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They seem to be alike, but it appears that they are not

A contrastive analysis of seem and appear and their Norwegian correspondences

Synnøve Bolstad

ENG 4191 - Master’s Thesis in English Language 60 ECTS credits

The Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages

The Faculty of Humanities

November 2019

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Abstract

How similar or different are seem and appear? And how are the differences and similarities

reflected in the Norwegian correspondences and chosen translation strategies? This thesis explores similarities and differences of seem and appear with respect to grammar, syntax, semantic

meaning and pragmatic functions, and demonstrates how interaction between form, meaning and function determines the meaning and function of the two verbs – and it uses the Norwegian translations to do it. The comprehensive study of seem and appear uses translation data from the English-Norwegian Parallel Corpus (ENPC) in two different methods; Semantic Mirrors and

contrastive analysis, to show that even though seem and appear are very similar and have many of the same correspondences in Norwegian, they differ with respect to grammar, syntax, semantic meaning and pragmatic function. The study shows that the interaction between form, meaning and function determines the meaning and function of the two verbs, and provides cautious support for the claim that seem and appear are going through a process of semantic bleaching and

grammaticalization and are turning into semi-modals like other emerging modal auxiliaries in English, possibly filling a lexical gap in the range of the modal auxiliaries.

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Table of contents

Abstract ... iii

Table of contents ...v

List of tables ... vii

List of figures ... vii

1.Introduction... 1

2. Modality, epistemicity and evidentiality ... 4

2.1. The rise of modality at the expense of mood ... 5

2.2. Modality as a grammatical concept ... 5

2.3. Modality as a semantic concept ... 6

2.4. Modality as a pragmatic concept ... 9

2.5. The concept of evidentiality ... 9

2.6. The relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality ... 10

2.7. Type and source of evidence ... 12

3. Grammar, syntax, semantic meaning and pragmatic function of seem and appear as presented in the literature ... 15

3.1. The grammar of seem and appear ... 15

3.2. Syntactic structure ... 16

3.3 Syntactic function ... 19

3.4. Semantic meaning ... 21

3.5. Pragmatic functions ... 23

3.6. The relationship between form, syntax, meaning and function ... 28

3.7. Previous studies of seem and appear ... 28

3.8. Focus of the present study ... 29

4. Method and Material ... 30

4.1. Equivalence and correspondence ... 30

4.2. Semantic Mirrors ... 31

4.3. Corpus linguistics, contrastive analysis and translation correspondences ... 35

4.4. About the chosen corpus ... 40

4.5. The data set ... 40

5. Analysis. ... 45

5.1. The senses of seem ... 45

5.2. The senses of appear ... 49

5.3. Grammatical form and syntactic structures of seem and appear and their correspondences ... 53

5.4. Evidential and epistemic meaning ... 60

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5.5. Pragmatic functions of seem and appear ... 65

5.6. The relationship between syntactic form, evidentiality and epistemic modality and function ... 72

6. Discussion and conclusion ... 75

6.1. Seem and appear differ with respect to grammar and syntax ... 75

6.2. Seem and appear have semantic meanings that are unique to them. ... 75

6.3. Seem and appear differ with respect to evidentiality and epistemic modality ... 77

6.4. Seem and appear have different pragmatic functions that reflect their epistemicity and evidentiality ... 80

6.5. Form, meaning and function ... 81

6.6. Seem and appear are becoming like the modal auxiliaries ... 81

6.7. Conclusion ... 82

7. Summary ... 84

8. References ... 86

Online sources ... 90

Primary data ... 90

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List of tables

Table 1. The Norwegian correspondences of seem and appear with a to-infinitive clause

or a that-clause……….42

Table 2. Congruent, non-congruent and zero correspondences of appear and seem, raw numbers and percentages in relation to the total number………..…………..53

Table 3. Type and source of evidence in sentences with appear and seem, raw frequencies and percentages………..61

Table 4. Distribution of sense-groups of seem and appear, raw frequencies and percentages……….64

Table 5. Pragmatic functions of appear and seem, raw frequencies and percentages…..…66

Table 6. Syntactic structures with seem and appear, source of evidence and pragmatic function, raw frequencies……….………72

List of figures

Figure 1. Evidential hierarchy after Willett (1988), based on adaptation by Faller (Brugman, 2015)……….13

Figure. 2 First t-image of Norwegian tak………..………..32

Figure 3. The inverse t-image of Norwegian tak……….…32

Figure 4. Second t-image of Norwegian tak………..………33

Figure 5. Restricted second t-image of Norwegian tak……….34

Figure 6. Sense groups of Norwegian tak………..34

Figure 7. Sense groups of seem and appear ………53

Figure 8. Sense groups and degree of evidentiality and epistemic modality……….65

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1.Introduction

When I say that somebody appears to have done something or seems to be doing something, I do not commit myself totally to the truth of that statement, and I hint that there is some evidence – or lack of it – that form the basis for how committed I am. The expressions seem and appear modify what would otherwise have been a categorical statement and introduce epistemic modality and evidentiality into the proposition. The choice of these verbs over other verbs, and the choice of one verb over the other, makes a difference in meaning and communicative function, and we should take care both when we use them and when we translate them.

On the face of it, the two expressions and their translations are very similar. They are used as synonyms, and dictionaries often use one expression to define the other. They also share pragmatic functions. However, there are obvious differences between the two expressions when it comes to grammatical properties and syntax, and they also differ in semantic meaning and communicative function.

So how similar or different are seem and appear really? And how are the differences and similarities reflected in the Norwegian correspondences and chosen translation strategies? The present study tries to give a comprehensive understanding of the similarities and differences of seem and appear with respect to grammar, syntax, semantic meaning and pragmatic functions, and how the

interaction between form, meaning and function determines the meanings and functions of the two verbs – and it uses the Norwegian translations to do it.

The research questions for my thesis are:

1. How different or similar are seem and appear with respect to grammar, syntax, semantic meaning and pragmatic functions?

2. How does the interaction between form, meaning and function determine the meaning and function of seem and appear?

3. How are these differences reflected in the translation?

To answer these questions, the present study uses translation data from the English Norwegian Parallel Corpus (ENPC) and two different methods, Semantic Mirrors (Dyvik, 1998) and contrastive analysis, to investigate the extent to which seem and appear differ. Translation data are thus used both as a source of information about the semantic meaning and pragmatic function of these two verbs in English, and as a source for detecting differences and similarities in the translations themselves.

