Defining Expertise : Solving the Climate Challenge with the Help of Science

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Culture

University of Oslo

Postboks 1108 Blindern 0317 Oslo www.sv.uio.no/tik

ESST MA

Defining Expertise

Solving the Climate Challenge with the Help of Science Live Moen

2011

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Live Moen

E-mail: [email protected] University of Oslo

Second semester specialization: Science and Politics in Controversies on Nature Supervisor: Göran Sundqvist

Word Count: 21240

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The school year 2010/11 has been a special year for me in so many ways. Having a baby between two semesters has been a life changing experience. Writing my master thesis and being a new mom has also been a journey and there are so many people I have to thank for making everything possible.

First and foremost I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Göran Sundqvist who has been abundantly helpful and offered invaluable assistance, support, patience and guidance throughout the process. Thank you so much.

Special thanks to everybody that works at the TIK - center and my fellow graduate

students. Without your knowledge and assistance this thesis would not have been successful. I also thank you for being so patient, understanding and enduring all of my talk of pregnancy and babies.

I would also like to thank Ole Ronny Tveite-Strand for looking out for me and helping me with all the planning that has to be done if you have a baby during the school year. It gave me great comfort to always be understood at a time when I needed it the most –so thank you again.

Not forgetting to thank my best friends who always been there. I am truly sorry that I have been so busy and I promise to be a better friend after this thesis. An extra “shout-out” to my study-buddies Hanne and Linda for all the support through our incredible inbox, I could not have done it without you girls.

I would also like to thank my great neighbors Mia and Jon for taking the time out to read through this thesis, thank you again my lifesavers.

I wish to express my love and gratitude to my beloved family for their understanding and endless love through the duration of my studies.

Most importantly I have to thank my love David who has supported me, listened to me, challenged me academically, read through my thesis too many times, motivated me, loved me and calmed me down when I needed it the most. Without you all of this would not have been possible. I can’t begin to describe how much I admire, respect and love you.

Finally I have to thank my son Marley, who was born on December 1, 2010 for showing his mama so much love and joy making this year the best of my life.

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my grandfather who passed away while I was writing.

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ABSTRACT

This project aims to study the role of experts in shaping climate policy. The problem of climate change poses challenges to those who develop policy instruments to reduce carbon emissions; this is as a result of complexity and uncertainty within the scientific field of climate research. As a result of this, expertise has had a particularly strong influence on development of policy. A qualitative analysis of the Climate Change Act adopted in 2008 by the UK Government and the advisory expert body the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), which was established as a part of the Climate Change Act to advise the Government on climate science, is therefore used as a case study to illustrate the relationship between

expertise and policy-makers. In light of Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ (2002, 20007) much debated efforts to create a normative theory of expertise, as well as some of the responding critical questions presented by Sheila Jasanoff (2003) and Brian Wynne (2003) I will analyse how expertise and policy makers interact to create the appropriate means to reduce carbon emissions.

The thesis also shows how the Government wanted to create a group with different expertise to summarize climate research in a better way in order to develop the best climate policy. It further examines the way in which the experts in the Committee work to promote their own expertise within the field of climate science as a united group of experts, an effort much in line with Collins and Evans’ proposed theory of expertise. Furthermore, this thesis shows that creating the CCC would be an interesting experiment as to how the Government can gather a group of experts from different scientific fields to let them work together to produce scientific advice that the Government has to listen to and create policy from, thus giving the experts a high power to influence policy.

In light of Jasanoff and Wynne’s work, however, the examination shows how different framings of scientific disputes could provide better insight to the solution. The analysis also shows how the boundaries between politics and science are blurred, thus suggesting that the Committee would benefit from public participation as a way to ensure that they produce the best result possible. This thesis presents a contribution to an ongoing discussion in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) concerning how expertise should be classified in connection with science-related disputes.

Keywords: Expertise, framing, co-production, policy, society, law and climate change.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CCC The Committee on Climate Change CO2 Greenhouse gas Carbon Dioxide SEE Studies of Expertise and Experience STS Science and Technology Studies ETS Emissions Trading System EU European Union

DECCA The Ministry of Energy and Climate Change (Part of the UK Government) HMG Her Majesty’s Government (Part of the UK Government)

ASC Adaptation Sub Committee (Part of the UK Government)

DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change (Part of the UK Government)

Defra The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Part of the UK Government)

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There is no “science” on the one hand and “society” and “values” on the other. These are dividing lines found only in our theories and imagination” (Latour 1987 in Asdal 2007: 8)

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

With this thesis I will contribute to the ongoing and much debated effort of Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars Harry Collins and Robert Evans to create a normative classification of scientific expertise. In their article The Third Wave of Science Studies:

Studies of Expertise and Experience, Collins and Evans argue that the field of science studies has shown why science and technology cannot always solve technical problems in the public domain. This is particularly the case because “The speed of political decision-making is faster than the speed of scientific consensus formation” (Collins and Evans 2002: 127). A subject over recent years has been the need to expand the domain of technical decision-making beyond the technically qualified elite, so as to improve political legitimacy. Collins and Evans argue, however, that the “Problem of Legitimacy” has been replaced by the “Problem of Extension”—that is, by a tendency to dissolve the boundary between experts and the public so that there are no longer any grounds for limiting the indefinite extension of technical decision- making rights. Moreover, they argue that a new theory of expertise, what they call the Third Wave of Science Studies or the Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE), is necessary to solve the problem of extension. In response to this article, Sheila Jasanoff and Brian Wynne argue that this normative classification of expertise overlooks valuable insights from the STS field regarding the relationship between society and science.

