanised fishing fleet, with a six fold increase in the volume (from 3240 tonnes to 19,5666 tonnes) of fishery export during a five-year period between 1985-2000 (Gupta & Sharma 2004). The capitalistic nature of the mechanised fishing technology, formed requirement for credit for fishers, in order for them to access new technology. Fishers engaged in traditional fishing activities had the least access to credit amenities because formal lending schemes favour asset-rich individuals.
2.5 Impacts on the sector
Between 90,000 to 100,000 active fishers lost their livelihoods in Sri Lanka due to the tsunami (Amarasinghe 2005). About 103,000 fisher people were displaced and 16,500 fisher houses where destroyed whereas 13,300 houses were damaged. Damages to the fishing industry in Sri Lanka were immense with 76 percent of the fishing fleet affected, i.e. 53 percent destroyed and 23 percent was damaged. 10 of the 12 existing fishery harbours, 37 fishing anchorages and 200 fish landing centres were either destroyed or damaged.
Rehabilitation costs are estimated to be about USD 123.2 million. This involves repairs and replacements of fishing crafts and equipment, restoration of harbours and anchorages, cold storages and ice plants. A drop of 41% in fish production in 2005 is estimated due to the effects of the tsunami (FAO 2005). Table 1 below shows the impacts on the fishing fleet in Batticaloa District and nationally. The statistics from Batticaloa illustrates a focus on replacing vessels that are used for near shore fishing and over-supply of canoes was present, which occurred within the first half of 2005. Most FRP boats were yet to be replaced, however replacements of these boats took place in December in Batticaloa District. As illustrated in the total of pledged and replaced vessels, it is assumed that more vessels will enter Batticaloa District after the tsunami than what was destroyed in the tsunami.
Table 1 Summary of destroyed, replaced craft and pledges, by craft type, in Batticaloa District as of November 2005. (Reproduced from Creech 2006).
Batticaloa District Nationally
Multi
Day One
Day FRP Trad. Beach
Seine Multi
Day One
Day FRP Trad. Beach
Seine
Destroyed: 0 4 494 2,107 119 187 272 3,986 9,051 699
% of National Total
0% 1% 12% 23% 17%
Replaced: 0 0 97 2,141 57 0 20 324 6,486 147
% of National:
Total
0% 0% 30% 33% 39%
Pledged: 0 5 495 356 57 175 373 1,938 2,678 297
% of National Total
0% 1% 26% 13% 19%
Final
Total: 0 5 592 2,497 114 175 393 2,262 9,164 444
% of
Destroyed - 125% 120% 119% 96% 94% 144% 57% 101% 64%
2.6 Social structures
2.6.1 Fisher folk
People that engage in fishing in Sri Lanka do not consist of a homogenous group of people.
Fishing communities are stratified, both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal stratification can be illustrated by type of fishing craft used, (such as ‘unmechanised traditional – lagoon’,
‘unmechanised traditional – marine’, traditional mechanised – marine’, mechanised outboard motor (OBM’ referred to as FRP boat in this study, ‘mechanised one day boats with inboard motors (IBM)’ and mechanised multi-day boats with IBM’.) Vertical stratification refers to the categories the people attached to the fishery sector belong to. These include part- and full- time fishermen and fisherwomen, part- and full-time fish workers, individual boat owners and commercial boat owners (Creech 2005). The vertical stratification determines a person’s status and is a contributing factor to differential vulnerability amongst the people belonging to the various categories.
The political economy of fishing communities creates vulnerability amongst certain groups of fishers. The fisheries sector is dominated by small groups of big boat owners and middlemen, locally called mudalalies. Fish workers are the majority group within fisheries and usually work for mudalalies for a small wage. The relationship between fish workers and mudalalies
is often one of dependency because fish workers depend on mudalalies for credit particularly in times of low incomes, furthermore the mudalali mostly decides upon the sale of the harvest (Shanmugaratnam 2005). Often the mudalali or middleman is the owner of the fishing vessel and equipment and this exacerbates the fish workers’ asymmetric relationship with the mudalali, resulting in livelihood insecurity.
Fisheries Cooperative Societies (FCS) is the community based institution ingrained in fishing communities, with the purpose of representing the people engaged in the fisheries sector.