For a productive discussion on whether the differences or similarities between seem and appear are related to grammatical properties, syntactic form, modal or evidential meaning and pragmatic effect, it is necessary to distinguish between evidentiality and epistemic modality as grammatical concepts, semantic concepts and pragmatic concepts. Any conclusion on how epistemic modal or evidential seem and appear are, depends entirely on the definitions and the boundaries of the concepts of evidentiality and epistemic modality. If evidentiality and epistemic modality are defined as separate grammatical concepts, only grammatical markers or members a closed grammatical class would qualify as evidentials or modals. As we shall see, seem and appear would not be evidentials or modals in this strictest definition. If, however, evidentiality and epistemic modality are defined as semantic concepts, the present study will show that both seem and appear clearly have evidential and epistemic meaning in certain constructions and could potentially qualify as evidentials or

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modals. The analysis of seem and appear also depends on pragmatic factors such as subjectivity and intersubjectivity, stance, hedging and politeness. It is difficult to draw strict boundaries between grammar, semantics and pragmatics when it comes to seem and appear, since the different

dimensions interact and mutually affect each other, but this study is an attempt at a comprehensive study of seem and appear that include these dimensions and their interdependency.

To answer the question of how similar or different seem and appear are, it is especially important to disentangle the complex relationship between reference to evidence (evidentiality) and speaker's evaluation of truth value of the proposition and his or her commitment to it (epistemic modality).

Different models describe the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality differently, but the relationship itself is not disputed: Type and source of evidence determines how strong the evidence is perceived to be. Direct evidence is more reliable than indirect evidence, and visual evidence is generally regarded as more trustworthy than hearsay, for example. Evidence strength speaks to how reliable the information is thought to be, which in turn influences how certain the speaker is. The degree of certainty reflected in in the speaker's statement is an epistemic quality and influences how committed the speaker is. The relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality is particularly relevant for inferences, assumptions and implicatures. Inferences is a way of acquiring information through reasoning, at the same time the reasoning can prompted by and dependent on evidence. This study will show that evidentiality and epistemic modality interact in inferences, and that in most cases evidentiality and epistemic modality become a matter of degrees:

whether the evidentiality is stronger than the epistemic modality, or the epistemic modality is stronger than the evidentiality. This study will show that evidentiality and epistemic modality are evenly distributed in inferences, but that in inferences with seem, the balance tips slightly towards epistemic modality: Inferences with seem tend to have a higher degree of epistemic modality, but not by much.

Previous studies (of seem) have shown that there is a relationship between syntactic form on the one hand and evidential and epistemic modal meaning on the other hand. Seem can for instance have the meaning ‘appearance’ and hedge probability or indicate hearsay depending on the construction it occurs in. According to Aijmer (2009), seem to is the most grammaticalized form and can be regarded as an evidential marker, and it seems (that) is similar to an adverbial. Previous studies have labelled seem in combination with a that-clause as a hearsay marker, signalling that knowledge has been acquired through language. The present study shows that both seem and appear have different meanings and functions in different syntactic constructions, and that they are not identical in this regard. While I confirm what others have found before me - that seem in catenative constructions is predominantly evidential and seem plus a that-clause is more epistemic - I find that the pattern is a little different with appear. This study finds that appear is predominantly evidential in both in catenative constructions and constructions with a that-clause.

Through the Semantic Mirrors-method, the present study was able to determine several different senses for seem and appear. The different sense partitions could then be placed on a scale ranging from having a high degree of evidential meaning and little or no epistemic meaning, to sense partitions with a high degree of epistemic modal meaning and little or no evidential meaning.

The relation between form, meaning and function is central to another question underpinning my thesis: whether seem and appear in certain constructions are going through a process of semantic bleaching and grammaticalizing and are becoming like the modal auxiliaries – so much so that they should perhaps be considered part of the group of emerging auxiliaries in English, like need to or used to.

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Previous studies have shown - and this thesis will confirm - that seem is rarely translated by a modal auxiliary, and it often disappears from translations without a trace. I find that the same is true for appear. Translation strategies like omissions, which entail a loss of modal or evidential meaning in the translations, and restructurings, e.g. with one of the Norwegian modal particles or a modal adjunct, offers insight into the different meanings and functions of the original expressions. The study also provides insight into the prototypical translations of seem and appear and how these are not the same as the most frequently used Norwegian correspondences for seem and appear. The study also shows that some correspondences are frequently used for some pragmatic functions, but not others, for example that translation with a Norwegian modal particle is the preferred translation strategy for seem as a politeness marker.

Moreover, translation strategies matter. Omission and restructurings that downplay the epistemic modality or upgrade the evidential strength or epistemic modal meaning could result in loss of meaning in the translated texts and subsequent misunderstandings.

The structure of the thesis is as follows:

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework for epistemic modality and evidentiality and

introduces the definitions and distinctions that are made. In this chapter I provide an overview of the rise of the concept of modality at the expense of mood and discuss modality as a grammatical, semantic and pragmatic concept. I also provide a typology of modality and discuss the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality. Chapter 3 presents the grammar, syntax, semantic meaning and pragmatic functions of seem and appear as it is presented in the literature. This chapter also contains an overview of previous studies of seem and appear and previous studies of some of the most frequent correspondences, e.g. the Norwegian modal particles. Chapter 4 presents the method of Semantic Mirrors (Dyvik, 1998), and describes the design of the contrastive analysis of seem and appear and their correspondences. Chapter 5 presents the results of the analyses with examples from the corpus, and these are discussed further in Chapter 6. This chapter is structured to answer the research questions of my study. Chapter 7 sums up the thesis and suggests further work.

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2. Modality, epistemicity and evidentiality

This chapter attempts to describe and disentangle the complex relationship between modality, epistemic modality and evidentiality. These concepts and the demarcations between them are central to the analysis of seem and appear. Both expressions can refer to evidence. And both can convey something about speaker's assessment of truth value of the proposition and his or her commitment to it and function as epistemic modal markers. However, how evidential or modal they are, is a point on which they are thought to differ. A comprehensive understanding of what is comprised in the concepts of modality, epistemic modality and evidentiality is thus necessary to understand crucial similarities and differences between the two verbs. The concepts are also intertwined: Speaker's commitment depends on how certain or uncertain he is of the factuality of the proposition, which in turn depends on the reliability of the information, which depends on the source and type of evidence. Any conclusion on how modal seem and appear are, thus depends entirely on the definitions and the boundaries of the concepts. The chosen approach to evidentiality and epistemic modality matters, because the question of whether seem and appear should be considered part of a category of modals or evidentials depends entirely on how the category and subcategories of modality are defined and where the lines are drawn.

Another important discussion is whether the differences or similarities between seem and appear are related to grammatical properties, syntactic form, modal or evidential meaning or pragmatic effect. As such, it is necessary to distinguish between evidentiality and epistemic modality as grammatical concepts, semantic concepts and pragmatic concepts. If we see modality as a grammatical concept, linguistic items such as seem and appear must share the grammatical properties of a closed grammatical class to qualify as a member. Alternatively, modality could be a semantic category, in which case the modal meaning qualifies an expression as modal. The function of modals in context or interaction is a third way of categorizing modals.