Sheila Jasanoff and Brian Wynne’s critique of the Third Wave of Science Studies was not mentioned in Collins and Evans’s next book Rethinking Expertise. As Mads Dahl Gjefsen (2009: V) mentions in his thesis as a critique of Collins and Evans, that Investigating different framings in scientific disputes will contribute to the classification of expertise. From the point of view of STS scholarship, an analytical approach focusing on the processes by which

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research questions are framed or formulated is promising in terms of understanding the basis for public involvement and stance taking in science-related disputes. These are timeless but nevertheless relevant questions in the field of STS: analysing expertise, how it works and how it is organised. The STS discipline is well suited for analysis of the Climate Change Act and the CCC expert advisory body.

To shed light on this discussion, I have chosen to test the arguments from both sides of the debate on a case study concerning the British Climate Change Act and the advisory expert body, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) In this thesis, the Committee on Climate Change “CCC” refers to the Non-Departmental Public Body set up through the Climate Change Act 2008. Doing so allows me to find out how the law frames and classifies expertise within the CCC, and how the Committee formulates and frames their scientific contributions to the law. My objective is to answer the following three questions: 1) How does the Climate Change Act frame and define expertise within the Committee? 2) How does the CCC frame and formulate its scientific contributions to the Act? 3) How will analysing and evaluating the CCC contribute to Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ efforts to create a normative theory of classification of expertise?

1.1.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Chapter one introduces the research questions, conceptual framework, and methodology of this thesis. It further provides some insight into the field of STS.

The theory is presented in chapter two, as are the issues surrounding the normative

classification of expertise. In this chapter, I also present some of the concepts that will be used in my analysis.

In chapter three, I present my case study and two of myresearch questions. In chapter four, I analyse my case study using the work of Harry Collins, Robert Evans, Sheila Jasanoff, and

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Brian Wynne in the field of classifying expertise. I also consider what contributions might be made to further develop Collins and Evans’ efforts to create a normative theory of expertise.

At the end of this chapter, I share some of my main findings and in chapter five the conclusions of the thesis are presented.

1.1.2 BACKGROUND FOR CHOICE OF SUBJECT

My motivation for writing this thesis stems from my interest in the interface between energy, agriculture, and the environment. On March 22, 2011, I attended a seminar at Litteraturhuset (The House of Literature in Oslo, where people can come together to communicate and promote interest in literature and reading, as well as freedom of speech issues) on the

possibility of a climate change law being enacted in Norway. This seminar introduced me to a similar law enacted by the UK in 2008. The Stern Review on The Economics of Climate Change, a 700-page report published for the British Government on October 30, 2006 by economist Nicholas Stern, proved an important tool in the process of passing the Climate Change Act. The report discusses the effects of global warming on the world economy.

Although this is not the first economic report written about climate change, it is the most elaborated and discussed report of its kind. The Stern Report, which offers a comprehensive cost analysis of greenhouse emissions, states that climate change is the largest and most comprehensive market failure in existence, presenting a unique challenge to the economy.

The Stern Report’s primary conclusion is that the benefits of strong early action on climate change outweigh the long-term costs of inaction. As a result of this report and a campaign called The Big Ask led by Friends of the Earth, Britain enacted a climate change law in 2008.

A climate law will ensure that climate goals are set, and that preventative measures are planned for decades in advance. The Climate Change Act makes emissions targets legally binding. A binding target of how low the greenhouse gas emissions must be in the future

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provides the basis for a long-term community planning. It also creates a situation in which climate change objectives should and must be reached regardless of changing political priorities.

The Climate Change Act combines all of my interests; it addresses issues concerning ecological economics also called living economy, sustainability, long-term commitments across government changes, responsibility, expertise, and of course, putting it all into practice.

In my thesis, I investigate the links between the Committee on Climate Change and the Climate Change Act itself during the period from 2008 to 2011.

I am particularly interested in investigating the relations between science and policy and how policy can help to "control" climate change issues. Moreover, the Act could serve as a template for other laws that can help to ensure a more sustainable environment in the future.

The British experience can also be a useful contribution in a debate about how a long-term, reliable and stable climate and energy policy should take form in Norway and other countries.

1.1.3 THE FIELD OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES

According to the handbook of Science and Technology Studies (STS), STS began to take shape as a discipline in the 1960s. There were calls for a “science of science”, and for attempts to create an explicit and rational “science policy”. In 1965, the Science of Science Foundation was established in London. The works of Robert K. Merton (1973) in the

sociology of science contributed to the birth of STS, but, as a number of early critics pointed out, this tradition took for granted the essentially positive view of science that was also implied in the drive for rational scientific policy. Drawing from work in the disciplines of History, Sociology, Philosophy, Anthropology, Cognitive Psychology, and Linguistics, the 1970s saw the emergence of a radical and new “sociology of scientific knowledge” (SSK).

This research had an academic, humanistic aim, and drew much of its initial inspiration from

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the work of Thomas Kuhn and to a lesser extent from J. D. Bernal and Michael Polanyi. The

“swing away from science in the schools” led to discussions about science with “social responsibility, reform science education—to liberalise it, to make it more human” (Edge 1995: 4). By the end of the decade, innovations on these lines had been made. One major result of these educational innovations of interdisciplinary interactions was that serious attention was paid to interdisciplinary collaborations, in both teaching and research. This feature has profoundly influenced the course of STS (Edge 1995: 3-11). The emerging field of STS has adopted as its fundamental concern the investigation of knowledge societies in all their complexity: their structure and practices, their ideas and material products, and their trajectories of change. Having grown from many disciplines means that STS today

encompasses a rich tapestry of theoretical and methodological perspectives, all specifically directed toward investigating the place of science and technology in society (Jasanoff 2004).

There are challenges around how to manage science and to control the community of experts. These questions are old but still relevant and controversial. This is where the STS field can contribute: STS research criticises that having scientific knowledge makes it possible to speak truth to power. This is complicated; it never goes only in one direction, where science only affects society or politics and not the other way around.

In the field of STS, some authors have argued that awareness of the environmental crisis has influenced a partial shift in the social contract between science and politics (Irwin and Michael 2003). Disenchantment and loss of public trust in science and technology (Wynne 2008) have culminated the expectations placed on environmental sciences and green technologies. The environmentalist movement is critical of science as well as deeply dependent on it.

