Fukushima

67 deadline in March 2015 (Gosden, 2016¹). Six months later the CGN and the British Government signed a contract, which stated CGN would provide for one-third of the cost. At the same time CGN sign a deal, which gives a 20 per cent stake in the EDF-plant at Sizewell. In spite of the deal, hailed by David Cameron as historic, EDF once again delayed their decision. They struggled to finance their own stake, and reports said they were looking for new investment partners. The concern for financing the project results in Thomas Piquemal`s – EDF`s chief financial officer – resignation from his role in March 2016 (Stacey, 2016²). After this EDF unveiled a plan to finance their stake in the Hinkley-project, with the French Government as an important part.

Conclusively, the state aid case ended in the fall of 2014 with an approval from the European Commission. For the British politicians and the supporters of the project in the business sector, it was a big barrier that was left behind. One of the three big obstacles towards finalization in the turbulence phase in the story of Hinkley Point C.

68

While the green movement undoubtedly succeeded in shaping the nuclear debate, the same was not true in the UK. There was a narrow of the gap between the pro- and anti-nuclear in the public, but only slightly (Skea et al, 2013;45). Skea et al. finds that the Fukushima accident appears to have had little direct effect on the prospect of building new nuclear in the UK. They described the NGOs as silent, and the public debate as muted, while the governments promotion of nuclear has continued with the same pace (Skea et al., 2013;45).

Why did not those opposing Hinkley Point C, as the symbol for a new nuclear generation in the UK, succeed in using the Fukushima accident? Public acceptability was highlighted by the government as one of the reasons to have confidence in the British nuclear sector a year earlier, and one would expect that the opposing side played their cards strategically to backtrack these words when a nuclear disaster is central on the news agenda all over the world.

5.2.5.1 The Weightman-report

As a brief backdrop, a study by Greenhalgh and Azapagic (2009;1059) concluded that the public opinion regarding nuclear power is clearly different in UK versus other comparable countries. The British society is, and has for many years been, generally more supportive.

Bickerstaff et al. (2008) demonstrates that how nuclear is framed in the public have implications on these findings. While nuclear often is an aspect connected to danger, with Chernobyl as the frequently reference point as the worst-case scenario, in other countries, nuclear is often framed alongside climate change issues in the UK. When analyzing the public perception of nuclear power as an important part of the British energy mix, Corner et al (2011;4826) finds that it is a complex aspect. At the same time as most people regard nuclear power as the least favorable energy source, it is perceived as one needed alongside wind, gas and other renewable sources to reach climate mitigation targets.

The Fukushima accident happened a few months into what Vincent De Rivaz labelled the year of delivery for the Hinkley Point C-process. Both the UK government and EDF came with responses to the disaster, ordering reports on the accident and viewing the possibility for a similar event happening in the UK. On Thursday the 9^th of June 2011 Dr. Mike Weightman, Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations, was called to the UKs parliamentary committee of Energy and Climate Change (Parliament, 2011). He was there to answer what implications the Fukushima accident had for the UK nuclear industry. The chair of the Committee starts the hearing with congratulating Weightman for his report on the accidents impact for the UK, and

69 calls the reaction after the accident in Japan rather hysterical. Dr. Phillip Lee, also in the committee, refers to the German Energiwende as a rather odd decision, and labels the number of victims that Greenpeace’s operates with as nonsensical. He calls it a problem that they are fostering the sort of belief that nuclear power is riskier than it actually is. Respondent 5 is in line with this, when stating that the German U-turn away from nuclear power was more driven by emotions than rational arguments.

Regarding the possibility for an accident like the Japanese one on British soil, Dr. Weightman points to two aspect in favor of the UK (Parliament, 2011). Firstly, he emphasizes that the technology is different. While the Japanese reactors are based on water, with a higher power density, the opposite is true for the British reactors, which is based on carbon dioxide. Secondly, he points to the most obvious aspect, the geographical position: On the middle of tectonic plates, making it not realistic for similar accidents to affect the UK nuclear sector. EDFs report (2015) came some years later, after they had done several stress tests at different nuclear sites, including Somerset. The conclusion is that they were going to improve the resilience to what the call extremely unlikely events. Some security enhancements were added to the Hinkley Point C-project.

Greenpeace responded to Dr. Weightman, calling his report a rushed one, made before the implications of the Fukushima disaster even were evident. Louise Hutchins, their Senior Energy Campaigner, said that the report had one objective: to give the green light to the new generation of nuclear power stations in the UK (Greenpeace, 2011). Hutchins furthermore underlines that Weightman got a deadline for his report that was ahead of the other reviews of the implications of Fukushima internationally, making his findings difficult to challenge and compare.

5.2.5.2 An unchallenged British acceptability

The Fukushima accident had an impact on the British nuclear debate. The rapid response from the government, with the consultation and report for Dr. Weightman shows this. However, the support for nuclear in the UK is not affected significant by the accident (Poortinga et al., 2013;1209). This could imply one of two things. Firstly, it could be argued that the support for new nuclear power is so manifested in the British society, that even a big exogenous shock like the Fukushima accident do not affect the support. Secondly, it could imply that the response from the supporters of Hinkley Point C in the aftermath of the accident was successfully targeted.

70

While the document analysis shows that there where third parties included in the process of viewing the UK`s nuclear sector after the Fukushima accident, the interviews revealed that this type of influence did not happen uncontested. However, somewhat surprisingly, Fukushima is not even mentioned as a barrier from the respondents that opposites the finalization of Hinkley Point C. In Germany, the Fukushima accident was used strategically to shape the governments nuclear policy. In the UK, Hinkley Point C had been the symbol in the fight against new nuclear for the opposing side ever since it was initiated. The unexpected barrier of Fukushima could function as a boost in this debate. But it does not. The only one of the respondents mentioning Fukushima, and not only mentioning the accident, but talks how his side interpreted and used the situation to their benefit, is the respondent from the nuclear side of the debate.

Respondent 2 states that – in line with the reference from the hearing in the Committee - the reaction in the media, and in turn in the public, was different in the UK than in other comparable countries. The respondent refers to the Weightman-report, which delayed the Hinkley Point C-process a couple of months, as a successful reaction from the government. the fact that they had an independent scientist to analyze if the catastrophic accident in Japan could occur in the UK, calmed the public society down. The respondent representing the nuclear industry thought it was smart to keep away from the public debate, as they regarded it as the best way to keep the public support for nuclear at a high level. Respondent 2 states the nuclear industry were involved in the response, but not in the public. They viewed their odds were better if an independent academic forwarded their perspective, and that the industry isn’t the best to talk when something like that happens.

In NIAs response in the public consultation regarding justifying the new technology, they underlined that the government`s plans successfully has taken into account new information and events since 2010 (Government, 2014²). One of these events is the Fukushima accident, and NIA states they are satisfied with the way the government responded to this event when updating their Hinkley Point C-plans.