Discursive institutionalism cannot explain all the changes, because there are things that simply
"happen", conditions of existence vary independently from any factors. As historic institutionalists have interpreted, processes of change are often uncontrollable - since people can act without a clear understanding of what they are doing, creating new conditions as a result of "scalding" and destroying old standards as a result of "drift" (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). In addition, there are unpredictable consequences of deliberate actions of individuals who hoped for a completely different result. As Michel Foucault said: "People know what they are doing; they often know why they are doing what they do; but what they do not know is what they do "(Drefyus and Rabinow, 1982: 187). Describing the consequences of "what they do", scholars use historic institutionalism, which explains the influence of external factors. At the same time, while discursive institutionalism cannot explain actions for unpredictable situations, it can explore the ideals and discourses of civil servants about these events and their causes.
Discursive institutionalism explains the changes through the ideas of agents that introduce new rules into practice. However, according to Jabko (2006), the theory does not deny that there are individual interests and material reality. The problem is that there are material interests that determine the institutionalism of rational choice. That is, material interests can be decisive in ideas and discourses. However, discursive institutionalisms point out that this can bring not only utilitarian problems, but also much wider
It should be noted, that the majority of such interests will be formed collectively, which means that the theory can take into account many ideas that are derivatives of the interests of individuals.
Considering their benefits in material realities, taking into account human behavior. Therefore, for discursive institutionalism, these ideas of interests should be noted and taken into account in the decision-making process. However, such a situation may serve as a reason for a more in-depth discursive approach that can clearly show the true incentives of people for such ideas (Schmidt, 2008).
23 Turning to Margaret Weir's statement (2006), we need to use an approach that adds to the interests of individuals in explaining, taking into account relational and cognitive factors.
As Schmidt noted, (2008) another problem is the linkage of interests with the authorities, namely the result of a link between government and ideas. In historical institutionalism, power is equated to a position. The place in the hierarchy is directly proportional to the number of resources that can be used to influence decisions. In discursive institutionalism, ideas and discourses are also given power, since bishops receive power through their ideas, giving them strength. Based on the principles of discursive institutionalism, positions may not play a role, since the decisive factor is a good idea and effective discourse, which gives a clear understanding of the content of the reform and its necessity.
Discourse is also viewed from the standpoint of power, as individuals gain strength from their ideas, giving power to these ideas. Ideal power, as defined by Hall (1989), is inherently relational, because ideas get power as much as they are for individuals. Conversely, individuals acquire power as far as their ideas are important for others and for the result. Therefore, the direct discourse should consider the positions and power of individuals. It should be borne in mind that the power comes not only from the position, but also from the ability of the subject to have power, that is, the process of forming an idea, its purpose, mode of presentation, audience, place and time can strengthen or weaken the power.
Liberman (2005) notes that ideas can create a motive, but not an opportunity given by institutions. The historical and institutional context establishes conditions where ideas can be realized, and vice versa, ideas serve to introduce changes to existing rules or their destruction and adoption of new habits (Lieberman, 2005). The problem is that there are many differences in two institutional approaches that cannot be neglected. Namely, the fact that discursive institutionalism concentrates the research of institutes based on the context of ideas, as well as the inability to transform the rules, since they must at the same time adhere to the old rules. To overcome this problem can be by separating the two approaches, first using historic institutionalism to study the existing rules and laws, and then use this information as additional to the discursive analysis to investigate how ideas influence the existing rules and how discourse explains the dynamics of their changes (Schmidt, 2002;
2006).
SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, I described the main theoretical approaches used in the study. For this study, two institutional theories were chosen: historical institutional and discursive institutionalism. These theories complement each other for a deeper understanding and explanation of the main issues.
24 Initially historic institutionalism was used to explain the chronological sequence of past reforms, but when the question relates to the reasons for the adoption of certain changes, discursive institutionalism is very useful in this case. I described when the transition from historical institutionalism to discursive occurs; as well as the limitations that each approach has.
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