My theoretical chapter demonstrates a thorough introduction to the debate surrounding the theory of expertise presented mainly by Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Sheila Jasanoff and

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Brian Wynne. Analysis of the use of expertise and how it is classified is central to the field of STS, as is the relationship between expertise and politics. It is also important to note that my thesis will not evaluate the merits or efficacy of the Climate Change Act. Rather, based on the field of STS, I will discuss the use of experts in environmental politics. Who are the experts on the environment and what factors give them credibility? An important task for my thesis will be to investigate how expertise is recognized, framed, and disseminated within the political realm.

1.2 METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA

This study falls within the fields of environmental and STS studies, and it addresses expertise within the field of environmental issues. On a normative level, this thesis seeks a conceptual means toward inclusive forms of environmental governance (Jasanoff 2001).

In order to ensure good quality research, it is important to consider reliability and validity.

Reliability is an important criterion in social research as it is tied to whether the research is conducted in a credible and trustful manner. Validity is tied to the legitimacy of the

interpretations the researcher has reached (Thagaard 2009).

I will rely on theory from the field of STS for analysis in my thesis. I also rely on other disciplines including Sociology, Environmental ecology studies, Economics, and

Anthropology as part of my literature. As the primary source I will draw upon to describe my case, I look to the Climate Change Act published by the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). A major part of my empirical work concerns the Committee on Climate Change. To this end, I focus on three progress reports as the foundation of my empirical data: Meeting Carbon Budgets – the need for a step change; Progress report to Parliament Committee on Climate

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Change October 2009, Meeting Carbon Budgets ensuring a low-carbon recovery. 2^nd progress report to Parliament Committee on Climate Change June 2010, Meeting Carbon budgets: -3^rd Progress Report to Parliament – 30 June 2011. Furthermore, I use the three corporate plans published in 2008-2009, 2009-2010, and the Committee on Climate Change framework document published by Her Majesty’s Government. I also include information from the remaining reports that have been published by the CCC, but the seven reports I mention above form the foundation of my empirical work concerning the CCC. I also include literature from different organisations and institutions that are related to my case.

The Climate Change Act and the Committee were established in 2008. I have chosen to include the entire period from 2008 through June 2011. I rely mostly on the British Government and the Committee on Climate Change’s own records and documents.

Throughout the data collection process I have also consulted different documents that I found of relevance to my thesis. These documents are briefly presented before referring to them in the text.

1.2.1 THE CASE

A common understanding of the case study tells us that it is research on an empirically limited unit, such as a group or an organization where the phenomenon is being studied in its natural environment and the research is based on several sources of data (Thagaard 2009).

Yin (2009) describes that a case study can be used as a template for further investigation.

The purpose of reliability is to ensure the possibility of replication of the study. Reliability is achieved here by including the sources of information, as with references, so that any use of data can be scrutinized. As Yin (2009), discusses, case studies can be supported by several types of data it is seen as advantageous if one can use more than one source at once. Several

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sources can then supplement and strengthen each other.

In this thesis, I have decided to study a single organisation, as an individual case will generate in-depth information on this specific case. However, there is no assurance that the result and conclusions will be applicable to all organisations of this kind and any kind of generalisation can therefore not be made from this study alone. Only through repetition of studies of similar cases can this case study contribute to the theoretical development of classifications of expertise (Yin 2009).

1.2.2 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

In this thesis I have used a hermeneutic approach, i.e. the doctrine of interpretation of texts.

This methodological principle maintains that one idea will be understood by another idea and another idea through the first, in other words, both a contextual and cognitive understanding.

Additionally, the thesis will conduct a qualitative literature study to examine the Climate Change Act and Climate Change Committee. A study of literature seeks to gather information, process it critically, and then summarise the material. This material in its processed form will then form the basis for discussion that will reveal the problem and thus contribute to the theoretical development of expertise.

As mentioned in the text above a key method of analysis in this paper is the interpretation of text. I started out reading official documents regarding the Climate Change Act and reports from individual publishers. This gave me basic knowledge about the Climate Change Act, and literature to further investigated the Committee on Climate Change and its connection to the Climate Change Act. Since the Committee on Climate Change actively and knowingly obtain attention to their expertise, both through its own marketing and editorial media coverage, the amount of text material available to the public was satisfactory. All sources that I have

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collected are considered to be relevant to the research questions. A high number of press clippings, public appearances by the Committees advocates and through their websites have been studied in connection to my thesis. Only the most relevant of these are referred to, and to make the analysis valid and reliable, I have attached the sources that I have found online with the URLs to the list of references. Thagaard (2003) emphasizes that written sources must be understood from its context and purpose, and it is obvious that the Committees promotional materials,publications and website will seek to present the committee and their expertise in a positive way.This is balanced by also analysing literature that is skeptical of Committee. I also rely extensively on literature from the field of STS to analyse the classification of expertise placed in the context of the Committee on Climate Change

In order to achieve a comprehensive approach to the problem, the most suitable literature must be used. It is necessary to be able to trust what is written in the literature being used, and to ensure that important information is not omitted. A literature review makes it possible to specialise in a subject, yet on the other hand, it is difficult to question the written sources. It is therefore necessary to rely on theory, self-knowledge, and critical ability to process the material. Although it is impossible to free myself from my own past understanding and the society I live in, individual performances and background, my aim is always to be as objective, analytical, and critical as possible.

Throughout this chapter my aim was to explain my methodological and analytical strategy and choices in order to increase the reliability of this research.

