We first provide an analysis of the spectators’ decision to cancel the deal between the buyer and the seller before we analyze the subsequent decision to fine. Finally, we examine the spectators’ beliefs and policy attitudes.
2.4.1 The decision to cancel
Across treatments, we find that60.7percent of the spectators choose to cancel the voluntarily agreed-upon deal between the buyer and seller. Figure 2.2 reports the share of spectators who choose to cancel the deal in each of the
Figure 2.2:Share of spectators that cancel the deal
Note:The figure shows the share of participants who cancel the transaction between the buyer and the seller in each of the four treatments. The standard errors are indicated.
four treatments. We first observe that even in the Low treatment, where the seller’s involvement is minimal, a majority of the spectators,57.4percent, cancel the deal. This share increases somewhat, to59.0percent, in the Propose treatment where the seller has proposed the deal. In the Obfuscate treatment where the seller has obfuscated the information given to the buyer, the share of spectators who cancel the deal further increases to64.5percent. Finally, we observe that 62.3 percent of the spectators cancel the deal in the High treatment, which implies that37.7percent do not cancel the deal even when the seller has both obfuscated the information and proposed the deal. We can summarize the first results as follows:
buyer and a minimally involved seller. A large minority do not cancel a voluntary deal between an irrational buyer and a seller even when the seller has obfuscated the information to the buyer and proposed the price that exploits the irrationality of the buyer.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.2 report regressions on the spectators’ decision on whether to cancel the deal between buyer and seller. We observe that the effect of having proposed the deal is not statistically significant (p = 0.464). However, the spectators’ willingness to cancel the deal is significantly increased when the seller has obfuscated the information (p = 0.001), and this holds independently of whether the seller has proposed the deal or not.
From column (2), we observe that these results hold when we control for background characteristics. Table 2.3 furthermore shows that these results hold for all subgroups. We can summarize these results as follows:
Result 2:Obfuscation of information by the seller increases the share of spectators who cancel the deal. Spectator behavior is not affected by whether it is the seller or buyer who proposes the deal.
From column (2) in Table 2.2, we also observe that female spectators and older spectators are significantly more likely to cancel the deal (p < 0.001 andp < 0.001), while spectators with high incomep < 0.001and Republican spectators (p < 0.030) are less likely to cancel the deal. The finding for Republicans is in line with previous research that suggests that conservatives are more likely to hold favorable views of the outcomes of free markets (Goren, 2005; Jost et al., 2009, 2003; Malka et al., 2014) and are opposed to interventions into these outcomes (Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Jost, 2017;
Skitka, 1999; Skitka and Tetlock, 1993).
Table 2.2:Regression results for decision to cancel the deal and fine the seller
Cancel Cancel Fine Fine
Proposed 0.016 0.013 0.033∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015)
R2 0.003 0.022 0.009 0.015
Observations 3991 3991 3991 3991
Note:The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators who decides to cancel the deal (columns 1-2) and the share of spectators who decides to fine the seller conditional on having canceled the transaction (columns 3-4).
"Proposed" is an indicator variable for the spectator being assigned to the treatment where the seller proposed the transaction. "Obfuscated" is an indicator variable for the spectator being assigned to the treatment in which the seller obfuscated the information. "Propose*Obfuscate" is the interaction between "Proposed" and
"Obfuscated". "Female" is an indicator variable for being female. "College" is an indicator variable for the spectator having a bachelor degree or higher. "Old" is an indicator variable for the spectator being older than 47 years. "Income" is an indicator variable for the spectator having a household income of more than $60,000 per year. "Republican" is an indicator variable for the spectator voting for the Republican party. β1 +β2 +β3 is the linear combination of the parameters for Proposed, Obfuscated and the interaction term between the two. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p <0.05,∗∗∗p <0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table2.3:Heterogeneityregressions Cancel PoliticalGenderEducationIncomeAge B=1ifRepublicanB=1ifFemaleB=1ifCollegeB=1ifhigherthan$60.000B=1ifolderthan47 Proposed0.0280.0150.0260.022-0.004 (0.026)(0.032)(0.031)(0.029)(0.032) Obfuscated0.074∗∗∗0.093∗∗∗0.061∗∗0.073∗∗0.084∗∗∗ (0.026)(0.032)(0.030)(0.029)(0.031) Proposed*Obfuscated-0.067∗-0.033-0.034-0.013-0.014 (0.037)(0.045)(0.043)(0.041)(0.044) B-0.057∗0.112∗∗∗-0.035-0.0370.079∗∗ (0.034)(0.031)(0.031)(0.031)(0.031) B*Proposed-0.0460.005-0.021-0.0140.036 (0.049)(0.044)(0.044)(0.045)(0.044) B*Obfuscated-0.012-0.0400.019-0.007-0.027 (0.047)(0.044)(0.044)(0.044)(0.044) B*Proposed*Obfuscated0.101-0.014-0.006-0.055-0.045 (0.067)(0.062)(0.062)(0.062)(0.062) Constant0.591∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ (0.019)(0.023)(0.022)(0.021)(0.022) R20.0070.0120.0050.0080.009 Observations39913991399139913991 Note:ThetablereportsresultsfromanOLS-regressionoftheshareofspectatorswhodecidestocancelthetransaction."Proposed"isan indicatorvariableforthespectatorbeingassignedtothetreatmentwherethesellerproposedthetransaction."Obfuscated"isanindicator variableforthespectatorbeingassignedtothetreatmentinwhichthesellerobfuscatedtheinformation."Proposed*Obfuscated"isthe interactionbetween"Proposed"and"Obfuscated".Bisanindicatorvariablethattakesthevalue1whenthespectatorisRepublican (Column1),female(Column2),college-educated(Column3),hasahouseholdincomethatishigherthan$60.000(Column4)orisolder than47years(Column5).Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.∗ p<0.10,∗∗ p<0.05,∗∗∗ p<0.01.Standarderrorsinparentheses.
