The nuclear table turned
What explains the relaunch of nuclear energy in the United Kingdom?
Even Braastad
Master’s thesis
Department of Political Science University of Oslo
May 2017
Words: 35 282
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The nuclear table turned
What explains the relaunch of nuclear energy in
the United Kingdom?
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© Even Braastad 2017
The nuclear table turned. What explains the relaunch of nuclear power in the United Kingdom?
Words: 35 282 Even Braastad
http://www.duo.uio.no/
Print: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo
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Abstract
Nuclear power was regarded as unattractive, and British politicians stated it would be foolish to embark on a new generation of nuclear in the United Kingdom. Three years after these statements, the energy review of 2006 became a political opening for the relaunch of nuclear in the United Kingdom. This opening results in the green light to Hinkley Point C in September 2016, with the French company Électricité de France as the operator.
What can explain the sudden shift in the perception of nuclear power in the United Kingdom?
How did the business sector work to make Hinkley Point C become the first new nuclear plant in thirty years in the UK? How did the opposites in the business sector use the barriers towards finalization strategically to try to make the outcome suit their preference? These are three of the main questions this thesis seek to explain.
It does this inside a theoretical framework identified by a rational institutionalist approach, leaning towards historical institutionalism. With document analysis and interviews as methods, the thesis analyses the ten-year long Hinkley Process-C. Interviews were conducted with central actors in the process, and the findings resulted in a broader insight in the various official statements from the government.
The thesis will conclusively argue that strategic work from the domestic industry were important preceding the 2006-review, and that EDF’s role in the British electricity changes dramatically throughout the process.
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Acknowledgements
There are many people who deserves my gratitude and a big thank you for their guidance. This is people who has contributed with academic input or moral support, some have even contributed with both.
First, my supervisor throughout the process between August 2016 and May 2017, Elin Lerum Boasson. Your academic insight in combination with your engagement at every twist and turn along the way has been invaluable. When there has been an overload of ambitions and ideas, you have effectively streamlined my chain of thoughts. Thank you.
Secondly, Kine Skogli deserve a big thank you. For making homemade tomato soup and being a positive support, even when I met bumps in the master-road.
Thirdly, the sometime quite extensive coffee breaks with Henrik Lund Eineteig, Ole Kristian Grime and Martin Grime have – without any real contest – been the highlight of every day on the 9th floor.
Even Braastad
Oslo, 12th of May 2017
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Content
1. Introduction………...1
1.1 A change in the energy agenda.………..4
1.2 Nuclear in the UK ……….…..………4
1.3 Research question ………..……….5
1.4 Why this case?……….6
1.5 Delineation…..……….7
1.6 Structure...……….. 8
2. Theory and concepts……….………..…………. 9
2.1 An unpredictability which opens for strategic action….…..……….10
2.2 Two neo-institutionalist schools……….……..…13
2.2.1 A synthesis of approaches.………..……….14
2.2.1.1 Menon’s experience monitoring and Moravcsik’s creativity ..…....….16
2.3 Theory of business impact………...……….19
2.3.1 Structural power.……….…………..……….………..20
2.3.2 Instrumental power ……….…………...………..21
2.4 Theoretical expectations ………….……,,,,,,,,,,,,…….………23
2.5 Concepts …………..……….………….………24
2.5.1 The divergent meanings of energy security.……….24
3. Method – Document analysis, process tracing and semi-structured interview.25 3.1 Case study………..27
3.1.1 Documents as source of data………..……….28
3.2 Process tracing………..………29
3.3 Interview………31
3.3.1 Potential problems………..………..32
3.4 Validity and reliability ……….33
3.5 Triangulation……….34
4. Actors involved……….36
5. Case introduction.………39
5.0.1 – No economic case for nuclear………,,……….40
5.0.2 Structure of empirical backdrop……….………..41
5.1 The departure 2006-2010……….……….42
5.1.1 Timeline……….……...42
5.1.2 From “foolish” to “significant contribution” ……….……….….43
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5.1.2.1 Opens for private investment ………44
5.1.2.2 The idea of nuclear………44
5.1.3 A shift with divergent origins…...………45
5.1.3.1 – a come-on for EDF……….46
5.1.3.2 EDF – successfully “swooped in” ………47
5.1.3.3 From back burner to pole position ………47
5.1.4 2010 – The nuclear pathway……….49
5.1.4.1 Three reasons for nuclear confidence………50
5.1.5 Summary departure………..51
5.2 The turbulence………...52
5.2.1 2011 – The year of delivery……….53
5.2.2 – No political barriers………..54
5.2.3 Financing ………56
5.2.3.1 Strike price – inevitable or closed doors? ………57
5.2.3.2 EMR-consultation……….58
5.2.3.3 Opponents from the inside………59
5.2.3.4 No subsidy – just PR? ………..60
5.2.3.5 Price tag – the value of 37 billion pounds ………60
5.2.4 State aid………...62
5.2.4.1 EU: Unfair competition………...62
5.2.4.2 Influence measures from both sides………...63
5.2.4.3 Anti-nuclear influence………...64
5.2.4.4 Nuclear influence………..….65
5.2.4.5 A historic barrier left behind………..66
5.2.5 Fukushima………....67
5.2.5.1 The Weightman-report………...68
5.2.5.2 An unchallenged British acceptability………...69
5.2.6 The final months………..……….70
5.2.6.1 May’s delay………...……….……...71
5.2.7 Summary turbulence………...………..72
6. Analysis……….………74
6.1 Expectation #1 – Unpredicted governing………76
6.2 Expectation #2 – Experienced monitoring………..77
6.2.1 Contrasted, creative behaviour……….78
6.2.2 An unused golden ticket………..….79
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6.2.3 The state aid case………..…81
6.2.4 What the learning-expectation explains………..…….82
6.3 Expectation #3 – Structural influence……….………82
6.3.1 EDF – Information control and strike price…….………83
6.4 Expectation #4 – Instrumental influence………84
6.5 Concluding remarks………...………..87
7. Sources………...……….89
7.1 Respondents………..……….89
7.2 Books………..………89
7.3 Academic articles………..…………90
7.4 Online sources………..……….92
Appendix………..……..102
Interview guide………..……102
Tables: Table 1 – Boasson..……….……….11
Table 2 – Summary findings …….………74
Figures: Figure 1 – The departure……….………...42
Figure 2 – The turbulence……….……….52
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The nuclear table turned
1. Introduction
What can explain British politicians’ approval of Hinkley Point C in September 2016, which started a new generation of nuclear power in the United Kingdom?
