Elephants over the Cliff: Explaining Wildlife Killings in Tanzania

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Land Use Policy

jou rn al h om ep a g e :w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / l a n d u s e p o l

Elephants over the Cliff: Explaining Wildlife Killings in Tanzania

Sayuni B. Mariki

^a

, Hanne Svarstad

^b,c,∗

, Tor A. Benjaminsen

^a

aDepartmentofInternationalEnvironmentandDevelopmentStudies(Noragric),NorwegianUniversityofLifeSciences(NMBU),Norway

bSectionforDevelopmentStudies,DepartmentofInternationalStudiesandInterpretation,OsloandAkershusUniversityCollegeofAppliedSciences(HiOA), Norway

cNorwegianInstituteforNatureResearch(NINA),Norway

a r t i c l e i n f o

Articlehistory:

Received4March2013

Receivedinrevisedform24October2014 Accepted25October2014

Keywords:

Elephant Conservation Webofrelations Politicalecology Resistance Tanzania Africa

a b s t r a c t

ManyincidentsofelephantkillingshaverecentlytakenplaceinTanzaniaaswellasinotherAfrican countries.Sucheventsareusuallypresentedasresultsoftherisingglobaldemandforivory.Asweshow inthiscasestudy,however,notallviolenceagainstelephantsisdrivenbytheivorytrade.Thisarticle presentsaneventthatoccurredinWestKilimanjaroin2009whennumerousvillagerschasedaherd ofelephantsoveracliff,killingsixofthem.Usinga‘webofrelations’approach,weseektouncoverthe underlyingaswellastheimmediatefactorsthatledtothisincident.Aseveredroughtsparkedofftheevent aselephantsincreasinglyraidedcropsanddestroyedwaterpipes.Therearegrowingelephantandhuman populationsinthearea,whichmustbeunderstoodinthecontextoflandusechanges.Largeareashavein variouswaysbeenturnedintodifferenttypesofprotectedareasduringthelastfewdecadesasresultsof effortsbyconservationNGOsandgovernmentalagencies.Inbetweentheseareas,peopletrytosustain alivingontheremainingland,whileencounteringincreasedproblemswithwildlife.Conservationin thestudyareatakesplacewithoutlocalcommunitieshavinganyrealinﬂuenceondecision-making.This leadstoafeelingofbeingmarginalizedanddisempowered,whichagaincausesresistancetoconservation, asinthiscase.

Introduction

AftertwodecadesofincreasingelephantpopulationsinTanza- nia,adeclinehasrecentlybeenrecordedinsomeareas(Niskanen, 2010; TAWIRI, 2010; Douglas-Hamilton and Poole, 2010).This declineisduetoaresurgenceofelephantkillingsmainlyassoci- atedwiththegrowingillegaltradeinivorytosupplythedemand forartefactsandalternativemedicinesinChinaandotherEastAsian countries(MillikenandSangalakula,2009;MartinandVigne,2011;

CAI,2012).

Someoftheviolenceagainstelephantsis,however,notdriven by the ivory trade. In this article, we use a ‘web of relations’

approachtoanalyseanincidentthattookplaceaneveninginMay 2009onthewesternsideofMountKilimanjaroinTanzania.Inthis particularincident,alargecrowdofvillagerssurroundedaherd ofelephantsandchasedthem,withtheaidoftorches,motorcy- cles,ﬁre,andnoise,towardsacliff,killingsixofthem.Thisevent

∗Correspondingauthorat:SectionforDevelopmentStudies,DepartmentofInter- nationalStudiesandInterpretation,OsloandAkershusUniversityCollegeofApplied Sciences(HiOA),Norway.Tel.:+4793466998.

E-mailaddresses:[email protected](S.B.Mariki),[email protected] (H.Svarstad),[email protected](T.A.Benjaminsen).

happenednearthecentreofEngareNairobivillage(Fig.1).During ﬁeldworkin2009–2011,wealsolearnedaboutseveralotherinci- dentsinwhichelephantshadbeenspearedorfounddeadwithout indicationsofivorypoaching.

Whilewerecognizethatpoachingforivoryconstitutesasig- niﬁcant driver for the on-going elephant killings in Africa, we ask whetherthere are moreof these casesthat might bemis- taken as ivory poaching, and which in reality are caused by a resistancetoconservationpractice.Onekeydistinctionbetween elephant killingsfor ivory or for resistance would, in addition to what people state in interviews, be whether the tusks are removedimmediatelyornot.Inpoaching,thetuskswillbequickly removedafterthekillinginordernottoattractattention.InEngare Nairobi,numerousvillagerswerebeingphotographedwiththecar- cassesthedayafterthekillings(weareinpossessionofsomeof thesephotographs),whilethetuskswerenotremoved.Inaddi- tion,whatseparatespoachingfromresistancemightalsobewhat Scott(1992)calls‘hidden transcripts’,which refertothenarra- tivesthatsubalterngroupsusetointerprettheirownexperience ofdominationoroppression.Furthermore,frustrationamongpeo- pleaboutthewaysconservationtakesplacemayalsoconstitute animportantcausebehindpoaching,sincepoachersoftenseem tobeabletocarryouttheiractivitieswiththecollusionoflocal people.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.10.018

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Fig.1.MaplocatingEngareNairobiandneighbouringvillages,thetwodivisionsofSihaMagharibiandEnduimet,andconservationareasandranches.

Casestudiesofhuman–elephantconflictsinAfricaoftencon- cludethatincreasesinhumanand/orelephantpopulationsarethe maincausesoftheseconflictsaselephantsandpeopleoverlapin theiruseofhabitatsandcomeintoconflicts(e.g.Thouless,1994;

Hoare,1999;HoareandduToit,1999;Naughton-Trevesetal.,1999;

Walpoleetal.,2003;WeladjiandTchamba,2003;OsbornandHill, 2005;Sitatietal.,2005;Graham,2006;WalpoleandLinkie,2007;

SitatiandTchamba,2008;Warner,2008;Karimi,2009;Kikotietal., 2010;MackenzieandAhabyona,2012).Somestudiesalsopointto land-usechangesasadriverofsuchconﬂicts(e.g.Campbelletal., 2002;Noe,2003;BenjaminsenandSvarstad,2010).Theseland-use changesresultbothfrompopulationdynamicsandfromtheimpact ofpoliciesandgovernance.Otherstudiesalsofocusondrought leadingtoincreasedresourcescarcityasafactorsparkingoffcon- ﬂicts(e.g.Dapash,2002;Zubairetal.,2005;Graham,2006;Leeand Graham,2006;Warner,2008;Lamarqueetal.,2009).

Elephantsrequirelargetractsoflandandconsumelargevol- umesofforage(Kangwana,1996;Kikoti,2009).Theymayspend 70–90%oftheirtime foraging andcan eat100–300kgofvege- tationin a singleday (Osborn, 2004).Thus, in their search for pasturesandwater,theyengageinextensiveseasonalmigrations oftenincludingmovingthroughfarmland(Kangwana,1996;Kikoti, 2009).Human–elephantconﬂictscanbedeﬁnedas interactions betweenhumansandelephantswheredirectandindirectnega- tiveconsequences,whetherperceivedorreal,existforoneorboth parties(Deckeretal.,2002;ZhangandWang,2003).

Thisarticlecontributestotheunderstandingoftheseconﬂicts withadetailedinvestigationofacaseofelephantkillingsprovid- inganinsight intotheinteractionofa broadsetofexplanatory factors.First,increasesinbothhumanandelephantpopulations in West Kilimanjaro are essential components in the land-use dynamicsresultingintheconﬂicts.Second,largeareashave,invariousways,beenprotectedduringthelastfewdecadesasaresult oftheagencyofactorsexternaltothelocalcommunities.These actorsincludetheWildlifeDivisionandtheTanzaniaNationalParks (TANAPA)undertheMinistryofNaturalResourcesandTourism,

wildlife-basedtourisminvestors,and internationalconservation organisations.Small-scalefarmersandpastoraliststrytosustain a livingontheland remaininginbetween theprotectedareas, whileencounteringgrowingproblemswithwildlife.Thishasleft peoplewithanincreasedfeelingofbeingmarginalizedanddisem- poweredandwithlimitedpossibilitiestoinﬂuencethesituation throughdemocraticmeans.Thus,wearguethatthiscasemaybe interpretedasanactofresistancebypeoplewhofeeldisempow- eredandwhohavelimitedaccesstorepresentationalchannelsto voicetheirconcerns.ThissituationisnotuniqueinEasternand SouthernAfricawherepowerfulactorshaveworkedfortheestab- lishmentofprotectedareasandgenerallyfacilitatedconditionsto increasewildlife.Thus,wesuggestthatanunknownnumberofthe otherelephantkillingsinAfricathatarereferredtoasivorypoach- ingmayalsoresultfromaresistancetoconservation.Inaddition, itisalsolikelythatresistancetoconservationplayarolerecruiting localcommunitymembersintonetworksofivorypoaching.