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2. INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF EXPERTISE AND TO CONCEPTS OF CO-PRODUCTION AND FRAMING

2.1 DEBATING EXPERTISE

The definition of “expertise” is not a matter that concerns just Harry Collins and Robert Evans and other STS scholars, nor is it strictly an academic subject. On the contrary, it is a highly disputed political issue. Increasingly, citizens organize themselves to validate or contest this definition (for instance, activists of environmental movements may claim that scientific knowledge on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) is uncertain, so it should not count as reliable expertise). Conflicts and disagreements regarding science and technology make it clear that there is a diversity of political cultures and social understandings of

expertise (Jasanoff 2005).Furthermore, Nelkin (1975: 36) explains that the reason experts have authority is that they are expected to make their interpretations and analysis based on a rational and objective thinking.

According to Collins and Evans (2007:13), there is a need for a new sociology of expertise.

To better understand the function of expertise, Collins and Evans analyse the meaning of expertise and put forth a definition of experts. Acquiring expertise is a social process, a matter of socialization with expert groups, and expertise can diminish if time is spent away from the groups. Collins and Evans (2007: 14) present the “Periodic Table of Expertise” wherein scientific expertise is made comparable to various forms of lay knowledge. I will now briefly present some of the different forms of expertise from their table I think are relevant for my thesis.

Ubiquitous expertise is the expertise that includes the endless list of indescribable skills it takes to live in a human society. To illustrate this point, Collins and Evans (2007: 16-18, 2-3) present the example of the French language as it is in England and as it is in France. A person

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who can speak French fluently in England is considered an expert, and may be able to get paid to work as a translator or interpreter, while someone who is fluent in French in France is not a “French Expert”. If, however, he or she speaks fluent English in France, he or she might be called an expert in English. Contributory expertise refers to the ability to engage in the full range of activities associated with membership of a community. It also encompasses tacit knowledge, as well as practical, craft, and linguistic skills. Interactional expertise, on the other hand, is contributory expertise minus the practical or craft skill. As a result, a person with interactional expertise is fully able to talk knowledgably about a topic, but is unable to carry out the practical tasks associated with it. More informally, a person with interactional expertise can “talk the talk” but not “walk the walk” (Collins and Evans 2007: 28-30).

According to Collins and Evans, one must distinguish between different types of expertise.

This can contribute to making the existing knowledge more evident for example in a

controversy. This can help to change the direction and also contribute to a fruitful discourse.

Collins and Evans go on to explain the notion of a core-set. A core-set has been defined as being made up of those scientists deeply involved in experimentation or theorisation directly relevant to a scientific controversy or debate. A core-set is often quite small, consisting of perhaps a dozen scientists (Collins and Evans 2002). A core-group is a group of scientists that emerges after a controversy has been settled. It is only the members of the core-sets or the core-group, which can contribute to the formation of consensus if the science is only likely to be understood by a small number of people with a specialised knowledge or interest.

However, it is not always easy to define the boundaries of a core-set because disputes within a core-set often involve the boundary work of defining people as legitimate or

illegitimate commentators. Having accepted that to categorise expertise makes sense despite the boundary problems, the task is to begin to work out what these types of expertise mean and how they fit together.

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To separate the different definitions from one another, Collins and Evans (2002) use Brian Wynne’s study of the relationship between scientists and sheep farmers after the radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl disaster which contaminated the Cumbrian fells (Wynne 1996).

Wynne found that the sheep farmers knew a great deal about the ecology of sheep, and about their behaviour. They also had a great deal of knowledge about the rainwater on the fells. This knowledge was relevant to the discussion of how the sheep and the fells should be treated so as to minimize the impact of the contamination. The farmers have characteristics of a core- group of experts in terms of experience in the ecology on sheep living on the grasslands, even though they have no formal qualifications. According to Collins and Evans (2002), the

farmers have contributory expertise, which in some respects is more important than that of scientists working for the relevant governmental department.

The scientists claimed the radioactivity would only remain in the soil for a couple of weeks and so a ban was posted on Cumbrian sheep. After testing the soil again later, the levels were still the same. After this, the scientists introduced a ban on sheep from Cumbria. It was difficult for farmers to keep the sheep during winter due to the expensive costs for hay. They were unable to sell the wool because it had been dyed orange by the experts. The farmers now only had two choices. They could either believe the scientists who told them that

contamination would go away with time or they could sell the sheep at extremely low prices.

Many farmers believed the experts and kept waiting until they could sell their sheep

uncontaminated. In the process, they lost a lot of money or just gave up. Eventually, it turned out that the method the experts had used to test the soil in Cumbria was not appropriate for the kind of soils found there. The experts should have included the farmers’ expertise on the soil and vegetation on the pasture where the sheep grazed.

The scientists, however, were reluctant to take any advice from the farmers. In the end, taking such advice would have proved beneficial. This seemingly trivial point helps us to

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understand what expertise is. The normative point that follows is that the body of expertise that should have emerged in respect of the Cumbrian sheep was a culmination of the separate contributory expertise possessed by the scientist and the farmers. The scientists’ expertise was not at risk of being displaced by that of the farmers; it was, or should have been, added to by that of the farmers. To produce the optimum outcome, Collins and Evans (2002) suggest that the scientists needed to have interactional expertise to absorb the expertise of the farmers.

Unfortunately, they seemed reluctant either to develop or to use such expertise.

Wave Two analyses the problem of the classifying experts who play a role in a debate, these experts can only be distinguished after the dust has settled, after it becomes clear whose claims became most convincing. Collins and Evans (2002) promote a third wave of science studies to deal with the problem of how to make decisions based on scientific knowledge before there is a scientific consensus. Decisions of public concern have to be made according to a timetable established within the political sphere not the scientific or technical sphere;

The decisions have to be made before the scientific dust has settled because the pace of politics is faster than the pace of scientific consensus formation. Political decision- makers are, therefore, continually forced to define classes of expert before the dust has settled (Collins and Evans 2002: 269)

What Collins and Evans argue is that sociologists of scientific knowledge, also have a duty to make history as well as reflect on it; they have a role to play in making history using their area of expertise namely knowledge. The Third Wave of science studies, SEE, turns, on a normative theory of expertise. The aim is to address the question of who should and who should not be contributing to decision-making using their expertise. According to Collins and Evans (2002) under Wave Three, expert and political rights can be seen to be much more balanced because of the new understanding of contested science that emerged from Wave Two. Collins and Evans (2002) resurrect the old distinction between the political sphere and

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the sphere of expertise, but in this “new” model Collins and Evans wish to draw a boundary no longer between the class of professionals accredited experts and the rest; but between groups of specialists and the rest.