This thesis will examine a research question which involves one of the major stories regarding energy politics in the modern history of the United Kingdom (UK). When Hinkley Point C got the green light in September 2016, it was the first approval of a new nuclear project since 1988 (Aldred & Stoddard, 2008). How have the actors with an interest in shaping the outcome of the Hinkley Point C-process worked strategically to do that? After the initiative under Tony Blair to expand the capacity of the nuclear power station at Somerset, the process has evolved from a nuclear dream to a nightmare for the British politicians inside ten years (Plymouth Herald, 2016). This thesis will analyze how those opposing new nuclear in the UK have worked to make it a nightmare, while those supporting have worked to realize the dream. The nuclear initiative in 2006 was a sudden change of preferences regarding nuclear power from the Labour Party, after an energy review three years earlier, concluding that an extension of the nuclear generation was unattractive (Government, 2003). Since then, Hinkley Point C has been a central part of the public debate, with an extensive media coverage. With a focused analyze on the most important points in time, this thesis aims to shed a new light on the case. With a theoretical approach identified by rational choice institutionalism, leaning towards historical institutionalism, and case study and semi-structured interviews as methods, this paper seeks to explain the process thoroughly. A process culminating in the UK governments approval in the fall of 2016. An outcome applauded by the supporters, and loudly criticized by its opponents (Sauven, 2016).
The approval in September 2016 gave the green light to the expansion of the nuclear power plant. The politicians involved in the case have been accused of being heavily influenced by the business sector as well as criticized for its issues regarding financing (Macalistar, 2006;
Wheeler, 2007; Stacey, 20161). Both aspects will be examined extensively in this thesis.
Evident in the business sector is hard opposites between those supporting and opposite nuclear as a part of the British energy mix in the future. Furthermore, two promises were broken. Firstly, the government’s plan to finance the operation of Hinkley Point C changed from the initial
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promise that the private sector was responsible, to an agreement which affected the consumer’s energy bill (Government, 20151). Secondly, Électricité de France (EDF) – the company responsible for building and operating Hinkley Point C – initially agreed on the governments terms, that no subsidies were granted, when entering the British market, before the opposite was true just some years later (Chazan & Pickard, 2013). The case was later investigated for breaking the European Union’s (EU) state aid rules, after the UK and EDF negotiated a strike price for every unit of energy produced (Commission, 2013). Conclusively, the thesis will focus on three dimensions important for shaping the process of expanding Hinkley Point. The domestic politics, the business interests and the influence from the EU.
While Thomas (2016) looks at the gap between the promises in 2006 and the finalized deal in 2016, and Cernoch and Zapletalova (2015) view the potential effects the expanding of Hinkley Point C has outside the British borders, this thesis will theoretically analyze the ten-year long process. Broadly, it is a case of what and/or who shapes British policy formulation in the nuclear field, and it will contribute to that field in a new way. Both McLeron (2008) and Lee (2004) concludes that business influences different policy areas in the UK. While McLeron analyze how the business and industry influence policy regarding higher education, Lee digs into diplomatic and foreign policy before concluding that the government-business-relation in the UK is changing towards a trend of steadily increasing business influence (Lee, 2004;54) This thesis will dig deep into how the business sector influenced a nuclear policy process full of twists and turns. What dynamics shapes the ten-year period from initiative to finalization of a groundbreaking deal regarding prolonging the nuclear powers life in the UK? Is it affairs controlled and influenced by the EU, or is decisions regarding nuclear policy an area covered by domestic actors? By this, it will be a contribution to the debate regarding EU’s influence over domestic policy. Graziano (2013) finds that EU influences domestic welfare reforms, and Katalin (2010) concludes that EU have a direct effect on member states social policy. By looking into the field of energy, and nuclear specifically, this thesis will contribute to this field, to investigate the scope of EU influence.
Conclusively, the results will show how policy on nuclear policy is implemented more specifically. Simon Taylor (2016) has done the most extensive work in the field with his book The Rise and Fall of Nuclear Power in Britain. While Taylor analyzes the Hinkley Point- decision in the light of the nuclear history and the lack of certainty regarding renewable energy in the UK, this thesis will look solely on Hinkley Point. When doing this, new explanations for
3 the British energy policy will arise. The dynamics at play between initiative and outcome will be thoroughly analyzed, to explain the twist and turns along the way to a great extent. While Taylor (2016) ask Was this the right choice? an important question regarding the given research question in this thesis will be Which actors and factors shaped the outcome?
It answers this question in more stringent theoretical frame than evident in a lot of the work on energy policy formulation in the UK. Elin Lerum Boasson’s work (2015) on EU influence leads to a discussion of a synthesis of two neo-institutional approaches, drawn from the learnings of Andrew Moravcsik (1999) and Anand Menon (2003), and in combination with Culpepper and Reinke’s (2014) work on business influence, it represents the theoretical backdrop. The expectations drawn from their theoretical work will guide the analysis with the finalization of the Hinkley Point C-process in September 2016 as the endpoint. The finalization is in this thesis identified as the end of the second phase in the process. These phases will be the framework for the analysis, which seek to break the process up from a) proposal to b) finalization, into two distinct sections. It is an aim to shed light on what forces - both politically and in the business sector - were evident and how they work when facing different challenges in the way towards finalization of the deal.
To capture the twist and turns of the story to the greatest extent, the thesis will use an extensive share of official documents as well as the media coverage as a basis. Amongst many, there are five actors which will be highly central in this thesis. Firstly, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), as they are the responsible department for energy policies in the UK.
Secondly, Électricité de France (EDF), which is the company responsible for building and operating Hinkley Point C. Thirdly, the European Commission, because of the state aid-case in 2013. Fourthly, the Nuclear Industry Association (NIA), which is the umbrella organization for nuclear interests in the UK. Lastly, E3G and Greenpeace, which is two of the most prominent actors opposing Hinkley Point C throughout the ten-year long process. When referring to supporters and opposites of the case, E3G and Greenpeace will be amongst the opposites, while EDF, NIA and other domestic nuclear actors will be included as the supporters. These actors will be introduced more thoroughly in chapter four. Furthermore, the information conducted from official documents is supplemented by interviews with carefully selected actors. What they have in common is that they all have been involved directly with this case at some of the critical phases in the process, and therefore they can share information highly relevant to supplement the documents. As nuclear is a highly controversial topic, the interviews will be
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important to get a hold of strategic work from the different sides of the debate, in preceding of the official governmental statements. The information relevant for answering the research question will be presented in chapter five, and furthermore discussed and analyzed in connection to the theoretical expectation – given in the following chapter – in chapter six.