Turning to the analysis of the share of the different types of spectators, reported in Figure 2.3, we find that a majority of the spectators,57.4percent, are Substantialists who cancel the deal even when the seller only accepts an offer made the buyer. We interpret these spectators as primarily caring about the consequences of the deal and considering the outcome of the deal unfair.
A large minority, 37.7percent, are Contractualists who do not cancel the deal even when the seller has obfuscated the information and proposed the deal. We interpret these spectators as primarily wanting to respect individual autonomy. We cannot rule out the possibility that these spectators are also motivated by a concern for efficiency, but given the small efficiency gain associated with the deal, we find this less likely (Almås et al., 2020). Only 4.9percent of the spectators are Proceduralists whose decision to cancel is dependent on the extent to which the seller has been involved in the process leading up to the deal. We interpret these spectators as mainly caring about whether the process leading up to the deal was fair.
Figure 2.3 also displays the distribution of Substantialists, Proceduralists, and Contractualists across the different subgroups. In all subgroups, the majority of spectators are Substantialists and Contractualists make up about a third of the spectators. There are some significant variations in the share of the types, with the share of Substantialists significantly higher among women and older spectators and spectators with low income (p= 0.001and p= 0.06), but the distribution of spectators types is strikingly similar across subgroups.
Result 3:We find that the majority of the spectators are Substantialists and that a large minority are Contractualists. Only a small minority are Proceduralists. The distribution of spectator types is largely robust across subgroups.
Figure 2.3:Classification of spectators
Note:The figure reports the estimated shares of spectators who are Substantialists, Proceduralists, and Contractualists, for the full sample and for different subgroups.
Figure 2.4:Share of spectators who fine the seller
Note: The figure reports the share of spectators who decides to fine the seller for each of the four treatments. The standard errors are indicated.
2.4.2 The decision to fine
Spectators who canceled the deal may think that the seller deserves to be punished for the role the he or she played in the process leading up to the deal. The spectators who canceled the deal were therefore asked whether they also wanted to impose a fine on the seller. Figure 2.4 reports the share of spectators who, in addition to canceling the deal, decide to fine the seller.
Across treatments, 16.3percent of spectators decide to fine the seller, but there is considerable variation between treatments. In the Low treatment, only11.2percent of the spectators fine the seller, while20.0percent of the spectators decide to do so in the High treatment.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.2 report regressions on the decision to fine the seller. From Column (3) we observe that the share of spectators increases by 3.3 percentage points when the seller proposed the deal (p = 0.026) and it increases by 8.0 percentage points when the seller has obfuscated the information (p < 0.001). Table 2.4 shows that these results hold for all subgroups. We furthermore observe that older spectators and Republican spectators are significantly less likely to fine the seller (p = 0.002 andp = 0.015respectively).
Result 4:Across treatments, only a minority decide to fine the seller. The share of spectators who fine the seller is higher when the seller has been active in the process leading up to the deal, by having proposed the transaction or having obfuscated the information.