2.1.1 INTRODUCTION OF FRAMING AND CO-PRODUCTION

For Collins and Evans, expertise should be defined on the basis of knowledge standards. The final decision on whether some citizen groups have valid knowledge that should be included in technical decision-making corresponds to the academic experts. Interestingly, however, Collins and Evans present a rather static picture of the science-society interplay. For instance, Collins and Evans do not take into account that there has been a transformation of the

traditional use of science as well as the spaces where scientific knowledge is developed. They defend the idea that it is possible to establish a distinction between facts and values, or

science and politics (Irwin and Michael 2003).

Wynne (2003) believes that Collins and Evans’ approach reflects a flawed if widespread understanding of the problem of legitimacy. Instead of determining whether experts, like the ones in the case of the Cumbrian sheep farmers, are recognised or neglected, the problem of legitimacy has more to do with the institutional neglect of issues of public meaning. It is also important to ask how public issues are framed and thus given meaning. They then define the public domain to be only about whether or not something is true. They entirely ignore the fact that public policy processes, and public reactions to scientific discourse of nature and society, are processes often of implicit negotiations of public meanings.

Furthermore Wynne looks to the field of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) which considers the social influences and the role that social factors play in scientific development and unaddressed questions about what is “core” in the core-set and why is it considered “the

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core”? The aforementioned core-set refers to those scientists deeply involved in

experimentation or theorisation which is directly relevant to a scientific controversy or debate.

To elaborate on the concept of framing and the conflicting framings of the meaning of the issues, Wynne looks to the Brent Spar controversy, which concerns Shell dumping a disused platform on the North Atlantic ocean floor. Greenpeace activists launched a campaign to highlight the irresponsible dumping. Facing a consumer boycott of Shell’s petroleum, Shell decided to abandon their plans of dumping the platform. Greenpeace was later accused of deliberately misrepresenting the environmental risks posed by Brent Spar due to incorrect analysis of toxic wastes in the platform dump. Greenpeace, on the other hand, was not concerned with the one platform alone but with the fact that this was the first of 400 or more such platforms that would soon be decommissioned from the North Sea. If these were dumped, it could set a precedent for dumping all sorts of other waste, including UK nuclear waste-inventories that had been slated for ocean bed disposal. Moreover, Wynne (2003) explains that the propositional issue of “is it safe?” has to be accompanied by a definition of what “it” is, as well as what “safe” is.

In the The Third Wave of Science Studies Collins and Evans (2002) say nothing about the importance of context and the questions of meanings for such public issues. Even if the farmers’ limited specialist propositional knowledge had been recognized and used by the scientist for example, knowledge about local variations in environmental conditions, would still make the whole relationship a question of the power to define the meaning of the questions. In this case it remained with the institutional experts: scientists and officials (Wynne 2003).

According to Jasnoff (2003), it is the preoccupation with the mutual embedding of natural knowledge and social order, their co-production, which gives the accurate and authoritative work in science studies its staying power. For example, with the Cumbrian sheep farmers, it

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was not merely that the farmers and radiation experts possessed different complementary knowledge about grazing conditions, local soils, and radioactive caesium uptake into vegetation. It was about the differences in their life worlds, entailing altogether different perceptions of uncertainty, predictability, and control. The knowledge stemming from these divergent experimental contexts was simply not additive because it represented radically other ways of understanding the world.

Furthermore, Jasanoff (2004) explains that expertise is not only something that is in the heads and hands of skilled persons, constituted through their deep familiarity with the problem in question, but rather that it is something acquired, and deployed within particular historical, political, and cultural contexts. Accordingly, who counts as an expert and what counts, as expertise in UK public health or environmental controversies may not necessarily be who or what would count for the same purpose in Germany or India or the USA.

It is hard to find forms of human organization or behaviour whose structure and function have not been affected, to some extent, by science and technology. What happens in science and technology today is interwoven with issues of meaning, values, and power in ways that demand sustained critical inquiry. As Jasanoff (2004: 150) points out, “In what conceptual terms, then, should we discuss the relationships between the ordering of nature through knowledge and technology and the ordering of society through power and culture?”

To fill this void, Jasanoff (2004b) elaborates on the concept of co-production, which has recently gained ground in the emerging field of Science and Technology Studies.

2.1.2 CO-PRODUCTION

Co-production, according to Jasanoff (2004b), is a way to gain explanatory power in broad areas of both present and past human activity by thinking of natural and social orders as co- produced. Briefly stated, co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in

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which we know and represent the world (both society and nature) are inseparable from the ways we choose to live in them. Society cannot function without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without appropriate social supports. Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of reality. It both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions in short, in all the building blocks of what we term social.

However, it is important to remember that co-production does not seek to foreclose competing explanations by laying claim to one dominant and all-powerful truth. It offers instead a new way of exploring the waters of human history, where politics, knowledge and invention are continually in flux (Jasanoff 2004b). Furthermore, Jasanoff (2004c) explains that co-production is not about ideas alone; it is equally about concrete, physical things. It is not only about how people organise or express themselves, but also about what they value and how they assume responsibility for their ideas and their inventions. Equally to the point, co- production occurs neither at random nor contingently, but along certain well-documented pathways.