Inthefollowing,weﬁrstreviewliteratureonresistancetocon- servationbeforewepresentthestudyareaandthe‘webofrelations’

approachusedaspartofourmethodology.Thereafter,weanalyze eachofthepossiblefactors,andestablishthewaysinwhichmulti- pleinvolvedfactorscombinetoexplainwhytheelephantkillings tookplaceinthiscase.Finally,wediscusstheroleplayedbyele- phantkillingsinaddressinghuman–elephantconﬂictsinthestudy area.

Resistancetoconservation

Thereisarichscholarlyliteratureondifferentformsofresis- tance to what is perceived as illegitimate or non-democratic governance(e.g.Scott,1985;Fegan,1986;Ortner,1995;O’Brien, 1996;Gupta,2001;Watts,2001).Peoplewhoaredispossessedand marginalizedbyconservationprojectsalsotendtoresistgover- nanceinvariousways(Holmes,2007).CavanaghandBenjaminsen (2015)identifyfourdifferentformsofsuchresistance;nonviolent, militant, discursive, and formal-legal. Illegal wildlife killings

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represent the militant form when they result from resistance, whichalsothis casestudyis anexampleof.Otherexamplesof suchresistancetoconservationhavebeengivenbyforinstance Neumann (1992, 1998), Western (1994), Weladjiand Tchamba (2003)andNorgroveandHulme(2006).

Someoftheseformsof resistancemaysometimesrepresent whatScott(1985)calls‘everydayresistance’whererelativelypow- erless peasants seek to avoid oppressive regulations by using techniquessuchas‘footdragging,dissimulation,desertion,false compliance,pilfering,feignedignorance,slander,arson,sabotage, andsoon’(Scott,1985,xvi).These‘weaponsoftheweak’(Scott, 1985)normallyneedlittleplanningorcoordination.Peoplemake useofimplicitunderstandingsandinformalsocialnetworksand avoidanydirectconfrontationwithelitesorgovernmentauthori- ties.Scott(1986)alsonotesthateverydayformsofresistanceare almostinvisible,butsuchresistancehasstillbeenfarmorepreva- lentinhistorythanovertrebellions.

Thus, local people use various overt and covert ‘resistance methods to challenge the hegemony of conservation imposed by protected areas authorities’ (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006, p.

1100).In additiontopoaching and thekillingof wildlife,these methods may include destroying government property, illegal extractionofresources,spreadingfalseinformation(Shafer,1999), destroyingresources(Harkness,2000),threatenedoractualvio- lence againstconservation staff(Neumann,1998; Benjaminsen, 2000; Brockington, 2004; Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Robbins etal.,2006),illegallyusingprotectedarealand(Li,2007;Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2015), destroying protected area infrastruc- ture(Meyerson,1998)andcollaborationwithpoachers(Western, 1994).Aswewilldemonstrate,thecasediscussedheremaybeseen asbothanexampleofovertandcovertresistance. Theviolence againsttheelephantswasdirectandexplicitwithpeopleposing fortheirphotostobetakenontopofthecarcasses.Atthesame time,sincethiswasaseriouscriminaloffence,itwaslaterduring ﬁeldworkdifﬁculttogetpeopletoadmittotheirdirectinvolvement intheevent.

Actsof resistancetoconservationare usuallycarried outby marginalized people who suffer the costs of conservation and whodo not have theabilitytocircumvent thesystemthrough bribing ofﬁcialsor accessingpolitical power(Holmes,2007).In China, a case was described in which farmers destroyed their collectiveforestbycuttingdowntreesthattheyhadpreviously managedafterthegovernmentincorporatedtheforestintoastate nature reserve (Harkness, 2000). Likewise, Li (2007) describes howdisplacedvillagersinIndonesiaresistedconservationbyille- gallysettlingdownandcultivating landfortheirsubsistencein a protected area. A similarcase is reportedby Western(1994) in Amboseliin Kenya,where the exclusion ofMaasai fromthe nationalparkinthelate1970s ledthem toprotestin theform ofcontinuedgrazing,increasedcollaborationwithpoachers,and the killing of wildlife. In a similar vein, Neumann (1992) tells aboutacaseinEasternSerengetiinTanzaniawhereMaasaivio- lentlyprotestedagainsttheproposedparkboundaries (through arson,thespearingofrhinosandthreatstogovernmentofﬁcials).

InGuatemala,Meyerson(1998)alsodescribesanincidentwhere localpeopletookthirteenscientistshostageandsetabiological researchstationontheSanPedroRiveronﬁreafterrestrictionsof squatters’settlementsintheLagunadelTigreNationalParkwere imposed.

Resistancetoconservationinitsvariousformsmayalsobeseen asaresponse towhat Nixon(2011)calls‘slowviolence’,which stands in contrast to spectacular and instantaneous violence.

Slowviolenceisgradualandincrementalandleadstoa‘delayed destructionthatisdispersedacrosstimeandspace,anattritional violencethat is typically not viewed asviolence at all’(Nixon, 2011:2).Dispossessioncausedbytheestablishmentofareasfor

environmentalprotectionisoneoftheexamplesofslowviolence mentionedbyNixon.

Studyarea

EngareNairobiissituatedintheSihaMagharibiDivisionofthe SihaDistrictintheKilimanjaroRegion,adjacenttotheEnduimet DivisionoftheLongidoDistrictintheArushaRegion(seeFig.1).

ThesetwodivisionsformpartoftheWestKilimanjarobasin.The populationconsistsofpastoralandagro-pastoralMaasaiandsmall- scalefarmerswhoareofWachagga,Wameru,Waarusha,Wasafa, andotherethnicities.Inthe1950s,Britishsettlersestablishedplan- tationsinthearea.

ThevillageofEngareNairobiwasonlyofﬁciallyregisteredin 2007.By2009,ithadapopulationofapproximately9000.Between KilimanjaroNationalParkandEngareNairobiandothervillages, there isa forestplantation runby theTanzaniaForest Services Agency.AlargepartofthepopulationinEngareNairobiconsistsof peoplewhowereevictedfromthisforestplantationin2007.Due totherapidgrowthofEngareNairobi,villageleaderstoldusthat theyhaverequestedthegovernmenttoincreasethevillagearea byaddinglandfromanearbyplantationownedbytheNational AgriculturalandFoodCorporation,butnoactionhasbeentakenso far.

Thestudyarealiesbetween1230mand1600mabovesealevel.

Mostofthelandconsistsofsemi-aridsavannahinterspersedwith woodlands.Thereis adiversity ofland uses,rangingfromdry- landpasturesontheplainsintherainshadowofthemountain, tosmallandlarge-scaleagricultureonthelowermountainslopes.

KilimanjaroNationalParkislocatedhighupontheslope.Rainfall isunpredictable,especiallyonthedryplains,withanannualaver- agearound340mm(Moss,2001).Intheagriculturalareasonthe lowerpartsofthemountainslope,theaveragerainfallis890mm (ReyandDas,1996).

Researchapproachandmethods

Inordertobetterunderstandresistancetoconservationandits causeswithinabroadercontext,wedecidedtotakea‘chainsof explanation’approachasamethodologicalstartingpoint.Blaikie andBrookﬁeld(1987)proposedthisasamethodologyforexamin- ingcausesofenvironmentalchange:

‘(Thisapproach)startswiththelandmanagersandtheirdirect relationswiththeland(croprotation,fuelwooduse,stocking densities,capitalinvestmentandsoon).Thenextlinkconcerns theirrelationswitheachother,otherlandusers,andgroups inthewidersocietywhoaffecttheminanyway,whichinturn determineslandmanagement.Thestateandtheworldeconomy constitutethelastlinksinthechain.’(BlaikieandBrookﬁeld, 1987,p.27)

Asafurtherelaborationofthisapproach,Robbins(2004),inhis textbookonpoliticalecology,hassuggestedtomovefrom‘chains’

to‘networks’,arguingthatthechainsofexplanationapproachmay beconceivedasarigid‘hierarchyofpower’thattendstoneglect theinteractionsbetweenactorsatvariousscales(pp.210and212).

