Chapter Six
6.3 Out of Area
Whether or not NATO should operate out-of-area is not the questions; NATO has operated outside of its core area for many years. This debate is in all reality a matter of finding a balance between the responsibility of Article Five and the needs of the U.S. The European NATO members should be confident by the continued reassurance from their American partner that its commitment to Article Five stands firm. NATO must, to be of continued relevance for the U.S., be prepared to continue operating outside its core area. Furthermore, a multipolar world will bring with it a myriad of security challenge, which means that Europe is likely to face challenges originating outside the continent. It is therefore both in the interest of the U.S. and European NATO members that NATO pursues an active role. This does not mean however, that the NATO should pursue an active role all over the world.
There are several ways in which NATO can contribute to the foreign policy strategy of the U.S. that will be important. The alliance with the implementation of smart defense will ensure the stability of NATO’s core area with less involvement of the U.S. NATO should also engage more actively to ensure regional stability on the borders of NATO countries and on the borders of Europe. This will be the most important area for NATO to operate in and it will be important for the U.S. that NATO can build on the success in Libya and continue to lead operations with the support of the U.S. In the future, it might be necessary for NATO to participate in operations all over the world, also in the Asia-Pacific region but this is not the role NATO should primarily take.
NATO’s most important role towards the Asia-Pacific region in general and China in particular will be as a collective security organization. A strong NATO will contribute to the perceived strength of the U.S. and thereby work preventively in helping the U.S. in containing Chinese foreign policy ambitions. In a multipolar world, containing rising powers while at the same time avoiding a security dilemma will be important for the U.S. and its allies. As the example of China have shown there are many areas which could lead to a regional conflict between China and its neighbors, and as many of these border countries are allies of the U.S.
a regional conflict may very well become global. It is important that NATO does not add to this pressure by engaging in military activity in the Asia-Pacific region, while at the same time acknowledge that increased tension between states is highly likely in a multipolar system. It is therefore close to impossible to avoid that China will feel threatened to some degree and making China aware that NATO is strong and has the capability to assist the U.S.
if necessary, also in this region will contribute to contain China, much in the same way NATO worked against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Arguably NATO was highly efficient during the Cold War precisely because it did not have to act and NATO should again seek to contribute in this way.
6.4 Enlargement
There are two reasons why NATO should not pursue further enlargement. First, the consequences it will have on NATO as an organization. Enlarging NATO was seen as a way of integrating more unstable states on the borders of the alliance in Europe and thereby increase the stability of these nations and also Europe as a whole but this has not been the case. As shown with Georgia and Ukraine, states that suffer from internal instability have been less desirable to integrate and membership has thus been postponed. In addition, many
of the countries seeking membership has no significant military capabilities and would add to the defense burden on NATO countering the argument that enlarging NATO would lead to a strengthening of NATO’s overall military capabilities. One of NATO’s foremost advantages is that it is an efficient organization and decisions are based on a consensus. To add more members to the organizations will increase the likelihood of inefficiency also taken into consideration that these new members might not share the common values and ideals that NATO was founded on. NATO members are already struggling with diverging interests and uniting the goals of current members should have priority on the agenda.
The alliances’ relationship with Russia, and the consequences enlargement might have on China is perhaps the second and most important reason why NATO should not pursue further enlargement. Russia’s outright opposition to NATO enlargement is well known and continuing to enlarge NATO especially eastward in Europe is likely to add further strains on the relationship between Russia and the West. NATO could benefit from closer cooperation with Russia on a range of issues, and Russia also enabled NATO to perform its operation in Afghanistan making Russia important for future potential military operations in Asia, especially Central Asia. While it is unlikely and perhaps not even an advantage to be in a permanent alliance with Russia; closer cooperation through forums such as the Partnership for Peace will help maintain stability on the European continent and the relationship between Russia and the West and consequently between NATO and Russia is therefore very important.
Regarding China, an enlargement including countries such as Japan and Australia would likely trigger the aforementioned security dilemma. While NATO should be prepared for the challenges that come with a multipolar world, it should not contribute to trigger an already existing danger of a security dilemma, neither through out of area operations nor enlargement on a global scale. NATO already has a web of forums in which it has contact with strategic countries like Australia and Japan, and can if necessary cooperate with them through U.S. leadership and should therefore not engage in global enlargement. Both the importance of a good relationship with Russia, and the risk of triggering a security dilemma with China are reasons to build on already existing forums and not actively provoke these emerging powers.
A multipolar world holds many challenges, also for NATO. But as this thesis has shown the transatlantic relationship is likely to be strengthened and so will NATO. It depends however, on the European NATO members’ ability to take greater responsibility for their own
security as well as the security of Europe. NATO has shown an ability to adapt in the past, and with the structural changes that are happening in international relations the North Atlantic allies have a unique possibility to do so again uniting the interests of its members and working towards a common goal: to ensure each other’s security and the stability of the world.
Appendix
List of Abbreviations
ANZUS: The Australia, New Zealand, U.S. Security Treaty BRIC: Term for Brazil, Russia, India and China
DEFCON: Defense Condition EU: European Union
GDP: Gross Domestic Product GNP: Gross National Product
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency IMF: International Monetary Fond
MNNA: Major Non-NATO Ally
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO: Non-Government Organization PPP: Power Purchase Parity
SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction WTO: World Trade Organization
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