Remaining Divided?

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Remaining Divided?

A Sociological Examination of Consociationalism’s Impact on Peace and Reconciliation in Contemporary Northern Ireland

Anja Herseth

A Master’s Thesis Presented to

The Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages The Faculty of Humanities

University of Oslo

ENG4593 – Master's Thesis in British studies (30)

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the MA Degree in British Area Studies

Spring 2020

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Remaining Divided?

A Sociological Examination of Consociationalism’s Impact on Peace and Reconciliation in Contemporary Northern Ireland

By Anja Herseth

Supervisor: Stuart McWilliams

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2020

Remaining Divided? – A Sociological Examination of Consociationalism’s Impact on Peace and Reconciliation in Contemporary Northern Ireland

http://www.duo.uio.no

Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo

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Abstract

There is a common understanding that peace was reached in Northern Ireland with the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998, which established a devolved consociational or power sharing system of government between the two opposing sides of the ‘Troubles’. However, despite ending the violent conflict, Northern Ireland remains divided, perhaps most evident from the rigid patterns of segregation and the ‘culture war’. This thesis seeks to give some answers as to why this is the case by examining consociationalism as an initiative for peace, asking does consociationalism succeed in achieving peace in Northern Ireland? Using

theories from sociology and peace and conflict studies, the thesis argues for the importance of framing, that is, distinguishing between different understandings of and approaches to

communal identities and peace is essential. All too often peace is understood in a structural sense, reduced to institutional reforms of governance structures. This understanding of peace neglects the societal aspects of the conflict which are pivotal for reconciliation. The thesis argues that the GFA’s consociationalism has been successful in terms of structurally managing the conflict and achieving absence of violence, however, consociationalism has been unsuccessful socially, not accomplishing and even impeding reconciliation or positive peace. Relating to this, the thesis discusses the primacy of structure or agency in shaping human behaviour and the tension that often occurs between a structural and social approach to peace. Furthermore, the thesis assesses whether the latest Northern Irish political

agreement – the New Decade, New Approach deal, reflects a move away from

consociationalism and accommodation towards integration or fixes the limitations of the existing consociational system. The overall argument of the thesis is that NDNA reflects a continuation of accommodation and a top-down, structural approach, confirming the argument that a social peace process is neglected and confirming the limitations of consociationalism.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to the following people, who have helped me in my work with this thesis.

First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Stuart McWilliams, for insights, guidance and for believing in my project.

I would also like to thank my fellow students from EMS. In an extra difficult time where we have not been able to be together up on the 8^th floor of Niels Treschows Hus, I have really appreciated all your messages of encouragement.

A special thank you to my flat mates Khalitza and Ingeborg and to Benedicte, Marte and Beatrice for always cheering me up and motivating me. I cherish our friendship.

Last but not least, a special thank you to my family for always believing in me and supporting me in everything I do.

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1. Introduction

The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998 is widely regarded as the pillar of peace in Northern Ireland, establishing a devolved consociational system of government on the basis of a definitive end to systemic sectarianism and violence. Despite ending the violent

Troubles, Northern Ireland remains divided, perhaps most evident from the rigid patterns of segregation and the ‘culture war’. This thesis seeks to offer some answers as to why this is the case by examining consociationalism in relation to peace. Thus, the first research question of this thesis is does consociationalism succeed in achieving peace in Northern Ireland?

By placing the debate of consociationalism or accommodation within the frames of peace and conflict studies, and the enduring ontological debate in the social sciences concerning structure and agency, the thesis seeks to illustrate the importance of

distinguishing between structural approaches and social approaches to peace. Namely, peace is all too often understood in a structural sense, reduced to institutional reforms of

governance structures. However, such an approach neglects societal elements pivotal for reconciliation linked to identity, emotionality and personal relations. The thesis seeks to demonstrate the achievements and limitations of consociationalism in relation to the different understandings of peace. The thesis argues that consociationalism has been highly successful in terms of structurally managing the conflict and achieving absence of violence, however, consociationalism has been highly unsuccessful socially, not accomplishing and even impeding reconciliation or positive peace.

The political system of Northern Ireland has been unstable ever since its

implementation in 1998, with the most recent suspension lasting for three years from 2017 to 2020. The restoration of Stormont in January 2020 by the New Decade, New Approach (NDNA) deal has led to renewed interest in and focus on the power sharing system in

Northern Ireland. The deal’s title has led to expectations of change or a ‘new approach’. This thesis assesses this by examining whether NDNA reflects a move away from

consociationalism and accommodation or fixes the limitations of the existing consociational system. To put it simply, the second research question is does NDNA reflect a new approach?

The thesis argues that NDNA does not reflect a new approach. The deal’s reforms do not alter the system. There are reforms in the deal that could improve the sustainability and transparency of the established system, however, the accommodationist social framework of

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the deal along with the new Executive’s proceedings since the signing of the deal suggest a continuation of the same problematic practice as ever.

The thesis responds to the debate on consociationalism and the Northern Ireland peace process by aiming to highlight the often overlooked sociological and social psychological aspects relating to inter-personal relations and emotions such as fear, prejudice and mistrust.

It also seeks to investigate the tension that often occurs between a structural and social approach to peace. The thesis does not discount a structural approach, but it argues it is insufficient on its own for reaching positive peace. In this way, the thesis aims to demonstrate the necessity of endorsing a social approach to peace in Northern Ireland. A sociological lens will hopefully expand upon the existing research of consociationalism and the Northern Ireland peace process and will better uncover the challenges facing Northern Ireland in reaching reconciliation or positive peace.

1.1 Delimitation

The research questions and the theoretical framework limit the scope of the thesis. The thesis will therefore be concentrated on the political system of consociationalism and

accommodation, and the theories from peace and conflict studies and sociology. For instance, there is not enough space to cover everything the NDNA deal presents, such as climate change or childcare. Additionally, an in-depth account of the Troubles or the debate around consociationalism and integration is beyond the scope of this thesis. The thesis will therefore focus on main characteristics and events, only including what is relevant and necessary to understand the thesis’s discussion. Furthermore, the time frame limits the scope of the thesis.