In the article The Role of Science in Environmental Regimes: The Case of LRTAP, Lidskog and Sundqvist (2002: 77-85) explain it is becoming harder to act without having science as a partner; there is an increase in people using science as a basis for their own positions in political debates. Furthermore, Lidskog and Sundqvist (2002) write about a scientisation of environmental policy; however, a policy of scientisation also means a politicisation of science.

Furthermore, they look at the theory of SSK again to understand three important findings that are crucial when analysing the role of science in environmental governance: namely, that knowledge never moves freely, that the value of science is the result of negotiation, and that science and policy are co-produced. Miller (2004: 254) describes the value of the co-

production idiom, which allows the observer to become familiar with a number of ways that

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knowledge and the social order will be combined in the emergence of new phenomenon, such as climate change. Both Jasanoff and Wynne are concerned with the framing and context of understanding and defining expertise in science related issues. To further elaborate, the following section of this thesis will present information on the concept of framing.

2.1.3 FRAMING

According to Mads Dahl Gjefsen (2009), the concept of framing as understood in relation to discourse analysis is commonly traced back to anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1972).

According to Matthew Nisbet (2009), framing as a concept and an area of research spans disciplines of social science. Frames are interpretive storylines that set a specific train of thought in motion, communicating why an issue might be a problem, who or what might be responsible for it, and what should be done about it. Framing is an unavoidable reality of the communication process, especially as applied to public affairs and policy. There is no such thing as unframed information, and the most successful communicators are very proficient at framing, whether using frames intentionally or intuitively.

Experts employ frames to simplify technical details and make them persuasive.

Furthermore, Nisbet (2009) explains that framing is not synonymous with placing a false spin on an issue, even though some experts, advocates, journalists, and policymakers certainly do spin evidence and facts. Rather, in an attempt to remain true to what is conventionally known about an issue, as a communication necessity, framing can be used to pare down information, granting greater weight to certain considerations and elements over others. The earliest formal work on framing traces back four decades to sociologist Erving Goffman, who described words and nonverbal interactions as helping individuals negotiate meaning through the lens of existing cultural beliefs and world views. In the 1970s, cognitive psychologists Daniel

Kahneman and Amos Tversky applied framing in experimental designs to understand risk

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judgments and consumer choices, concluding in their Nobel Prize-winning research that,

“perception is reference dependent.” If individuals are given an ambiguous or uncertain situation to consider, the different ways in which a message is presented or framed apart from the content itself can result in very different responses, depending on the terminology used to describe the problem or the visual context provided in the message (Nisbet 2009).

Furthermore, Erving Goffman (1974: 10-11) investigated frames as those identifiable elements, which together make up the definitions of social situations. Thus frames can be understood as the unspoken sets of associations that are used to make sense of situations, statements or events real or imagined (Gjefsen 2009: 30). Furthermore, Gjefsen (2009: 31) has noted that:

The notion of frame, then, is similar to everyday expressions such as context and setting, which help observers interpret events, the important analytical distinction being that Goffman refers to a theorised notion of what he

perceived as basic mental categories, as opposed to the larger physical context in which some aspect of reality is being observed (although such wider context do, of course, influence the mental frames invoked in any given situation).

Wynne’s (2003: 402) use of the term framing is the most prevalent in much of the literature today, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. Wynne (2003) writes that the crucial shortcoming of Collins and Evans is their lack of consideration for “how public issues are framed and thus given meaning.”

Investigating different framings in scientific disputes can provide a deeper understanding of the different contexts within the dispute, thus contributing to better solutions. In order to evaluate these theories of classifying expertise I will test them on a case. By using a case study, I can evaluate my findings and contribute to the development of the works on defining expertise.

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3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT AND

THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE

I will now present a summary of the path leading to the Climate Change Act, which was established in 2008 in the United Kingdom. To elaborate, I look to The UK Climate Change Act 2008-Lessons for International Climate Laws, an independent review by Client Earth, a document published in 2009 by an environmental organization that works to protect the environment through advocacy, litigation and research. Furthermore, I consult the Climate Change Act 2008 (Her Majesty’s Government 2008) and a document published by the World Wildlife Fund Den Britiske klimaloven 2011 to provide the best insight into the Climate Change Act.

3.1 THE PATH LEADING TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT

According to Friends of the Earth (2008), the initiative behind the law was the need for legal grounds that would get politicians to actually carry out promises they presented in their political programs. At the same time, climate change increasingly became a higher priority on the political agenda. The threat became even clearer when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published the Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation, in 2007 (IPCC 2011). The report The Stern Review which elaborates on the financial aspects of the climate threat written by Sir Nicholas Stern, professor in

Economics at College de France. Al Gore’s movie An Inconvenient Truth drew a large audience to the cinemas and BBC icon David Attenborough told not just about nature’s magical greatness, but also shed light on the climate threat.

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With broad bipartisan support in parliament and total support from important organisations in British society, among them the Confederation of British Industry and the Trade Union Congress, the Act was passed on November 26, 2008. The Act had, of course, additional support from the environmental groups led by Friends of the Earth. This organisation, consisting of 200 local groups throughout the UK, was the first to promote the ideas of a climate act. The co-operation between the various environmental organisations helped to apply the additional needed pressure.

According to Bjartnes (2011: 6-10), all of these factors helped to create an environment for the climate change issue in which political action could be motivated. When Britain had presidency of the EU in 2005 and later in the G8, then Prime Minister Tony Blair made climate change one of the most important issues on his agenda. His actions in the

international arena resulted in additional pressure on him in Britain because he had to live up to his international commitments. At the same time, David Cameron, the elected leader of the Conservative Party was highly engaged in the climate issues and his advisers saw this as a huge potential to build his image as a responsible and environmentally conscious leader.

Cameron's advisers also saw the Climate Change Act as a part of his strategy. (Bjartnes 2011:

13-16).

