3. Grammar, syntax, semantic meaning and pragmatic function of seem and appear as presented
3.5. Pragmatic functions
The meaning of modal items, especially modal lexical verbs like seem and appear, are often contextually determined (see chapter 2.4.) The most relevant pragmatic functions for seem and appear are discussed below. Examples are from the ENPC, but not exclusively may own data set.
3.5.1 Epistemic stance
‘Stance’ is commonly understood as the expression of a speaker or writer’s attitude, perspective, point of view, standpoint, opinion or position, including in its definition degrees of certainty,
knowledge, degrees of commitment to truth of propositions and sources of knowledge, among other epistemic qualities" (Orch, 1996 in Ajmer, 2019). Epistemic stance is distinct from affective stance, which has to do with feelings or emotions, but both types of stance can be expressed in a situation.
This broad definition of epistemic stance entails all the pragmatic functions of epistemic modal markers: the function of construing hypothetical situations and possible worlds, displaying certainty and uncertainty (hedging), signalling of commitment and detachment, defining common ground and establishing 'sources of knowledge'. Consequently, the pragmatic functions of epistemic stance markers include functions of evidentiality, for example the construing of knowledge and the speaker's role in construing the information that is the basis of the modality.
Haddington (2004) points out that the notion is in danger of becoming an "all-embracing and elusive notion…which includes everything and explains nothing" and which is used to describe phenomena that have already been described by using other notions or terminology. In an attempt at unpacking the concept, Haddington distinguishes between 'stance' as a subjective attitude and 'stance taking', which is active use of multiple linguistic resources and practices in an interactional setting.
The starting point for investigating stance as attitude is usually a linguistic form, for example a syntactic unit or a word. This applies to the present study of seem and appear as evidentials or epistemic modal markers. In my analysis (Chapter 5), I have scoped down the concept of epistemic stance so that only the function of marking speaker's commitment and detachment to the
proposition is included in epistemic stance. (39) is an example of appear functioning as a marker of detachment. The speaker is distancing himself from the propositional content that Louise shared the contempt for the New World. (40) is an example of the speaker taking ownership of the propositional content. The lack of distance in (40) is of course further emphasized by the oblique object to me, which makes the speaker the explicit experiencer:
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(39) Many of these relatives still lived in Germany and had the Old World's contempt for the New, a contempt in which Louise appeared to collude. (RF1)
(40) It seemed to me that whatever else was true, it was absolutely the case that Ty deserved to realize some of his wishes. (JSM1)
This study investigates similarities and differences between seem and appear with respect to how often and in what context they function as markers of stance and attempts to determine whether their function of marking stance is connected to type of evidence. The findings suggest that there is a difference, and that it is related to the evidential and epistemic modal meaning imbued in appear and seem respectively (6.3.).
3.5.2. Hedging
Hedging is generally understood as "a discourse strategy that reduces the force or truth of an utterance and thus reduces the risk a speaker runs when uttering a strong or firm assertion or other speech act" (Kaltenböck, 2010). When the term was first introduced in 1972, the original definition of hedges was that they were "words whose job it is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy" (Lakoff, 1972:
195 in Fraser, 2010). For some time, they were considered marginal, even redundant, items that contributed little to the communication. Today, they are generally acknowledged as playing a crucial role in both spoken and written discourse, and that understanding a text not only depends on understanding the factual content, but also the writer's intention which is often encoded in hedges (Mkhitaryan, 2015).
Related to the concept of hedging is the mitigation perspective; which is all about reducing the unwelcome effects on the hearer (Caffi in Fraser, 2010). Mitigation introduces the three concepts of bushes, hedges and shields. These concepts are three types of mitigation that reflect which part of the utterance they operate on: the proposition, the illocution and the utterance source. Bushes are lexical items that reduce the commitment to the propositional content, may introduce vagueness in the interpretation of the utterance and affect the truth value of the proposition. Hedges are lexical expressions that lessens the force of the speech act (e.g. a performative or a declaration) and shields are devices that avoid or shift the responsibility of the utterance, e.g. by introducing a different speaker (Fraser, 2010). All three are relevant subcategories for seem and appear, since both expressions clearly can reduce speaker's commitment to the content of the proposition, can lessen the force of a declarative sentence, and can sometimes shift responsibility for an utterance from the speaker to the evidence at the basis for a proposition or introduce the speaker as the ultimate experiencer of a proposition, see sections 3.3.2. and 5.5.1.