Apart from the background, the thesis focuses on Northern Ireland after the GFA of 1998. As the thesis, particularly the third chapter, deals with issues which are in process, changes may arise continuously which may challenge or confirm the conclusion of this thesis. In other words, the account is constrained by the developing or emerging nature of the situation. For instance, at the time of writing the government has yet to publish its Programme for

Government (PfG). However, NDNA and the practice of politicians analysed so far give a good indication of what is to come.

Next, as a Norwegian MA student, I am aware that there are limitations to my capacity to understand the sectarian violence and ethno-national division of Northern Ireland.

Therefore, although the thesis mostly focuses on the limitations of consociationalism I do not condemn it. The purpose of this research is to explore, not to instruct. However, there is also

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an advantage to not coming from Northern Ireland. Namely, I do not have any personal bias towards any ethno-national community and can therefore study the topic at hand neutrally and academically.

1.2 Theoretical Framework and Sources

Regarding the first aim, the theoretical concept of consociationalism is examined in practice to test the applied theory. In explanation, a broad range of written sources describing for instance the practice of Northern Ireland’s power sharing governments since 1998 or public trust in politicians, are analysed thematically to determine whether they can answer the question of consociationalism’s impact on peace and whether they support the theoretical framework or not. The thesis critically analyses existing data and works of others and explores their practical implications for consociationalism in relation to peace. The second aim of the thesis is investigated through close reading and content analysis of the official NDNA and Together: Building a United Community Strategy (TBUC) documents. Moreover, as the third chapter addresses a more contemporary issue, it mainly relies on online

newspaper articles to provide an insight into the current political situation. The sources are analysed thematically to establish whether NDNA and the new Executive endorse an accommodationist or integrationist approach to ethno-nationalism and peace.

Combining a broad range of written material provides a thorough examination of the topic and a confluence of evidence which increases the credibility and validity of the results.

The thesis relies on both written primary and secondary sources of both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The introductory chapter mainly builds on secondary sources consisting of academic books and articles in books and online journals. These sources provide an essential insight into the established debate of consociationalism and different approaches to peace. As a starting point for the thesis, the sources offer academic and critical perspectives on the topic at hand that I can position my thesis and research in relation to. The second chapter relies on both primary and secondary sources by scholars conducting different types of qualitative research such as document analysis and interviews. Other primary

sources of quantitative research include statistics on election results and survey data on attitudes to politics and interface barriers. Addressing a contemporary issue, the third chapter mainly builds on primary sources including official documents and online news articles.

Since the area of study is Northern Ireland, a certain amount of cautiousness when dealing with the sources is necessary. I have therefore been considerate of the subjectivity

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and the potential presence of bias of authors when collecting and utilising the source material.

My purpose is to address the topic at hand neutrally and I believe this focus on source criticism and the combination of a broad range of sources and research approaches ensure this.

1.3 Structure

The thesis consists of four chapters. The first is introductory, the second chapter explores consociationalism in relation to peace, the third chapter analyses the NDNA document and the new Executive’s proceedings, while the fourth and final chapter summarises the most important findings, reflects on the implications of these finding and suggests further research.

The second and third chapters include a summary.

In addition to clarifying the purpose and delimitation of the thesis and describing the applied sources, the introductory chapter provides a brief account of the conflict and peace process as well as the situation in Northern Ireland today, and presents the theoretical

framework of the thesis, namely the concepts of consociationalism and integration as well as theories from peace and conflict studies and sociology.

The second chapter provides a historical analysis of Northern Ireland’s consociational political system. This chapter addresses the first aim of this thesis, that is to investigate how successful consociationalism is in achieving peace. This is examined by discussing

consociationalism’s effect both structurally and socially. In terms of structure, the chapter explores the functionality of Northern Ireland’s consociational system such as delivery and sustainability. In terms of the social effect of consociationalism, the chapter explores how the system influences civil society and its ability to achieve reconciliation between the ethno- national communities.

The third chapter has a more contemporary focus, following up the second chapter.

This chapter addresses the second aim of this thesis, that is to investigate whether NDNA reflects a new approach or not. The chapter analyses the deal’s institutional reforms and social strategy, as well as discussing the practice of the new Executive. What constitutes a new approach can again be seen both structurally and socially. In terms of structure, or the political system, a new approach would be a move away from consociationalism or

improvements to the limitations of the existing consociational system revealed in the second chapter. A new approach socially relates to the new Executive’s social strategy and

politicians’ personal attitude and commitment. In terms of the social strategy, a new approach

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would be a move away from accommodation towards more integration. A new approach in terms of politicians’ personal attitude and commitment would be a practice of better

cooperation and more compromise.

1.4 Background: The Troubles, The Peace Process and Contemporary Northern Ireland

The following brief account of the conflict and peace process draws on the invaluable and well-balanced Making Sense of The Troubles: A History of The Northern Ireland Conflictby David McKittrick and David McVea.

The conflict in Northern Ireland, more commonly known as ‘The Troubles’, was a violent sectarian conflict usually taken to have lasted from 1968 to 1998. The Troubles resembled a civil war, with street fighting and riots, bombings and sniper attacks. About 3,700 people were killed and many thousands more injured during the Troubles.¹

The basis of the conflict can be traced all the way back to the sixteenth and seventeenth century with the plantation of Ulster, when Protestant British settlers from

England and Scotland emigrated to the predominantly Catholic Ireland to plant a loyal British garrison community.² The Catholic Irish became de facto second-rate citizens through a series of suppressing laws, resulting in them fighting for Home Rule, orself-government for Ireland within the United Kingdom (UK).³ The island of Ireland was partitioned in 1921, setting up one parliament for six north-eastern counties and another for the remaining 26 counties.⁴ In 1949, the 26 counties which made up the so called ‘Free State’ stepped out of the Commonwealth and became The Republic of Ireland or Eire. The six northern counties, where Catholics were a minority, remained in union with the UK as Northern Ireland.⁵ From this arose diverging aspirations for the constitutional status of Northern Ireland between the predominantly Protestant unionists and loyalists who wanted to retain the union with Britain, and the predominantly Catholic nationalists and republicans who wanted Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland or to declare an entirely new all-island republic.⁶ The dichotomy of nationalist and unionist refers to the ‘mainstream’ political divide while the