1.1 A change in the energy agenda
The emerging idea of new nuclear in the UK could be connected to a change in the world of energy. The political idea of producing a sufficient amount of energy has changed somewhat:
To produce enough energy is still a salient political issue, as the population growth is yet to stagnate, and a large share of the world’s population is yet to have access to sufficient energy supplies for an affordable price. However, this twofold problem has turned into what is labelled the energy trilemma (Kuzemko et al, 2016). The twofold problem of sufficient supply to an affordable price, has since the 90’s been accompanied by the issue of clean energy sources, which connects to a sustainable future and reaching supranationally defined climate mitigation targets (Kuzemko et al, 2016;1). While renewable energy sources are considered an important part of the green shift towards a sustainable future, it is debated if renewables sources can face the energy challenge alone. A controversial alternative is nuclear energy. The International Energy Agency (IEA) suggests that a global increase in the use of nuclear of 80 percent is needed to face the energy trilemma in an adequate fashion (Greenhalg & Azapagic, 2009;1056).
The Chernobyl accident in 1986, however, shaped the debate for many years, after one of four reactors in a nuclear power plant 90 kilometers north of Kiev exploded. Two and half decade later the security around nuclear energy where viewed satisfactory, and many countries – including Germany – regarded it as a sufficient alternative energy source (Thalman, 2015).
Then, two weeks before it was 25 years since Chernobyl, an earthquake caused another nuclear accident - the Fukushima accident (Skea et al., 2013). The catastrophic events in Japan in 2011 functioned as an efficient boost for the nuclear sceptics in the public debate.
1.2 Nuclear in the UK
While Angela Merkel took a clear stand against nuclear energy as a part of the German energy mix, the debate has continued being prominent in the UK (Neate, 2013). Around 21 percent of the electricity in the UK is generated by 15 nuclear power plants (Government, 20161).
However, the share of domestically produced electricity by nuclear is decreasing, as many of the reactors have been shut down. The extension of the lifespan on current reactors as well as
5 building new ones still have had a central place on the British agenda since 2006 (Ward, 2017).
Emily Cox et al. (2016) analyzes this, when raising the question why the UK has a disproportioned and persistent commitment to nuclear compared to other comparable countries (Cox et al, 2016;9). A British energy review in 2006, initiated by Tony Blair, concluded that nuclear energy should have a prominent role in dealing with the futures energy challenges.
From not being an alternative in 1997 via being unattractive in 2003, nuclear was forwarded as a central part of the solution in Blair’s introduction to the 2006-review (Government, 2006). In the aftermath of this conclusion, the building of the nuclear power plant Hinkley Point C were initiated (Gosden, 20161). Since then the project has outlived four prime ministers, broken a number of deadlines and faced several bumps on the way towards finalization.
Between the 30th of July and 15th of September 2016 Theresa May took the ten-year-old story of nuclear power plant Hinkley Point C in two dramatic turns. When operator of the power plant, EDF, backed the deal in June, it was expected that Theresa May concluded the process by doing the same. The newly appointed British prime minister did not and instead she made a surprising statement saying that the process was delayed due to a new review of the process as a whole. Just 75 days later, she took a U-turn when UK approved the 18-billion-pound deal (Farrell, 2016). Hinkley Point C has been heavily debated and somewhat divergent British, European Union (EU), French and Chinese interest have dragged the process in different directions ever since the initiative.
If the twin-reactor power station is built, the capacity would be 3.2 gigawatts annually, which equal the electricity needs of seven percent of UKs population (Gosden, 20161). At the same time, there are considerations regarding security, cost and energy flexibility that have influenced the debate. This alongside diplomatic challenges when dealing with China, and the newly emerged obstacle of European cooperation after Brexit has made it a troubling case for British politicians.
1.3 Research question
The opposing voices have labelled the process the White Elephant (Lucas, 2016), referring to the metaphor of having a useless possession, which amounts to costs out of proportion. White elephant or not – Hinkley Point C has represented a ten-year-old problem for four UK Prime Ministers.
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By answering the given research question, the paper will shed a threefold light. Firstly, it will break up and explain a complicated political process, and show how different actors in interaction influence the decision takers. Secondly, it will more specifically identify if – and potentially how – the domestic business sector used different critical points in time strategically to reach their target in the process, with a focus on how these actors tried to use different events in the given time-span to shape the process. Thirdly, it will show the diversity of interests, both domestically and supranationally, who interacts as potential obstacles and drivers towards the given political decision.
1.4 Why this case?
The overarching aim when answering the given research question is to identify firstly, what the main drivers and barriers towards the deal was, and when doing that, secondly, identify which actors representing the opposing sides in the debate – especially the actors with business interests – and, thirdly, explain how they worked to facilitate or function as an obstacle towards a finalization of the project. An extensive analysis will be conducted with a focus on the two phases, which will be introduced more thoroughly under 1.5 delineation. At each defined critical step in the process, the thesis will identify how actors from different sides worked.
In the aftermath of Theresa May’s approval in September, Andy Stirling and Phil Johnstone, political scientists at the University of Sussex, wrote a piece on the social sciences role in explaining processes like this in The Guardian. Social science can provide a better understanding of why different perspectives disagree – and when to identify a common ground.
(…) for powerful interests in any setting, social research can also play a useful role in helping to justify, present (…) favored policies, they wrote (Stirling & Johnstone, 2016). It will not be an aim of this thesis to close down the debate, however, the results will accentuate the most important parts of the process, and examine each of them extensively.
There are in turn reasons for this case being relevant. Given the threefold reasoning presented in the last paragraph under 1.3 Research question, this thesis could explain the politics regarding one of the most debated fields of energy politics. It will examine what efforts the business sector made to influence the outcome. When answering the research question inside the given framework, it will be easier to get a hold of similar processes both at earlier and coming points in time. In addition, it could function as a bite in the puzzle towards a broader understanding of political interaction at different levels.