InasimilarveinRocheleau(2008:724)proposes‘websofrelation’

byarguingthat

‘(t)hecentreofgravityismovingfromlinearorsimpleverti- calhierarchies(chainsofexplanation)tocomplexassemblages, webs of relation and “rooted networks”, with hierarchies embeddedandentangledinhorizontalaswellasverticallink- ages.’

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Thus,politicalecologistshavetriedtomoveawayfromfocusing onchainstoafocusonnetworksandwebsthatprovideabetter frameworkforexplaining morecomplexinterrelationshipsthan one-wayinﬂuencesfromhighertolowergeographicallevels.

These‘chains’and‘webs’ofanalysiswithinpolitical ecology havesimilaritieswithandseemtobeinspiredbythe‘progressive contextualization’approachinculturalecologyproposedbyVayda (1983).Thisapproachholdsthathuman–environmentinteractions maybeexplainedby‘placingthemwithinprogressivelywiderand ordensercontexts’(Vayda,1983:265),andonecanstart

‘withtheactionsorinteractionsofindividuallivingthingsand canproceedtoputtheseintocontextsthatmake actionsor interactions intelligibleby showingtheir place withincom- plexesofcausesandeffects’(Vayda,1983:270).

Progressivecontextualizationhasbeenfurtherdevelopedinto

‘eventecology’(VaydaandWalters,1999).Thisisacausalhistorical approachthatexplainsenvironmentaleventsorchanges.Vayda andWalters(1999:169)arguethateventecologyhastobecarried outbyfollowingtwobasicsteps:

‘...beginresearchwithfocusontheenvironmentaleventthat onewantstoexplainandthenworkbackwardintimeandout- wardinspacesoastoconstructchainsofcausesandeffects leadingtothoseeventsandchanges’.

VaydaandWalters(1999)criticizepoliticalecologyforassum- ingthatpoliticalfactorsalwaysexplainenvironmentalchangeand, hence,forbeingblindtohowother(non-political)factorsaffect environments.Politicalecologists,ontheotherhand,arguethat progressive contextualization is inclined toresult in ‘apolitical’

explanationsthatdonotdealadequatelywithpowerandpolitics (Robbins,2004;Penna-Firme,2013).

Thetaskwesetoutforourselveswastoexplainwhyvillagers killedtheelephants.Thus,whatwerethefactorsthatledvillagers totakesuchradicalaction?Inordertoanswerthisquestion,we decidedtostartoutbyincludingabroadsetofpossiblecausescom- prisingbothnaturalandsocialfactors,whilestillkeepingpower asa centralconcernandobjectofanalysis.Hence,this isalsoa contributiontodemonstratetheapplicationofa‘webofrelations’

approach to explain environmental events. Afterthe presenta- tionof themethods used,we describethevarious elementsin whatwefoundtoconstitutethewebofrelationsinthiscase(see Fig.2).

FieldworkwasconductedduringSeptembertoDecember2009, inMarch2010,andinAugustandDecember2011.Theinterviews werecarriedoutindifferentperiodsinordertoexplorenewaspects thatcameupduringdataanalysisandtolearnabouttheimpactof elephantkillings.Snowballsamplingwasusedtochooseinterview- ees.Theﬁrstindividualshowever,werepurposivelyselectedand askedforfurtherreferralsinordertoidentifyotherpeoplewho wereconsideredasrelevantforthestudy.Thecriterionweused waswhetherpeoplehadinformation abouttheincidentofele- phantkillingsandhuman–elephant/wildlifeconﬂictsingeneral.

Datawerecollectedonfactorsthat ledtotheelephantkillings, generalissuessurroundinghuman–elephant/wildlifeconflicts,and the impacts of the elephant killings incident, protected areas, wildlifeandhumanpopulationsandactorsbehindconservation inWestKilimanjaro.Westartedtheinterviewsbyinformingthe participantsabouttheresearchandacquiringtheirpriorinformed consent.Weusedaninterviewguidewiththeissueswewanted tofocusupon.Inthefirstinterviews,wesensedthatpeopledid notfeelfreetoexpressthemselves,becausetheywerenotsure aboutourintentions. Thus,we explicitlyguaranteedanonymity forallintervieweesandencouragedthemtoexpressthemselves freely.In addition,thefirstauthor stayed inthestudy areafor acertainperiodduringfieldwork inordertowinlocalpeople’s

The act of elephant killings

Villagers decide to resist by aacking the elephants

Elephants raid crops, destroy water facilies and cause fear

Decisions and implementaon of conservaon with limited concern for the burden carried by local communies

Powerful actor groups: Naonal governmental conservaon bodies, foreign conservaonists and their Tanzanian branches, tourist industry, aid donors Concentraon of human populaon in the area

Elephant populaon growth Local people feel

marginalized in decision-making

Drought

Fig.2.Awebofrelations.

trust andlearn aboutthecausesof elephant killingsandprob- lemsrelatedtowildlifeconservationinthearea.Nevertheless,most intervieweeswerehesitanttoadmitparticipationintheelephant killings,althoughinsomepartsoftheinterviewstheycouldtalk abouttheirresentment towardselephants aswellas providing detaileddescriptionsofwhathadhappenedduringthisparticular event.

Intotal,weconductedqualitativein-depthinterviewswith58 villagersindividually.MostinterviewswereconductedinSwahili by the first author and lasted for one to 2h. The sample size wasreachedwhennewdatawerenolongeraddingnewinsights to the researchquestions. Most interviews were recorded and transcribed.Inadditiontoin-depthinterviewswithlocalpeople, governmentofficials,NGOrepresentativesandtouristcompanies, wealsoheldfourfocusgroupdiscussionswithvillagers.Further- more,wecarriedoutinterviewswithkeyinformantswhowere chosenbasedontheirabilitytocontributewithinformationand reflections on theresearch topic. The aimwas to seekknowl- edgeableindividualswhocouldprovideinsightfulinformationon human–wildlifeconflictsinthestudyarea.Wealsomadeuseof participantobservationbylivingwithvillagersforsomeweeksto witnesstherolesthatelephantsplayinpeople’severydaylives.

Finally,wecollectedandreviewedrelevantdocumentsandother studies.

The data collection and analysis were conducted as paral- lel processes throughout the research. During data collection, immediatelythereafter,andwhilelisteningagaintotherecorded interviews,wenoteddownfurtherideasandpotentialelementsof ananalysis.Intranscribingtheinterviews,allpauses,repetitions andverbalutteranceswerewrittendownasdetailedaspossible toavoidlosingvaluableinformation.Wealsoworkedthroughthe ﬁeldnotesandtranscriptsseveraltimesandelaboratedcodesand anindex,and we identiﬁedaspects onwhich we neededmore

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knowledge,andatre-visitstotheﬁeld,weconcentratedonlearning moreabouttheseaspects.

Potentialcausesoftheelephantkillings

Whydidthevillagersparticipateintheelephantkillings?To answerthisquestion,itiscrucialtounderstandthevillagers’own interpretationofthesituation.Thisissuewillbeaddressedlater.

First,weﬁnditnecessarytopresentalltheelementsthatwethink contributedtothisevent.

Localburdenofconservation

During fieldwork,we learned thatelephants repeatedlyraid cropsinthearea.Allpeopleinterviewedreportedthatcropraiding wasamajorproblem.Statisticsthatwecollectedfromlocalgov- ernmentindicatethatin2009atotalof901acreswereraidedin threevillages(EngareNairobi,NamwaiandMatadivillages)inSiha MagharibiDivision,and2222acresinsevenvillagesinEnduimet Division.Insomeperiods,manyfarmersspentmuchtimeguarding theirfields.Thedamagewas,however,significant.

Elephantsalsocauseproblemsatwaterpoints,andtheysome- timesdestroywaterpipes.Furthermore,manypeoplefearattacks ofelephantsonpeopleandlivestock.AsdemonstratedinFig.2, wefoundthatthecostofconservationbornbylocalfarmerscon- stitutesanimportantpartofthebackgroundfortheactionsthat villagerstookwhochasedtheelephantstowardsandoverthecliff.

Theburdenonlocalpeople’slivelihoodsfoundinthisareaisin consistencewithsomeotherstudiesinthisaswellasotherareas withelephantpopulationsinAfrica(e.g.Hoare,1999;Naughton- Treves et al., 1999; Tchamba, 1996; Parker and Osborn, 2001;

Dublinand Hoare, 2004; Osborn and Hill, 2005).Kikoti (2009) describeshowelephantswouldstayintheriparianforestsalong theEngareNairobiNorthRiver(alsocalledtheSimbaRiver)dur- ingdaytimeandraidlocalﬁeldcropsatnight.Furthermore,Trench etal.(2009)statethatsomevillagers,especiallyinthenearbyTin- gatingavillage,havegivenupfarmingbecauseofelephant-related problems.