There was, of course, an opposition to the broad consensus with Nigel Lawson as a prominent spokesperson. Nigel Lawson could be called the grandfather of British neo-liberal economics. According to Repeal the Act, an organization that works against the Climate Change Act (2011), the Climate Change Act risks burdening the British economy and consequently undermining competitiveness and the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business. Further, Repeal the Act (2011) believes that climate change science is not well established, and that there are flaws in the climate change science of the IPCC assessments reports. Therefore, there is no sound reason to impose expensive and restrictive public policy

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decisions on the British people without first providing convincing evidence that human activities are causing dangerous climate change beyond that resulting from natural causes.

The 2008 Climate Change Act commits the United Kingdom, uniquely in the world, to cut their CO2 emissions by 80 percent by 2050. This comes at a cost of up to £18.3 billion each year for the next four decades. In cash terms this amounts to £734 billion, making it far and above the most expensive law put through Parliament. This will equate to more than £880 a year for every household in the country. According to Repeal the Act (2011b), the UK will pay for more useless windmills and rapidly rising carbon taxes, high electricity bills, and other harsh carbon-reduction regulatory costs. The Climate Change Act will potentially destroy the economy by causing the export of British jobs to countries without carbon taxes, become the cause of fuel poverty for more than 5 million British citizens, raise the price of food, clothing, travel and continue to litter The British landscape with wind farms.

3.1.1 MAIN POINTS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT

The following are the main points of the Climate Change Act:

Enactment of the 2050 target (80 percent reduction compared to 1990)

Enactment of the 2020 target (as amended in 2009 from 26 to 34 percent reduction compared to 1990)

The introduction of a binding maximum limit of greenhouse gas emissions for each five year period up to 2050 (“carbon budgets”)

The Department of Energy and Climate Change are made responsible for attaining both the 2050 target and for reaching the goals of each and every carbon budget Annual reporting on goal attainment

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Comprehensive procedures for determining and changing targets for budget periods and distributing responsibilities for implementing the necessary measures to make this possible

Establishing an independent Committee on Climate Change (CCC), which should be central in setting the agenda in relation to most decisions taken in pursuance of law. In addition it will provide its annual assessment of progress and achievement (HMG 2008)

According to Her Majesty’s Government (2008) the Act is broken into four sections as follows:

Section 1. Carbon target and budgeting establishes the key elements of the legislation: the 2050 target and the carbon budgets system. The Act establishes a legal duty on the

Government to reduce the UK’s GHG emissions by at least 80 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2050 as well as an interim target for 2020. The Government must also establish a series of carbon budgets every five years, and must then prepare policies and proposals to meet those budgets. Section one also defines the requirement to establish a system of carbon accounting.

Section 2. The Committee on Climate Change establishes an independent Committee to advise the Government on the targets, budgets, and other matters related to action on climate change (both mitigation and adaptation), and to report annually to Parliament on progress towards meeting the targets and budgets.

Section 3. Trading schemes operated by setting caps on total GHG emissions from particular types of activities or sectors, and can limit high emission activities or encourage low-carbon or GHG-reducing activities.

Section 4. Impact and adaptation of climate change requires regular reports assessing how climate change is expected to affect the UK, as well as programmes for adaptation to climate

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change to respond to the impacts and risks identified in the reports (Client Earth 2009: 13-20, Climate Change Act 2008).

According to Client Earth (2009: 13-20), the Act applies to the whole of the UK. The core duties under the Act (such as setting the 2050 target and the carbon budgets) apply to the Secretary of State and accordingly to the UK Government as a whole. However, the term

“national authorities” in the legislation refers to the Secretary of State and the Governments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (known as the devolved administrations). Some of the powers and responsibilities established under the Act (e.g. the power to request the advice of the CCC) apply to all the national authorities. The Secretary of State must also consult with the devolved administrations on a wide range of matters (including setting the 2050 target and the level of carbon budgets). In addition, some provisions of the Act apply only to Wales.

Scotland has also passed its own national climate change legislation, the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009.

According to a central provision of the Act, it is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80 percent lower than the 1990 baseline. The provision creates a legal duty for the UK Government to reduce the UK’s emissions of Green House Gas emissions (GHG) by at least 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. The UK’s emissions are adjusted to account for any carbon units bought from overseas

“credits” or disposed of to third party “debits”. The 80 percent target is a unilateral target, which the UK has adopted into national legislation in the absence of EU or international commitments to such a target (HMG 2008).

The Act covers the UK’s emissions of CO2 and other specified GHG emissions. The reduction in GHG emissions required to comply with the duty can be achieved through actions taken in the UK and abroad. However, the Government has a duty under the Act to consider the need for UK domestic action on climate change in relation to both the 2050

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target and the carbon budgets. The Government also has the power to amend the 2050 target, but this power can only be exercised under certain circumstances. The Act includes that it would be appropriate to change the target where the Government considers that there have been significant developments in scientific knowledge about climate change, European international law, or policy (HMG 2008).

In addition, developments at the EU and international levels such as a new international treaty on climate change could affect the UK’s commitments and make it appropriate to change the UK’s national target. The legislation allows the target to be “amended”, which could mean an increase or a decrease to the target, depending on the circumstances and what the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The year 1990, which is used as a baseline, can also be amended in response to significant developments in European or international law or policy.

According to HMG (2008), in addition to the 2050 target, the Act provides for an interim GHG emissions reduction target for 2020. The 2020 target must be set as part of the carbon budgeting process. Under section 5 of the Act, the carbon budget must be at least 34 percent lower than the 1990 baseline. The 2020 target can be amended in a similar way to that described above in relation to the 2050 target.