1 McKittrick & McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, (London: Penguin, 2012), p. ix

2 Ibid. pp. 1-30

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

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dichotomy of republican and loyalist generally refers to more militant stances, including those of paramilitary groups. The following chapters of this thesis will mostly operate with the political terms as the thesis addresses a political topic. For the republican paramilitaries, the conflict was viewed as a guerrilla war for national independence and their targets were therefore predominantly the state forces but also the loyalist paramilitaries.⁷ The aim of loyalist violence was to halt the republican violence against the state which they saw as terrorism.⁸ In practice, however, a significant number of both Catholic and Protestant civilians were killed.⁹

The lead up to the Troubles began in the 1960s when Catholics initiated a civil rights movement, protesting discrimination by Northern Ireland’s unionist-dominated

government.¹⁰ Catholics were discriminated against systemically through the first past the post electoral system and ‘gerrymandering’ which deliberately rearranged constituency boundaries to influence the outcomes of elections in favour of unionists.¹¹ They were also discriminated against in employment and housing to prevent Catholic majorities from

emerging in the constituencies.¹² Policing and the judiciary were also controlled by unionists, which disfavoured nationalists.¹³ The initially non-violent street marches of the civil rights movement soon deteriorated into violence by paramilitary groups on both sides and later the state forces. The British Army arrived in 1969 in response to the request from the Northern Irish government to assist the Royal Ulster Constabulary in controlling the violence.¹⁴ Soon the state forces also resorted to violence. The day known as ‘Bloody Sunday’, 30 January 1972, is central in the history of the Troubles. On this day, 14 unarmed civilians were killed by British Paratroopers in Londonderry/Derry during a civil rights march.¹⁵ The event

provoked violence. 1972 became the most violent year of the Troubles and decades of violent conflict ensued thereafter.¹⁶

Direct rule from Westminster followed ‘Bloody Sunday’, however, it was only meant as a temporary solution.¹⁷ Thus, from there on followed the search for a solution for Northern

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid, pp. 43-46

11 Ibid, pp. 9-10

12 Ibid, pp. 43-46

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid, pp. 61-88

15 Ibid, pp. 88-91

16 Ibid, p. 88

17 Ibid, pp. 96-97

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Ireland. Unsurprisingly, finding an agreed system of governance between unionists and nationalists proved difficult. The first attempt at power sharing was the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, however, the inclusion of a ‘Council of Ireland’ and the fact that the Republic of Ireland continued to claim that the whole island of Ireland formed one national territory induced unionist rejection of the agreement.¹⁸

In the 1980s, the British and Irish governments changed their approach to Northern Ireland from attempting to solve the problems related to governance and the constitutional status to instead focusing on ending violence.¹⁹ The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and the Downing Street Declaration of 1993 facilitated the peace process of the 1990s. With these accords, both governments confirmed there would be no change to the constitutional status without the consent of the majority of Northern Ireland’s citizens, Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution were deleted and Britain officially expressed they had ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland’.²⁰ As the new approach was to end violence, focus was put on the paramilitary groups who used violence to promote their political agenda. Secret talks between politicians and paramilitary groups ensued to persuade them to abandon the use of violence.²¹ From August 1994, the paramilitary groups declared ceasefires, however, they were often followed by violent setbacks.²² Nevertheless, efforts to end violence and to find a solution for Northern Ireland continued.

After a long and challenging period of attempting to find a settlement, with many violent setbacks, an agreement was reached on 'Good Friday', 10 April 1998, as a result of multi-party talks. The agreement was implemented by consent of a majority in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland through a public referendum.²³ A more detailed account of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) and a discussion of its achievements and limitations follow in the theory on consociationalism and in the second chapter, however, it is important to account for the situation in Northern Ireland today which sparked my interest in

investigating just that.

Although Northern Ireland is post-conflict it is generally agreed that it is not post- sectarian. Namely, society remains as divided as ever along ethno-national lines. The most

18 Ibid, pp. 114-138

19 Ibid, pp. 173-195

20 Ibid, pp. 187-194 & 229-232

21 Ibid, pp. 215-233

22 Ibid, pp. 232-245

23 Ibid, p. 256

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apparent manifestation of this are the rigid patterns of segregation. Segregation in Northern Ireland exists in many forms. Physical forms of separation and division are for instance present in housing and the education system as well as at work, and in sport and leisure.²⁴ There is also a mental segregation, visible in people’s friendship and marriage patterns.²⁵ The threat of and exposure to tension and violence during the Troubles led to extensive self- segregation of the two communities.²⁶ Nevertheless, it has been revealed that the level of segregation has in fact increased since the late 1990s.²⁷ This thesis will explore why this is the case.

It is important to identify the covariance between levels of segregation and social class. Disadvantaged working-class areas are more likely to be highly segregated than middle-class and upper-class areas.²⁸ These areas are often called ‘interface areas’ as

‘interface barriers’ such as walls, gates and fences physically separate the two communities there.²⁹ This is where the highest levels of violence both during and after the conflict have taken place.³⁰ The barriers were initially constructed by either community to block violent attacks, but later the British Army erected officially sanctioned walls as a temporary military response to violence.³¹ Over 50 years later what was meant to be temporary is now well established. Interface barriers have even increased in height and in number since the GFA.³² As stated by Gormley-Heenan et al., the peace walls have ‘copper-fastened segregation and division’, making it harder to bridge the community divide.³³People living at interface areas often have very limited contact with the other community on the opposite side of the wall.³⁴ Whereas the city centre of Belfast has been extensively modernised, the interface areas remain deprived. These areas are challenged with high levels of poverty and unemployment, educational disadvantage, and drug use.³⁵ Although condemned by most people, paramilitary groups still control many of these areas.³⁶ These facts are evidence of the shortcomings of the peace process. Scholars have argued that the interface barriers are a physical representation of