StudiesfromotherareasthroughoutAfricashowthatelephants canberesponsibleforlarge-scalecropraidingandpropertydam- age(e.g.Tchamba,1996;WeladjiandTchamba,2003).Muruthi (2005)calculatedthatelephantsintheZambeziareaofZimbabwe areresponsibleforuptothree-quartersofallcropdamagecaused bywildlife,whileSmithandKasiki(2000)documentedthatfarmers aroundTsavoNationalParkinKenya,havestoppedfarmingcrops preferredbyelephants,suchasbananasandsugarcane.Gupta’s (2013)studyinBotswanashowsthatcropraidingbyelephantshas causedsomefarmerstostopfarmingtheirlargearablelandand insteadgrowvegetablesandfruitintinybackyardgardens.Osborn andHill(2005)statethatinareasinAfricaaffectedbycropdam- agebyelephants,andwherepeopledependonfarming,people’s livelihoodsarethreatenedandthestandardoflivingisverylow.

Drought

AseveredroughtinnorthernTanzaniaandKenyawasasignif- icantcauseoftheincreasedproblemsthatvillagersexperienced withelephantsintheWestKilimanjarobasinin2009.Whenpro- tectedareasarehitbydrought,wildlife,includingelephants,tends tomigratetoareaswithhumansettlementsand plantationsin searchofwaterandgreenvegetation.Watersources,cattletroughs andwatertaps,aswellascropﬁeldsconstitutethemainincentives forelephantsandotherwildlifetomoveintofarms(Thouless,1994;

SmithandKasiki,2000).

AmaninEngareNairobidescribedthelocalsituationin2009in thisway:

‘Many people had plots along Engare Nairobi South River ....Wateringtheplotswasverycostlyandhard,becausethere waslittleﬂowofwaterintheriverandeveryonewasﬁghting forwater....Smallplotsalongtheriverweremoreprecious thanmanyacressomewhereelse.Peoplehadhopedtoharvest somecrops,butelephantsusedtocomeanddestroy2–3acres perday.’(Interviewno.40,Nov.2009)

During fieldwork, we learned that people tried tokeep the elephantsawaybyguardingthefieldsthroughoutthenightand tryingtoscarethemawaywithfire,noiseandtorches.We also observedpeopletryingtopreventelephantraidsbyfencing,build- ing hedges, and burning chilipeppers. These methods are also used inother countrieswithsimilarelephant problems (Zhang andWang,2003;WeladjiandTchamba,2003;SitatiandWalpole, 2006;Wangetal.,2006;MackenzieandAhabyona,2012).Fencing isreportedinsomestudies(e.g.WeladjiandTchamba,2003)with limitedeffectinkeepingelephantsandotherwildlifeaway.Other studies(Tchamba,1996;SmithandKasiki,2000)showthatsuch mitigationeffortsmayprovideashort-termsolutionindeterring elephantsfromfarms,buttheanimalsmaybecomehabituatedto thesemeasuresinthelongrun.

During the drought in 2009, elephants searching for water destroyedvariouswaterfacilities.Weweretoldthatsuchdestruc- tion also happened during thedry seasons in years of normal weather.Thisdamageisexpensiveandcandeprivepeopleofwater fordays,asittakessigniﬁcanttimetorepairpipelines.Onemorn- ing,wemetpeoplefromNgereyanivillagewithdonkeyscarrying largeplastic containersto searchfor water. Intheevening, we learnedthattheyhadbeenapproachedbyelephantsthatchased thedonkeysaway.BothpeopleandlivestockinWestKilimanjaro have,infact,beenkilledandinjuredbyelephants.For instance, Tingatingavillagersclaimthatmorethan75%ofwildlife-related humandeathsarecausedbyelephants.

Duringﬁeldwork,villagerscomplainedthattheyincurredsub- stantialcostsasresultofdamagecausedbyelephants,forwhich theyreceivednocompensationfromthegovernment.TheWildlife Actof2009statesthat‘consolation’paymentistobegivenincases ofinjury,deathanddestructionofcropscausedbywildanimals (UnitedRepublicofTanzania,2009:52).Theregionalgovernment documentsuchcosts,butduringﬁeldworkwedidnothearofany suchcompensationbeingpaid.

Thedroughtwascausedbypoorrainsthroughout2008anda lackoflongrainsinAprilandMay2009(Rusell,2009;Western, 2009).AccordingtoMoss(2009),MaasaieldersinKenyaclaimed thedroughttobethemostseveresince1961.Maasaieldersthat weinterviewedalsotoldusthatitwastheworstdroughtformany decades.Manyrivers,dams,andswampsdriedoutand thefew remainingwatersourcesbecamesitesofhuman–wildlifeconﬂicts.

News headlinesstated that ‘Drought puts wildlifein dangerin Tanzania’(Ihucha,2009)andthat‘DevastatingDroughtWorsens Human–WildlifeConﬂict’(Maina,2009).Duetothedrought,ele- phantsmigratedtowardshumansettlementsandfarmsinsearch ofgreengrassandwater.Thepresenceofwatersourcessuchas theEngareNairobiRiver,alongwithcattletroughs,watertapsand ﬁeldswerethemainreasonsforelephantsandotherwildlifeto moveintofarms.Thiscontributedtoasituationwhereelephants raidedcrops and destroyedhumanwater facilities toa greater extentthanusual.

Throughﬁeldworkin2009,weexperiencedtheintensityofthe drought,whichcausedvarioushardshipsforpeople,includingthe damagecausedbyelephants.Weobservedthatmuchwildlifeas wellaslivestockdiedandfoodaidbecamecrucialforpeople.Rain- falldata(Fig.3)alsoshowthatthe2009droughtwassevere.

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Fig.3.RainfallFluctuationsinWestKilimanjaro.Note:Yearslackingrainfalldata formorethanﬁvemonthsarenotincluded.

Source:TanzaniaMeteorologicalAgency(2009).

Humanpopulationgrowth

Human–wildlifeconﬂictsareoftensaidtobecausedbyagrowth inhumannumbers,leadingtocompetitionwithwildlifeforfood, water and space (Mwamfupe, 1998; Hoare and du Toit, 1999;

SiexandStruhsaker,1999;Hoare,1999;Naughton-Trevesetal., 1999;SmithandKasiki,2000;OsbornandHill,2005;Sitatietal., 2005;Karimi,2009;ButtandTurner,2012;Reid,2012).Incases whereelephantscauseproblemsforcommunities,humanpopula- tiongrowthisrepeatedlycitedasanexplanatoryfactor.

ForinstanceKarimi(2009)statethat:asthe‘humanpopula- tionofAfricahasgrown,thewildareasneededtosustainelephant populationshavedwindled,puttingthespecies,andthereforethe ecosystemimpactedbythematrisk’(p.16).Furthermore,inKenya, ElephantCareInternationalarguesthat:

‘Theroot causeofhuman–elephant conﬂictis theexploding humanpopulationgrowthandresultantpressureonelephant habitat.Habitat lossanddegradation inevitablyleadtocon- ﬂict.AsKenya’shumanpopulationsoars,elephantpopulations will continue to be under greater pressure.’ (Elephant Care International,undated)

Inasimilarvein,WWFholdsthat:

‘Ashabitatscontractand humanpopulationsexpand,people andelephantsareincreasinglycomingintocontactwitheach other.Wherefarmsborderelephanthabitatorcrosselephant migrationcorridors,damagetocropsandvillagescanbecome commonplace, providing a sourceof conflict which theele- phantsinvariablylose.’(WorldWildlifeFund,undated) Lookingatthepopulationfiguresforthetwodivisionsstudied inWestKilimanjaro,wefindthatthehumanpopulationinthearea seemstohaveincreasedsubstantiallysince2002.In2002,theSiha MagharibiandEnduimetdivisionshad19,807and17,020residents, respectively(NationalBureauofStatistics,2002).In2009,popu- lationfiguresinthesetwodivisionshadincreasedto25,623and 45,763.Inadditiontonaturalpopulationincrease,theestablish- mentofseveralnewvillagesin2007(suchasMitiMirefu,Engare Nairobi,MatadiandNamwai)mayhaveattractedotherpeopleto migrateintothearea.Atthesametime,theremightalsohavebeen considerableout-migrationsofpeoplewhohavemovedtoother urbanareasortheyhavemovedtocitiesinlinewiththegeneral tendenciesofurbanization.