7 There has been done work on both drivers and barriers for nuclear power in the UK (Greenhalg
& Azapagic, 2009), EU state aid policy in the energy sector (Flåm, 2009) and the Hinkley Point C distinctively as a political process (Thomas, 2016). What this paper will do is to synthesis a broad basis of findings from papers like the ones mentioned, and break up the Hinkley Point C- process more thoroughly than what has been true before. By doing that, a knowledge gap regarding British policy formulation in a distinct field will be filled, with a highly debated and relevant case. Two distinct processes – related to policy formulation in the UK - will be highlighted. Firstly, how actors on different levels, both politically and in the business sector, shapes a national debate on nuclear energy sources domestically. Secondly, the paper digs deeper into an aspect of EU state aid policy yet to be analyzed thoroughly, and investigate what implications the EUs decisions in the Hinkley Point C-process could have on longer terms.
1.5 Delineation
The thesis will be divided into two distinctive phases, where the first is clearly different from the other. What they do share, is that they contain highly critical points in time for the way towards finalization of the Hinkley Point C-deal. The empirical basis is a result of an extensive work with relevant literature and theory. The critical phases are a direct result of the process tracing, and furthermore confirmed as important points in time in the process when conducting interviews. As the interviews is a supplementation to the documents, it was of great importance to interview actors from all sides of the debate, and actors relevant for the case both at specific points in time and for the entire period. However, influence could be direct and indirect in nature, and the number of actors involved reach to an amount beyond the scope of this thesis alone.
Diplomatic relations to China is an aspect that not will be analyzed thoroughly, even though mentioned briefly in the case introduction. The Brexit-debate, which was evident in the summer of 2016, will also just briefly be mentioned. Inside the given framework, with the given research question, it seems more fruitful to have an extensive focus on other aspects influencing the outcome. It will concentrate on three levels. Firstly, the domestic politics, which involves three different government constellations. Secondly, the business actors with both economic and moral interests of an approval/not an approval of the Hinkley Point C, which should be expected to try to shape the process along the way. Thirdly and lastly, the European dimension is important given the fact that one of the big barriers towards finalization was the state aid case in the European Commission.
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These choices of relevant actors are furthermore delineated into two different bulks. How did the domestic business sector work in the start of the process, how did they respond when the expanding of Hinkley met its biggest barriers and what where their role in the conclusion of the deal? Was the process shaped by the actors possessing political creativity (Moravcsik, 1999) in their toolbox, or was it, following Menon (2003), learnings throughout the process that monitored the business sectors modes of influence (Menon, 2003)? Or was it business company’s size and importance which gave direction to the political decisions (Culpepper &
Reinke, 2014)? The bulks are:
- The departure. What was the political drivers behind the shift of priorities in the British energy sector before the energy review in 2006? What role did EDF play, and how did the opposing sides domestically react? The departure-part of the process starts with the 2006-review, and ends in 2010.
- The turbulence. What has been the problems with financing the project? Why did Hinkley Point C end up as a state aid case in the European Commission? How did the domestic politicians react, and did the business sector do anything to influence the outcome? In addition, there is a shift in government, where the most anti-nuclear party – the Liberal Democrats – are a part of the coalition in 2010 (Mason, 2015). The turbulence-phase of the process starts in 2011, and ends with the yes to Hinkley Point C from the British Government in the fall of 2016.
1.6 Structure
The paper will be structured with a presentation of the theories and perspectives relevant in the analysis at first, followed by the examination of the three methods used – document analysis, process tracing and semi-structural interviews. Furthermore, chapter four will introduce relevant actors, before chapter five contain a description of the Hinkley Point C-case in two distinct phases. The analysis will then be presented in chapter six in light of the theoretical expectations given in chapter two. Furthermore, the sixth chapter will sum up and conclude the findings.
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2. Theory and concepts
This paper seeks to examine the course of events which ended with the UK governments and Theresa May`s yes to the Hinkley Point C-plan in September 2016. Both supranationally, domestically and organizationally there have been a different set of actors that are expected to have interests in shaping the outcome. Firstly, domestic politics at all phases of the process is expected to have been influential as the decision makers are elected politicians. However, their role regarding a principal-agent view, emphasized later in this chapter, is differing throughout the process. Secondly, given the state aid case in the Commission, the thesis expects the country-EU-relation to shape the process. The reasons why the Hinkley Point C-process was investigated for breaking EUs state aid rules will be explained more thoroughly in the case introduction, under 5.2.4. Thirdly, it is expected that organizations and national companies in the business sector with divergent interests regarding an extension/not an extension of nuclear as a part of the energy mix have tried to influence the process. It is furthermore expected that these influence is increasingly evident in connection to the points in time defined as critical towards the finalization of the deal.
Under 2.1-2.3 the paper will discuss different theoretical approaches suited to explain all these different types of influence, to answer the research question.
Firstly, in chapter 2.1 the thesis will discuss Elin Lerum Boasson’s theory on EU mechanisms evident in the field of nuclear policy, and discuss the Hinkley Point C-case considering what Boasson identify as unpredicted EU governing (Boasson, 2015;55). The conclusions drawn from Boasson leads the discussion to:
2.2, where it will be argued that a neo-institutionalist framework – drawing learnings from a rational choice institutionalist approach leaning towards historical institutionalism - is a fruitful way to answer the given research question, and different theoretical approaches and applications of these neo-institutionalist approaches in the literature will be presented and discussed.
Thirdly, with Culpepper and Reinke as a backdrop, chapter 2.3 will introduce theory on different measures the business sector can apply to influence political processes. Culpepper and Reinke’s work is also in line with historical institutionalism, but with a stronger focus on agency
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than what is common in the approach. It will be discussed if both structural and informal measures of influence could be evident from the business sector in the Hinkley Point C-case.
Theory is a tool to explain and understand the case. As evident in the introduction, there are several events and interests who “dragged” the process in different directions throughout the ten years. Therefore, the overarching aim is that at least two central aspects should be captured by the theory chosen. Firstly, why these twists and turns occurred. This is a descriptive task.
Secondly, and more analytically, the theory should guide the thesis investigation regarding how the actors with different targets in the Hinkley Point C-process worked to change the basis of information on which decision were taken.
