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Chapter 6 Analysis

6.9 Discussion

Throughout these sections central themes were discussed in depth. Themes that came up repeatedly in the data-collection process were identified early on, these have worked as guiding topics for the different sections of the analysis. They were supplied with direct quotes from the informants and a theoretical basis from the conceptual framework.

Throughout the chapter I have shed light on different factors and perspectives on the situation.

Furthermore, it was a particular concern to respect the informants, by highlighting things they felt strongly about and making space for their own words throughout the chapter. After this detailed discussion of the different themes, this section aims to finally answer the research questions of this thesis. The last section of this chapter presents a short discussion in which the main points are repeated and tied together, with each of the research questions in focus.

1) What are the root causes of the 2018 conflict between the Guji and Gedeo Ethnic Groups?

It is difficult to pinpoint the core issues in this complex conflict, in reality the interviews with my informants were long and complex, rarely one simple cause or issue was mentioned alone.

According to my findings the root cause of the 2018 conflict between Guji and Gedeo were made up of several interconnected factors, of which the first relates to territory, in the form of continued disagreements over the administrative border between the zones. And the second relates to self-rule under the ethnic federalism, illustrated through the issue of minority rights and the implications of the administrative borders.

Throughout the analysis these structural causes were identified at the heart of the 2018 conflict between Guji and Gedeo. To sum it up shortly, the politization of ethnic identities in Ethiopia and the drawing of borders of administrative units on the basis of ethnic identity has created conflict between the two groups. The problem at the core seems to be related first and foremost to “self-rule”, in particular the rights of minorities under the ethnic federalism appears to be an issue here. It is clear that the ethnic zones are dominated by the majority ethnic groups, who dictates the official language and expression of culture in that area. This clearly causes some grievances among the Gedeo minority in West-Guji who wished to be educated in their own language, to wear their traditional clothes, and practice their culture.

At the same time there are clear grievances with the border that was drawn in the late 1990s, Guji informants felt that they had given up land to the Gedeo and that these past decisions had favoured the Gedeo. Here the “territory” issue comes in. Under the ethnic federalism it

appears that the border between the two zones in theory can be changed if another referendum was to be held in the border areas. This idea creates fear and insecurity among the groups. A consequence of such a referendum – if the Gedeo won – would be that Guji in these areas would become a minority themselves, and consequently lose a number of rights. This way the conflict revolves around rights. Both these issues persist as part of, or as consequences of, the

Ethnic Federal system – and hence they are structural in nature. Such structural systems causing conflict among ethnic groups, is precisely what the constructivist take on ethnicity and conflict seeks to highlight.

Having pinpointed some of the root causes it is extremely curious why the conflict broke out specifically in the beginning of 2018, remaining dormant for 20 years. This leads us to the next question this chapter have attempted to answer:

2) Why did conflict between the two groups break out in April 2018?

This thesis finds, based on interview data from 37 informants in the field, that the supposed referendum letter sent out in the spring of 2018 is the main spark of the conflict. The rumours of a request for referendum from Gedeo inhabiting parts of the Guji zone created fear among the Guji that they would lose more land to the Gedeo, which led to the outbreak of violence and mass displacement. All the root causes listed above manifest themselves in this letter, and it is clear that the threat of another referendum brought grievances to the surface, on both sides.

However, the majority of the informants argued they wanted to live in peace together. The main perception among my informants was that the conflict was driven by elite actors, landowners, religious leaders and politicians were specifically listed. In other words, people who have something to gain from conflict between the two groups. These people clearly instigated the 2018 conflict between the two groups, through the spread of misinformation, by urging people to take up arms, as well as through the referendum proposal itself, which sparked the conflict. Here insecurity and lack of verified information is a prominent issue, making it possible for these actors to exploit underlying grievances to mobilize for conflict.

Lastly, one cannot exclude the possibility that events at the national level did play a role in the outbreak of conflict at this specific time. This chapter argues that the interference of elites is a main driving force for conflict, the findings suggest that these elites mobilized people for conflict by spreading false information and manipulating people to take up arms. It is

certainly possible that the conditions at the national level played a role in their decisions to raise the identified conflict issues again at this specific time. More research is required to prove such a link, but several informants did connect the crisis at the national government, the new prime minister and his more liberal approach to the outbreak of conflict in April 2018.

3) How does the 2018 conflict relate to the previous conflicts between the two groups?

That the 2018 conflict is related to the 1995 and 1998 conflicts should be obvious at this point. According to PRIO’s definition of recurring conflict, the conflict must break out between the same parties after minimum two years of peace (S Gates et al., 2016, p. 3). That is clearly the case – as a period of 20 years separate the 2018 conflict from the previous conflict between Guji and Gedeo. Furthermore, grievances related directly to the outcomes of the previous conflicts have been identified as a core issue, in fact the 2018 conflict appears to be a continuation of unresolved issues from the 1990s. That is in line with PRIO’s suggestion that conflict recurrence is often tied to the outcomes of previous conflict (S Gates et al., 2016, p. 3). Lastly, and perhaps most critically. The identified root causes are largely

complementary to the ones found by previous researchers in studies on the 1995 and 1998 conflicts, indicating the conflict is recurring over (mostly) the same issues.

In particular, my findings are complementary to those of Regassa 2007 and 2012, in which he argued that the conflicts in the 1990s had to do with settling and determining rights under the new system, as that still seems to be the case. The issue of minority rights, and the

disagreement over demarcation between the zones, indicates that the very same issues are still present. These core issues remain unresolved, even though more than 20 years have passed, and that is a concern. Conflict recurrence is a major issue, as well as a future threat to the security in the area. Having identified that these core issues are still present, they must be resolved, or conflict is likely to recur again in the future, over the very same issues.

Chapter 7 Conclusion