Furthermore,we alsolearned duringﬁeldwork that anesti- mated30,000peoplewho hadlivedin theforestwerein2006 and2007evictedfromEngushaiandLondros(seeFig.1)(Ndagulla, 2009; Park Protection Wardeninterview, 2009). As theirliving intheforestwasseen asillegal,theywerenot includedinthe

populationfiguresbeforetheywereevictedfromtheforestafter theextensionofKilimanjaroNationalParkin2005.Mostofthese peopleweremovedtoliveinthenearbyvillagesandonlythen becamepartofofficialpopulationnumbers.Hence,populationfig- uresremainuncertain,butsomevillages,suchasEngareNairobi, havegrownsubstantiallyduringthelastdecade,nottheleastdue toevictionscausedbytheextensionofKilimanjaroNationalPark.

Theelephantpopulation

ManyoftheintervieweesinWestKilimanjarosaidthattheele- phantpopulationhadconsiderablyincreasedduringthelastfew years.PeopleinEngareNairobitoldusthattheyhadneverencoun- teredelephantsbefore2009.Onevillagersaid:‘Ihavestayedhere formorethan19years,butIhadneverseenanyelephantshere beforethisyear.Whenwesawtheelephantdung,itwassomething thatsurprisedus.’(Interviewno.24,Nov.2009).

Overallﬁguresontheelephant populationinTanzaniashow thatsincetheivorybanin1989,elephantnumbershaveincreased from55,000to136,753in2006;withTanzania’spopulationrepre- senting80%ofallEastAfricanelephants(Blancetal.,2007;TAWIRI, 2007).However,from2006to2009therewasadeclineto109,000 inthecountry’selephantpopulation(UnitedRepublicofTanzania, 2010; TAWIRI, 2010).The reasonsare believed tobeincreased ivorypoaching–especiallyintheSelous-Mikumiecosystem(CITES, 2010;UnitedRepublicofTanzania,2010)–duetorisingdemandfor ivoryinsomeAsiancountries(BBC,2012;CAI,2012);themigration ofelephantsfromSelousintotheNiassaGameReserveinMozam- bique,anddataprocessingerrorsinthe2006survey(CITES,2010).

WhiletheelephantpopulationinSelous-Mikumihasdecreased inthelastfewyears,thepopulationinWestKilimanjaroseemsto havegrownfromanestimateof150–400in2003(Blancetal.,2007) to600in2010(Kikotietal.,2010).Thisincreasemaypartlybea resultofconservationmeasuresinWestKilimanjarosupportedby theAfricanWildlifeFoundationandtheHoneyGuideFoundation.

AnoverallgrowthinnumbersofelephantsinWestKilimanjarois consistentwithﬁguresfromtheneighbouringAmboseliNational Parkofanincreasefrom967in2007to1266in2010(KWS/TAWIRI, 2010).ThepopulationofelephantsinKenyaalsoincreasedfrom 22,036in2002to23,353in2006;whileonthewholeAfricancon- tinent,elephantnumbershaveincreasedfrom402,067in2002to 472,269in2007accordingtoBlancetal.(2007).Furthermore,data fromBlancetal.(2003)andBlancetal.(2007)indicateanincrease ofelephantsintheKilimanjaroNationalParkfrom220in1990to 793in2007.

Asalreadymentioned,thedestructionbyelephantsofcropsand waterfacilitiesisaresultofhumanbeingsandelephantssharing thesamespace.ThepopulationofelephantsinWestKilimanjaro seemstohaveincreasedsubstantiallyinrecentyearsand,inperiods ofseveredroughtelephantstendtocausedamagetocropsand waterpipelines.

Landrestrictedforconservationandwildlifetourism

The land use pattern in and around West Kilimanjaro con- stitutesa crucialelement intheweb ofrelations regardingthe elephantkillings.AsFig.1shows,largepartsofWestKilimanjaro todaybelongtobotholdandmorerecentlyestablishedconserva- tionareas.Atthesametime,peoplearelefttomaketheirliving inareasthatarerelativelylimitedandlocatedinbetweenthese conservationareas.Theelephantpopulationcanthriveandgrow withinthe conservationareas in good years, while in times of droughtthey‘spillover’intofarmland.Fig.1includeslandinWest Kilimanjarothatisusedforlarge-scalecommercialfarming,which alsorestrictstheareaavailableforsmall-scalefarmingandgrazing.

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Wepresentbeloweachoftheareasreservedforconservationand tourism,startingwiththeestablishmentofnationalparks.

AsshowninFig.1,therearethreenationalparksinandcloseto WestKilimanjaro.NgurdotoCraterNationalParkwasestablished in1960,anditbecameapredecessortothepresentArushaNational Park.Afterseveralexpansions,ArushaNationalParkencompasses 552km²from2006.

TheKilimanjaroNationalParkwasinauguratedin1973,with anareaof753km²,anditwasexpandedto1831km²in2005by theinclusionoftheKilimanjaroForestReserve(TANAPA,2005).

AllnationalparksinTanzaniaareadministeredbytheTanzania NationalParks(TANAPA),whichisaparastatalorganizationunder theMinistryofNaturalResourcesandTourism.Naturalresource usebylocalcommunitiesisnotallowedinanyofthenationalparks.

ThemountaintopofKilimanjaroisafamoustargetforhikers,and thistourismactivitygeneratesrelativelylargerevenues.Duetothe 2005expansion,EngareNairobiislocatednexttothepark,butthe hikingtourismactivitydoesnotsigniﬁcantlybeneﬁtpeopleinWest Kilimanjaro.

Acrosstheborder inKenya, theAmboseliNationalParkwas establishedin1974,coveringanareaof392km².TheKitiruaCon- cessionArealiesbetweentheTanzanianborderandthewestern partofAmboseli,covering121.4km²andestablishedin2009with thehelpoftheKenyaWildlifeTrust.AccordingtoKenyaWildlife Trust(2010),itwasestablishedinorder tosecure ahabitatfor wildlifeandenableMaasaicommunitiestobeneﬁtfromwildlife tourism.ThereisaproposaltoestablishtheLemomoConcession AreaeastofKitirua,withaspeciﬁcfocusontheconservationof wildlife(Kikoti,2009).

TheLongidoGameControlledAreacovers1700km²andisman- agedbytheWildlifeDivisionoftheMinistryofNaturalResources andTourism.Itwascreatedin1946bythecolonialgovernmentas anareaforsporthunting(UnitedRepublicofTanzania,1998).The WildlifeActof2009requirespeopletoacquirepermitsfromthe DirectorofWildlifefortheirlivestocktograzeingamecontrolled areas.TheLongidoGameControlledAreacoverstheentireLongido Districtandislocatedalmostentirelyonvillageland.

Wildlifemanagementareas(WMAs)areportionsofvillageland setasideforconservation,oneoftheintentionsistogeneraterev- enuesfromtourism.TheEnduimetWMAwasgazettedin2007and covers742km².Sofar,fewtourismcompanieshaveengagedin thearea,andlocalrevenuesaresmall(Marikietal.,inpress).This WMAwasplannedasameanstodecreasemeatpoaching(Poole andReuling,1997)anditwasseentobestrategicallylocatedonthe wildlifemigratoryroutebetweenKenyaandTanzania(Minwary, 2009).

Inthe1950s,Britishsettlersestablishedanumberofestates inWestKilimanjaro thatweresetasidefor large-scalefarming andlivestockproduction.Timberplantationswerealsoestablished by the Forestry Division by clearing approximately 3775ha in theKilimanjaro natural forest (Lampreyet al., 1991).Afterthe ArushaDeclarationin1967thatdemandedplacing‘themeansof production...under thecontrol andownership ofthepeasants andworkersthemselvesthroughtheirgovernmentandcooper- atives’(Nyerere,1967:2b),theagriculturalandlivestockestates werenationalizedandrunbyparastatalssuchastheNationalFood CooperationandTanzaniaBreweriesLimited,thatproducedwheat andothercrops,andraisedcattle.

Duringthe1990s,awaveofprivatizationimpactedonthecoun- try,includingWestKilimanjaro.Anumberoflargepropertieshave beenacquiredbyinvestorswhohaveturnedthemintoprivatecon- servationandtourismestates.Aprivateinvestorinwildlifetourism hasleasedthreeestatessince1994(Endarakwaifrom1994,Raﬁki from2000,andNoalafrom2007),combiningthemintooneprop- ertycalledtheEndarakwaiRanch.Thereisatouristlodgeonthe propertyandtherestofthe44km²areaisusedforwildlifesafaris.