24 Hughes et al., ‘Segregation in Northern Ireland’, p. 35

25 Ibid, p. 36

26 Ibid, p. 35

27 Ibid, pp. 35-36

28 Ibid, p. 35

29 Byrne et al., ‘Attitudes to Peace Walls’, p. 7

30 Geoghegan, ‘Will Belfast ever have a Berlin Wall moment’

31 Byrne et al., ‘Attitudes to Peace Walls’, p. 5

32 Gormley-Heenan et al., ‘The Berlin walls of Belfast’ p. 358

33 Ibid.

34 Browne & Dwyer ‘Navigating Risk’, p. 798

35 Ibid, p. 800

36 Moriarty, ‘Paramilitaries control NI’

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the fact that peace is not settled.³⁷ Furthermore, closed social communities reinforce and promote inequalities.³⁸ McKittrick argues how segregation and the interface barriers are symptoms of division, not the causes of division. This presumably indicates that there are societal explanations for segregation linked to relations and emotions such as fear, prejudice, hate and anxiety between the two communities.

Today, there is also talk of a ‘culture war’, defined as ‘a conflict or struggle for dominance between groups within a society or between societies, arising from their differing beliefs, practices, etc.’³⁹ Ever since the plantation, symbols have served to define and divide the two communities of the predominantly Protestant British and the predominantly Catholic Irish. Disputes over territory, symbols and status have always shaped the Northern Irish political and social discourse, however, scholars argue the culture war escalated sharply when the large-scale violence of the Troubles started phasing out.⁴⁰ It has been argued that once the GFA put the constitutional issue to rest and provided an agreed system of governance, what previously divided the two communities was largely settled and therefore the importance of cultural symbols which separates them from each other intensified.⁴¹ Today, unionists and nationalists battle for cultural supremacy, or at least fight for their culture not being superseded by the opposing community’s culture.⁴² The culture war includes issues concerning identity, culture, public symbolism and legacy issues. For instance, public

symbols or markers of territory include the British Union Jack or the Irish tricolour flags, and murals displaying key events of the Troubles in a biased manner.⁴³Particularly in interface areas it is easy to discern whether you are in a nationalist or unionist part of an area based on cultural symbols.⁴⁴

The culture war has generally been non-violent. However, violence has occurred for instance surrounding the Ulster Protestant celebration on 12 July as marches occasionally have gone through Irish Catholic and nationalist neighbourhoods, which is met with

opposition from residents.⁴⁵ Violence is usually spurred by paramilitary groups. Street fights,

37 Gormley-Heenan et al., ‘The Berlin walls of Belfast’, p. 358 & 373

38 Sterrett et al., ‘Agitating for a design and regeneration agenda in a post-conflict city’, p. 100

39 Dictionary.com, ‘Culture War’

40 Gorvett, ‘Northern Ireland Is in a Culture War’

41 Brewer, ‘The Sociology of the Northern Ireland Peace Process’, p. 280

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

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setting fire to vehicles and throwing petrol bombs are examples of violence during the Orange Order’s marching season.⁴⁶ The Holy Cross dispute is another example of the use of violence in the ‘culture war’. When the Ardoyne area of North Belfast became segregated during the Troubles, a Catholic primary school for girls ended up being left in a Protestant area. In protest, loyalist paramilitary groups tried to stop the schoolchildren and their parents from walking to the school by verbally discriminating, throwing bricks, fireworks, blast bombs and so on at the schoolchildren, their parents and the police.⁴⁷ The culture war has also sparked mass public unrest among people who are not part of paramilitary groups. In 2012, the Belfast City Council voted to end the practice of flying the Union Jack from the city hall daily.⁴⁸ This led to weeks of protests and riots across Northern Ireland by unionists who saw the decision as an open assault against their cultural heritage.⁴⁹ Thus, the culture war

continues to divide the two communities in post-conflict Northern Ireland. The culture war, segregation, interface barriers and the related societal elements have not been sufficiently addressed or resolved. One might wonder why this is the case. This thesis will try to provide some answers as to why.

1.5 Theory: Consociationalism and Integration

1.5.1 Consociationalism and Accommodation

The consociational theory was developed by Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart and has been advocated especially by political scientists John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary in the case of Northern Ireland. According to consociationalists, the best way of achieving a stable democratic solution in societies with ethnic division and conflict is to establish power sharing between the opposing communities.⁵⁰ Lijphart identifies four defining characteristics of consociationalism. The first is ‘government by a grand coalition’, or executive power sharing, to ensure the representation of all significant segments of the plural society.⁵¹ Second, all segments hold a mutual veto right which will protect the autonomy and interests of minority groups.⁵² Third, ‘proportionality’ involves that the different groups are represented

proportionately based upon their population size.⁵³ To ensure the sufficient representation of

46 The Guardian, ‘Orange Order parades’

47 Heatley, Interface: Flashpoints in Northern Ireland

49 Ibid.

50 Taylor, Consociational Theory, p. 1

51 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 25

52 Ibid, p. 38

53 Jarrett, ‘Beyond Consociational Theory’, p. 416

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groups in a plural society, proportional representation by single transferable vote (PR-STV) is seen as the most apt electoral system.⁵⁴ Finally, ‘segmental autonomy’ allows for culturally- based community laws such as the right to maintain ethno-national schools or separate laws that preserve the social and cultural practices of minorities.⁵⁵

Thus, consociationalism involves recognising and accommodating the different and competing ethno-national identities.⁵⁶ Consociationalists believe this will ensure group autonomy, fair representation and protection and equality of both communities.⁵⁷ It is worth emphasising how for Lijphart, ‘accommodation’ was to be understood first and foremost as a

‘spirit of accommodation’ between the elites which was vital to make the consociational institution work.⁵⁸ In other words, the system is meant to be premised on compromise between the competing groups. Finally, consociationalism corresponds with an

accommodationist approach to communal identities. Accommodation builds on a collective rather than individual social principle and sees identities as ‘inflexible, resilient, durable and hard’.⁵⁹ In other words, culture and identity are understood as having a static nature.