Halliday (2004) called modality the region of uncertainty that lies between 'yes' and 'no'. A more detailed definition of modality is that it is a feature of language that allows the speaker to

communicate some nuance of reality, truth, probability, possibility and inherent obligation pertaining to a situation or event, to communicate the speaker's degree of commitment to an

expressed proposition, and the speaker's attitude and judgement towards the propositional content of a proposition. This definition is a synthesis of different definitions of modality that captures different notions of modality. It shows how modality is a very broad linguistic category – "a super category" according to Nuyts (2005). The present chapter provides the theoretical background for parsing this super category into manageable concepts suited to provide answers to the research questions. It starts with a brief outline of how the concept of modality has evolved over the years (2.1). Modality as a grammatical category is presented in 2.2. The definition of modality as a

semantic concept is presented in 2.3. This section includes a typology of different types of modality, including epistemic modality. Modality as pragmatic concept is discussed in 2.4. The concept of evidentiality is discussed in 2.5., and the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality is discussed in 2.6. Next, different models for categorizing source and type of evidence is presented in 2.7.

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2.1. The rise of modality at the expense of mood

This section comprises a brief outline of how the concept of modality has become increasingly popular and widespread in its use at the expense of the concept of mood (adapted from Nuyts and Auwera, 2019). The concept of modality is closely linked to the concept of mood, and different definitions of modality will relate to the mood system in different ways.

Early Greek scholars defined mood as part of a language system that allows us to express ideas and moods by making a statement, posing a question or expressing an order, through sentence types and speech acts. In other words, the focus was mainly on form. This is the Protagorean notion of mood.

Later on, Roman grammarians viewed mood as "different inclinations of the mind as marked on the verb" (Nuyts and Auwera, 2019: 23), thereby introducing a definition that referred to both form and meaning. With this definition, the number of moods grew as new types of moods were introduced, for example the infinitive and impersonal moods. This is the Dionysian notion of mood. In the Middle Ages, grammarians introduced the idea of propositional content (dictum) that could be characterized according to a set of labels (modi): the propositional content that it is raining could, for example be either 'necessary', 'possible', 'impossible', 'contingent', or even 'true' or 'false' (Nuyts and Auwera, p.

17). This is the Boethian notion of mood.

In later studies of English as a vernacular language, the modal auxiliaries were usually described and analysed as part of mood, but at the same time they were often linked to the ideas of necessity and possibility, which is very similar to the modern concept of modality. The concept of irrealis – that something is not real or not factual – was also introduced as a type of mood in this period (Bybee 1994, Palmer 2001).

Even though the modern concept of modality, which has at its core the notion of possibility and necessity and can be traced back to Aristotle and his square of oppositions that explains the relationship between necessity and possibility, it was Kant (1781) and his knowledge theory that caused the increased use of the term modality, which replaced the Boethian mood. Kant's philosophy was concerned with knowledge and truth, e.g. how we acquire knowledge and whether it is possible to have certain knowledge. According to Kant, modality is one of four categories of human

judgment: quantity, quality, relation and modality. Modality can be either problematical (Is the proposition possible?), assertorical (Is the proposition real or true?) or it can be apodeictal (Is it necessary?). Kant was the first to use the term modality to refer to the necessity and possibility of a proposition.

From the 1960s and onwards, modality entered English linguistics, and was increasingly used to analyse modal auxiliaries and speech acts (Leech, 1969, Lyons 1977, Halliday 1970), modal logic and types of modality (von Wright 1951, Palmer 1979).

2.2. Modality as a grammatical concept

Modality as a grammatical concept focuses on form and linguistic properties that place modal expressions in a grammatical category. Modality is defined as a category of grammatical forms which express modal meaning. Traditionally, the only modal expressions which constitute a well- defined class in English are the modal auxiliaries (Palmer, 2011). The modal auxiliaries can-could, may-might, shall-should, will-would and must all have clear formal markers that distinguishes them as a grammatical class. These are the NICE-properties:

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• Negation (Auxiliaries can be negated

• Inversion (they can be inverted in questions)

• Code (they can be left stranded as in John can't sing, but I can)

• Emphasis (they can be used in emphatic form).

Modal auxiliaries do not have an -s in singular third person and they cannot co-occur (there can be no double modals).

Seem and appear are not part of the closed class of modal auxiliaries (they don't fulfil the NICE- properties), nor have they yet found a place among the semi-modals, some of which are on the rise, aspiring to become part of the class of modals through the process of grammaticalization (Bybee et al, 1994, Leech, 2004, Krug, 2000). Semi-modals, or marginal modal auxiliaries, are need (to), dare (to), have to, have got to, used to, used to, be supposed to and be going to. Other emerging modals are had better, want to, be going to and would rather. This new generation of auxiliary verbs has been progressively emerging in Modern English and have taken over some of the functions of the traditional modals (Mitchell and Leech in Facchinetti, 2003).

However, there is an argument to be made that seem and appear have gone through a process of grammaticalization and have become and much like the modal auxiliaries in form and meaning (Johansson, 2001). The point to be made at this stage is that if we operate with a definition of modality as a grammatical concept, seem and appear would only qualify as modals if they were members of a closed grammatical class, no matter how modal their meaning. That's why grammatical properties of seem and appear and the syntactic constructions they occur in are presented in detail (3.1. and 3.2), and why a central discussion in this thesis is whether seem and appear in certain syntactic constructions could qualify as modals or as auxiliaries (6.4.)

2.3. Modality as a semantic concept

As a semantic concept, modality is a category that covers the many different nuances of modal meaning conveyed by modal expressions. Even though the concept of modality has been studied extensively over the years, there is no unified view among linguists on "how to cut up the semantic space of modality into types of modality, or even the boundaries of modality" (Lewis, 2015). Several ways of organising and categorizing modality has been proposed in the literature. A three-way division between dynamic, deontic and epistemic modality is presented here. The typology below (adapted from Nuyts and Auwera, 2019) is based on shared semantic properties. The category of epistemic modality is more or less consistent across all typologies, but there is an ongoing debate on whether evidentiality is part of epistemic modality or not, and whether a speaker's attitude and opinion fall under the category of epistemic modality or is understood as a category of its own.

Examples in this section are from Nuyts and Auwera (2019). Relevant parts are marked in bold.

2.3.1. Dynamic modality

Dynamic modality (sometimes called inherent modality) has to do with capability and ability. A distinction is made between participant-inherent dynamic modality, i.e. abilities that are fully inherent in the first-argument participant, for example

(1) He can stand on his head

and participant-imposed dynamic ability, i.e. ability that is determined by external circumstances and may be beyond the participants control

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2.3.2. Deontic modality

Deontic modality is traditionally defined in terms of permission and obligation, including related notions of interdiction and advice. Most scholars include volition and intention in the category of deontic modality, but this is debated. An even broader definition of deontic modality is that it is an indication of the degree of desirability of the state of affairs in the utterance (3). In this definition, the concept of desirability should be taken widely: it could be anything from societal norms to personal ethics.

