Democratisation, decentralisation and participation

According to Ribot (2003), natural resources have a particular role in local level

democratisation. Improving and securing access to natural resources are important for the socio-economic development of the people who depend on them as a source of income. The natural resources are a source of income and wealth, and in a context of democratic transition, the notion of redistribution is often central, along with expectations of participation and material benefits (Luckham et al. 2000). Equally, democratic aspects are important and necessary in a co-management debate; as to which role the state takes on, and how it contributes to expanding, improving and consolidating the action space of the marginalised fishers, facilitating socio-economic development. Development is not an automatic spin-off from democratisation (Hanlon 1996). Touraine (1998) argues that democracy and

development cannot exist unless they co-exist. This is supported by Luckham et al. (2000:13),

36 who argues that democratic rights and basic entitlements of democratic citizenship are not compatible with poverty and gross social inequality.

Both the South African and Mozambican governments adhere to market economic principles.

Touraine (1998) makes a distinction between market economy and political democracy. Open political and economic systems are necessary preconditions for democracy and economic growth, but other factors are needed in addition to achieve development. These include a legal system, and entrepreneurs and agents to accommodate the redistribution of the national

product. For resource management, this includes establishing a legal framework and defining the property rights systems. Furthermore, fisher organisations or other groupings of

individuals must be allowed and encouraged to take on management responsibility.

The reformed fisheries management policies of South Africa and Mozambique in different ways presuppose decentralisation of different forms of fisheries management responsibility, both explicitly and implicitly. Many of the factors that to some extent are treated or are implicit in co-management theorisation, are addressed in decentralisation literature.

Decentralisation is a worldwide political reality. It has become a popular prescription for governance problems, especially in developing countries. Increasingly, it became a part of development strategies in the 1980s as part of human-centred approaches to development (Litvack et al. 1998).

The process of decentralisation can be complex, taking into consideration a diversity of existing cultural, political and institutional arrangements. It is a restructuring process that involves numerous stakeholders, different geographic entities such as international, national, sub-national and local levels, and a variety of actors representing central and local

governments, private sector, community organisations, international donors, civil society and citizens (Nath undated, approx. 2000; Work 2002). Ideally, decentralisation can result in increased legitimacy and contribute to cutbacks in expenditure because the state can hand over some of its tasks to other actors; those arguments are used to advance co-management as well. Decentralisation of management responsibility involves a restructuring of authority, which in turn implies transfer of responsibility for tasks such as planning, management and resource allocation from central government agencies to lower levels of government (Work 2002).

In a democratic transition, decentralisation can be seen as a process as well as an end-in-itself,

37 as a means to further ends, and as ‘meaningful’ authority devolved to local units of

governance (Blair 2000). It is also a means to bring decision-making closer to the people in order to better address local needs. When public services are adjusted to local needs, it means that they are closer to people, and the local situations and conditions can be considered (Work 2002). It is a general assumption that a state closer to the people in spatial and institutional senses, is more likely to develop policies which will meet the needs of the marginalised people (Crook and Sverrisson 2001). This will increase the opportunities for people to participate in economic, social and political decisions, which, on a long-term basis, will contribute to developing people’s capacities as well as enhance government responsiveness, transparency and accountability (Nath undated, approx. 2000; Work 2002). Increase in participation will have positive effects on aspects such as fair representation and

empowerment, and ultimately, poverty reduction (Blair 2000: 23). To be able to get close to such objectives, the ‘paradox of participation’ must be overcome. The paradox of

participation labels the situation in which the marginalised are more or less incapable of using the opportunities for enhanced participation provided by democratic decentralisation

(Echeverri-Gent 1992, in Crook and Sverrisson 2001). This may occur when powerful groups use their power to co-opt, corrupt or subvert the democratic process (Luckham et al. 2000:

22).

Luckham et al. (2000) emphasise participation as a starting point of democratic deepening:

Incorporating marginalised groups must be a necessary and inherent feature of democracy.

There is often an overly positive view of participation, especially in a developing country context. However, participation is not unambiguously beneficial to marginalised groups.

Peters claims that

“…too often, participation became a method for governments to mobilise cheap labour and involuntary contribution, supposed beneficiaries were treated as recipients of projects rather than architects of their own preferred activities, participation meant the devolution of responsibilities but not of rights, and the decentralization of tasks but not resources.” (Peters 2000: 13)

In case of the above, decentralisation is limited, and marginalised groups become passive beneficiaries. With delegation of powers comes the question as to whom power is being delegated, within what context and with what measures of accountability, according to Wily

38 (2000). She identifies two main paradigms of state–people joint management. One is founded upon a view of local communities as primarily user beneficiary co-operands, and the other seeks to involve communities as actors in management, endowing them with varying degrees of power to determine and regulate themselves. She argues that the latter power-sharing paradigm is more transformatory of centralised resource management. However, the dominant paradigm has been that of sharing the use rights or income from the resource with the

communities, i.e. a passive participation regime, seeing users as beneficiaries, without authority or ownership.

A form of decentralisation is referred to as devolution, whereby local bodies are granted the political and financial authority to undertake responsibilities (Johnson 2001). This means transfer of responsibility, decision-making, resources and revenue generation to a local level public authority that is autonomous and fully independent of public authority. This is the form of decentralisation that often is considered “true” decentralisation. Decentralisation can also take the form of deconcentration, in which local bodies assume responsibilities that have traditionally been carried out by central line agencies (Johnson 2001). Work (2002: 6) defines deconcentration as the transfer of authority and responsibility from one level of the central government to another, while maintaining the same hierarchical level of accountability from the local units to the central government ministry or agency. Work (2002) calls it divestment when the government transfers planning and administrative responsibility, or other public functions, to voluntary, private or non-governmental organisations, which aim at involving the public. This may involve contracting out administrative functions, deregulation or full privatisation; in other words, a privatisation of tasks. A concept related to divestment is deregulation, which denotes when the government decentralises tasks to the market and to non-governmental organisations (Basta 2001); in Ribot’s (2003) words, privatisation in the name of decentralisation. If resources that should be available to the public are transferred to private bodies, they may turn more difficult to access by the public (Ribot 2003). This relates to the next section, which deals with the risk of elite capture and the need for accountability institutions.