Since the share who canceled the deal is increasing with the involvement of the seller, the share of spectators who fine the seller will be increasing with the seller’s involvement even when the share who fine conditional on canceling is the same across treatments. It could, however, also be the case that those who have canceled the deal are more likely to fine if the seller has been involved in obfuscating the information and proposing the deal. To shed light on this mechanism, we examine the share of spectators who fine the seller among those spectators who canceled the deal. Table 2.7 in the appendix shows the same overall pattern of results for the share of spectators who fine the seller conditional on having canceled the transaction. The share of spectators who fine the seller among the spectators who canceled the transaction increases from19.5percent in the Low treatment to32.2percent in the High treatment. This shows that the treatment effect on the share who
Table2.4:Heterogeneityregressions Fine PoliticalGenderEducationIncomeAge B=1ifRepublicanB=1ifFemaleB=1ifCollegeB=1ifhigherthan$60.000B=1ifolderthan47 oposed0.051∗∗∗0.0160.059∗∗∗0.063∗∗∗0.023 (0.018)(0.022)(0.022)(0.021)(0.022) 0.088∗∗∗0.073∗∗∗0.085∗∗∗0.085∗∗∗0.109∗∗∗ (0.020)(0.023)(0.022)(0.021)(0.024) oposed*Obfuscated-0.045-0.007-0.038-0.042-0.034 (0.029)(0.033)(0.033)(0.032)(0.034) -0.008-0.0110.0030.013-0.026 (0.021)(0.020)(0.020)(0.020)(0.020) oposed-0.063∗∗0.034-0.052∗-0.068∗∗0.020 (0.031)(0.030)(0.030)(0.030)(0.030) -0.0230.015-0.009-0.010-0.059∗ (0.034)(0.032)(0.032)(0.032)(0.032) oposed*Obfuscated0.068-0.0360.0270.0390.019 (0.048)(0.047)(0.047)(0.047)(0.046) 0.114∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ (0.012)(0.015)(0.014)(0.013)(0.015) 2 0.0120.0100.0110.0110.014 39913991399139913991 ThetablereportsresultsfromanOLS-regressionoftheshareofspectatorswhodecidesfinetheseller."Proposed"isanindicator forthespectatorbeingassignedtothetreatmentwherethesellerproposedthetransaction."Obfuscated"isanindicatorvariable thespectatorbeingassignedtothetreatmentinwhichthesellerobfuscatedtheinformation."Proposed*Obfuscated"istheinteraction "Proposed"and"Obfuscated".Bisanindicatorvariablethattakesthevalue1whenthespectatorisRepublican(Column1), (Column2),college-educated(Column3),hasahouseholdincomethatishigherthan$60.000(Column4)orisolderthan47years 5).Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.∗ p<0.10,∗∗ p<0.05,∗∗∗ p<0.01.Standarderrorsinparentheses.
fine is not only driven by the higher number of spectators who cancel the transaction.
2.4.3 Beliefs and policy attitudes
Our study also provides evidence that people believe that the type of situ-ation presented to the spectators, in which sellers exploit the irrsitu-ationality of consumers, is common. At the end of the experiment, the spectators were asked about their beliefs about the behavior of consumers and firms, as well as their policy attitudes. The results are reported in Figure 2.5. We observe that a large majority of the participants agree with the statement that consumers often make mistakes when evaluating a product or service (78.0percent strongly agree, or agree). A majority of spectators also agree with the statement that companies often profit from consumers’ mistakes (78.5percent agree, or strongly agree) and with the statement that companies actively target consumers who are likely to make mistakes (58.8 percent agree, or strongly agree).
We also measured attitudes to government regulations by asking the par-ticipants about the extent to which they agree with the statement that "The government should restrict businesses’ opportunity to make profit from cus-tomers who misunderstand the value of a product or service". More people agree with the statement (42.6percent strongly agree, or agree) than disagree (30.2percent strongly disagree, or disagree).
We find a strong correlation between people’s decision in the experiment and their support for government regulation. Table 2.5 reports regressions on whether the spectators either strongly agree or agree that the government
Figure 2.5:Beliefs and policy attitudes
Note:The figure reports the share of spectators who strongly agree or agree to the following statements: "People often have the wrong beliefs about how valuable a product or service would be for them" (Mistakes), "Businesses often make profit from customers who misunderstand the value of a product or service" (Profits),
"Businesses actively target customers who are likely to overestimate the value of their product or service" (Targets), and "The government should restrict businesses’
opportunity to make profit from customers who misunderstand the value of a product or service" (Regulate).
