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Comparison to related work – alternatives and selection

8.2 Selection of appropriate equipment

8.2.3 Comparison to related work – alternatives and selection

To consider all possible alternatives in carrying out a specific task is not what happens in actual decision making, according to March and Simon (March and Simon, 1958), since there are infinite possible alternatives in any situation. The term bounded rationality or limited rationality is applied by these authors in studying decision-making processes in organizations (Simon, 1997), where the individual actors have a bounded view of the potential alternatives. According to March and Simon, this is a characteristic of all decision making processes – decisions are made based upon a limited, or bounded view of the possible set of alternatives. “Most human decision making, whether individual or organizational, is concerned with the discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives;

only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives” (March and Simon, 1958). In other words, a criterion for decision making is

“good enough” or “satisfying” in most cases. The word “satisfice” was coined by Simon (Simon, 1996) as a portmanteau of "satisfy" and "suffice", and he pointed out that the human being does not have the resources to maximize fully.

To make a decision involves making a choice from a number of possible alternatives for achieving a goal. The task of rational decision making is to select the alternatives that result in preferred consequences. Simon divides the decision making process into three steps: 1) identifying and listing all alternatives, 2) determining all of the consequences resulting from the alternatives and 3) comparing the accuracy and efficiency of the consequences. However, Simon notes that any individual or organization attempting to apply this model in a real situation would not be able to comply with the tree steps completely. It is not only unlikely to be able to identify all the alternatives; it is even less likely to know all the consequences that follow from them.

What Simon proposes is that a human being striving for rationality assumes he can isolate from the rest of the world a closed system containing a limited number of variables and a

corresponding limited range of consequences. For measuring the correctness of decisions, two major criteria are used 1) the adequacy of achieving the desired objective and 2) the efficiency with which the result was obtained.

In the literature about problem solving and bounded rationality (Newell and Simon, 1972;

Simon, 1996) Simon was not specifically interested in the day-to-day “use” of personal equipment, where choices are made on a moment-to-moment basis for what equipment to use. The circumspective use perspective, and the view of selecting alternative equipment by the sight of circumspection, is therefore different from the bounded rationality perspective. The bounded rationality perspective on decision making is a rationalistically motivated, albeit bounded, process where there is an ongoing cognitive process of detached reflection about alternatives and corresponding consequences. The

circumspective use perspective, on the other hand, is about awareness and comportment towards a situation. The alternatives, and the consequences of the alternatives, are not listed and deliberated as explicit alternatives during the activity of use; they are seen with the sight of circumspection in the moment of use.

Gasser wrote an early contribution about computer-supported work (Gasser, 1986). He distinguishes between computing work and routine work. His starting point is that most computer work serves as resources or indirect tools to support other kinds of work. For example, to use a computer for communicating over a distance is conducted in order to exchange information with another person. The use of computers presumes the existence of other work, namely the primary work of the computer user. Hence, the use of computers is embedded in a context of many other tasks, where computing itself is usually a resource supporting the other tasks accordingly. Gasser introduced the notion of computer work and articulation work in addition to the primary work in order to discuss a new type of work based on computers in organizations.

According to Gasser, work is a contingent process. It is not possible to predict the entire range of contingencies that people in organizations encounter in daily work. When contingencies are faced, people use various strategies for addressing such situations.

Workarounds are one of the three strategies applied when faced with contingencies, in addition to the strategy of fitting and augmentation (Gasser, 1986).Working around means using a computer intentionally in ways for which it was not designed, or simply avoiding computers by relying upon alternative means of accomplishing work.

The way in which alternative technologies are visible for the user are not discussed explicitly by Gasser. Hence, the perspective on integrating computing work and routine work is not about the individual user and the ways in which the alternative equipment in a use situation is visible to him. In this respect, it differs from the perspective of

circumspective use, since circumspective use is about a kind of awareness in the work situation involving the use of computers. Nevertheless, Gasser’s work is an early contribution to describe the use of computers (in organizations), and largely provides similar perspectives to my own.

Shneiderman discusses his own use of computers, having found that it was easy to interpret the usage in terms of satisfying his own needs (Shneiderman, 2002). He states that he uses computers to support relationships with family, friends and colleagues, for example. He then discusses four basic needs, proposing a taxonomy of needs that the use of computers can support: gathering information, collaborating with colleagues,

designing interfaces and distributing ideas. Later, he develops this into a process model:

1) collect information, 2) relate (communicate), 3) create (innovate) and 4) donate (dissemination). The challenge with any such design principles based on the underlying needs is that it is possible to propose and apply all sorts of principles because they are so general. For example, another person could say that the need is to calculate and simulate.

According to Max-Neef (Max-Neef, 1991), there is currently no generally accepted taxonomy of needs available, albeit there have been many attempts to develop one.

However, it is possible to examine, observe and talk about human needs – without there being any agreed upon definition. By being engaged in exchanges about what the human needs are, and the possible strategies for getting the needs met, new alternatives emerge.

The mere awareness of needs makes it possible to get to know alternative ways,

strategies or satisfiers that are selected to facilitate meeting the need. Therefore, the discussion that Schnederman is engaged in is important. Being open to the possibility of getting needs met in various ways, with various types of equipment, gives a sense of freedom to the user – the freedom to choose among the possible alternatives that a use situation opens up.