Believing that ethno-national identities will never deteriorate, accommodationists promote public and institutional recognition and expression of differences.⁶⁰

Northern Ireland has largely been viewed as a key confirming case for consociational theory since the GFA introduced consociational power sharing, and particularly since the St Andrews Agreement paved the way for a power sharing executive between the unionist Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the nationalist Sinn Féin (SF) in 2007.⁶¹ First, there are formal stipulations for power sharing government in Northern Ireland. Moreover, the system requires communal registration for the Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), meaning each member is required to designate as either ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’.⁶² Next, Northern Ireland uses the electoral system which according to Lijphart is most apt for consociationalism. The Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA) is elected by proportional

representation using the single transferable vote (PR-STV).⁶³ After elections an executive is

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid, p. 415-16

56 Knox, ‘Peace Building in Northern Ireland’, p. 16

57 Taylor, ‘The Belfast Agreement and the Politics of Consociationalism’, p. 217

58 Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, pp. 103-122

59 Rosland, ‘Making Hope and History Rhyme?’, p. 155

60 McGarry & O’Leary, ‘Chapter 3: The Politics of Accommodation and Integration’, p. 80

62 Jarrett, ‘Beyond Consociational Theory’ p. 417

63 Ibid, p. 416

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formed using the d’Hondt model ‘on a proportional basis of the numeric strength of parties in the legislature, with the First Minister from the largest party and the Deputy First Minister from the second largest party’.⁶⁴ The First Minister and Deputy First Minister cannot represent the same ethno-national community, they have equal powers and must work together in order to govern.⁶⁵ Another consociational element of the political system are the cross-community thresholds for decision making.⁶⁶ That is to say, key legislation requires cross-community support in the Assembly using two different voting procedures; either by

‘parallel consent’ which requires the support from the majority of both unionists and

nationalists, or a ‘weighted majority’ which requires the support from 60 percent of all MLAs and 40 percent of both unionists and nationalists.⁶⁷ Furthermore, a mutual veto can be used on matters of key concern to guarantee that the interests of both communities are upheld.⁶⁸

The GFA also set up a North/South Ministerial Council that would consist of

members from the NIA and ministers from the Republic of Ireland, as well as a British/Irish Council which was the east/west dimension of the Agreement.⁶⁹ In this way, the GFA is ultimately an intergovernmental settlement including cross-border bodies. O’Leary calls this

‘power sharing plus’.⁷⁰ 1.5.2 Integration

The integrational model represents the opposite approach to consociationalism and accommodation. It was developed especially by James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science, Donald Horowitz, and has especially been advocated by political scientist Rupert Taylor in the case of Northern Ireland. The model promotes an institutional

arrangement which attempts to soften up the divisions in society. Integrationists respect differences in the private domain but reject public institutional recognition and facilitation of communal identities.⁷¹ Namely, integrationists believe the source of conflict is group-based partisanship in political institutions.⁷² In explanation, they argue that a state which serves the

64 Ibid, p. 417

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 McKittrick & McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, p. 256

70 O’Leary, ‘The 1998 British-Irish Agreement’, pp. 14-35

72 Ibid, p. 83

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interest of one or some segments of society will provoke counter-mobilization among the excluded communities and this may lead to conflict.⁷³

In this way, integrationists go beyond seeing the ethno-national divide as the primary cause of conflict. Taylor argues how it was systemic discrimination, not ethno-nationalism per se, that caused the Troubles. More specifically, according to Taylor, the basis of the Catholic uprising in the late 1960s was ‘grievances around the gerrymandering of electoral boundaries, unfair housing allocation, discriminatory employment practices, biased policing, and the misrule of law.’⁷⁴ Taylor believes the strong opposition between the two communities is a ‘socially constructed frame that is integral to systemic sectarianism’.⁷⁵ Therefore, he holds that consociationalism’s protection of groups over individuals, ‘simply works to reinforce the hegemony of this frame and to compromise rights agenda’.⁷⁶

To avoid ethnic partisanship in public institutions, integrationists favour institutional arrangements that transcend and minimise differences.⁷⁷ By way of explanation, the

integrationist model seeks intergroup cooperation through the creation of pre-election

coalitions between ethnic parties, or more ideally the creation of larger multi-ethnic or neutral parties that transcend ethnic interest.⁷⁸ The preferred electoral system of Horowitz is the Alternative Vote (AV). The system involves preferential voting just as the STV, however, Horowitz argues the AV would require each winning candidate to win majority support in single-member districts.⁷⁹ For politicians to build such a majority, they would have to ‘vote pool’ among different ethnic groups.⁸⁰ In this way, the system would encourage the

moderation of ethnocentric parties, giving such parties an ‘incentive to tone down their ethnocentric rhetoric during election campaigns, and they would be more likely to cooperate in office’.⁸¹

The integrationist model must not be mistaken for assimilation. It does not require cultural conformity across the public and private spheres. Integrationists ‘condemn

“ethnocide”, the killing of cultures, “linguicide”, the killing of languages, and “theocide”, the

73 Ibid.

75 Ibid, p. 322

76 Ibid.

78 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 563-684

79 Ibid.

80 McGarry & O’Leary, ‘Consociational Theory’, p. 253

81 Ibid.

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deliberate killing of particular religious cultures’.⁸² However, integrationists usually favour voluntary assimilation as it erodes differences.⁸³ Therefore, integrationists promote policies that mix people in schools, workplaces and neighbourhoods but also encourage people to do so irrespectively.⁸⁴ In terms of approach to communal identities, integrationists reject the notion of identity as a singular, pre-given and unchanging concept, instead seeing identities as ‘malleable, fluid, and transformable’.⁸⁵ Integrationists seek the equality of individuals and promote shared identities beyond ethno-nationalism.