2.1 An unpredictability which opens for strategic action
In the 1990’s three approaches grew inside the intuitionalist approach. The historical, rational choice and sociological approaches to institutionalism were labelled by the umbrella term new institutionalisms (Hall & Taylor, 1996;936). What they share is an effort to explain the role institutions play in the determination of political outcomes. In line with the rationalist approach, Simon Bulmer (1993;351) analyzed what is the most comprehensive way to study European integration. He emphasizes that the member states to an increased degree share some policy objectives, but that the divergent interests still create some deviating domestic solutions (Bulmer, 1993;352). By this, his approach acknowledges the systemic conditions which constraints state behavior, but still emphasizes the role of state action inside a framework larger than the state itself. This acknowledgment will be key in this chapter. Furthermore, Elin Lerum Boasson (2015;25) argues that a multi-field understanding of policymaking is appropriate when trying to understand the interactions in complex social systems inherent in the development of national climate policy. In her book, National Climate Policy, Boasson discusses the failed attempts to produce global commitments to climate policymaking. She argues for the need of a better understanding of national climate policymaking, and develops an analytical framework to analyze which mechanism who are at work when national climate policies are established.
In structural terms, she differs between concentrated and distributed structural resources, whereas the first is where the decisions are taken centrally in EU, while the opposite is true for the latter (Boasson, 2015;55). Furthermore, she differs between if there are one or several policy models in a given policy area. She sums it up in a table with four mechanism. Each mechanism represents different types of dynamic concepts, where social interaction between organized
11 individuals or groups is characterized with a shared understanding of the goal (Boasson, 2015;27). Each of the four political mechanisms are related to the European level, whereas one of them will be guiding for the theoretical understanding evident in the forthcoming theoretical chapter (Boasson, 2015;55).
Structural patterns CONCENTRATED DISTRIBUTED Institutional patterns
One dominant policy model EU governs
Strong impact from Brussels
Bottom-up harmonization Intermediate mechanisms Several policy models Unpredictable EU governing
Intermediate mechanisms
1000 flowers
Weak policy impact Table 1
These are different mechanisms of EU influence on the national policy development. The mechanism EU governs and 1000 flowers is underlined as contrasting cases by Boasson (2015;57). While the Emission trade scheme is identified as “hard” EU politics, who ticks the top left corner of the table, the bottom right corner is identified by policy areas where the EU does not have official policy, and the nation states have several different approaches to the given policy. The top right corner is ticked by the policy areas where there is a harmonization of policy across the borders, but without the EU influence.
Arguably, the EU played a central role in the Hinkley Point C-case. The building of the nuclear power plant became EU policy once the European Commission considered the case, regarding if the state aid financing of Hinkley Point C was contrary to EU law (Commission, 2013).
However, two arguments imply that a state aid case regarding nuclear power is not expected to by a case of an EU governs model. Firstly, there are divergent interests and perspectives regarding nuclear power amongst the member states in the EU. This will be argued for with Germany and UK as two opposites. Secondly, the reason why the Hinkley Point C-ruling from the European Commission was important for more countries than just the UK was the fact that it was the first of its kind. By that, it is like a Cassis de Dijon-case, where the outcome could potentially have precedent for the future (Claes & Førland, 2015;115).
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So, unpredicted governing is arguably a mechanism expected to be evident in the Hinkley Point C-case at the EU-level. This implies several features expected to occur in the state aid case in this thesis. Firstly, given the divergent approaches amongst the different member states in the EU, on should expect that relevant actors in the given case works strategically towards DG Competition to influence their decision. Secondly, the unpredictability in state aid case implies that the process in the DG Competition is not a transparent one, which opens for influence. their benefit.
An example should be derived from the first argument, regarding divergent policy approaches to nuclear. Some countries – like UK and Czech Republic – is outspoken pro regarding nuclear as a part of the low carbon energy future (Bell, 2012), while others oppose it. Germany, who have created their own term – Energiwende – as a path away from it, and Austria, who opposed the Commission’s approval of Hinkley Point Cs state aid case (Commission, 2015).
Conclusively, nuclear power is a case of divergent national interests in a field EU tries to govern. This has implications for the forthcoming analysis. Firstly, the fact that EU investigated the case, and made a ruling on the state aid issues related to it, shaped the room of action for interests in the UK, both for the political actors, and the business actors at both sides of the debate. Secondly, if it is true that this was new policy ground to cover for the EU, it is expected that the British government and the business interests put great emphasize in influence the outcome to their benefit.
Furthermore, Boasson’s definition of the term European environment will be central for the theoretical and empirical review in this thesis. She writes that the European environment comprises all the national and political fields and organizational fields in states that are member of (…) the European Union, EU policy development arenas and European organization that relate to specific issue-area. (Boasson, 2015;54). Hence, an issue relating to energy or climate policy will be treated politically in this European environment. She emphasizes that climate-policy may be dominated by one policy recipe, although most often practices will differ across Europe.
With the expected unpredicted EU governing as guiding, one will – following Boasson – see a considerable room of negotiation between national governments and the EU (Boasson, 2015;55). If Boasson’s conclusions are right, there is an extensive room for national actors to influence the process. She emphasizes that the strategic capabilities of national actors are key in cases with these features.
13 The theoretical expectation drawn from Boasson’s work is:
Given a diversity of approaches to nuclear policy amongst the member states, one should expect that domestic actors works strategically towards DG Competition at the time of the state aid case.
This structural perspective opens for an understanding of the Hinkley Point C-case where strategic action from relevant actors – both political and in the business sector - throughout the process will be evident. The question is, really, to what extent is the state aid decision one made centrally in Brussels, and to what extent is it a process opening for strategic action from the parts involved in the case?
2.2 Two neo-institutionalist schools
Boasson’s framework opens for strategic action in a case like the one given. This thesis will apply a version of a rational choice institutionalist approach to answer the research question. It is relevant to understand how a member state inside the EU control their own sovereignty and how much autonomy they have inside the EU framework (Saurugger, 2014;83). It is a central assumption that state actors, in this case the UK, acts rationally when pursuing their defined interests in a European context. When doing this, they transfer some competencies to the supranational body when it is rational to do so, while trying to keep more domestic control over other political areas. As a member of the EU in the defined period of this thesis, UK already have accepted that the European Commission and the Court of Justice of The European Union (CJEU) can rule against them if the implemented rules are not accepted. This is an agent versus principal aspect, where EU influence over the domestic level can by analyzed.