TheWestKilimanjaroRanchcoversanareaof303km².Itwas operatedbytheNationalRanchingCompany(NARCO)forlivestock productionuntil2007,whenAWFenteredintoaMemorandumof Understandingwiththecompanytoestablishintegratedlivestock- wildlifedevelopmentontheranch(AWF,2009).TheAWF was, however,unabletoleasetheranchin2011,becauseofadisagree- mentwiththegovernment.Theranchiscurrentlyonthelistof NARCOranchestobeprivatized.

Furthermore,awildlifecorridorhasbeenestablishedinthearea andAWF(throughitsKilimanjaroElephantResearchandConser- vationProject)hasproposedfourmorecorridors(Kikoti,2009).The wildlifecorridorKitendeniwasestablishedin2001(andregistered in2002)toconnectelephantmigrationsbetweentheKilimanjaro andAmboseliNationalParksandtheproposedLemomoConcession AreaontheKenyansideoftheborder(Kikoti,2009;Kikotietal., 2010).Actors who supportedtheestablishment of thecorridor includeTANAPA,theWildlifeDivision,MonduliDistrictCouncil, andAWF (Kikotietal.,2010).Theproposalofnewwildlifecor- ridorswasarguedonthebasisofelephantmigratoryroutesand dispersalareasrevealedinstudieswhereelephantswerecollared andtracked(Kikoti,2009).Someoftheareasidentiﬁedaselephant routesoverlapwithlocalsettlements.Therehavebeenwidespread rumoursinEngareNairobithatthegovernmentintendstodislocate peopletoestablishawildlifecorridor.Infocusgroupinterviews, peoplevoicedfearsofbeingevictedreferringtoastudycarriedout byAWFthroughtheKilimanjaroElephantResearchandConserva- tionProjecttoassessthecostsofrelocatingvillagers.

Conditionspresentedthusfarconstitutedriversinthewebof relationsthatinﬂuencedthefactorsthateventuallycausedtheact ofelephantkillings.First,theestablishmentofconservationareas makesWestKilimanjaroanareathatelephantsareattractedto fromnearbyprotectedareassuchasArushaandAmboseliNational Parks.Thus, itislikely thattheincreasingnumberofelephants in the areain recent years is partly due to these conservation measures.Aswehaveseenabove,thepresenceofmoreelephants impliesthatthereislikelytobemorecropraidingandotherprob- lemsforpeople,particularlyinperiodsofseveredrought,suchas thatof2009.Secondly,whenconservationareasareestablished, theavailablelandandnatural resourcesfor small-scalefarmers andpastoralistsbecomesincreasinglyrestricted.

Finally,villagersobserveandinterpretthechangesintheirarea.

Duringinterviews,focusgroupsandparticipantobservation,we learnedthatmanypeoplearefrustratedandangryaboutthesitua- tion.Thefollowingisatypicalremark:‘Weareangrythatinvestors and conservationists are expanding wildlife protected areas in ordertoenablewildlifetoﬂourishandattracttourists,whilewe aresqueezed.Theywantwildlifetodominateattheexpenseof people.’(Interviewno.8,Nov.2009)

Likewise, another villager established a direct link between conservationandtheelephantkillings:‘Someofthepeoplewho participatedinelephantkillingshadplotsalongtheriver,whileoth- ersdidnot,butduetothehostilitytowardsconservation,theyalso followedtheelephantsandchasedthemtowardsthecliff’(Focus GroupInterview,Dec.2009).

Furthermore,many intervieweesmadeconnections between theelephantproblemsandtheprivateleasingoflandforconser- vationandsafaritourism:

‘Icansaythatthewhitepeoplelike[anon.]aretheonesbringing thiscalamity.WildlifeusedtostayintheparkslikeNgorongoro andSerengeti.Thesepeoplehaveinvestednearbyourvillage andattractwildanimalsthatcometooursettlements.’(Inter- viewno.6,Nov.2009)

Moreover,villagerstoldusthattheyfearedthatlandacquisi- tionsfora wildlifecorridorthroughEngareNairobi wouldforce themaway fromtheirpresent settlementsand livelihoods.One

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manexpressedthefollowingaboutthesituation,whichresulted intheelephantkillings:

‘Wewerescaredin2009ofbeingdislocatedfromourvillageto pavethewayforwildlife.Wedonotgetanysleepaswethink anytimesomethingmighthappen.Itishardtododevelopment activities.Itishardtogetthisfearoutofourminds.’(Interview no.3,Dec.2009)

Actorsbehindlandappropriationsforconservation

Whoaretheactorsthatinﬂuenceconservationinandaround WestKilimanjaro?First,theTanzanianparliament(Bunge)makes ofﬁcialdecisions on wildlife policiesand actsthat legalizethe establishmentof variousprotected areas.Therehave beenpar- liamentary elections since independence in 1961. From 1992, Tanzaniaadoptedamultipartydemocracyandsince1995,mem- bers of Bunge have been elected within a multi-partysystem.

Second,inputs tothepolicy-makersas wellasimplementation and management are carried out by the Wildlife Division and TANAPA.ThesearebothundertheMinistryofNaturalResources andTourism.Therehavebeenseveralcorruptionscandalsinthe lastfew yearsin thenatural resourcesandconservationsector, inwhich civilservantsandtop politicianshave madedecisions andallocatedpublicresourcestotheirprivatebeneﬁts(Sachedina, 2008;Jansen,2009; Nelson,2009,2010;Cooksey, 2011;Mikali, 2011).

Inrecentyears,theWildlifeDivisionhasstrengtheneditsown powerinconservationandlandmanagement(Benjaminsenetal., 2013)andtherebyweakenedthepowerofvillageanddistrictcoun- cils.TheWildlifeActof2009gavepowerstotheDirectorofWildlife toissuegrazingpermitsingamecontrolledareas,suchasLongido.

Itstatesthat‘anypersonshallnot,savewiththewrittenpermission oftheDirectorpreviouslysoughtandobtained,grazeanylivestock inanygamecontrolledarea’(UnitedRepublicofTanzania,2009:

26).Furthermore,theWildlifeDivisionhasincreaseditspowers tocontrolWildlifeManagementAreas,whileatthesametimeit claimsthattheseareasaremanagedbylocalcommunities.The 1998WildlifePolicyallowedthecreationofthisnewcategoryof conservationarea(WMAs),statingthatlocalcommunitieswillhave

‘fullmandateofmanagingandbeneﬁtingfromtheirconservation efforts’(UnitedRepublicofTanzania,1998,31).TheWMAshave enabledtheWildlifeDivisiontoaccruefundsfromwildlifeoutside nationalparksandgamereserves.Thestate’sreconsolidationofits powerinwildlifemanagementseemstoworkasawayforcorrupt governmentofﬁcialsandthestatetreasurytocaptureresources fromvillageland(BenjaminsenandSvarstad,2010;Benjaminsen andBryceson,2012;Benjaminsenetal.,2013).

Furthermore, there are initiatives from the Tanzanian gov- ernmenttocreateaconducive investmentenvironment (United Republicof Tanzania, 1998). In thewildlifesector, thegovern- ment encouragesthe ‘establishment of zoos,game sanctuaries, wildlifefarmsandranchesonprivatelandanddevolve(s)responsi- bilitytomanagewildlifeinthosetoprivatesectorandindividuals’

(United Republic of Tanzania 2007: 40). As noted by Igoe and Brockington(2007:432),thistypeof‘neoliberalisationofnature’

re-regulates nature through commodiﬁcation and commercial- ization by partitioning the ‘resources and landscapes in ways thatcontrolandoftenexcludelocalpeople’,whilebeneﬁtingthe nationalandtransnationalelites.TheNdarakwaiRanchisanexam- pleofthisphenomenon.Theestablishmenthascontributedtoland usechangesawayfromagricultureandlivestocktowildlife-based tourism.