1.5.3 Criticism

Integrationists have criticised consociationalism for reinforcing division and polarisation through the fixed communal preconditions of the system, including the group designation in the Assembly, the Executive formation, the requirement of cross-community support for key decisions, and the voting system.⁸⁶ Namely, integrationists argue this promotes and

maximises communal advantage while effectively discounting the votes of ‘others’, people who do not identify as just one or either of the ethno-national identities. In line with Taylor’s case for systemic sectarianism, integrationists believe ethnic identities are not as longstanding or as deep as accommodationists suggest and therefore see integration as more achievable.⁸⁷ In this manner, integrationists criticise consociationalism and accommodation for hindering and downplaying human capacity to develop identities that cut across the traditional divide when arguing that ethno-nationalism is the cause of conflict and therefore the communities must remain separate but equal through accommodation.⁸⁸

As a response to this criticism, McGarry and O’Leary point to the distinction between a ‘corporate’ and a ‘liberal’ consociational democracy.⁸⁹ Corporate consociations usually have ‘corporate electoral rolls’ meaning that citizens are obliged to vote ‘within their own ethnic community for their own ethnic parties’.⁹⁰ Northern Ireland, however, is according to McGarry and O’Leary a liberal consociation. They argue the GFA does not set aside seats for unionists and nationalists as citizens in Northern Ireland vote on a ‘common roll’.⁹¹ That is to

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid, p. 82

85 Rosland, ‘Making Hopes and History Rhyme?’, p. 155

87 Ibid.

89 Ibid, p. 271

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

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say, they are free to vote for any candidate or party they prefer, irrespective of their ethno- national identity. The algorithm that allocates ministers is ‘difference-blind’, operating

‘according to the strength of representation won by parties in the Assembly, not their national identity’.⁹² In this way, McGarry and O’Leary argue that the election of MLAs does not privilege particular identities. Nevertheless, they do admit that there are other mechanisms that privilege ethno-nationalism over other forms of identity, such as the communal registration of MLAs, the election of the First and Deputy First Minister and cross

community support for the passage of important laws.⁹³ However, McGarry and O’Leary still regard the GFA as reflecting liberal as opposed to corporate consociationalism and are open to amendments of the more corporate mechanisms ‘within a consociational framework’⁹⁴

Consociationalists argue that the integrative approach is essentially majoritarian and disproportional both within and across blocs, explaining how there will be unambiguous unionist and nationalist majorities in several constituencies and that AV will lead to

underrepresentation of minorities in these constituencies.⁹⁵ In addition, McGarry and O’Leary argue that AV does not necessarily lead candidates to seek lower-order preferences across the ethno-national divide as ‘the imperative of staying in the count would dictate building as big an initial first- and second-preference vote tally as possible’.⁹⁶ Consociationalists believe a non-proportional system would never have been agreed upon during the negotiations which led to the GFA, particularly by the hard-line parties associated with paramilitary

organisations such as SF, The Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party who ‘stood to lose out by it’.⁹⁷ Moreover, they deem integration as unrealistic, pointing to the fact that the electoral divide into two rival ethno-national blocs remains as strong as ever and parties formed outside the two blocs have shown no sign of making a political break-

through.⁹⁸ McGarry and O’Leary do not believe changes to the electoral system would

transform this strong polarisation.⁹⁹ They also question the transformative ability of voluntary assimilation, arguing people would fear for the extinction of their ethno-national culture.¹⁰⁰

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid, p. 272

94 Ibid, p. 277

95 Ibid, p. 268

96 Ibid, p. 269

97 McGarry & O’Leary, ‘1 Power shared after the deaths of thousands’, p. 62

98 Ibid, p. 255

99 Ibid.

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Their evidence for this is segregation, pointing to the popularity of segregated schools and neighbourhoods.

To give a short summary, consociationalists believe integration will exclude at least one community, leading to underrepresentation. Correspondingly, integrationists believe consociationalism will exclude communities with identities and interests that transcend traditional ethno-nationalism. Again, this hinders all groups of society from being

represented. Additionally, consociationalists fear that the exclusion of one community will reignite conflict and violence, while integrationists fear that with consociationalism society will never move beyond sectarianism.

1.6 Theory: Peace and Conflict Studies

1.6.1 Johan Galtung’s Definition of Peace

Sociologist and political scientist Johan Galtung is the principal founder of the discipline of Peace and Conflict studies. Galtung defines peace as ‘the absence of violence’.¹⁰¹ However, he argues that under this definition ‘highly unacceptable social orders would still be

compatible with peace’.¹⁰² Therefore, Galtung distinguishes between ‘negative peace’ and

‘positive peace’.¹⁰³ Negative peace is the absence of physical violence, however, other forms of violence such as structural and cultural violence remain. Positive peace, on the other hand, is the absence of all forms of violence. To make the distinction clearer, Galtung contrasts a society where there is no more shooting with a society where there is no more need for shooting. From this, it is clear that in a society with negative peace, that peace is fragile and a return back to conflict and violence is more likely.

Related to this is the distinction between peacemaking and peacebuilding. While peacemaking involves bringing an end to violence by managing the conflict, peacebuilding goes beyond simply managing the conflict. More specifically, peacebuilding seeks to solve the structural, relational and cultural contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict to prevent conflict from reoccurring.¹⁰⁴ An example of dealing with paramilitarism clarifies this distinction. A peacemaking approach would end violence through the decommissioning of paramilitaries. Peacebuilding, on the other hand, would underpin this by tackling the very

101 Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, p. 168

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid, p. 170

104 Doyle & Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding’, p. 779

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culture of paramilitarism, for instance through eliminating their ways of expression such as murals and reintegrating former combatants into society.¹⁰⁵

1.6.2 Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches

Top-down and bottom-up are two distinct approaches regarding who should be building peace in a post-conflict society or who the peacebuilding initiatives should be aimed at.¹⁰⁶ Top-down approaches place emphasis on elite actors such as high level politicians and international organisations.¹⁰⁷ This approach is often criticised for neglecting the experiences and voices of the grassroots level, the civilians of the conflict who have been most

devastatingly affected by the conflict.¹⁰⁸ This is the focus of bottom-up approaches which emphasise efforts at the societal level aimed at or developed by ordinary citizens.¹⁰⁹ Other key actors in such approaches are mid-level actors such as leaders of non-governmental organisations (NGOs).¹¹⁰ This form of peacebuilding is community based and the aim is to build peace from the ground up by empowering the people and transform relationships between people of opposing communities.¹¹¹