(3) It must be done

2.3.3. Epistemic modality

The term 'epistemic' derives from episteme, the Greek word for knowledge, and epistemic modality has to do with knowledge and belief – or the lack of it. However, there are different takes on epistemic modality, too, and the fault lines goes between modal meaning connected to (i) speaker's subjective attitude and judgement, and (ii) modal meaning qualifying the factuality of a proposition:

(i) Epistemic modality expresses the attitude of the speaker towards the propositional content and marks the extent to which the speaker can commit himself to the state of affairs in the proposition – or the truth value of the proposition (Lyons, 1977, Palmer, 1986, Halliday 2004). Epistemic modal forms are thus "defined semantically as those linguistic forms which are used to indicate the speaker's confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of the proposition expressed in the utterance" and they can express the whole range of attitudes from confidence to doubt" (Coates, 2013). In this view, epistemic modality expresses the subjectivity of the speaker.

(ii) Epistemic modality is a category that qualifies the factuality of a proposition, and whether something is objectively true or not. More specifically, modal elements mark the state of affairs as undetermined in terms of factuality. This concept has its roots in the early ideas of the realis-irrealis-dimension of language and the notion of possible worlds, in which

propositions or events were seen as 'real' or 'true', and modal expressions were defined relative to other world’s distance to the real world in the theory of modal logic (Perkins, 1983; Palmer 1986). This definition of epistemic modality is thus an estimation (typically by the speaker, but not always) of "the likelihood that the state of affairs expressed in the clause applies in the world" (Nuyts, 2019, 38).

There is some debate as to whether the truth value of a proposition should be a category of its own (alethic modality) pertaining to modes of truth. The underlying premise for separating truth value from epistemic assessment is that whether something is true or not is a separate notion from the speaker belief and commitment to the truth of a proposition. It is full possible to be strongly committed to the truth value of a proposition, even if what you are committed to is objectively wrong. With this division, whether something is true or not (modes of truth) is covered by the category alethic modality, while epistemic modality comprises modes of knowing and reliability of evidence. Coates (2013) for example, stresses that in everyday spoken interaction, epistemic modality is used to convey the speaker's attitude to the proposition, not to convey some objective

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truth. Others rejects this division, and states that there is no difference between what is logically true and what the speaker believes to be true (Palmer, 1986 in Nuyts, 2019).

Epistemic modality is closely linked to evidence. Speaker's commitment to the truth value of a proposition may depend on factors connected to the evidence itself, such as source of evidence, and factors that are more epistemic in nature such as mode of knowing, strength of evidence, reliability of knowledge, speaker's deduction and personal judgement based on evidence which in turn influences speaker's certainty and commitment to the proposition. In some typologies, evidentiality is singled out a category of its own, separate from epistemic modality, others subsume evidentiality as part of epistemic modality. Evidentiality and the demarcation between epistemic modality and how that affects the analysis of seem and appear is discussed in more detail in 2.6.

Some typologies place the speaker's (or someone else's) attitude towards a state of affairs as a category of its own (boulomaic modality, sometimes called attitudal modality or emotional attitude).

This is not very common, most likely because this type of modal meaning is not very relevant for the grammatical category of the modal auxiliaries – the study of which dominates the literature on modality. Instead, attitudal modality is usually perceived as a shared semantic characteristic of epistemic modality. This is the approach chosen in this thesis: Speaker's attitude is part of epistemic modality, and the division is made between what is primarily evidence-based and thus evidential, and what is primarily epistemic and expresses the speaker's attitude and belief.

2.3.4. Other possible schemas for organising modality

Several other ways of organising and categorizing modality has been proposed in the literature (Quirk et al 1985, Palmer, 2001, Nuyts, 2019), but are only mentioned briefly here, since they are not used in this thesis.

The classic division is between root modality (the root sense of modal auxiliaries, e.g. obligation permission, ability etc, i.e. deontic and dynamic ability), and epistemic modality. This typology fits the closed class of modal auxiliaries, but it is less useful to study the many different lexical items with modal meaning that does not form a grammatical category, e.g. seem and appear. Another similar approach proposes two broad categories for modality: 'event modality' and 'propositional modality'.

Event modality covers dynamic and deontic modality; propositional modality covers epistemic and evidential modality. In this typology, epistemic modality is further subdivided into speculative, deductive and assumptive modality, and evidential modality has the subcategories reported and sensory.

Another way of looking at modality is to regard all categories of modality as being concerned with possibility and necessity. The idea is that all categories of modality can be characterized in terms of these notions. The categories will have a value for necessity and possibility, and propositional content can be characterized as being more or less possible or more or less necessary. These schemas are not particularly useful approaches for seem and appear, therefore I have chosen not to pursue these dimensions in my discussions in this thesis.

Distinguishing between 'speaker-oriented' and 'agent-oriented' modality is another way of categorizing modality. Speaker-oriented modality covers markers of directives (e.g. imperatives, optatives and permissives). In other typologies these are categorized under the heading mood, not modality. Agent-oriented modality covers any meanings which predicate conditions on the agent,

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e.g. obligation, desire, ability, permission and root possibility. Agent-oriented modality is thus identical to root modality mentioned above, while speaker-oriented modality covers epistemic modality. Speaker-oriented modality is in many ways a pragmatic approach to modality (2.4.)

2.4. Modality as a pragmatic concept

Sometimes, the modal meaning of a lexical item is not coded in a word class, nor inherent in the lexeme, but is acquired when language is put to use. This brings the analysis of seem and appear into the realm of pragmatics. Epistemic modal markers and evidentials have pragmatic functions when they convey something which is not (or is not just) about the source of information in the utterance nor about the assessment of the truth value of the proposition.

For seem and appear, which do not fit neatly into a well-defined grammatical category, and are vague and multifunctional, a pragmatic approach is sometimes needed to discuss the modal and evidential qualities of the two expressions. The functions of seem and appear are typically to show stance, to hedge or to construe shared knowledge, to be a marker of politeness or a face-saving device, or to serve other pragmatic functions, such as topic transitions and making counter proposals. The different pragmatic functions of seem and appear are presented in Chapter 3.

2.5. The concept of evidentiality

Evidentiality is a category of linguistic means that has source of evidence as its primary meaning (Brugman, 2015). The definition seems straightforward, but in linguistic literature there is little agreement as to what the category really covers. As is the case for modality, evidentiality can be defined as a purely grammatical phenomenon, a semantic category, or it can be described and discussed in terms of functions of evidential devices (Almeida, 2015: 126).

Evidentiality was first studied in languages that have evidentiality coded into their grammatical structure, e.g. verb suffixes in Native American languages. Later studies have shown that there is a wide range of evidential markers such as verb suffixes, sentence-affixes, lexical predicates or fully- fledged morphological categories. In English, evidentiality is expressed through a variety of devices.

The most common ones are lexical verbs, but modal auxiliaries, adverbs, discourse particles and miscellaneous idiomatic phrases can also express evidential meaning.

Seem and appear are lexical verbs with semantic meaning relating to visual, sensory or inferred evidence and are examples of linguistic devices with evidential meaning (semantic approach) or lexical items that can function as evidentials (functionalistic approach). Some scholars argue that evidentiality should not be defined as a strictly semantic, grammatical or modification phenomenon, but should be understood as a functional-conceptual substance domain (Boye and Harder 2009 in Brugman, 2015). In such a schema, the function of seem and appear would determine if and how they belong to a category of evidentials or epistemic modals.