Each FCS has a nine-member Board of Directors which consists of six members. The studied FCSs in Batticaloa District had committees which consisted of a President, Vice-President, Treasurer, Chair person and in addition some other members. Traditionally the FCSs main source of finance is the Government, and funds are channelled through the Ministry of Fisheries (FAO 1984). Most FCSs, except those in the north of the country, are generally weak CBOs. Office bearers of a typical FCS are usually older men, who are boat owners and usually do not fish themselves but employ fish workers to use their boats and equipment.
There are several factors that may contribute to such organisation structure. The dominance of men is a reflection of a fisheries sector where there are very few women engaged in fishing.
Some are engaged in lagoon fishing and post harvest processing of fish. Older individuals have more status in the community, thus also easier become an office bearer (Creech 2005).
2.6.2 Sri Lanka’s administrative system- in retrospect
Sri Lanka has failed to develop the necessary links between economic policies and political strategies in order to perform and accomplish development amongst it people (Nithiyanandam 2000). At Independence in 1948, Sri Lanka’s administrative system (established during the British colonial period) was highly centralized. An important feature of this system was the provincial/district administration which is known as the “Kacheri System” (District System).
A Government Agent (GA) was appointed as Government’s general representative in the district and had at the time assigned for all governmental tasks within his area. This system changed in 1992 with the ‘Transfer of Powers Act No. 58, which transferred responsibilities to Assistant Government Agents at divisional level with the designation of “Divisional Secretaries”. Accordingly the Divisional Secretariat became the administrative centre for governmental policy implementations.
2.6.3 The role of the state in the tsunami aftermath and the structure of coordination
The tsunami allowed for cross party mobilisation in its initial stages of the emergency relief phase. The Government and LTTE further worked towards a shared mechanism for tsunami relief and reconstruction in the NEP called P-TOMS, however this mechanism was rejected by the Supreme Court. This rejection may have contributed to that key actors reverted back to pursuing traditional competitive politics, thereby withdrawing the opportunity for cooperation between the conflicting actors in Sri Lanka. There was opposition to the P-TOMS from Nationalist political parties such as Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Uruma (JHU) in the South, who campaigned against the enforcement of P-TOMS, thereby challenging its legality in the Supreme Court (LankaWeb 2005).
Most of the information sharing and coordination occurred at district level by the District Secretaries and the Divisional Secretaries as key actors. Four coordination bodies were operating in the Batticaloa District, which were The Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN), United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the Consortium of Human Affairs (CHA) and Innayam. UN OCHA was in charge with the coordination of INGOs. TAFREN was one of three task forces and was set up under a Presidential directive after the tsunami, with a mandate to facilitate, enable, coordinate and monitor the post-tsunami reconstruction efforts (RADA 2006). The other task forces were TAFRER (Task Force for Rescue and Relief) and TAFLOL (Task Force for Logistics, Law and Order). TAFREN was the operating task force in the recovery phase in the Batticaloa District, and was supposed to coordinate the NGOs activities. The role of CHA was to encourage and facilitate coordination between all parties involved. Innayam is a local coordination body dealing with local NGOs. Formal district coordination meetings, sector specific and cross sector meetings have taken place at the divisional and/or district level (Amarasinghe 2005). Both the district and the divisional level used lead agencies to chair meeting alongside providing technical support. In LTTE controlled areas, several entities are involved in relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction such as the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), the Planning and Development Secretariat (PDS) and INGOs and NGOs. TRO played a significant role in both the relief and reconstruction phase in Batticaloa District although this area is Government controlled. Figure 5 below shows the position the various actors have in the rebuilding process after the tsunami.
Figure 5 Illustration of Actor’s positioning in the recovery process (Adapted from Amarasinghe 2005).
Coordinating committees disseminating district-level information on damages, relief and reconstruction needs, existed at the district-level consisting of the district secretary, divisional secretaries, representatives from the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (DOFAR) and NGOs (Amarasinghe 2005). Village-level activities were planned at divisional- level, whereby the divisional secretaries cooperated with the NGOs and CBOs. The smallest administrative unit at the village-level was the Grama Niladhari (GN), however the smallest unit in the fisheries administrative division consisted of the Fisheries Inspectors (FI) division.
The Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MOFAR) established in January 2005 a management scheme with the purpose of dealing with the needs of the fisheries sector after the tsunami. The structure of this scheme is illustrated in Figure 6 below:
Figure 6 MFAR’s disaster management scheme (Amarasinghe 2005).
The Special Disaster Steering Committee consisted of officers who were assessing the people’s needs after the tsunami in the various districts. The District Disaster Steering Committee held meetings at the District Secretaries and discussed any current affairs and made decisions regarding rebuilding of the fisheries sector. The Disaster Management Centres were established at the FI division-level and consisted of the Fisheries Inspector, Coordination officers, Fisheries Guards, representatives from fishing community organisations and the GN.
Divisional Secretaries played a key role in the recovery process in the tsunami aftermath because they were the contact and information point between the Government and aid agencies (Haug pers. comm.) as well as entry point to the Government administration.
With the change of Government in November the old structure as described above was replaced with three new structures; Ministry of Nation Building, Ministry of Resettlement and Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA). RADA was to replace TAFREN, TAFOR, the Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU), The Traditional Accommodation Project (TAP) and the Rehabilitation of Persons, Properties and Industries Authority (REPPIA). Past structures dealing with relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts have provided limited coherency within their strategies as responsibilities in regards to conflict-related issues was scattered among the various structures. RADA and the Ministry of Nation Building are dealing with both tsunami- and conflict-related issues, thus there might be a better insurance of equal treatment of tsunami and conflict affected communities (CPA 2006).
RADAs role is rather unclear due to secrecy in surrounding the creation of this authority,
activities regarding reconstruction and development after any disaster, it be natural- or conflict- related (CPA 2006). The present structure of RADA is illustrated in Figure 7 below, which shows that a link between RADA and LTTE is absent.
Figure 7 Present structure of RADA (source: CPA 2006).
2.6.4 Aid delivery actors
Due to the unprecedented scale of the tsunami a myriad of actors entered Sri Lanka in order to assist in recovery of the affected people. There were already some INGOs present in Batticaloa District prior to the tsunami and while some of them continued working with war affected victims, most converted to efforts targeting tsunami victims in the tsunami aftermath.
Some INGOs cooperated with local NGOs or CBOs, whereas others carried out their work without such collaborations. The level of knowledge of the local context and experience with reconstruction work varied greatly among the aid agencies working in Batticaloa, consequently affecting the quality of the recovery.
The immediate relief phase proceeded with vast distributions of aid, both from within Sri Lanka and abroad, and consisted mostly of food, clothes, various household-items and debris clearing. This aid was given and carried out by individuals and various organisations and institutions from non-affected areas of Sri Lanka as well as from abroad. Non-food items have been distributed with religious institutions such as temples, churches and mosques playing the leading roles. Amarasinghe (2005) notes that no complaints have been made in the immediate relief phase which indicates a successful distribution of relief aid.
2.7 Land issues
The ethnic conflict has impacted significantly upon land and housing in Sri Lanka, particularly in the multi-ethnic East. Over 800,000 people, whereby 78 per cent Tamils, 13 per cent Muslims and 8 per cent Sinhalese have been displaced in the North and East due to the war. Key obstacles both due to the war and the tsunami are loss or destruction of property documents such as deeds or land permits. Property rights to land are volatile and politicised in Sri Lanka and justification for land claims used by the various parties is often mirrored on communal disputes at meso- and micro-level (Korf 2003).
The Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU) was established to deal with housing needs after the tsunami. The people who lost their houses or lived within the buffer zone will receive houses built on small plots donated by the state. Housing loans are given to people that lived outside the buffer zone, whereby they can repair their damaged houses.
Reconstruction of houses for people who lived within the buffer zone prior to the tsunami is funded by NGOs, INGOs and the private sector. Damaged or destroyed houses outside the buffer zone are funded by World Bank, Asian Development Bank and others.
Construction of houses within the buffer zone is illegal and land will be identifies and allocated nearby the affected village, but outside the buffer zone.