In relation to the theories of consociationalism and integration, consociationalists tend to rely on an elite, top-down approach to conflict while integrationists usually promote a bottom-up approach where they advocate for civil society to challenge the ethnocentric elites on both sides.¹¹²

1.6.3 Structural and Social Approaches

Structural and social approaches relate to the source of the conflict, that is, the two approaches have different views on what type of work is necessary to solve and cure the causes of conflict in society. A structural approach sees the source of conflict as connected to the structures or institutions in society, for instance state breakdown or the failure of the political system to provide legitimate authority.¹¹³ Therefore, this approach deems it important to address and remedy the institutional failures and the resulting structural

105 McFarlane, ‘NGOs in Grassroots Peacebuilding’, p. 5

106 Zanker, Legitimacy in Peacebuilding, pp. 2-4.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

113 Doyle & Sambanis, ‘International Peacebuilding’, p. 779

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inequalities. In other words, this approach to peace engages in creating solid state institutions and political structures that treat the population equally.¹¹⁴ This approach is also called political approach as it is linked to the management of the political system, for instance through changing the model of governance, introducing fairer systems of voting, introducing human rights laws and so on.¹¹⁵ A political approach to peace often revolves around reaching a political agreement, such as the GFA.¹¹⁶ Professor of Post Conflict Studies John D. Brewer argues that political agreements often do not resolve the process of societal healing as negotiators either ignore these concerns or assume that they will follow naturally from the establishment of a political agreement.¹¹⁷ Thus, structural initiatives are a vital step in any peace process; however, it is argued that an exclusively structural approach is insufficient. To clarify, there is a belief that institutions, or structures, will not be solid without reconciliation at the societal level.¹¹⁸ This is the focus of the behavioural or social approach to

peacebuilding. Namely, this line of thought sees the source of conflict as grounded in the dysfunctional relationship between the opposing communities in society.¹¹⁹ The approach is intricately linked to the contact hypothesis of psychologist Gordon Allport, suggesting that sustained contact under the right conditions will reduce prejudice between traditionally opposing groups.¹²⁰ More specifically, a social approach focuses on attitudes and emotionality, and initiatives can for instance involve truth and story-telling workshops, forgiveness and atonement strategies, policies that facilitate and encourage public tolerance and integration, new and shared cultural symbols and so on.¹²¹ In other words, it is argued that the ‘groundwork’ of building a good relationship between former enemies is necessary for the institutions to function, and that this needs to be done before or alongside a structural approach.

On the one hand, top-down and structural approaches to peacebuilding are vital for creating equality and harmony in terms of service delivery.¹²² Examples are housing, employment, and economy. These approaches are great indicators and measurements of progress and success of the more external peace at the surface of society. On the other hand,

114 Newman, ’24. The International Architecture of Peacebuilding’, p. 318

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Massey, ‘6 Forgiveness and Reconciliation’, p. 90

119 Ibid.

120 Massey & Abu-Baker, ‘2 A Systemic Framework for Forgiveness’, pp. 22-23

122 Ibid, pp. 275-276

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these approaches neglect important societal elements such as individual subjectivity, inter- personal relations, identity, emotionality and so on. This is where ‘trust is rebuilt, fear and anxiety reduced, and broken relationships restored’.¹²³ However, this does not mean that structural approaches should be dismissed. It is more a question of perhaps what should come first and what should be prioritised. What is valuable about such a discussion is that the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches are detected. However, as Brewer argues, peace is too often ‘reduced to institutional reform of governance structures’.¹²⁴ In this way, the societal elements are disregarded. Advocating for a sociological approach to peace, Brewer distinguishes between state-building and peacebuilding, where state-building ‘builds strong states’ and improves governance, while peacebuilding ‘builds strong civil societies’ and improves reconciliation.¹²⁵ In other words, a structural or political peace process involves a process of conflict management which alone will achieve negative peace. A social peace process involves a process of conflict transformation which will achieve positive peace.

1.7 Theory: Structure and Agency

The primacy of structure or agency in shaping human behaviour is a central and longstanding debate in the social sciences. A structural understanding of human behaviour involves the idea that structures, such as social class, religion, gender and ethnicity or powerful stable societal structures such as educational, religious or political structures, affect and limit the choices and actions of individuals.¹²⁶ Primacy of agency, on the other hand, contends that individuals act and make their own free choices independently from structures.¹²⁷ A third understanding was developed by British sociologist Anthony Giddens. His ‘Structuration’

theory highlights the synthesis of the two influences on human behaviour, arguing that they are complementary forces. In explanation, while structures influence human behaviour, structures are maintained and adapted through agency.¹²⁸ Put differently, Giddens argues that as structures are socially constructed, they have no inherent stability without agency.¹²⁹ Therefore, structures are only reinforced if humans act in a compliant manner with the

123 Ibid, p. 274

124 Ibid, p. 272

125 Ibid.

126 Barker, Cultural Studies, pp. 231-238

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid, pp. 232-233

129 Ibid.

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structures.¹³⁰ In other words, humans have the ability to change the social structures they inhabit.

130 Ibid.

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2. Consociationalism and Peace

2.1 Introduction

The GFA with the establishment of devolved power sharing government is widely regarded as the pillar of the peace process in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, the country remains as divided as ever, notwithstanding the general commitment to the peace process. This chapter explores why this is the case by asking does consociationalism succeed in achieving peace?

The chapter examines consociationalism in relation to different understandings of peace, such as negative and positive peace. More specifically, the chapter discusses consociationalism’s effect both structurally and socially. In terms of structure, the chapter assesses the

functionality of Northern Ireland’s consociational system such as delivery and sustainability.

In terms of the social effect of consociationalism, the chapter examines how the system influences civil society and its impact on reconciliation between the ethno-national communities.