Table2.5:Governmentregulation SupportforregulationSupportforregulationSupportforregulationSupportforregulationSupportforregulationSupportforregulation Cancel0.248∗∗∗0.205∗∗∗ (0.015)(0.016) Fine0.243∗∗∗0.130∗∗∗ (0.021)(0.022) Mistakes0.021-0.016 (0.019)(0.019) Profits0.162∗∗∗0.106∗∗∗ (0.018)(0.019) Targets0.152∗∗∗0.113∗∗∗ (0.016)(0.016) Female-0.0000.0180.0190.0110.019-0.003 (0.015)(0.016)(0.016)(0.016)(0.016)(0.015) Age-0.102∗∗∗-0.074∗∗∗-0.084∗∗∗-0.083∗∗∗-0.071∗∗∗-0.084∗∗∗ (0.015)(0.015)(0.016)(0.015)(0.016)(0.015) College-0.024-0.025-0.030∗-0.034∗∗-0.033∗∗-0.028∗ (0.016)(0.017)(0.017)(0.017)(0.017)(0.016) Income-0.023-0.031∗-0.033∗-0.029∗-0.032∗-0.021 (0.017)(0.017)(0.017)(0.017)(0.017)(0.016) Republican-0.088∗∗∗-0.096∗∗∗-0.103∗∗∗-0.100∗∗∗-0.093∗∗∗-0.078∗∗∗ (0.016)(0.016)(0.017)(0.017)(0.016)(0.016) Constant0.376∗∗∗0.470∗∗∗0.502∗∗∗0.396∗∗∗0.421∗∗∗0.234∗∗∗ (0.019)(0.018)(0.023)(0.022)(0.020)(0.025) Observations399139913991399139913991 R20.0810.0550.0220.0400.0450.117 Note:ThetablereportsOLSregressionsonanindicatorforwhetherthespectatorstronglyagreedoragreedwiththestatement"The governmentshouldrestrictbusinesses’opportunitytomakeprofitfromcustomerswhomisunderstandthevalueofaproductorservice". "Mistakes"isanindicatorvariableforthespectatorstronglyagreeoragreewiththestatement"Peopleoftenhavethewrongbeliefsabout howvaluableaproductorservicewouldbeforthem","Profits"isanindicatorvariableforthespectatorstronglyagreeingoragreeing withthestatement"Businessesoftenmakeprofitfromcustomerswhomisunderstandthevalueofaproductorservice","Targets"isan indicatorvariableforthespectatorstronglyagreeingoragreeingwiththestatement"Businessesactivelytargetcustomerswhoarelikelyto overestimatethevalueoftheirproductorservice"."Female"isanindicatorvariableforbeingfemale."College"isanindicatorvariablefor thespectatorhavingabachelordegreeorhigher."Age"isanindicatorvariableforthespectatorbeing."Income"isanindicatorvariable forthespectatorhavingahouseholdincomeofmorethan$60.000peryear."Republican"isanindicatorvariableforthespectatorvoting fortheRepublicanparty.∗ p<0.10,∗∗ p<0.05,∗∗∗ p<0.01.Standarderrorsinparentheses.
should restrict businesses’ opportunity to make profit from customers who misunderstand. From columns (1) and (2) we observe that those who cancel the deal or fine the seller are much more likely to agree with the need for government regulation (p < 0.001 and p < 0.001). From column (6) we observe that this holds even when we control for beliefs and background characteristics. We summarize these findings in the following result:
Result 5:Behavior in the experiment is strongly predictive of attitudes to govern-ment regulation. Spectators who cancel the deal or fine the seller are more likely to agree that the government should restrict businesses’ opportunity to profit from irrational consumers.
2.5 Concluding remarks
We have presented the first set of evidence showing that a majority of Ameri-cans prefer to cancel voluntary deals in which a consumer has misunderstood the true value of a product and pays more for the product than it is worth.
This is the case even when the seller’s role is limited to accepting a proposal made by the buyer. This suggests that the main concern people have with deals in which a seller exploits the irrationality of a buyer are the conse-quences which these deals produce.
The willingness to cancel deals in which consumers are exploited sheds light on the widespread support for stricter government regulation of businesses, such as the US CARD act (Agarwal et al., 2015) or European regulations about "unfair" contract features (Heidhues et al., 2018). However, the fact that a large minority choose to uphold such transactions even in settings
proposed the deal also sheds light on why such regulatory efforts often meet fierce resistance.
Only a small minority of the spectators consider the seller’s involvement to be critical for the decision to cancel or not. In contrast, the seller’s in-volvement, particularly whether they have obfuscated the information the buyer received, is important for the decision to fine. This suggests that procedural concerns play a more important role in people’s willingness to fine the seller than in their willingness to cancel the deal. Further, the find-ing that procedural concerns are strongly driven by opposition to complex information disclosure could offer insight into widespread acceptance of policy initiatives that improve access to information from firms (Reisch and Sunstein, 2016; Sunstein, 2019b). This result underlines the importance of firms’ decisions about how to disclose information about their products and it provides evidence that complex information can negatively influence con-sumer perception of a firm (Bao and Ho, 2015; Kozup et al., 2008; Nguyen and Mutum, 2012).