Over the years a significant number of subcategories of hedging has been introduced, such as 'adaptors', 'agent avoiders', 'approximators', 'attribution shields', 'bushes', 'committers',
'compromisers', 'diffusers', 'diminishers' and 'down-toners' to name a few from the first section of an alphabetical list (Fraser 2010). However, a main distinction can be made between propositional hedging and speech act hedging. In this view hedging is defined as "a rhetorical strategy, by which the speaker, using a linguistic device, can signal a lack of commitment to either the full semantic membership of an expression (propositional hedging)…or the full commitment to the force of the speech act being conveyed (speech act hedging)" (Fraser, 2010: 22). Hedging thus affects the propositional content of a proposition e.g. by introducing an overall vagueness or questioning the truth value of the proposition. Hedges also reduce the illocutionary force of the utterance and speaker's commitment in general. In this view reinforcements, or boosters, are not part of hedging.
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Hedging is a particularly relevant concept for the lexical modal verbs seem and appear. Seem is often singled out as a modal expression with the pragmatic effect of signalling that there is some tension between what the speaker thinks and other, more argumentative voices.
Most scholars agree that there is no grammatical class of hedges in English, and that almost any linguistic item and expression can be interpreted as a hedge. According to Fraser, an expression is only recognized as a hedge when it is used in hedging (Fraser, 2010). Typical lexical items that function as hedges are:
• Classical approximators (sort of, kind of, so to say). These hedges affect the truth value of the propositional content. Expressions like sort of and kind of often co-occur with
expressions of epistemic modality and with cognitive verbs used as parentheticals, such as I mean, I know, I think, I believe, I feel, it seems (my emphasis), and when they do, they assign some degree of intersubjectivity to the hedge, i.e. they communicate shared knowledge (Ketzner, 2010) When they co-occur with verbs of communication, the hedging attributes a lower degree of speaker commitment.
• Epistemic phrases (I think, I guess, it seems - my emphasis). Comment clauses with epistemic meaning can function as hedges.
• Hedged performatives (I would suggest). Hedging can lessen the speaker's intention in speech acts such as making a promise or giving a warning and can weaken speaker commitment in general.
• Discourse particles. The Norwegian modal particles are examples of how discourse particles can function as hedges. In my material, modal particles are frequent translators of seem, but not appear.
• Placeholder nouns (thing). Vague and unspecific nouns can contribute to overall vagueness and non-commitment. As vague expressions, seem and appear can act as hedges.
• Approximation of numbers (about half, thousands, fifty-ish). Approximative numerals and numerical expressions are typical hedges.
• Adverbs and adverbials (supposedly, presumably, apparently). Hedges were traditionally examined under the header of adverbs and adverbials. They are sometimes called stance adverbs – adverbials that overtly mark a speaker's or writer's attitude to a clause or comment about its content. Stance adverbs are divided in three categories: epistemic, attitude and style. They can express a) certainty and doubt, b) actuality and reality, c) source of knowledge, d) limitation, e) viewpoints or perspective and f) impression (Ketzer, 2010).
• Impersonal and passive constructions and if-clauses can also function as hedges.
I include the list of typical hedges, because seem and appear make the list several times, and because the two verbs can be used interchangeably with many of the lexical items listed above, such as modal adverbials and epistemic comment clauses. Furthermore, the Norwegian correspondences of seem and appear manifest themselves in various forms, all found on this list.
The functions of the different linguistic items that functions as hedges that are relevant for seem and appear (Kaltenböck, 2010, Ketzer, 2010 Kärkkainen, 2003) are listed below.
Adaptors indicate that the speaker does not have enough evidence to present a clear-cut case of classification, and therefore provides a rough classification. The classical approximators (roughly speaking, in a way, or something like that, rather, like, kind of, sort of) often co-occur with
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expressions of epistemic modality and with cognitive verbs used as parentheticals, such as I mean, I know, I think, I believe, I feel, it seems. When they do, they signal that the basis for the shared knowledge may be negotiated, i.e. they assign some degree of intersubjectivity to the hedge. Seem and appear in the comparative constructions (when they combine with like, as if or as though) functions as adaptors:
(41) It seemed as if the whole world was there. (BO1)
Modifiers and boosted modifiers are linguistic items that serve as a signal for loose interpretation of the lexical choice, a signal of indeterminateness and vagueness or they serve as a signal of hesitation and self-correction. When they function as modifiers, seem and appear display uncertainty and doubt and reduce the speaker's commitment to the truth value of the propositional content. In (42), the choice of seem signals that the speaker is hesitant to make a more categorical statement, and seem functions as a hedge in the form of a modifier, signalling uncertainty and doubt and reduced commitment truth of the proposition.
