As mentioned before, the proposed new normative meaning of the self-determination norm embodies the reconciliation between broad content of rights (including the right to demand secessionism) with states’ authority and sovereignty. However, through the example of the securitization act employed by the Spanish government to address the Catalan 2017 referendum
it becomes obvious how self-determination norm is perceived as a disruptive rather than a cohesive norm. The Spanish government created violent environment in which many Catalans were injured and hospitalized, however by focusing the criticism on violence international community failed to comprehend the real problem causing the violence. “The top United Nations human rights official urged today the authorities in Spain to ensure thorough, independent and impartial investigations into all acts of violence that took place Sunday during a referendum on the independence of Catalonia.” ("UN human rights chief urges probe into violence during referendum in Catalonia", 2020) The real problem not addressed by the international community is the self-determination norm, more precisely the absence of clarity of law on how to deal with the groups that demand rights under the self-determination norm.
The uncertainty and haziness around the norm not being addressed is the real problem producing dangerous consequences for groups, leaving them unprotected in the face of violent security measures as an answer to their demands. “The European Commission has confirmed that the Catalan independence referendum was “not legal” under Spanish law. It described the vote, which saw police beat protesters and shut down polling stations, as an “internal matter”
and suggested it would not heed calls to intervene.” (The Independent, 2020). In the statement of the European Commission it becomes clear what is really the focus of international community: sovereignty and not human rights. In addition to that, defining the self-determination norm behind the veil of ignorance was a normative attempt to make states’
authority and human rights more intuitively dependable. In other words, the self-determination norm behind the veil of ignorance is consolidating factor for governments legitimacy and authority. In addition to that, if history could be a reliable indicator of the future than it is clear to see how the harsh reaction of the Spanish government against Catalan secession preferences is not enough to stop their demands, on the contrary it only generates the opposite effect than planned ones. “The Spanish Government’s strategy proved both repressive and ineffective, and the Catalan Government gained significant political capital and control of the narrative.”
(Cetrà, 2018) Cetrà (2018) claims how the use of violence deepened the constitutional crisis in Spain, “damaged Spain’s international image, and fed into the increasingly prominent argument within the Catalan independence camp that secession is a remedial solution against Spain’s disrespect for democracy and basic rights” (Cetrà, 2018, p. 190). However, as mentioned before, the practical implications of the normative meaning of the self-determination proposed in this thesis do not advocate secession, rather a right to demand secession should be understood as a last resort option to alarm and force the state to improve
an unsolvable problem because the right of one group to secede can automatically “entail a denial of the same right to another group” (Klabbers 2006). “The Åland Islands dispute of the 1920s made clear that allowing the Swedish-speaking Finns to separate from Finland would undermine the self-determination of the Finns, who had themselves just barely become independent from Russia” (Klabbers, 2006, p. 190). Same logic applies to Serbs in Kosovo.
The Kosovo’s unilateral secession from Serbia in 2008 denied the same right to Serbs to secede from Kosovo and join Serbia. The same goes for Catalans, Spaniards and minorities in Catalonia that do not want to secede from Spain. In addition to that, the right to secessionism is an adequate example of the tyranny of majority. While analysing the ICJ advisory opinions on Namibia and Western Sahara, Klabbers (2006) noted how the courts turned self-determination into a procedural guarantee. “Because even democracy, however valuable, can lapse into tyranny of the majority, a procedural right to be heard is invaluable” (p. 62) Klabbers (2006) defines the self-determination in terms of a procedural right meaning how groups on which state decisions have a political affect should be consulted about those decisions and therefore taken seriously. Despite of that, Klabbers denies any binding attributes to opinions of the people ‘taken seriously’. Nonetheless, the normative meaning for self-determination proposed by this thesis would encompass the procedural aspects of the self-determination as a practical embodiment of exercising the right to self-determination. However, the procedural consultation should be taken more seriously than in Klabbers (2006) version, as it will be both an exercise of the human right and a consolidation of statehood legitimacy. In addition to that, the international community has to re-evaluate and take the norm of self-determination seriously because, as exemplified in the case study, human rights can continue to be violated if the law of self-determination is not freed from the uncertainty and ambiguousness. Moreover, the failure in recognizing the norm of self-determination as the consolidating element of the governmental legitimacy leads to a dangerous possibility to antagonize and securitize certain political groups in the absence of clarity on the law of self-determination which can lead to serious violations of human rights as shown in the case study. By utilizing the Rawlsian vocabulary in tradition of political philosophy this thesis offers a meaning of self-determination that could help in balancing the power of authority and inviolability of human rights. Practical implications of the proposed meaning are calling for the re-evaluation of self-determination as an attempt to make international political morality more attentive to significance the norm
‘ought’ to have for reconciling the state authority with human rights.