Both state actors and actors from the business sectors are involved in formal and organized events when developing politics. For example, in the state aid case everyone was invited by the Commission to send their written opinion on the case. However, Shepsle (1989;134-135) states that informal measures could be an important feature on the way from a a) not finalized, to b) a finalized process. He underlines that with this approach the theoretical framework includes personal values and beliefs, instead of robbing their own theories of any generality by modeling rational behavior in the most Spartan of all institutional settings. So, when trying to identify the characteristics of a given outcome, the context should be analyzed. In addition, the players of the “game” should be identified, and how they encompass to the rules of the game, deliberative and strategically. More specifically aimed at the “game” between business actors
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and the EU, Flåm (2009;336) analyses the state aid policy regarding environmental policy. She expects that it is reasonable to assume that this is a field subject to a great deal of external pressure and lobbying, but finds that the opposite is true. Her expectation of external pressure is drawn from the fact that state aid policy is a field distinctive from other policy processes in the EU. The Commission is more central and autonomous to a much greater extent than in other areas, and the Parliament and the Council of Ministers have no formal roles, and therefore one could expect a large degree of external pressure (Flåm, 2009;338).
2.2.1 A synthesis of approaches
For rationalists, institutions represent a strategic operating environment. As argued for under 2.1, the Hinkley Point C-case is one with the possibility for strategic action in an unpredicted governing-area. There are formal rules in different institution that constrain the actor’s behaviour, but in addition these institutions represent a room where strategic action can shape the outcome. This understanding is on line with the definition of institution in two approaches to institutionalism; historical and rational choice institutionalism. Historical institutionalism defines institution as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure (Hall & Taylor, 1996; 938). Institutions in a rationalist choice approach is understood in the same – somewhat dual – way. For rationalists, institutions are formal rules and procedures (…) or informal practices that structures interaction (Aspinwall
& Schneider, 2000;11).
This dual understanding of institutions, evident in both rationalist and historic approaches, is core in this thesis. While they function as regulative on interaction, and by that makes constraints on behaviour, institutions also represent a political space where actor’s with different interests can act rationally to pursue them. As a football field, the institutions have sidelines that cannot be crossed, and even inside the sidelines there are rules that constraints how the players of the game can play it. However, the rationalist understanding recognizes the space left open for action as vital, and how the players adapt to this space is key for the result.
But in which theoretical light will the given research question be answered to the fullest? While the ten-year process, divided into two phases, may be investigated best with theory derived from historical institutionalism, the calculated action from the actors at the different critical points in time could possibly best be analysed and answered considering a rationalist approach (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000;29).
15 Whether historical or rational, the research is dealing with uncertainties and tries to make descriptive, explanatory or causal inference. With the given research question the aim is to describe a plausible chain of events, which explain the causality of the process from 2006 to 2016. King, Keohane and Verba points to that where the objective is to gain knowledge though empirical research and the search for patterns, rules of inference should be followed. Inference, whether descriptive or causal, qualitative or quantitative, is the ultimate goal of all social science (Keohane et al, 1994; 6, 34). But is it, however, given that one should stringently follow the learnings from one theoretical approach? In Aspinwall and Schneider`s (2000;26) work on the different institutionalist approach they ask the question: Is there something wrong with methodological pluralism? Their answer is that there is a potential in theoretical convergence, and the supporters of this view are many. Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996) analysed this potential a few years earlier, and concluded that they favour interchange as far as possible, most fundamentally because each of these literatures seems to reveal different and genuine dimensions of human behaviour and of the effects institutions can have on behaviour. (…) each seems to be providing a partial account of the forces at work in a given situation or capturing different dimension of the human action and institutional impact present (Hall & Taylor, 1996;955). This is key for this thesis. The strengths from the two approaches will be used supplementary, to paint the fullest picture possible of the Hinkley Point C-case between 2006 and 2016.
Rational choice institutionalism has been criticized for searching for confirming evidence (Pollack, 2005;34), and overlooking potential explanations. Theorist following this approach have often been engaged with analysing events with a short time-span (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000), like an election. However, Ira Katznelson and Barry Weingast finds that rational choice institutionalists have begun to attend more systematically to historical and institutional processes to better understand how actor preferences have been created (Katznelson &
Weingast, 2005;6). The approach has furthermore been criticized for suffer under the problem for coming up with hypotheses that seems plausible, but cannot be traced back to a convincing deductive framework (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000;14). In this thesis, it will be argued that the historical process tracing in combination with a rationalist approach, give a fruitful framework for identifying the important aspects of the given case. While the norm of rationalists is short- term, the critical voices calls for a more coherent tracing from a) theoretical expectations to b) outcome. This thesis will use the strengths of the rationalist approach to explain institutional behaviour at the important points in time.
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There is literature on the EU which uses different modes of this synthesis of approaches. When discussing how rational choice institutionalist theorist often lack a broad empirical background to their analysis, Aspinwall and Schneider (2000;25) refer to Fabio Franchino’s work on the Commissions control functions. Franchino (2000;63) uses a rationalist framework when analysing the Commission committees control function. However, Franchino leans towards historical rationalism when going beyond explaining their role inside a short time-span, and identifies the period between 1987 and 1998 as his time-span. Furthermore, both Andrew Moravcsik and Anand Menon hypotheses long-term explanation inside a rational institutionalist framework. They do this with an agent-principal view, but with different approaches.
2.2.1.1 Menon’s experienced monitoring and Moravcsik’s creativity
Anand Menon writes that the most obvious problem, empirically, with a rational institutional framework with a principal-agent view is that they overlook the historical features (2003;175).
In his work, Member states and international institutions, Menon suggests an alternative approach to EU studies (Menon, 2003;171), and concludes by proposing a more dynamic theoretical explanation (2003;195). Menon hypothesises – and conclusively finds - that historical learnings leads to experiences, which monitor actions in the future (2003;184, 196).
Menon analyse the relationship between the EU (principal) and member states (agents), and how the agents uses historical learnings to act rationally in the future in relation to their principal at given points in time. Menon finds that agents learns from events in the past and by that become more aware of the risks. Conclusively, they will invest increased resources into monitoring the actions made in relation to the principal (Menon, 2003;184). The agents view on new deals and contracts forwarded by the principal will also be shaped by their experience, and will hence becoming more adept at designing contractual arrangements limiting the possibility for agency opportunism. Menon applies this theory on the relation between the EU and the member states. This thesis will apply the same theoretical understanding, but not exclusively on this relationship. It will be applied on business actors at both sides domestically, as well as for the country-EU-relation.