(42) … he seemed to be losing weight. (AT1)
However, the two expressions could also function as boosted modifiers and signal heightened speaker's commitment (speaker assertion). Boosted modifiers, which are used to take on the stance as knowledgeable, are typically adverbs like certainly, or the use of evidentials, i.e. lexical items that communicate about the source of evidence. In (43) appear communicates that the speaker has made relevant observations supporting his statement. Both appear and seem can be evidentials and function as boosted modifiers by referring to type and source of evidence and strengthen the
speaker's commitment to truth depending on the strength of the evidence. Seem can also emphasize speaker's subjective judgment independent of evidence. This is particularly true in constructions with the speaker as explicit experiencer (44).
(43) He also appeared to have decided that the examination was over, and started to look round for his hat. (OS1)
(44) They seem to me to rely too much on forms of life we already know. (CSA1)
Adjusters signal that the information is sufficient, even if it is approximate, for the hearer to be able to understand the meaning. This type of hedge can express evidential meaning, in particular
imprecision, and thus affect the truth value of the proposition. Approximators and epistemic phrases are examples of lexical items that typically function as adjusters. Constructions with seem and appear in comment clauses (45) are examples of this subcategory of hedges (3.2.11.).
(45) "The children in Little Weirwold have been quite spoilt, it seems," commented the Doctor.
(MM1)
3.5.3. Politeness/face-saving function
Modal items can also function as politeness markers and have the effect of saving face. Face-saving in pragmatics is to mitigate or avoid face-threatening speech acts, such as requests or insults. The politeness marker can save the face of the speaker or the ones he or she is addressing. A possible reason for modifying a speech act may be, for example, to increase solidarity (positive politeness if
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the speech act is favourable to the hearer) or to express more distance if the speech act can be experienced as intrusive (negative politeness) (Holmes 1984, Ajmer, 2019). Showing sensitivity to others' feelings and avoiding expert status are two other pragmatic functions related to politeness (Coates, 2013). With seem and appear, the speaker takes on some responsibility for the
interpretation of the situation, because of the implied experiencer (it seemed/appeared to me), and the choice of seem or appear thus functions as a face-saving device (46).
(46) "You seem to be unaware," he said, "that this is a private lounge. (AH1) .
A related function is Self-repair. This happens when a lexical item hedges strong opinions by toning down the impact of the statement to reduce the imposition on the hearer.
(47) The Soviet Union seemed to be governed by a gerontocracy, and the Politburo itself might have been an adjunct of the Kremlin hospital. (MAW1)
The function of establishing common ground and providing source of knowledge is sometimes considered a function of hedging. In this thesis, establishing common ground is considered a function of all the subcategories of hedges.
3.5.4 Subjectivity and intersubjectivity
Subjectivity and intersubjectivity are central concepts when discussing epistemic modality and evidentiality from a pragmatic perspective. In linguistics, subjectivity is generally defined as the linguistic expression of speaker involvement. A modal item that signals speaker's assessment and that the assessment is the responsibility of the speaker, is subjective. Intersubjectivity is defined "as the sharing of experiential content (e.g. feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and linguistic meanings) among a plurality of subjects"(Zlatev et al., 2008: 1 in Almeida, 2015: 130). A modal evaluation is intersubjective if it is presented as being shared by the assessor and a wide group of people.
Intersubjectivity is thus about how the speaker and the audience construe knowledge and define common ground.
Both subjectivity and intersubjectivity are clearly linked to the notions of epistemic modality and evidentiality. Modality is sometimes defined as the grammaticalization of the speaker's subjective attitude. In cognitive linguistics, the link between the different concepts has resulted in a threefold distinction of evidentials, namely explicit (I saw), implicit (epistemic modals) and opaque (it seems)' (Almeida, 2015: 130).
3.5.5. Other pragmatic functions
Other pragmatic functions for epistemic modal items are
• The function of achieving certain conversational outcomes in certain sequential slot (e.g.
to avoid disagreement in certain slots)
• The function of regulating aspects of interaction (like topic transition)
• Articulation and rhetorical strategies
• Make counter proposals
These functions are not variables in my analysis and are not discussed in detail.
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