Lexical modal verbs are considered borderline between the lexical and the grammatical category, but a watertight division between lexical and grammatical evidentiality may not be very useful (Aijmer, 2009). The grammaticalizing seem and appear may have the semantic category or their functions as a starting point for the process of becoming full-fledged grammatical items like the modal auxiliaries.

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2.6. The relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality

Epistemic modality is strongly linked to evidence, but the relationship between epistemic modality and evidentiality is less clear-cut than one could wish for. The main question concerns that which is not purely source of evidence, but more epistemic in nature. These are mode of knowing, strength of evidence, reliability of knowledge, speaker's deduction and personal judgement based on evidence – all of which influences the speaker's certainty and commitment to the proposition. Are the epistemic features part of evidentiality or not? And how do the two concepts relate to each other? Three main approaches are described below: epistemic modality and evidentiality as one category (2.6.1.), Evidentiality as a category of its own (2.6.2.), or a combination of the two where evidentiality and epistemic modality are considered two distinct categories with overlapping functions (2.6.3). The definitions matter, because the analysis of seem and appear and their correspondences depends entirely on where the boundaries are drawn between evidentiality and epistemic modality. The relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality is particularly relevant for inferences, assumptions and implicatures. On the one hand, inference is a way of acquiring information through reasoning, and reasoning might be considered evidence. Reasoning is also sometimes triggered by and dependent on evidence. On the other hand, inferences could be considered to represent the speaker's deductive epistemic judgements. Whether seem or appear could be considered evidential or epistemic or both would thus depend on the approach.

2.6.1. A broad approach to evidentiality

One possible relationship between epistemic modality and evidentiality is to include evidentiality in the definition of epistemic modality, or to include epistemic assessment and degree of certainty in the definition of evidentiality (Chafe and Nichols, 1986, Squartini, 2019: 58). The category of

epistemic modality is expanded to cover both evidentiality and the source of the information and the epistemic modality – the mode of knowing, the reliability of the information, degree of certainty and speaker's commitment to the proposition. Another take on the broad theory of evidentiality is to make the definition of evidentiality broad enough to include a wide range of epistemological and pragmatic properties. Chafe (1986) for example, defines evidentiality as "marking the speaker’s attitudes to knowledge of reality", a definition which subsumes degrees of reliability as well as evidential meaning related to hearsay, induction and deduction. With inferences, there would be no distinction between encoded evidential meaning (expressing inference based on observational evidence) and implicated meanings, e.g. speaker's evaluation and judgement about the truth value of the proposition in this approach (Aijmer, 2019).

2.6.2. A narrow definition of evidentiality

The narrowest definition of evidentiality restricts the linguistic category of evidentials to have only two obligatory properties that hold fast across all languages: They specify the source of evidence and they are members of a specific grammatical system. Other properties of evidentials, e.g. semantic and pragmatic properties like epistemic meaning, illocutionary meaning, speaker deixis and truth- conditionality vary across languages and must be empirically determined for individual items and languages. They are not inherent features of evidentiality in the strictest definition (Brugman, 2015).

Even if we define evidentiality primarily as a semantic category, a narrow definition would mean that evidentiality is concerned with source of evidence, and only that. In the narrow theory of

evidentiality, evidentiality and epistemic modality are two distinct categories, and the link between them is indirect. Evidentials code for strength of evidence only implicitly, relying on a presupposed

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hierarchy of strength of evidence, in which direct attested evidence is considered stronger than indirect reported evidence, second hand sources are more reliable than third hand sources and so forth. It is this implicit connection that, in turn, links evidentiality to how certain the speaker will be with respect to the propositional content and perhaps to his or her degree of commitment. (Givòn, 2001 in Brugman, 2015). Reliability of information, degree of certainty and speaker's assessment of the truth value of the proposition belong to the category of epistemic modality.

The relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality can more easily be discussed within a framework where the two notions are kept apart (Aijmer, 2009, Corinillie, 2012, Almeida, 2015). The narrow theory of evidentiality, which restricts evidentiality to source of information, is thus arguably better suited to analyse and reflect upon the evidential and epistemic quality of lexical items such as seem and appear. In a narrow theory, inferences signalled by seem and appear would be evidential only when they code for source of evidence. Source of evidence may be both observational evidence and the reasoning process behind a proposition, and this would be different from the speaker's judgement of the likelihood that the proposition is true.

2.6.3. Mixed approach: The categories overlap or are subcategories of one another

A third theory of evidentiality suggests that evidentiality and epistemic modality are two distinct categories with an overlapping relation "where modality and evidentiality partly intersect" (Dendale

&Tasmowski, 2001 in Brugman 2015). Both evidentiality and modality may thus be equally present in inferences. There are several different takes on how to disentangle the concept of evidentiality from the concept of epistemic modality in a mixed approach.

One take is to see the two as separate concepts in general, but with overlapping meaning and function when it comes to inferences. When seem and appear express inference based on

observational evidence, they would express evidentiality and epistemic modality simultaneously, and it would not be possible to separate one from the other. This would be much like epistemic must, which expresses both evidentiality (inference-based on evidence) and epistemic modality (personal assessment and evaluation) (Aijmer, 2009).

Another view, rooted in the non-factuality of modality, distinguishes between direct evidentials that are not modal, and indirect evidentials that are modal. Direct evidentials are evidentials based on direct perception. These are considered too factual to be considered modal. Indirect evidentials, however, are far less reliable and permits a lower degree of commitment to the factuality of the situation, and can therefore be considered genuinely modal (Squartini, 2019: 61). Another version of the mixed approach is to see evidentiality as a subcategory of epistemic modality. This approach sees evidential distinctions as part of the marking of epistemic modality (Willett, 1988 in Brugman, 2015).

2.6.4. Chosen approach to evidentiality

For seem and appear, it matters a lot whether we see evidentiality as a category of its own as distinct from epistemic modality or not. In the narrowest definition of evidentiality, seem and appear would not qualify as evidentials, since they are not a closed grammatical class. However, if evidentiality is defined as a semantic category, seem and appear certainly have evidential meaning in some contexts, and would qualify as an evidential. In the broad definition of evidentiality, in which the category of evidentiality is expanded to include epistemic assessment in terms of degree of certainty, they could both qualify as evidentials.

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For the purposes of this thesis, which is to determine any similarities and differences between seem and appear, and whether that is related to their evidentiality and epistemic modality, it is useful to consider epistemic modality and evidentiality as two distinct categories, allowing for the fact that they sometimes overlap when it comes to inferences. With this approach it is possible to determine if appear is more or less modal than seem, and discover if one of the expressions (for example appear) is primarily contingent on visual evidence and thus an evidential, whereas the other (for example seem) could be either evidential (when referring to evidence) or modal (when signalling personal judgment) or both (signalling personal judgement based on evidence). These differences would reflect a significant difference between the two expressions and influence how they are translated.

