I NSTITUTION BUILDING

For the past two decades, the international aid community has done little to build local capacity in either the public sector or civil society. To the extent this issue is now on the aid agenda, the agencies will have little country-specific experience or networks to draw on. Instead, they have a legacy of a virtual UN shadow administration in the social sector, run from Pakistan and often using local Afghan employees and selected NGOs to implement projects (see chapter 4 below). There is, however, a rich and varied Afghan capacity that can be mobilised. To illustrate: the massive growth of Afghan NGOs in the early 1990s was largely a local response to a UN invitation in 1989.⁴⁰ Some municipalities and shura that have been encouraged to take on a larger responsibility have done so effectively and become predictable suppliers of services to the local population.

Afghan human resources

While many educated Afghans have left the country, very significant Afghan human resources remain or are in neighbouring states. Many skilled Afghans are engaged in the UN and NGO sector; there is also a range of professionals in the health and education sector and in the business community. As a World Bank report of 2001 notes, the business sector within Afghanistan increased in areas enjoying relative security during the 1990s.⁴¹

A useful starting point is to discard the prevailing myth that there is little or no Afghan civil society, and then identify the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant groups and sectors. Many seem invisible to the aid agencies because they have been peripherally involved in either the provision of humanitarian assistance or the UN-led peace negotiations. Moreover, the international aid community has tended to focus on vocal diaspora groups rather than those working quietly inside Afghanistan or in the neighbouring countries. This tendency seems to be persisting in the post-Taliban phase: at the recent United Nations Development Programme/World Bank/Asia Development Bank-sponsored meeting in Islamabad, called to start planning for reconstruction, only a couple of some 200 Afghans invited had Kabul as their address;

the rest were from the diaspora. ⁴²

A variety of civil organisations appeared in Afghan cities during the communist regime, including women groups, labour and trade organisations. Discarded as

"communist" structures by the mujahedin government and humanitarian agencies alike, they represent at least a tradition that may be revived.⁴³ In the countryside, tribal structures and the village middleman were sidelined first by the commanders and later by the shura established by the humanitarian agencies.⁴⁴ The tribal structures remain

40 When the UN announced it would support the establishment of Afghan NGOs in 1989, the number increased from around 20 to 250. Many were formed by political parties, military commanders, UN employees, and Pakistani and Afghan businessmen.

41 For details see World Bank (2001) Brief Overview of Afghan Economy, 5 October 2001. Islamabad, World Bank.

42 Similarly, the list of consultants suggested to undertake the initial needs assessment in December 2001 revealed Western predominance.

43 The NGOs mainly recruited their staff among Afghans residing in Pakistan who had fled from the Soviet invasion. They were closely related to the mujahedin parties.

44 This middleman function was termed arbab, malik or mir in rural areas and wakil-e-gozar in the cities. They represented the population vis-à-vis the government and were to inform the villagers on

intact, although they are evidently less influential than before. The religious networks gained prominence and became better organised during the Taliban period, but their future role is difficult to judge in the present situation.

Afghan Islamic groups that include prominent and respected religious leaders were involved in the peace process during the 1990s, as were civic groups that attempted to negotiate between the warring factions. However, this proved a dangerous occupation as several leaders of such civic associations (including the father of Hamid Karzai, Chairman of the Interim Authority) were assassinated in Pakistan. Moreover - and very importantly in relation to present peace-building efforts - when these groups felt excluded from the UN-led peace processes, they gradually lost momentum and popular support.

In general, Afghan NGOs established in Pakistan earned themselves a negative reputation as several were affiliated with "conflict entrepreneurs", had more of a business approach and lacked solid roots in society. Setting these aside, several innovative and successful NGOs have gained both national and international credit for their work. Moreover, staff members of such NGOs have gained popular respect and trust. They represent a significant source for future development, whether in the state administration (from which many were recruited) or in civil society.⁴⁵

During the past two decades there has been a massive work-migration outflow of Afghan men to Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf countries, where they have acquired advanced skills in construction and other industries that are central to the reconstruction phase. The exile period has also strengthened regional networks of trade and capital flows. Afghans have become prominent businessmen in neighbouring countries, many maintaining the legal trade network between Afghanistan and the Middle East and the West. Earlier proposals to mobilise these resources have re-emerged and are being promoted by the World Bank.⁴⁶

The greatest scarcity concerns people with higher education and administrative skills.

Resources within the diaspora community are here highly relevant. An initiative to establish a database of Afghan professionals in exile who could be called on to assist in the reconstruction period appeared in 1998, and has also been incorporated in the World Bank's first Approach Paper for the reconstruction. ⁴⁷

governmental decisions and regulations. Ideally, they were appointed jointly by the government and the villagers and not regarded as government employees.

45 The Afghan demining NGOs have a worldwide reputation as being professional and innovative, and several of the development oriented NGOs are of international standard.

46 The World Bank "Approach Paper" presented at the Islamabad meeting in November 2001 emphasised mobilising Afghan entrepreneurial skills from the exile community (para. 64). There was less mention of Afghans inside the country, who have very considerable entrepreneurial and survival skills. Afghanistan. World Bank Approach Paper, available at http://lnweb18.worldbank.o.../

7AA687A0D 8FE2 99985256 AFB00742B6D?OpenDocument.

47 "Approach Paper", para 11, Executive Summary. For earlier proposals, see Haneef Atmar, Sultan Barakat and Arne Strand (1998). From Rhetoric to Reality. The Role of Aid in Local Peace-building in Afghanistan. Workshop report, York: The University of York.

3.4. Policy implications

Restore national institutions

Central institutions of the modern state, first launched in the 1920s, became progressively more established under the modernising monarchs in the 1960s and 1970s. There was a national police, a national bank, a national army, and national ministries with provincial branches. These institutions continued to exist to some degree into the 1980s - even a skeletal structure was restored by the Taliban.

Admittedly, the structure had limited reach and was gravely weakened during years of warfare. But the idea of a national state and institutions does not have to be invented.

The problems posed by the existence of regional and local warlords should not be underestimated. As power structures that have developed over two decades, they represent strong vested interests, and most have foreign support. There are basically three approaches to building them down. The warlords can be politically starved through exclusion, tamed by inclusion in a national structure, or reformed in situ.

Experience from the past two decades suggests that the last alternative is unlikely to succeed. A precondition for the second is the existence of a reasonably strong national authority that can shape the inclusion process. The first alternative entails the development of national institutions at the central, provincial and district level that can break the regionalised economy of war. The two most promising approaches, then, both require a strengthening of national institutions.

Because of weak existing structures, a national focus for aid distribution may initially lead to programmes and projects that are less than effective. On the other hand, working at the national level is necessary to set overall policy priorities and to facilitate making them transparent.

Choose local partners that support a development orientation

While traditionally having limited functions, the shura may become development bodies that function on the local level, provided they receive support to take on this role. By contrast, working with military commanders at the regional or the local level only serves to strengthen the political economy of war. Working more closely with local, traditional authority structures might mean the aid agencies will lose influence over the assistance process, yet the gain would accrue to civil society institutions with a degree of representativeness rather than the warlords.

Use local resources

The principle of using local human resources is generally emphasised by the international community in post-conflict situations; practice does not necessarily follow. As noted above, there are many skilled Afghans both inside and outside the country. The international aid community has so far, emphasised the exile community. To rectify this, aid actors need to identify, co-operate with, and develop relevant Afghan groups and institutions. The knowledge and networks of the humanitarian organisations that have long experience of working inside Afghanistan are particularly valuable in this respect.

Given very limited capacity building in the past, this clearly must be a main priority for rehabilitation and broader peace-building strategies.