3.0 Methodology
3.1 Study sites
The research was conducted in Batticaloa District in eastern Sri Lanka (Figure 3), which is a government controlled area that has been heavily affected by the tsunami and is also suffering from the effects of twenty years of continuing civil war. As the two largest populations in the east are of Tamil and Muslim origin, one village predominantly populated by of each of these ethnic groups was chosen as study sites.
The Batticaloa District has a population of approximately 545,480 people, and the highest population density is at Kattankudy DS Division. The major portion of the population is engaged in agriculture (paddy cultivation) whereas fishing is the second largest economic sector. A total of 255,000 persons from Batticaloa District were affected in the tsunami, whereby 3,177 lost their lives. The estimated monetary losses in the district are approximately Rs. 10,472.5, whereby Rs.722.7 stems from the fisheries sector. 5,376 houses were partially damaged whereas 12,232 were fully damaged (Recoverlanka 2005).
The studied fishing villages are in Kattankudy DS Division (Kattankudy north) and in Malmunai North DS Division (Palameenmadu). Both villages were adversely affected by the tsunami and people’s assets base for livelihood generation was severely damaged. The two communities were located in the cleared area (Government controlled) within a range of 20 km to Batticaloa town. Kattankuddy, which is the Muslim village, was considerably larger in terms of population size compared to the Tamil village Palameenmadu. Palameenmadu is located in close proximity to both the sea and the Batticaloa lagoon, however the interviewed fishers from the village were mainly sea fishers and only carried out lagoon fishing in the off season. The interviewed fishers from Kattankudy were all sea fishers. The majority of the interviewed households in both villages consisted of people that had lived there since birth, however a large number of the respondents had at least been displaced once before, as a consequence of the war. Almost all had been displaced more than once after the tsunami and all the respondents from the Tamil village were still displaced, living in a temporary shelter camp. They had been allocated new land near an area named Kokkuvil (Figure 8), which was further away from the sea than were they used to live before the tsunami. Figure 8 below
Thiraimadu temporary shelter camps, whereby all the interviewed households from Palameenmadu resided.
Figure 8 Map and satellite image showing the study sites in Batticaloa District. Temporary shelter camp and proposed land for traditional Palameenmadu residents (Source: Mearch.org 2005 & Google Earth accessed 17 May 2006).
The respondents from the Muslim village consisted of people mostly from outside the buffer zone. Thus many of these people had either moved back to their previous homes, or were living in a temporary shelter camp but waiting to return as soon as the rebuilding was completed. Displaced people from different communities inhabited the temporary shelter camp in Kattankudy, as a result of the war. The temporary shelter camp wherein the Palameenmadu residents lived was built after the tsunami and was occupied by people who lost their homes in the tsunami.
The Tamil village consisted of 380 families whereas the number of people in the studied section of the Muslim village is unknown but likely much higher. Only a small fraction of the northern section of this village was studied, however the whole village consisted of approximately 80 000 people.
3.2 Methods of Data Collection
This study examined processes of fisheries production and livelihood revival among fishing communities, as well as aid delivery systems performance in the fisheries sector. Primary and secondary data have been collected and the methodology consisted of mainly qualitative research methods. The qualitative strategy included interviews on attitudes and perceptions of local people and various other actors involved in the reconstruction process.
3.3 Sampling Design and Procedure
The type of sampling was of a non-probability character. Convenience sampling of snowball character was employed as the people interviewed were the ones most readily available, for example in temporary shelter camps or at fish landing sites (Bryman 2004). By utilising such a strategy, additional contacts were established that were of relevance to the research, in this way a broader and larger sample for interviews was created. The same procedure was used when interviewing various other actors involved in the recovery process.
A representative sample of people with regard to gender, age and ethnicity was an intended goal. As fishers’ are usually men, it was seen as important to also gain women’s perceptions.
Some wives of fishers were therefore interviewed, however none of these women were actively engaged in fishing but stayed at home caring for their children.
The interview questions were based on Adgers’ (2003) key indicators (property rights, access to resources, institutional change, demographic change and economic structure), with particular emphasis on property rights, access to resources and institutional change. Interview questions for households involved their fishing practices before and after the tsunami, type of fishing they engaged in, equipment replacement after the tsunami, perceptions on recovery process and the buffer zone policy.
Some of the data gathered on the fishers was interpreted statistically using Excel and the statistical program Minitab.