In this thesis I take this mixed approach. I define seem and appear as lexical verbs that can have evidential and/or epistemic meaning (one or the other or both in a semantic overlap), and that they can have several pragmatic functions, some of which they share.

Recent studies seem to support such integrated models of evidentiality and epistemic modality, in which "both categories interplay…and intermingle in various degrees" (Squartini, 2019: 64).

2.7. Type and source of evidence

The epistemic assessment of a proposition depends on several variables connected to evidence beyond its source, for example mode of knowing, evidence strength, reliability of information and degree of certainty. There are different models for analysing different types of evidence and their relative strength. Two main approaches are presented below: The first approach includes typologies with only an implicit link to epistemic modality. The second approach includes epistemic modal values, such as 'mode of knowing' and 'degree of certainty' as variables (2.7.2). The chosen approach for this thesis is presented in Figure 1.

2.7.1 Typology of evidence excluding epistemic modality

In the narrow approach to evidentiality, in which evidentials make up a distinct linguistic category with source of evidence as an obligatory property, source of evidence has the following four values:

can be either sensory inputs, another's report, inference and general, cultural knowledge (Brugman, 2015).

A more detailed typology of evidence takes the binary distinction between direct and indirect evidence as its starting point and presents subcategories for each type (Willett in Brugman, 2015).

Direct evidence is attested evidence, which can be visual, auditory or other sensory evidence.

Indirect evidence has two subcategories: reported evidence and inferred evidence. Reported

evidence includes hearsay (second hand or third hand reports) and folklore. Inferences can be based on observable results or one's reasoning, and the reasoning process is thus considered evidence (see 2.6.). The hierarchy of evidence is presented in Figure 1.

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Figure 1. Evidential hierarchy after Willett (1988), based on adaptation by Faller (Brugman, 2015).

The model incorporates a presupposed hierarchy of strength of evidence. Direct attested evidence is considered stronger than indirect reported evidence, and second-hand sources are more reliable than third hand sources. Folklore is less reliable than other reports. Inferences based on visible results are arguably stronger than inferences based on the speaker's reasoning. The hierarchy of evidential strength in turn affects reliability of information and speaker certainty or uncertainty, but the link between evidentiality and speaker certainty or uncertainty of the truth value of the

proposition (i.e. epistemic assessment) is indirect.

2.7.2 Models of evidence-types including epistemic modality

Some typologies of evidence include epistemic modality. A multi-dimensional approach with the variables evidence type (sensory, visual, reported), evidence location (location of the speaker vis-à- vis the described situation) and evidence strength (reliability of evidence) has been proposed, for example (Nuyts, 2019).

Another model that includes reliability of knowledge, and thus epistemic assessment, as a variable was presented by Chafe (1986). The variables in this model are:

(i) source of knowledge (sensory evidence, language, a hypothesis).

(ii) mode of knowing (one's belief, induction (from physical evidence), sensory evidence, hearsay (from language) or deduction (from a hypothesis).

(iii) reliability of knowledge

(iv) degree of match between the information or knowledge and the speaker's choice of linguistic device.

The different categories and subcategories in the different models correspond for the most part:

'sensory evidence' in Chafe's model and Nuyts typology corresponds to 'direct attested evidence' (visual, auditory or other sensory) in Willet's model.' Spoken or written language' as source of evidence corresponds to 'Indirect reported evidence', and Chafe's 'hypothesis as a source of knowledge' corresponds to 'indirect inferred evidence' in Willett's model.

With 'mode of knowing' as a dimension on its own, Chafe's model is more specific in its description of how knowledge is acquired. However, the same variables (except 'belief') are incorporated in

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Willett's classification: Induction from physical evidence in Chafe's model corresponds to knowledge from attested evidence in Willett's model, 'hearsay' is a variable in both models, and what Chafe calls deduction from a hypothesis is covered by Willett's category of inferred evidence. 'Belief' as a source of knowledge is not part of Willett's model. Belief involves personal assessment and epistemic modality and Willett's model pertains only to evidence. It is possible to believe something without evidence. The most significant difference between the different models is thus the variable

'reliability of knowledge' which is explicit in Chafe and Nuyt's models, but implicit in Willett's model.

In my study, I analyse the type and source of evidence in the translation pairs according to Willett's typology. The assessment of the strength of the epistemic modality expressed is thus determined indirectly according to the hierarchy of evidence above. In my analysis, I have included 'no

evidence/personal belief' as a category to determine which translation pairs do not refer to evidence at all, only to speaker's judgement, belief and epistemic assessment.

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3. Grammar, syntax, semantic meaning and pragmatic function of seem and appear as presented in the literature

Seem and appear are interesting and complex verbs. They are categorized as lexical verbs with modal meaning, but they are also members of the grammatical category of catenatives and they resemble auxiliaries in many ways. The modal and evidential meanings expressed by seem and appear are notoriously difficult to pin down. As sense verbs in the same vein as see, sound and feel, seem and appear have evidential meaning because they refer to physical evidence as source of knowledge (see 2.5 The concept of evidentiality). As lexical modal verbs they have epistemic meaning and denote uncertainty, non-factivity, and epistemic assessment (2.3.3.) Seem, but not appear, also has additional meanings closer to cognitive verbs like think. (Chafe 1986: 267, Aijmer, 2009: 72).

The difficulties in analysing seem and appear are multiplied by the fact that the two expressions can be used in many different syntactic structures, and that the meaning expressed in fact depends on the syntactic construction they occur in. Furthermore, the distinction is not between modal or not, or evidential or not, but is often a matter of degree and a mix of the two. The analysis of seem and appear will also depend on pragmatic factors such as subjectivity and intersubjectivity, stance, hedging and politeness. Moreover, all these factors can co-occur when we analyse specific examples (Aijmer, 2009).

To analyse seem and appear, it is necessary to analyse them at the levels of grammar, syntax, semantics and pragmatic effect. In the present chapter I present the levels of analysis that are relevant for my study, the distinctions that are made and the terminology I have used.

3.1. The grammar of seem and appear

As lexical modal verbs, seem and appear have the same grammatical properties as other lexical verbs. They show person, mood, tense and number. They keep the -s in third person singular present and have do-support. They also belong to the grammatical class of catenatives, or chain verbs as they are sometimes called. Catenatives can link with other verbs to form a chain of verbs. A catenative takes as its complement a non-finite construction, often an infinitive (see section 3.2.).

Seem and appear are not part of the closed class of auxiliaries, nor have they yet found a place among the semi-modals need (to), dare (to), have to, have got to, used to, used to, be supposed to and be going to or other emerging modals are had better, want to, be going to and would rather, which are on the rise, aspiring to become part of the class of auxiliaries through the process of grammaticalization (Bybee et al, 1994, Krug, 2000, Leech, 2004). Grammaticalization is the process of change in languages when lexical verbs with semantic meaning over time become function words, like prepositions or auxiliary verbs; or grammatical markers, like affixes and suffixes. Modal

auxiliaries, which developed from the lexical verbs willan, cunnan and motan in Old English into the modal auxiliaries will-would, can-could and must are a prototypical example.

