The country of Afghanistan has been at a state of war for more than three decades. When the Obama administration reviewed the U.S. policy towards the mission in Afghanistan, the administration decided that in order to have a successful withdrawal of troops and make sure that the country would not again become a safe haven for terrorists, stability had to be ensured.152 Nevertheless, that is far easier said than implemented. It seems that the idea of a centralized government in Afghanistan is not as bad an idea as it could first appear, based as it is on the regional structures and lack of infrastructure. Instead of accepting the current
common perception that the country is more or less ungovernable because of regional autonomy and lack of a credible government for thirty years, one should, according to Thomas Barfield, examine the country’s history more thoroughly.153 Barfield argues against the perception that presupposes an inherent opposition towards centralized government in Afghan culture. The historical reality is that Afghanistan has more facets than many decision-makers in Europe and in the United States recognize.154 He argues that many decision-makers in coalition countries have been colored by the idea that Afghans will oppose any foreign involvement in their national affairs: “The most basic reason was that Afghanistan had always been more complex than the simple picture painted by the press. Nor was Afghanistan in 2001 the same place with the same attitudes that it had been two hundred, one hundred, or even
152 White House, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan 01-12-2009; White House, Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan 06-22-2011
153 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History 2012: p. 272-273
154
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twenty-five years ago.”155 This could arguably be at the core of the problem with creating a new centralized government in Afghanistan. How the foreign forces follow and adhere to this perception of Afghanistan’s history appears to differ from what the situation is today as compared to when the mission started. This is not to say that all aspects of the cultural understanding of how the Afghan political culture has evolved, and been affected, by events over the last decades are wrong. However, the situation in Afghanistan is now different from what it was in early 2006 when the insurgency started to gain new momentum. With regard to Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar, Barfield’s book makes it clear that there is a definite gap between the ISAF perception on democracy and how Afghans perceive democratic
governance.
Afghanistan has not always been the place it is today, where the standard of living is one of the lowest in the world. It has had periods of peace and prosperity. Barfield argues that the issue with enabling a viable government and sustainable security situation has become particularly difficult because the ISAF forces are applying a style of democracy that is not necessarily in tune with the traditions and culture of the country itself. The difficulties that are experienced with reintegrating insurgents and partnering issues at the local level appear slightly different on the national level. Persuading people to trust that Karzai’s government actually will work once most of the foreign forces leave is, to some extent, a question of trust in democratic forms of government. However, creating a democracy in a country that has two generations who know little else than conflict needs to be handled in a different manner than creating a centralized government in Kabul that disperses the State’s resources based on a medieval structure of personal favors to remain in power.156 In provinces like Kunar and Nuristan that have historically been more isolated than Nangarhar, which contains the key urban hub in the east, the understanding of a functioning government is less. In the isolated provinces, there has been little contact with the government in Kabul. The branches of the government do not stretch far enough for the provinces like Kunar and Nuristan to see stable and continuous positive progress. This is compounded with the population’s poverty, where most of Afghanistan’s people exist as subsistence farmers and have resolved local disputes in a traditional way for centuries. It would seem, that for many villagers there is little need for a centralized government that in their eyes, exists only on paper. However, if politics would materialize in practical improvements, their view on politics might change.
155 Ibid. p. 274-275 (Barfield)
156 Ibid. p. 303 (Barfield)
55 One can argue that the people in these regions, regardless of how poorly developed the regions may be, do not simply want to live at an existential minimum. If asked, it is likely that they would want to see improvements in their living conditions. More importantly, it is likely that, regardless of political regimes, they want to see a more peaceful situation, which has been observed through successful projects like road construction and building of wells.157 Most people in Afghanistan want to see their country become a better place. This may sound very obvious but a quote from Barfield’s book sheds light on the ambiguity of this argument:
“Regions [in Afghanistan, TKP] wanted a direct choice in how they were to be governed at a local level. The international community saw assertions of such regional autonomy as signs of disorder that needed to be curbed.”158 In counterinsurgency, when it comes to partnering, the emphasis has to be on learning how the other party conducts themselves, and then apply how one conducts oneself into the equation and acting, so to speak, on the result of the merger of these two aspects. Therefore, understanding the local culture is more than simply knowing how to behave in “social” settings on the battlefield. Integrating the understanding into actual policy and achieving results on strategic goals seems harder on the strategic/national level than achieving it in tactical situations at the local level.
The divide between urban and rural areas in Afghanistan, especially when it comes to cultural understanding in COIN operations, could arguably be considered two worlds. As a thought experiment, one can imagine a person who has been living in a remote location with little formal education, compared to a person in Kabul who may have had twelve years education, possibly even in universities outside of the country. The values that these people adhere to are probably vastly different from each other. What a person in Kabul sees as a political necessity based on his/her understanding of international relations today is most likely completely different from what the farmer in a remote village sees as important. The farmer’s immediate concerns are likely not to be connected to international relations, but rather relations within the areas that surround the village. For the farmer his main interest may be his immediate security. For the person in Kabul or Jalalabad, his/her interests may go further and contain more facets than that of the farmer, who lives more isolated. The problem with conducting COIN operations in areas of eastern Afghanistan is that both these kinds of problems have to be addressed simultaneously and with more or less the same approach. To add to the complexity, the counterinsurgents must take into account their own culture and
157 David Kilcullen The Accidental Guerilla 2010: p. 108-109
158 Ibid. p. 303
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their values that come into play when dealing with Afghans and COIN operations.
The problem with using the urban/rural divide is that it can tend to be an
oversimplification, used to explain a complex situation in a complex country. This is not to say that it has no bearing at all. Rather, the divide is an issue that needs to be taken into account, but it should be used as a guide instead of an idea that reigns true in all parts of Afghanistan.159 In Kunar and Nuristan, which are less developed than Nangarhar, it is likely to find a more conservative approach to community politics. Nangarhar may also be more
“modern” in terms of policies and the implementation of aid programs than what one would expect in mountain villages in Kunar and Nuristan. This would not be an oversimplification.
Though one can argue that the urban/rural divide is an oversimplification of the situation in Afghanistan, it still is an issue that needs consideration when conducting COIN operations.
The three provinces discussed in this chapter showcase that the argument for the rural/urban divide holds some validity because the differences between the provinces are more
pronounced. This is especially true because both Kunar and Nuristan are remote and poorly developed compared to Nangarhar. The two remote locations are also a factor as Nangarhar is closer to Kabul and the central government.