However,conservationin Tanzaniacannot beseen asa fea- turethatis controlledonlyby actorsinthegovernment.There arealsointernationalactorsthatplay essentialrolesinpropos- ing, facilitating and funding conservation in this as wellas in

other countries in the global South. AWF belongs to a group of non-governmental organizations fromthe global North that hasa powerful role in enhancing protected areasin the South (Sachedina, 2008; Scholﬁeld and Brockington,2010).This large non-governmentalorganisationwasestablishedintheUSAin1961 tocapacitateAfricanstomanagewildlifeafterthecolonialwardens had departed (Adams, 2004).In WestKilimanjaro, AWF consti- tutestheleadingconservationNGO.InAfrica,AWFalongwiththe WorldWideFundforNature (WWF)and ConservationInterna- tional,haveidentiﬁeddifferentpartsofthecontinentinwhicheach workstoestablishaseriesofconservationareas.Theycallthese areas ecoregions(WWF), hotspots (Conservation International), andheartlands(AWF).In1998,AWFbeganitsHeartlandProgram (Adams,2004)andWestKilimanjaroislocatedwithintheKiliman- jaroHeartlandArea(KWS/TAWIRI,2010).AWFhasbeencentralin theprocessofestablishingandfacilitatingtheEnduimetWildlife ManagementArea.Theorganizationalsomadeeffortstoobtainthe WestKilimanjaroRanchforconservationpurposes.Moreover,AWF hasinvestedmucheffortinelephantresearchintheareatoidentify andlegitimateconservationmeasures,suchasnewwildlifecorri- dors.AWFisalsofacilitatingtheLakeNatronWildlifeManagement AreaintheLongidoDistrict.

Conservation organizations depend on their ability to raise funds,andthemainsourcesareusuallydevelopmentaiddonors, corporationsandindividualsupporters.Since1989,AWFinTanza- niahasreceivedmostofitsfundsfromUSAID,butalsosomefrom otherinternationaldonorsandindividuals(Sachedina,2008).WWF hasbeenfocusingoninfrastructureintheEnduimetWildlifeMan- agementArea,alsowithﬁnancialassistancefromUSAID.TheHoney GuideFoundationworkswithgamescoutstoprotectwildlifein theEnduimetWMA,receivingﬁnancialsupportfrompartnerssuch astheBigLifeFoundation(BigLifeFoundation,2011),TheNature Conservancy(TheNatureConservancy,2012)andtouristdonations (HoneyGuideFoundation,2012).

Hence,theseactors(partsoftheTanzanianGovernment,aswell asinternationalconservationists,theirdonorsandsomeactorsin safaritourism),despitehavingdifferentobjectivesandstrategies, havesucceededininﬂuencingconservationpracticeinWestKili- manjaro.Alesswell-reporteddimensionisthatvillagersinWest Kilimanjaro do not seem to have had much inﬂuence in these decisions.Wefoundthatmanyvillagersexpressedafeelingofpow- erlessness.Theytoldusthattheyhavetriedtocomplainaboutthe situation,butdonotfeelthattheyareheard.Onemansaid:‘The governmentclearlyshowsthatitvalueswildlifemorethanpeople.

Alsoinvestorsvaluewildlifemorethanpeople.’(Interviewno.27, Nov.2009).

Anotherintervieweeexpressedthefollowing:

‘InTanzania,localpeopleare notvaluedas muchasforeign investors.Governmentofﬁcialssometimestellusnottodisturb investors,becausetheypayalotofmoneytothegovernment, whilewepaynothing.So,iftheinvestorscomplaintothegov- ernmentwewillbedislocated.’(Interviewno.31,Nov.2009) Hence,therearepowerfulactorsbehindtheappropriationof land for conservation both within the Tanzanian state as well as among international conservation organizations. Small-scale farmers and pastoralists, on the other hand, feel increasingly marginalized and disempowered by these actors. As generally pointed out byScott (1985)and in relationto conservationby Brockington(2004),suchmarginalizationandincreasingdistance topowermaypushlocalactorstowardshiddenactsofresistance.

AsalsonotedbyBrockington(2004),conservationmaybehighly successfuldespitesuchlocalhiddenopposition.WestKilimanjaro seemstobeanotherexampleofthiscontradictionwherestories ofsuccessfulwin–winconservationcontinuetobetoldbypow- erfulnationaland internationalconservationactors,whilelocal

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resistancetothisconservation,includingthekillingofelephants, islargelyignored.

Killingelephantsasanactofresistance

Ininterviews,villagersemphasizedtheirfrustrationduetothe difﬁcultsituationwiththeelephantsandconcomitantlytheirlack ofinﬂuence ontheaforementionedlandusechanges. So, what broughtthevillagerstoseetheactofkillingelephantsasaway ofdealingwiththesituation?Inotherwords,whatmotivatedthe elephantkillings?Onthebasisofinterviewswithvillagersinthe area,weherediscussthreeexplanatoryalternatives.

First,thedeathoftheelephantscouldhavebeenunintentional bythosewhoparticipatedinthechase.Insomeinterviews,villagers triedtoconvinceusthatthiswasthecase.Oneintervieweesaid:

‘Wedidnotkilltheelephants.Farmerswerechasingthemoutof theirfarmsunfortunatelytheyfellintothepit.’(Interviewno.51, Nov.2009)

KillingelephantsisaseriouscrimeinTanzaniathatcanleadto longprisonsentences.Itisthereforelikelythattheincidentmaybe presentedasanaccidentinordertopreventcriminalcharges.After theelephantswerechasedoverthecliff,somevillagers,however, stabbedacalftodeath,whichwashardlyanaccident.Furthermore, asimilarelephantkillingtookplacenearbya yearlater whena herdofelephantsraidedfarmlandplantedbysmall-holders.People thenusedspearsandarrowstokilloneoftheelephantsthathad laggedbehindtheherd.Finally,thoseintervieweeswhoimplied thattheelephantsaccidentallyrantowardsthecliffandfellover describedtheincidentas‘aprotest’inotherpartsoftheinterviews.

Nevertheless,itislikelythattheintentiontokilltheelephantswas notpresentamongallofthoseinvolved.

Secondly,thekillingsmaybeconsideredasanattempttoreduce theelephantpopulationandtherebybeinterpretedasatypeof informal(andillegal)formofwildlifemanagement.Thiswouldbe inlinewithﬁndingsfromKenyawhereMaasaipoisonedalllions inAmboseliNationalParkin1990,andspeared27of40lionsin NairobiNationalParkin2003(Lamarqueetal.,2009:33).Asimilar incidentinKenyawithelephantshasalsobeenreported(Moss, 2008).

However,wedidnotﬁndsupportforsuchanexplanationin ourstudy.Whenintervieweeswereaskedexplicitlyaboutelephant killingsasaformofwildlifemanagement,weweregivenanswers suchas:

‘No,itwouldnotbepossibletoreducethenumberofelephants thatway,giventhehighnumberofelephantsinthearea.’(Inter- viewno.53,Dec.2011)

Thirdly,theactofelephantkillingcouldbeseenasanactof protestand amessagetothegovernment.Oneintervieweesaid forinstance,‘Itwasademonstration,sothatthegovernmentisto rememberthepeople’(Interviewno.54,Dec.2011).Anothersaid:

‘Webecameveryfuriousandsaidletthegovernmentchoose eitherpeopleorelephants.Ourvillageisnotawildlifecorridor’

(Interviewno.13,Nov.2009).

Likewise,thefollowingviewwasexpressedinafocusgroup meeting:

‘Wesawthatthegovernment,investors,andtheAfricanWildlife Foundationdidnotlistentoourworriesanddidnotunderstand ourpains.Wethereforeoptedforthistactic[thekillingofthe elephants]toendtheannoyanceofwildlife.Thiswasawayto sendthemessagetothegovernmentthatwearetired.’(Focus Groupmeeting,Dec.2009)

Whenpeopletalkedaboutwhatspeciﬁcallymotivatedsucha demonstration,wereceivedanswersaboutvariousaspects,suchas

thelackofeffortbydistrictauthoritiesandotherstoinstallwardens todetercrop-raidingelephants,lackofbeneﬁtsfromconservation, lackofcompensationforthedamageandextraworkburdencaused byelephants,protests againsttheintentions ofconservationists toimposeanewelephantcorridorandotherconservationareas, andannoyanceattheotherappropriationsandleasesoflandwith restrictionsonlocaluse.