However, even if they do not share the four properties that distinguish auxiliary verbs from other verbs (that auxiliaries alone can be negated, be inverted, show code and will allow a following verb phrase to be ellipted and that they can be emphasized) (Palmer, 2001), they do share many grammatical properties with the auxiliaries (2.2.). They are used in the same position as the

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auxiliaries, i.e. before a non-finite verb form. The difference is that seem and appear are followed by a to-infinitive clause rather than a bare infinitive. They also resemble the auxiliaries in that they are generally semantically independent of the subject (Johansson, 2001), see also section 3.7.

Furthermore, seem and appear alone can be negated like the auxiliaries in some syntactic constructions (4), and I will argue that they can be emphasized (5):

(4) It appears/seems not

(5) She APPEARS/SEEMS to be okay.

In this thesis I will make the argument that seem (and to a lesser degree appear) in certain constructions may be going through a process of grammaticalization, approaching the modal auxiliaries in form and meaning. An important stage in the process of grammaticalization is the loss or reduction of lexical meaning. This process is called semantic bleaching. A high number of different correspondences and variety among them is a sign of semantic bleaching. As this study will show, seem and appear have a high number of different correspondences, and they have many different senses. This is especially true for seem, and could signify that seem, but also appear, are becoming semantically bleached as part of the process of grammaticalization (6.5.).

3.2. Syntactic structure

Seem and appear can be used in many different syntactic structures, but they are not identical with respect to the syntactic structures they can occur in and the structures they favour. Below is a list of possible syntactic structures for seem and appear, in which the similarities and differences between the two are emphasized. The list of syntactic patterns and the examples are adapted from the online edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language

(Huddleston and Pullum, 2002) and Hasselgård et al. (2004).

3.2.1. A simple SV-patterned sentence (noun/pronoun + appear)

Appear can occur as a one-place verb in a simple sentence with SV-pattern. It is possible to say (6) The sun appeared.

However, even though it is possible to make a simple SV-sentence with appear, it is not very

common. The less marked use of appear is to add one or more optional adjuncts to the SV-sentence, e.g. a time, place or manner adverbial.

(7) The sun appeared on the horizon before six o'clock in the morning (8) Suddenly, he appeared in the doorway.

This SV-pattern is not possible with seem. Seem is a two-place verb in that it requires a minimum of two arguments. It is not possible to say

(9) She seems*

The obligatory second argument for seem is typically a complement (an adjective, a noun, a

prepositional phrase or a clause, see 3.2.6., 3.2.7., 3.2.2., 3.2.4. below) which ascribes a quality to the subject. With seem, a time or place adverbial will not suffice. Both seem and appear are intransitive verbs that do not take an object as the second argument.

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3.2.2. Catenative constructions (seem/appear + to-infinitive clause)

Being catenatives, seem and appear can link with other verbs to form a chain of verbs. They take non-finite verb clauses, as their complement, e.g. to-infinitive clauses with a lexical verb (10), to- infinitive clauses with to be plus an adjective (11) or to-infinitive clauses with to be plus a present participle (12). Seem and appear can also be followed by a perfect participle-clause, e.g. the infinitive form of the perfect auxiliary have plus a past participle (13).

(10) They appear/seem to agree.

(11) She appeared/seemed to be anxious.

(12) She appears/seems to be trying to persuade him to help her redecorate her flat.

(13) She appears/seems to have forgotten what he said earlier.

In this thesis, follow Huddleston and Pullum and use the term catenative for both the non-finite complement and the verb that licences it, i.e. the entire construction of verb and complement (Nordquist, 2018). Seem and appear plus any of the to-infinitive clauses above are referred to as catenative constructions in this thesis.

3.2.3. Constructions with existential there (there + seem/appear + to be)

Seem and appear also occur in constructions with existential there (14). In these constructions they function as auxiliaries to the verb to be.

(14) There appears/seems to be two buttons missing on my jacket.

3.2.4. Syntactic constructions with a that-clause (seem/appear + that-clause)

Both seem and appear can also be followed by complements in the form of that-clauses (15):

(15) It seems/appears that it is raining.

In constructions with a that-clause, the subject is always anticipatory it.

3.2.5. Attributive complement in the form of an adjective phrase or a past participle (seem/appear + adjective and seem/appear + past participle)

Both seem and appear can be followed by a complement in the form of an adjective phrase (16).

Seem and appear also take a past participle as a complement. Huddleston points out that when the past participle is used with seem and appear, it is always an adjective (17).

(16) She appears/seems capable.

(17) It appears/seems broken.

3.2.6. Syntactic constructions with an adjective and a that-clause (appear/seem + adjective + that-clause)

Seem can also easily combine with an adjective and a that-clause, e.g. with the adjective possible and a that-clause in (18). The syntactic construction is also possible with appear, but in this pattern, there are significant differences between seem and appear. Appear in combination with some adjectives comes across as marked and not idiomatic (19). In combination with other adjectives, e.g. likely and probable, it works just fine (20).

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(19) *It appears possible that it will rain (20) It appears likely that it will rain tomorrow

3.2.7 Attributive complement in the form of a noun phrase (appear/seem + noun phrase)

Seem, but not appear, can combine with a complement in the form of a noun phrase (21).

(21) She seems a capable person

Any combination of appear with another noun phrase would have to be made by way of a to- infinitive clause (22):

(22) She appears to be a capable person

3.2.8 Attributive complement in the form of a prepositional phrase (seem + prepositional phrase)

When a prepositional phrase is used as a predicate, it usually has idiomatic meaning and often resemble adjectives in that they ascribe a quality to the subject. This construction is only possible with seem (23) and (24).

(23) She seems completely at home in politics (24) They all seemed in favour of the change

Again, combining appear with an attributive complement in the form of a prepositional phrase would have to be done with a to-infinitive clause (25).

(25) They all appeared to be in favour of the change.

3.2.9 Syntactic constructions with the conjunctions as if, as though and like (appear/seem + as if/as though)

Both seem and appear can occur in syntactic constructions with the conjunctions as if and as though (26). These conjunctions are used to make comparisons, and to talk about an imaginary situation or a situation that may not be true, but that is likely or possible (Cambridge Online Dictionary). When combined with the verb in the past subjunctive or the past perfect subjunctive, this syntactic construction is used to describe an unreal or improbable situation (27).

(26) It appears/seems as if it is raining (27) She seemed as though she were dying.

In informal English, like can be used in a similar way to as if, though it is not always considered correct in formal contexts (Cambridge Online Dictionary). The construction with like is only possible with seem (28).

(28) It seems like it could rain any minute.

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In this thesis, the constructions with as if, as though and like, and their Norwegian correspondences, syntactic constructions with som and som om, are referred to as comparative constructions and hypotheticals.