The present study also suggests that fairness considerations need to be taken into account by firms when considering how to handle their customers.
In line with previous research (Bhattacharjee et al., 2017; Kahneman et al., 1986), we find that people are willing to punish firms that earn a profit from behavior that they perceive as unacceptable. We also show that simply accepting to be paid more for a product than it is worth can be seen as unacceptable.
In this study, we have examined people’s attitudes to deals where consumers who make mistakes when calculating the value of a product are exploited.
An interesting question for future research is to examine people’s attitudes
to the exploitation of other types of irrationality among consumers. Finally, the present study is conducted with participants recruited from the general population in the US. An important question for future research is how attitudes in the US compare with attitudes in other countries.
2.A Demographics
Table 2.6:Descriptive Statistics
Number of participants Share
Income < $30,000 1130 0.28
Income 30,001 - $60,000 1136 0.28
Income 60,001 - $100,000 925 0.23
Income 100,001 - $150,000 523 0.13
Income > $150,000 277 0.07
High School Education or below 1158 0.29
Some College Education 1342 0.34
Bachelor or equivalent 956 0.24
Master or equivalent 535 0.13
18 - 34 years old 1035 0.26
35 - 44 years old 740 0.19
45- 54 years old 812 0.20
55 - 64 years old 682 0.17
65+ years old 722 0.18
Female 2084 0.52
Republican 1232 0.31
Observations 3991
2.B Additional results
Table 2.7:Regression results for decision to fine the among the sellers that canceled the deal
Fine Fine
Note: The table reports results from an OLS-regression of the share of spectators that fine the seller among spectators that canceled the deal. "Proposed" is an in-dicator variable for the spectator being assigned to the treatment where the seller proposed the transaction. "Obfuscated" is an indicator variable for the spectator being assigned to the treatment in which the seller obfuscated the information.
"Proposed*Obfuscated" is the interaction between "Proposed" and "Obfuscated".
"Female" is an indicator variable for being female. "College" is an indicator variable for the spectator having a bachelor degree or higher. "Age" is an indicator variable for the spectator being older than 47 years. "Income" is an indicator variable for the spectator having a household income of more than $60,000 per year. "Republican" is an indicator variable for the spectator voting for the Republican party.β1+β2+β3
is the linear combination of the parameters for Proposed, Obfuscated and the inter-action term between the two.∗p <0.10,∗∗p <0.05,∗∗∗p <0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
2.C Instructions
Low Treatment
On the next screen we ask you to make a decision that might have real consequences for two other individuals. We recruited these two individuals on an international online labor market to participate in a study. Both indi-viduals received a participation fee.
We randomly assigned the two individuals to either the role of seller or the role of buyer. The seller was given a product that he or she could sell to the buyer.
We informed both the seller and the buyer that the product had no value for the seller. The seller, but not the buyer, was informed that the value of the product for the buyer was $2.
The seller could not disclose this information to the buyer. Instead, we gave the buyer information about the value of the product in a complex manner.
The buyer made a mistake when interpreting this information and wrongly believed that the value of the product for him or her was $20. The seller knew that the buyer made this mistake.
The buyer offered to buy the product for $10 from the seller. The seller accepted this offer.
- The seller gained $10 on the deal.
- The buyer lost $8 on the deal.
We now want you to decide whether this deal should be upheld or not.
o I want to uphold the deal. The seller gains $10 and the buyer loses $8.
o I want to cancel the deal. Neither the seller nor the buyer gain or lose.
There is a one-in-five chance that your decision will be implemented. If your decision is implemented, the seller and the buyer will receive payments according to your decision within a few days. The seller and the buyer are informed that a third-party will make a decision that determines their payments.
Propose treatment
On the next screen we ask you to make a decision that might have real consequences for two other individuals. We recruited these two individuals on an international online labor market to participate in a study. Both indi-viduals received a participation fee.
We randomly assigned the two individuals to either the role of seller or the role of buyer. The seller was given a product that he or she could sell to the buyer.
We informed both the seller and the buyer that the product had no value for the seller. The seller, but not the buyer, was informed that the value of the product for the buyer was $2.
The seller could not disclose this information to the buyer. Instead, we gave
the buyer information about the value of the product in a complex manner.
The buyer made a mistake when interpreting this information and wrongly believed that the value of the product for him or her was $20. The seller knew that the buyer made this mistake.
The seller offered to sell the product to the buyer for $10. The buyer
The seller offered to sell the product to the buyer for $10. The buyer