Decentralisation drawbacks and the need for accountability

Crook and Sverrisson (2001) see a tendency to conflate decentralisation with democracy and increased participation, and to assume that decentralisation automatically leads to democracy

39 and participation. However, decentralisation may have its drawbacks, and meet with

unpredicted barriers, such as informal community mechanisms and institutions. In resource management, user groups have different interests and preferences, and according to Agrawal and Gibson (1999), some will pursue self-interests in processes of policy change and

development. Further, they claim that unchecked authority for community-level decisions is likely to lead to perverse outcomes in terms of management and resource conservation.

Jentoft et al. (1998) warn that co-management actually may entrench or reinforce inequalities in communities. It is in the interest of those who already wield power in the community to take advantage of devolved management responsibility. This may have adverse influence on the process of mobilising and organising fishers, as well as on resource management

outcomes, local politics, and strategic interactions within communities. This brings in the power perspective: Decentralisation as an institutional change is rarely a win-win situation.

Those on the losing side (relatively seen) will not easily give up their privileges and benefits (Ostrom et al. 1993).

Crook and Sverrisson (2001) studied whether decentralised forms of government tend to be more responsive to the needs of the poor, and found that such responsiveness is a rather rare outcome. This observation is supported by Vedeld (2003) and Blair (2000), who agree that there is limited evidence for claiming that decentralisation leads to poverty reduction. The explanation is that local elites get most of the power because of their position, and they are able to channel the benefits to themselves, or “… at least maintain the existing distribution pattern (which largely benefit them, anyway)” (Blair 2000: 25). The asymmetrical power balance and unequal access to information, knowledge, and skills enable the elite to get the upper hand also in decentralisation processes (“elite capture”). Smoke (2003) argues that decentralisation can be a guise for renewed attempts by national political elites to expand their control through developing new local institutions or restructuring existing ones. Smith (1985, in Crook and Sverrisson 2001) says that decentralisation, particularly devolution to elected representative councils, tends to empower local elites, because they are best placed and most likely to be able to capture the benefits. Local governments and decision-making bodies are often dominated by elites. Manor (1999, in Blair 2000) claims that local elites may be even less likely than national elites to redistribute resources to the marginalised groups. He says that he has yet to discover evidence of any case where local elites were more benevolent than those at higher levels. Furthermore, Tarrow (1988: 88) argues that “…elites are unlikely to be persuaded to make policy changes that are not in their own interest”.

40 This means that the stronger groups can use the position they already have to position

themselves advantageously, and thus, they have an advantage in reaping benefits of new institutional orders. This makes the processes of local politics important, in terms of political engagement, contestation and struggles that challenge those elites. This will contribute to creating institutions with downward accountability and responsiveness of the governing actors (Vedeld 2003: 161). In other words, the choice of local institutional systems is a crucial matter in decentralisation. When establishing local institutions for decentralised natural resource management, it is important to empower the most broadly representative and downwardly accountable local institutions (Ribot 2003).

If the powers to manage natural resources are allocated to non-representative authorities, there is a risk of impediment of the progress of democratic transition. Ribot (2003) uses traditional chiefs as an example. In line with this, Peters (2000) points to the danger that even though some powers are extended to local groups, the lack of political accountability of local leaders may result in the benefits reaching only a small section of the community.

Despite of the best intentions of decisions made to undertake changes, governments in many countries are often not responsive to their citizens, and decision-making is rarely transparent and predictable (Litvack et al. 1998). In the words of Ostrom:

“Agreeing to follow rules ex ante is an easy commitment to make. Actually following rules ex post when strong temptations arise, is the significant accomplishment.”

(Ostrom 1990: 93).

According to Narayan (2000), state officials, public employees, private providers of services, and politicians must be held to account, and made answerable to their policies and actions affecting the well-being of citizens. Accountability is when people are able to hold

government responsible for how their decisions affect them. Litvack et al. (1998) emphasise the need for accountability institutions, governance and capacity, to protect marginalised people from abuse, fraud and further deprivation; i.e. watchdogs. The primary institution for accountability is election. Citizens must have the right to hold local leaders and public officials accountable through elections, collective action and other democratic means (Johnson 2001). However, they must be allowed to indicate their concerns also between elections. There must be ways to publicise citizen’s views and uncover wrongdoing of the

41 local government, or others who are in charge. Accountability demands active state

involvement. Democratic politics is not just about monitoring the exercise of power by the state, but also about monitoring local bodies or powerful private interests (Luckham et al.

2000). When institutions for accountability are in place, it increases popular control over what the local government has done or left undone (Blair 2000).