3.2.10. Syntactic constructions with like and a noun phrase (seem + like + noun phrase)

Seem, but not appear, can also combine with like and a noun phrase:

(29) He seems like a fool

3.2.11. Parentheticals (it + seems/appears)

Parentheticals are syntactically unintegrated elements which are separated from the host clause by comma, and in spoken English often by intonation. Because they are syntactically independent, they can occur in medial or clause-final positions. Parenthetical expressions add information but can easily be removed without destroying the meaning or grammar of the main sentence. Parenthetic seem is frequently used (30). It is possible, but less common to use appear as a parenthetical (31).

(30) They're not coming after all, it seems.

(31) The government, it appears, had covered up the scandal.

This construction is also called a comment clause.

3.2.12. Syntactic constructions with the pro-clause so or not (seem/appear + so/not)

Another possible construction with seem and appear is in combination with the pro-clause so, or not:

(32) It seems/appears so (33) It seems/appears not.

The combination of seem and appear and the pro-clause so or not is only possible with empty it as the subject, not when the subject of the clause is a noun or a pronoun (34).

(34) She appears/seems not*

3.3 Syntactic function

Both seem and appear are multifunctional. This section presents the different functions of seem and appear in the syntactic constructions presented above.

3.3.1. Attributive or equative function

Seem and appear are copular verbs, sometimes called linking verbs. These are verbs that connect the subject to a complement. The complement attributes some quality to the subject, e.g. their

appearance, their character or their behaviour. As shown in sections 3.2.5., 3.2.6., 3.2.7., 3.2.8., the quality that is ascribed to the subject can be expressed in the form of an adjective phrase or a past participle, an adjective phrase plus a that-clause, a noun phrase, a prepositional phrase or a to- infinitive clause of to be plus a noun phrase. This is the attributive, or ascriptive, function of seem and appear.

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Another function of linking verbs is to identify a relationship or an existing condition between the subject and the predicate. The relationship can be between nouns, adjectives and clauses.

Constructions with existential there are examples of how seem and appear refer to existence. Also, the constructions with empty it are commonly used to describe a condition, typically about the weather, the temperature, time and distance (Hasselgaard), see for example (26) and (28) in section 3.2.9. above.

The choice of appear or seem instead of copular be is a well-established strategy to introduce uncertainty and epistemic modality into an otherwise straightforward relation between the subject and the complement, whether it is an attribute or an existing condition. Replacing be with seem or appear has sometimes been likened to altering an equalizer-sign to an approximately equal-sign.

As linking verbs, seem and appear are also used to make comparisons. Constructions with as if, as though are typically used to make a comparison to an imaginary situation or a situation that may not be true but that is likely or possible (Cambridge Online Dictionary), or an unreal or improbable situation (3.2.9). These are the hypotheticals (3.2.9). Comparative constructions with seem/appear and like (3.2.10.) also typically make comparisons between how something how something looks or is perceived to some pre-established notion. These are the more straight-forward comparisons.

However, seem and appear express less reliability than constructions with other verbs like look like, sound like and feel like that also indicate knowledge derived from sensory evidence.

3.3.2. Highlighting the speaker as experiencer

I will argue that another function of the verbs seem and appear is to introduce the speaker as the ultimate experiencer. This function is tied to seem and appear as sense verbs. All sense verbs (such as appear) and the verbs of seeming (such as seem) licence a to-phrase where the oblique noun (to me) phrase expresses the experiencer (35). But it can easily be dropped from the clause, in which case the experiencer is only implied (36).

(35) The proposal looks (seems) very promising to me.

(36) The proposal seems promising.

With both seem and appear it can be argued that that the ultimate experiencer is always the

speaker. This is true, even if the explicit experiencer in the clause is an oblique object in the form of a third person noun or pronoun. For example, in (37), the explicit experiencer is the third person pronoun them. But it is really the speaker's assessment of the situation that is conveyed through the choice of seem or appear. Therefore, the speaker is the ultimate implied experiencer of the situation in the proposition, whereas the experiencer of the different elements in the proposition (e.g. the newness of the idea) is the explicated third party.

(37) The idea appeared/seemed to be new to them.

Of course, the speaker, or the narrator, is always a factor to be reckoned with in every third person narrative, but the effect of using the sense verbs seem and appear is that the speaker is given a stronger presence in the proposition. As sense verbs, they connect the speaker's perception with the

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proposition. To what extent the speaker's perception is based on evidence, is an observation-based inference or an inference based on logic and reasoning – i.e. whether they convey evidentiality or epistemic modality or both, is a point of debate at the heart of this thesis (see section 6.2.3.).

3.3.3. Changing the subject role and thematic structure

Another function of seem and appear can be to play around with the grammatical and semantic subject for certain effects or change the thematic structure of a sentence. Seem and appear are so- called raising verbs, that can displace a noun phrase from a position within an embedded clause to a subject position in a higher clause (Oxford English Grammar). Typically, a raised subject is a

grammatical subject that carries a semantic role associated with a verb in a lower clause. Thus in (38) Henriette appears/seems [ _ to like Paul]

the subject, Henriette, is related syntactically to the verb seem in the matrix clause, but semantically to the verb like in the lower clause. The subject of the matrix clause (Henriette) is said to have been raised out of the bracketed clause from the position indicated by ‘_’. The effect of raising the subject and placing it in the thematic position, is to emphasize Henriette's role as the experiencer (of like), while keeping the modal meaning of seem. The displaced subject is called a raised subject.

Other syntactic constructions with seem and appear, for example in constructions with anticipatory it or existential there, move the real subject towards the end of the sentence, giving it more

importance, according to the principles of end-focus and end-weight (the information principle).

In many ways, it can be argued that it is their function of raising the subject that makes seem and appear auxiliary-like. When the subject is raised form the lower clause the straight-forward relation between the subject and the main verb (that Henriette likes Paul) is interrupted by the modality or evidentiality imbued in seem and appear. In addition, as raising verbs seem and appear are

grammatically connected to the subject, but their function is to convey epistemic modality (the source of which is the speaker, not the grammatical subject) in relation to the main verb like. The main verb is thus modified by seem or appear, but seem (or appear) has an independent connection to the subject, similar to epistemic must in Henriette must like Paul.

3.4. Semantic meaning

The next level of analysis is semantics. Under his heading, I will summarize what seem and appear mean according to the dictionaries. I will also discuss briefly evidential meaning and epistemic modal meaning, and the topic of vague language.

3.4.1. Meaning of seem and appear according to the dictionaries

Etymologically, appear stems from Latin appārēre, which means "to come into sight, be visible, be evident," and from the combination ad + pārēre, which means "to be visible, be evident, be subject (to), comply (with)," of uncertain origin. Appear is listed with several meanings: It describes how something looks, it is used as a synonym for seem, it can mean "to begin to be seen" or "come into sight", "to perform publicly in a film, play or a show", "to start to exist" or "become available" or "to arrive" (Cambridge English Dictionary).

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