Experienced monitoring will be operationalized so three types of behaviour is included. Firstly, when actors involved in the process acts in contrast to what they have done previously in the process to seek a different outcome. Secondly, when actors involved in the process acts in the same way that was successful previously in the process. Conclusively, when actors act in line with what was unsuccessful previously in the process, they have not learned. Thirdly, when
17 actors adapt creatively to the context they have learned to act in, it indicates they are monitoring rationally because of experiences. These three operationalisations are modes of how an actor act. It is meant to measure action when action has occurred, not to measure what an actor do, but how they work to influence a political outcome.
Andrew Moravcsik does some interesting work in relation to the third operationalization, creative action. In his work, Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation, he argues that studies involved with breaking up processes with actors at both the domestic and supranational level should pay attention to the state-society relation (Moravcsik, 1999;270). He specifically digs deeper into what he labels the Monnet-Delors-factor, to see if individual political skills are evident when working strategically with modes of influence (Moravcsik, 1999;275). He hypotheses’ that while information could be distributed somewhat symmetrically, political creativity could be distributed asymmetrically (Moravcsik, 1999;277).
This thesis will investigate these hypotheses further, and apply it on the relevant actors in the case in this thesis. Could it be a fact that the political creativity from the business sector or the domestic politicians was the driving force behind the shift of the priorities regarding the British energy future, while the access to information was somewhat symmetrical?
Conclusively, while Menon states that historical experiences will affect forthcoming tactics from the agents, Moravcsik highlights that the agent who acts in the most creative way, will be successful. Both approaches could reveal how actors with interests works to reach their intended target, and they capture some of the same aspect. As those opposing Hinkley has one target, there are business organizations with economic incentives to support Hinkley. Following both Menon and Moravcsik’s work, an important aspect is to capture how these agents work. If the government implements politics that oppose their view, they will work to change the base of information on which decisions are taken. The analytical task is to capture how they work at critical points in time from a) the energy review of 2006, via b) a turbulent period with several barriers towards finalization.
The theoretical expectation, drawn from Menon and Moravcsik’s work, is:
The actors who are able to use learnings from interaction previously in the Hinkley Point C- process, when pursuing their interests in an institutional setting, will be most likely to reach their targets.
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While Menon analyses the relationship between the EU and the member states, this thesis will apply the same theory on a broader, thoroughly selected, set of actors. It should be emphasized that the EU is an especially central actor at one given point in time in the Hinkley Point C-case:
When the financing of the project was investigated for breaking the state aid rules in the European Commission. At this point in time, the UK as a EU member state, is the agent.
However, as highlighted in the introduction, the initiative and finalization of the project is at the table of the domestic politicians. It will become evident in the empirical chapter that the business sector worked to influence this turn of events. Therefore, the business sector will be the agent and the UK government will be treated as the principal at other points in time of the following analysis.
While Moravcsik analyzes political creativity in a Commission context, this thesis will apply the theoretical expectation on the set of actors trying to influence the process. Conclusively, political creativity is a skill, which the business sector can use to influence domestic politics, and a skill which domestic politicians can use to influence the EU. In contrast to the first two operationalization’s drawn from Menon, which points to differing or continuing a mode of conduct when facing a similar challenge at a later stage in the process, creativity is somewhat different. Creative measures are to be understood as measures made when facing a new challenge, different to the other events, in the process. Furthermore, political creativity will be understood to cover two modes of action for the actors involved. Firstly, strategic work that changes the basis of information which shapes the justification of political decisions. Secondly, action that clearly differs from the action that others actors involved does.
In line with Shepsle (1989;135) this expectation will identify how the players of the game encompasses to the rules of the game. As the historical and rational choice approach to institutions both highlight, institution is constraining behavior at the same time as it opens for certain modes of conduct. Both expectation share the understanding that the actors which is the best to act inside this political space, will be the most successful. The institutional setting differs across the period. There is a Labour government in the initial phase, followed by a coalition between the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats, which then again is superseded by a Conservative majority government. Furthermore, the state aid case offers yet another institutional setting which the actors will pursue to adapt to.
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2.3 Theory of business impact
The theory evident in 2.2 argues for theories of the mutual relationship between national and supranational policy, and underlines the nature of this relationship as important to understand the important events evident in the forthcoming analysis. Furthermore, in the introduction, the impact from the domestic business sector is underlined as potentially important in the process.
Therefore, 2.3 will dig into theory of business impact, which will lead to two theoretical expectations on different measures of impact.
Emily Cox, Phil Johnstone and Andy Stirling analyzes business influence in the UK nuclear sector, in their thesis Understanding the intensity of UK policy commitments to nuclear power.
Cox et al (2016) forwards several questions regarding UKs nuclear policy. All their four key questions, guiding the analysis, is somehow connected to the fact that UK has another view on the future of nuclear than others. One of the queries is exactly why have official UK nuclear commitments remained so disproportionate and persistent when contrasted with many other comparable countries over the years?
Furthermore, they conclude that the nuclear industry obviously enjoys particular forms of influence (Cox et al., 2016;5), and that nuclear policy could seem to be partly driven by factors that remain entirely undeclared. This is intriguing ground to cover for the forthcoming analysis.
If Cox et al. is right in stating that the nuclear industry has a unique possibility to influence, how do they use it, and what opposition does this forms of influence meet from the once opposing nuclear? There are a lot of theory on business influence, but not specifically on business influence in the field of British nuclear policy. However, there has been done work relevant as a backdrop for the theoretical expectation regarding business influence.
There is a distinction between the theory presented in chapter 2.2, and the one evident in this chapter. While both Menon and Moravcsik emphasize how actors can encompass to the rules of the game, and by that points to cultural factors on how to shape a political process, Culpepper and Reinke’s theory on business impact has a different angle. They view which means of influence that can be used as something related directly to the size and/or importance of a given company.
So, while Boasson’s multi-field approach deals with EU influence along different dimensions, Culpepper and Reinke (2014;427) approaches the case of bank bailouts in UK and USA with a theoretical understanding of business power separated into two different dimensions. The first
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one, the 1) instrumental power, is one where business influence politics. It could be through donations for campaigns, privileged access to decision makers and lobbyist organizations that defend their company`s interests (Culpepper & Reinke, 2014;429). So, instrumental power is expected to be used by the actor`s in the business sector that is not directly influencing politics when decision makers concludes on future policy. Their size and importance in the domestic industry is not alone big enough to influence politics, and therefore they need to use other measures to influence politicians to make decisions in their favor. While the theory derived from Menon and Moravcsik looks at the given process, and analyzes if action contrasts or are in line with previous action, the instrumental mode of influence is somewhat different.