2.2 Achievements & Limitations

The GFA is a prime example of a top-down, structural approach to peacebuilding in the sense that it was a response to the failure of legitimate authority during the Troubles when unionists dominated Northern Irish politics. This is one of the primary structural sources of the conflict and the GFA was put forward to remedy this by creating solid state institutions and political structures that would treat both communities in Northern Ireland equally.¹³¹ This structural approach has been vital for the peace process in Northern Ireland, putting an end to

domination and discrimination of one community over the other with the establishment of a consociational power sharing government.

Moreover, the GFA largely put the constitutional issue to rest, another structural source of the conflict and violence.¹³² Namely, as opposed to the failing Sunningdale

Agreement of 1973, the aim of the GFA was to bring peace and to set up functioning political institutions rather than settling the constitutional issue. The GFA introduced the ‘principle of consent’, legitimising both aspirations for the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. The constitutional status would remain within the United Kingdom, however, the status could be

131 Taylor, ‘The Belfast Agreement and the Politics of Consociationalism’, p. 218

132 Gormley-Heenan & Aughey, ‘Northern Ireland and Brexit’, pp. 513-517

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changed in the future if a majority of the people in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland voted for a united Ireland in a public referendum.¹³³ Professors of politics at Ulster University, Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Arthur Aughey, explain how this involved a

‘progressive lowering of the political temperature in Northern Ireland and the fashioning of a new modus vivendi on the island’.¹³⁴ In explanation, politicians detracted from speculating and fighting over constitutional futures because the GFA established a mutually acceptable arrangement for both unionists and nationalists, namely a cross-community basis with both a British and Irish dimension.

Putting the constitutional issue to rest was also agreed on in order to put an end to the large-scale violence of the Troubles. This is undoubtedly the greatest success of the GFA.

The political arrangement of power sharing created a new stability in which the opposing communities could fight with words in government halls rather than with bombs and bullets on the streets. The new political system drastically changed the scale of violence in Northern Ireland. In terms of killings, research from July last year revealed that since the GFA in 1998, 158 people have died in conflict related deaths compared to approximately 3,700 deaths during the Troubles.¹³⁵ Similarly, the number of shootings and bombings has decreased since 1998. First, however, dissident activity and violence rose as a response to the GFA by those who opposed it. Since the height of this violence in 2001-2002 with 358 incidents of shooting and 318 bombings, shootings and bombings dropped to 50 and 18 in 2017-2018.¹³⁶ Gormley- Heenan refers to research by The Detail, a news and analysis website, which estimates that if the conflict continued after the GFA in 1998, more than 2,400 people may have lost their lives by 2019.¹³⁷ In that way, the GFA was a ‘life-saving turning point’ for Northern Ireland;

an achievement that should not be underestimated.¹³⁸

However, as the GFA did not settle the constitutional issue, a significant dividing line between unionists and nationalists persists. The constitutional issue remains as important as ever, particularly since the Brexit debate, reflected in Northern Irish politics. Namely, politics largely revolves around ethno-nationalism. The only significant neutral party is the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), however, the party remains marginal in relation to the

133 McKittrick & McVea, Making sense of the Troubles, pp. 256-257

134 Gormley-Heenan & Aughey, ‘Northern Ireland and Brexit’, p. 504

135 Gormley-Heenan, ‘Has devolution brought peace’, p. 47

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid.

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other parties.¹³⁹ The constitutional issue is central in the policy of the most ethnocentric parties of SF and the DUP, where the main political aim of SF is a united Ireland and the main political aim of the DUP is preserving Northern Ireland’s union with the United Kingdom. It can be argued that the unresolved constitutional issue helps persist the divide and it certainly causes other problems, demonstrated later in this chapter.

Moreover, sectarian violence and killings persist in Northern Ireland, mostly caused by republican or loyalist paramilitary groups.¹⁴⁰ This validates the fact that this top-down, structural initiative to peace has not succeeded in solving the underlying causes of that violence. This also relates to underlying social causes of the conflict, namely inter-personal relations between the two sides and more specifically attitudes, mistrust, prejudice, fear and so on between them. The peace process in Northern Ireland has rested on the top-down structural and political approach of the GFA, confirming Brewer’s argument that peace is normally reduced to political agreements and institutional reform of governance structures.¹⁴¹ In other words, the societal elements, or a social peace process, have largely been neglected.

Not resolving the process of societal healing and emphasising elite initiatives above civil society initiatives, are likely reasons why Northern Ireland today is post-conflict but not post- sectarian and faces the challenge of a culture war. It can be argued that this is in accord with the argument that a structural approach is vital but insufficient in reaching positive peace and that the structures themselves will not function unless built on a solid ground of

reconciliation. In line with the case of structure hindering agency, one can argue that the political system of consociationalism derived from the GFA even impedes efforts to move beyond the ethno-national divide and official social strategies to achieve social peace or reconciliation. These arguments will be demonstrated in the following sections of this chapter.

2.3 Structural Limitations

There are several shortcomings of consociationalism in Northern Irish politics in terms of performance and sustainability. Namely, politicians have not managed to follow

consociationalism’s intended practice of sharing power, cooperating, and compromising. In terms of delivery and function, disputes between the DUP and SF have been an ever-present feature of Northern Irish politics, hindering progress on numerous political issues.

139 Whyte, ‘Elections’

140 Gormley-Heenan, ‘Has devolution brought peace’, p. 47

Remaining Divided?

Remaining Divided?

A Sociological Examination of Consociationalism’s Impact on Peace and Reconciliation in Contemporary Northern Ireland

University of Oslo

Remaining Divided?

A Sociological Examination of Consociationalism’s Impact on Peace and Reconciliation in Contemporary Northern Ireland

Abstract

Acknowledgements

Contents

1. Introduction

1.1 Delimitation

1.2 Theoretical Framework and Sources

1.3 Structure

1.4 Background: The Troubles, The Peace Process and Contemporary Northern Ireland

1.5 Theory: Consociationalism and Integration

1.6 Theory: Peace and Conflict Studies

1.7 Theory: Structure and Agency

2. Consociationalism and Peace

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Achievements & Limitations

2.3 Structural Limitations