Concerningbenefitssharingbetweendifferentvillages,aninter- viewee fromEngare Nairobi arguedthat ‘we don’t receive any benefitfromwildlife,eitherfromthenationalparkorfromthe investor.ThesituationismuchbetterforvillagesunderEnduimet WildlifeManagementAreabecausetheygetsomebenefitsfrom wildlife,butwesuffersomuch,andwegetnothing...’(Interview no.48,Dec.2009).AlthoughEngareNairobivillageisunderKili- manjaroNationalPark’soutreachprogramme,ithasnotbenefitted fromparkrevenuessince1994whentheprogrammewasinitiated (Mariki,2013).Thevillagesufferscostsofconservationfromdif- ferentprotectedareasinthesurroundings.Villagesthatarepart ofEnduimetWildlifeManagementAreahaveobtainedsomeben- efitsfromwildlifethroughtourismrevenuesandemploymentin theWMA(Sulleetal.,2011).However,thebenefitstothevillages arelimited(Marikietal.,inpress).

Villagers also told us about how they had tried in vain to addressthesituationthroughothermeans.Theycontactedgov- ernmentofﬁcialsaswellasthemedia.Thegovernmentwasnot, accordingtoseveralinterviewees,takinganyactionontheele- phantsituationbeforetheelephantkillingstookplace.Oneman said:‘Whenwewerereportingcropraiding,injury,andproperty destruction,nogovernmentofﬁcialshowedup.Butwhentheele- phantswerekilled,variousgovernmentbodiescameveryfastto EngareNairobi.’(Interviewno.30,Nov2009)

In2006,threeyearsbeforetheevent,somevillagershadraised money tohirea TVjournalisttoreportontheirproblemswith elephants.OnemaninEngareNairobitoldus:

‘Weaimedtokilltheelephantsbecausetheyhavedisturbed usforalongtimethroughcropraiding,lackofsleepandother costs.Wehavecomplainedtothegovernmentmanytimeswith noavail.In2006,weevencontributedmoneyandpaidajournal- isttocomeandreportaboutit.Insteadofinformingaboutwhat wastroublingus,hereportedgoodthingsabouttheinvestoron howhehelpsthecommunitythroughhistourismactivities.We weresoangry.Therefore,thekillingofelephantswasawayto tellthegovernmentthatwearetormented!’(Interviewno.38, Nov.2009)

Tsai(2012,p.2)arguethatsuchnoncompliancebehavioursmay actuallybeintendedto‘communicate factualinformation about localconditionsandcitizenneedstostateauthoritieswhenthey lackeasyaccesstoformalchannels...eitherbecausetheyareof politicallymarginalizedpopulationsorbecausetheyliveinanon- democraticortransitionalsystem’.Scott(1977)ontheotherhand stressesthatpeasantsaremorelikelytorebelagainstpoliciesthat contravenethesubsistenceethicoftheir‘moraleconomy’.Resis- tancemighthappenwhen peoplebelievethat responsiblestate authoritieshavefailedtoincorporatetheirinputsintodecision- making(Tyler,2006;Levietal.,2009).

The elephant killingsmay alsobe seen as anapplication of the‘weapons of theweak’ (Scott,1985).Theefforts topresent thedeathoftheelephantsininterviewsasanaccident,isinline withthistheory.Thevillagers’collectivedecisionofnotexposing thenamesofpeopleresponsibleforelephantkillingsorclaiming responsibility can alsobein linewiththis theory. Scott(1989, p.56)arguesthat‘whentheactofeverydayresistanceismeant tobenoticed–meanttosendasignal–asinthecaseofarson orsabotage,thentheresisterstakespecialcaretoconcealthem- selves,oftenbehindafacadeofpublicconformity’.Inthestudy

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area,beforetheincidentofelephantkillings,themajorityoflocal peopleusedtoutilizecovertweaponswheretheyengagedwith hiddenactivities.Theyusedpoisonousarrowstokillelephants, whileothersuseda‘silentkillermethod’,asonewomanexplained:

‘Thereareelephantskilledonebyone.Insecret,peopleplace long sharp pointed objects like nails or sharp iron bars or somethingsimilarontheelephant’shabitualpaths.Whenthe elephantsarepiercedtheygetinfections,andwithtimethey die’(Interviewno.20,Nov.2009).

Impactoftheincidentofelephantkillings

Towhatextenthavesuchelephantkillingsprovedtobeeffec- tiveasameansofresistance?Somechangeshavetakenplacethat may,partlyortoagreaterextent,beattributedtothesekillings.

BoththeMemberofParliamentfromtheareaandtheDistrictCom- missionerarrivedatEngareNairobisoonaftertheeventinorder todiscusswiththevillageandwardrepresentativeswhataction shouldbetaken.Moreconservationwardenshavebeenseeninthe areasincethekillings,whichmayhavecontributedtoreducing theelephantproblemsbyhelpingtochaseelephantsfromfarms.

Theplan bysomeconservationists toestablisha wildlifecorri- dorthroughEngareNairobihasalsobeenpostponed.Furthermore, AWFhasnotbeenabletocontinueleasingtheWestKilimanjaro Ranchasa wildlifesanctuary.Thus,as anactof resistance,the case ofthe elephant killingsmightbe seenas havingachieved someeffect.However,duringﬁeldworktwoyearsaftertheevent, villagerscontinuetofaceproblemswithelephantsandcomplain aboutthelackofcompensationfordamages,aswellasalackof inﬂuenceondecision-making.

Conclusions

Wehaveinthisarticleuseda‘webofrelations’approachtostudy aparticularconservationconﬂict.Thisframework includesboth socialandnaturalfactorsandaparticularfocusonpowerrelations andtheinﬂuencesfromvariousactorsandprocessesatdifferent geographicallevels.

Theaimofthestudywastoexplainwhyvillagerskilledsixele- phantsinWestKilimanjaroduringaneveninginMay2009.We arguethat this incident cannotbe explainedas a case of ivory poaching. Nor can it be seen as merely a result of drought or increased populationpressure causing competition over scarce resources.

Whilethereseemstobeamixofmotivesinvolved,weconclude thattheimmediatecauseofthiseventwasresistancebyvillagers whohaveexperiencedincreasingcroplosscausedbyelephants, and who feelmarginalized and disempowered by conservation practices.Hence,thiscasecanbeseenasanexampleoftheweapons oftheweakusedasaresponsetotheslowviolencethatvillagersare subjectedtobyconservationgovernance.Theimplicitaimofsuch resistanceistosendamessagetothegovernment,toinﬂuential internationalconservationorganizationsandinvestorsintourism inasituationinwhichvillagersdidnotfeelthattheycouldreach throughwithothermeans.Theeventwassparkedbyageneral frustrationandfeelingofpowerlessnessontheonesideandan opportunitythatemergedontheother(asmallherdofelephants movedclosetothevillagewhenmanypeoplehappenedtobegath- eredthere).Thecombinationofthesetwofactorsmayexplainwhy thisattackontheelephantshappenedatthisparticularplaceand moment.

Inaddition,otherfactorsthatalsoplayedaroleinthewebof relationsbehindthiseventwereagrowingelephantpopulation, theconcentrationofpeopleinanareathatmoreandmorefre- quentlyisvisitedbyelephants,andthefactthattherewasasevere

droughtintheareaatthetimeoftheevent.Weargue,however, thatthemainrootcausethat producedthis actofresistanceis thewaythatconservationisdecidedandimplementedbyexter- nalactorsand withlimited concernfortheburdens carriedby localcommunities.Actorsthat,invariousways,havecontributed tothissituationarenationalgovernmentalconservationagencies, someforeignconservationgroupsandtheirbranchesinTanzania, someactorswithinthetouristindustryandsomeinternationalaid donors.

Inordertoavoidsucheventsinthefuture,werecommendthe implementationoflanduseplansthatdemarcatewildlifeareas, settlementsandotherlanduses.Furthermore,localcommunities shouldinpractice,andnotonlyinrhetoric,beinvolvedandhave substantialinﬂuenceindecision-makingonmatterspertainingto landuseandwildlifeconservation,intheirimmediateenviron- ments.Finally,wildlifeconservationalsoneedstotakemuchmore seriouslythechallengeofbeneﬁtsharingwithlocalcommunities andcompensationforwildlifedamages.

Acknowledgements

Thisresearchwassupportedbytworelatedresearchprojects;

theEKOSIASAprojectfunded byTheNorwegian Programmefor Development,ResearchandEducation(NUFUT2-2007/10228)and thePAPIAproject(ProtectedAreasandPovertyinAfrica)funded bytheResearchCouncilofNorway(NORGLOBAL178645).Weare gratefulforcommentsonearlierversionsfromseveralcolleagues andinparticularGeorgeHolmes,BillDermanandEspenSjaastad.

Besides,weappreciateconstructivecommentsfromfouranony- mousreferees.Furthermore,wethankSveinErikSloreid(NINA) whocontributedtoproduceFig.1.

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