Instrumental power is lobbying campaigns and strategic communications directed to the decision makers (Culpepper & Reinke, 2014;430), and does not have to be influenced by the preceding events in a given process.
In contrast, the 2) structural power inheres the fact that firms are agents of economic activity in capitalist democracies. The investments a given firm makes, is so important for a state’s economic growth that governments consciously or unconsciously adopts their policy to fit the given firm’s investments. Culpepper and Reinke (2014;431) differs between the two dimension of power by referring to a poker game. Structural power is the cards a player holds in his/her hand, whereas instrumental power is everything evident in the game beyond the cards. When an actor sit comfortably with winning cards on their hands, they arguably have control over the game. They know more than their opponents, and by that have tight control over the information in the game, which influence how they play it to maximize their odds of not just winning, but winning big. In the case of Hinkley Point C, it would be necessary to identify which role forwarding of business interests played in the process along the way. There have been business interests in favor of both going for and opting out of the Hinkley Point C, but what role has the business sectors influence measure played in the process between 2006 and 2016?
2.3.1 Structural power
One could argue that structural power is likely to be evident, with a threefold reasoning. Firstly, the energy sector in UK had already been heavily privatized at the time of the initiative under Tony Blair (Watson and Pearson, 2012;9), and by that, the private investment became increasingly important for energy policy in the British market. Secondly, EDF bought British Energy with approval from the government in 2008 (Gosden, 20161). The purchase included eight nuclear power stations, and by that, they became an important stakeholder in the British
21 energy mix. Thirdly, how the firm invest will in turn be expected to have an impact on the direction the national policy takes. All these assumptions are derived from a structural approach, rather than an instrumental one. In addition, all three could also be connected to the fact that the UK, like many other countries, is facing a future where they must change their domestic energy sector to meet the climate mitigation targets.
The first theoretical expectation drawn from the theory of structural power as evident in the Hinkley Point C-case, which is the third expectation for this thesis, is:
The business sector which possesses structural power will influence the Hinkley Point C- process in favor of reaching their targets.
However, it is important to note that it is not a derivation from the structural approach that the British government automatically make the policy that a given company prefer (Culpepper &
Reinke, 2014;433). Actors with a certain knowledge of the policy involved will have a strategic and central position, but the national decision makers still have room for making their own decisions.
2.3.2 Instrumental power
Emphasized by Culpepper and Reinke, structural and instrumental power is not mutually exclusive categories in a political process (Culpepper & Reinke, 2014;430). While structural power is “behind” the agenda-setting for the decision-makers, business actors who uses instrumental power works to change specific legislative pieces. This interpretation of the dimension could be expected to be true in a case like the Hinkley Point C-process as well. So, on the other side, a fair expectation could be that instrumental power was important in this case, with a threefold reasoning. Firstly, caused by the fact that nuclear power policy making is technical politics. When that is the case, one could reasonably expect that the business sector defending nuclear power were consulted in the process, and by that influenced decision makers directly through their views on it. Secondly, in September it became a fact that the process ended with a yes to new reactors at Hinkley Point in Somerset. However, the fact that the nuclear sector does not represent more than about seven percent of the total electricity supply raises another aspect. As a minority on the supply side in British energy sector, one could expect that strategic communication directly to the decision makers and other measures to influence was a key for the supporters of the labelled relaunch of nuclear in Europe (EDF, 2016). Thirdly, as evident in the introduction and more thoroughly presented in chapter 4. Case Introduction,
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this has been a quite messy political process. This disorder could be viewed as a window of opportunity for the business sector, and one could argue that instrumental influence, with rational self-maximizing communication strategies, would suite the situation.
So, with this threefold argument for instrumental power to be evident in the Hinkley Point C- case, the second theoretical expectation drawn from the theory of business impact, and the fourth and final expectation, is:
The business sector used instrumental power in the Hinkley Point C-process between 2006 and 2016 to reach their targets.
In contrast to the theoretical expectation drawn from Menon and Moravcsik’s work, instrumental power says something about what room the actor have to act inside, not how they act. Was the relevant business sector in a position where they had to lobby? Did they use other measures to position themselves strategically in the political space?
This view – strategic action inside the domestic, political space - is true for all the presented theory. However, a business actor who possesses structural power is expected to need less strategic and creative action to reach their intended target. The neo-institutional tradition, here presented inside a rational choice and historical framework, stresses that national actors themselves decides what competencies to delegate to the European level. By that, they in a rational way analyze which competencies they will benefit the most from transferring to an over-national level. In the theoretical expectations derived from Elin Boasson’s work, the expectation is that Hinkley Point C takes place inside a policy mechanism where the EU tries to have a common policy, but where the fragmentation between different nations are still prominent. Furthermore, the structural approach to business influence derived from Culpepper and Reinke emphasizes the national political actor’s role in policymaking. Though they stress that some policy areas are influenced by important organizations at the business level, they also write that there is no automatic between a company`s preference, and the actual political outcome.
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2.4 Theoretical expectations
To sum up, this thesis seeks to explain the Hinkley Point C-process in light of four theoretical expectations. After chapter 5. Case introduction, with a broad empirical backdrop, chapter 6.
Analysis, will discuss the findings in chapter five considering these given theoretical expectations.
Expectation #1 – State aid opens for domestic action
The first one is key. The assumption, in line with Elin Lerum Boasson`s work, is that state aid cases is defined by unpredicted EU governing, which in turn gives a room for political action for the domestic actors. The first theoretical expectation is:
Given a diversity of approaches to nuclear policy amongst the member states, one should expect that domestic actors works strategically towards DG Competition at the time of the state aid case.
Expectation #2 – Menon`s and Moravcsik`s creative, experienced monitoring Drawn from Andrew Moravcsik`s and Anand Menon`s work, it is expected that what learnings the involved actors acquire throughout the process, will affect their choices and rational tactics at later stages towards finalization.
The actors who are able to use learnings from interaction previously in the Hinkley Point C- process, when pursuing their interests in an institutional setting, will be most likely to reach their targets.
Expectation #3 – Structural influence
Two expectations were drawn from Culpepper and Reinke`s work on business influence. The first one is labelled structural influence. As referred to, a threefold reasoning could justify the expectation of structural influence, following Culpepper and Reinke’s theoretical work. Only business actors of great importance for the domestic economy will have the ability to influence politics in line with this fifth theoretical expectation.
The business sector which possesses structural power will influence the Hinkley Point C- process in favor of reaching their targets.