The 2050 target is supported by a series of carbon budgets. The Government must set these budgets for the net UK carbon account over consecutive five-year periods. The Government has a legal duty under the Act to ensure that the net UK carbon account for a given budgetary period does not exceed the level of the carbon budget. The Act required that the first three carbon budgets (2008-2012, 2013-2017 and 2018-2022) were set by June 1, 2009. Future budgets must be set at least 11 years in advance. For example, the next budget to be fixed—

the fourth budget for 2023-2027—must be set by the end of June 2012. The carbon budgets are intended to set the trajectory for emissions reductions between 2008 and 2050. The

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budgets must be set with the intention of meeting the 2050 target and complying with the British, European, and international obligations. The level of the budgets, which include the years 2020 and 2050, must comply respectively with the targets for those years. Accordingly, the budget which includes the year 2020 must include at least 34 percent emissions reduction, and for 2050 at least 80 percent emissions reduction. Section 5 includes a power to set targets for future years (such as years after 2050), and if such a target is set, then the carbon budget for the period including that year must meet the relevant target. Carbon budgets are set by the Government through a statutory order, following advice from the CCC, consultation with the devolved administrations, and approval by Parliament (Client Earth 2009: 20-21, Climate Change Act 2008).

According to HM Government (2008), the Act establishes a number of new reporting requirements, and the Government must lay reports before Parliament as follows: reports setting out the Government’s expectations of the indicative annual ranges for the net UK carbon account for each year within a budgetary period, and on proposals and policies for meeting the carbon budgets for current and future budgetary periods. The reports must include details on how the proposals and policies will affect different sectors of the economy, the timescales over which the policies are expected to take effect, and how carbon units will be used in the budgetary period. Reports under the Act must be laid before parliament no later than 31 March in the second year after the year to which the period relates; for instance, the 2008 report must be laid by March 31, 2010.

The Government has the power to borrow and bank emissions between budgetary periods.

Up to one percent of the carbon budget of a future budgetary period may be carried back to the preceding budgetary period. The intended effect of this adjustment is to reduce the future budget and increase the earlier budget (in effect reducing emissions under the earlier budget less challenging to achieve). Alternatively, the whole or part of any amount by which a

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carbon budget exceeds the net UK carbon account may be carried forward with the effect of increasing the future carbon budget. The procedure for making such adjustments involves consultation with the devolved administrations, and seeking and taking into account the advice of the CCC (Client Earth 2008 27-30).

3.2 RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER ONE: HOW DOES THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT FRAME AND DEFINE EXPERTISE WITHIN THE COMMITTEE?

I investigate how the Climate Change Act frames and defines the climate issue problems. By doing so I can also investigate how the Climate Change Act frames and defines expertise within the CCC. As Miller (2004: 244) describes,

Only when the Earth’s climate was re-imagined as a global system, bringing views of the atmosphere into line with assumptions about the jurisdiction of international institutions, did claims about climate change begin to engage with debates about international politics.

According to the British Government, intervention was necessary since climate change is caused by emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. An externality exists, as those who emit do not have to bear directly the full cost of their actions. The global causes and consequences of climate change, coupled with the long-term and persistent nature of its impacts, strengthens the need for Government action. In addition, there may be barriers to optimal adaption caused by, for example, uncertainty and lack of information about the impacts of climate change. The Act creates a framework, which enables the UK to meet its domestic targets, as well as ensuring that the UK can meet existing and future international commitments for emissions reductions (DECC 2009).

One important effect of the climate law has been increased awareness of this issue amongst politicians. It has created greater focus on action. The Department of Energy and

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Climate Change (DECC) also emphasises that the climate law has influence over how it is possible to work on climate issues throughout the Government. Climate change is higher on the agenda than it was previously, and any decisions that have positive climate effects will be prioritized when new policy is developed.

The message to the business sector has also become clearer: the UK is going through major changes and it will be necessary to make extensive investments in order to satisfy the relevant control. According to Bjartnes (2011), companies and business leaders plan the long- term low carbon strategies for their businesses. Britain is to be de-carbonized and the question is not how but when it will happen.

Introduction of the Climate Change Act comes with the introduction of carbon budgets, which set a limit on greenhouse gas emissions in each five-year period until 2050. The purpose of this is to ensure that there is a gradual reduction of emissions in line with long- term goals. The Government is obliged to set and maintain carbon budgets and to seek and consider the advice of the CCC. The CCC monitors the progress of the Government and reports to Parliament. If the Government declines to follow the Committee’s advice, it must explain its reasons for doing so. If it fails to meet a carbon budget, it must take action and put forward proposals to compensate for the excess emissions.

3.2.1 ABOUT THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE WITHIN THE ACT:

The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), and the Devolved Administrations in consultation with the Committee on Climate Change created a framework which guides how the CCC should work.

The Committee’s tasks and role in management are carefully defined in the Climate Change Act; it is designed in a way that gives the Committee’s publications high status and importance within the parliamentary system, both in relation to the executive and legislative

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power. The Government must justify why they choose, if they do, to disregard the advice the expert body gives. The recommendations from the CCC thus hold a different status than advice from underlying administrative bodies that the Government can easily choose to ignore (CCC 2011).

To ensure its credibility, it is important that the Committee be able to clearly and rationally present the economics of the costs, benefits, and risks of abatement decisions. This means that the Committee’s members should be experts in their field, rather than representatives of specific stakeholder groups, and should be supported by a secretariat with a strong base of analytical skills. The following list provides an indication of the types of expertise that will be desirable in the overall composition of the Committee: economic analysis and forecasting, business competitiveness, financial investment, technology development and diffusion, energy production and supply, climate science, emissions trading, and climate change policy—in particular its social impacts (Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 2007: 38).

The composition of the Committee was further developed in 2010. The Government stated that in addition to the fields of expertise mentioned above, the Climate Change Act requires securing that the Committee has experience and knowledge of certain topics. These topics include climate change policy at the national and international level, and in particular its social impacts; climate science and other branches of science; differences in circumstance between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the capacity of national authorities to take action in relation to climate change (HM Government et al 2010: 18-20).

To gain a clearer understanding of how the Climate Change Act frames and defines

expertise within the CCC, the next section of this thesis will investigate the different members of the board in the Committee.