Peace talks in Abuja

When it comes to the peace talks concerning Darfur in Abuja, there has been a comparison made between those talks and the peace talks which recently concluded between the north and the south of the country. Stiansen highlights a point shared by some of the interviewees:

‘The Darfur talks are much more complex and complicated than the talks between the north and the south for the CPA. It’s just much more difficult, in the south we had a fairly predictable environment; we knew the players. In Darfur it’s not the case at all’ (Ibid).

Despite these problems with the peace talks, according to Pronk, ‘Abuja is the only game in town’ (Pronk, 2006 [interview]). There are five factors which the interviewees find fault with the current peace talks. The first is the issue of legitimacy which has made it much more cumbersome for the IC to address the issue of who represents the genuine

interests of the people of Darfur and whether or not all the parties who should be participating in the negotiation progress are involved. The second category is the

fragmentation within the opposition parties at the negotiating table. The third and fourth categories are the quality of leadership within the rebel groups both on the ground and at the negotiations. Finally, the fifth is the overfacilitation of the peace process by the IC.

These five problematic areas are variables which need to be addressed for the political efforts conducted on behalf of the people of the region.

5.3.2.1 Legitimacy. One of the cited threats to the long term needs of POC by Pronk and Stiansen revolves around the concept of legitimacy in political representation (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]; Stiansen, 2006 [Interview]). Even though the talks have yet to be concluded, Stiansen makes a point:

‘Here in the case in Darfur you have a legitimacy question, but the question can they actually deliver, are the people with them. Are the negotiators at the talks able to deliver on the ground? Can they get the promises that are made at the talks implemented on the ground?’ (Ibid)

According to Pronk concerning the discussions in Abuja, ‘… power and wealth being discussed between the GoS and the movements, neither of the two and the movements are many, are representative of the real perspective of the people of Darfur concerning power or wealth’ (Pronk, 2006, [Interview]).

The issue is that the people do not feel represented by either the GoS or the

warring factions. Humanitarian #3 says, ‘…you have a large percentage of the population that hasn’t taken any sides in the conflict and have tried to stay neutral. And they are not even a part of the negotiations’ (Humanitarian #3, 2006 [Interview]). Even if an

agreement is reached, there is some doubt that it will actually be implemented by all the people and parties whose voices are missing in its creation.

This limited popular mandate to negotiate as a variable also extends to certain groups who are key players in the conflict. Arab militia groups including the infamous Janjaweed are mysteriously absent from the political process. Pronk is concerned that an

agreement in Abuja will be contested by those who were not included in the deal, especially those groups who are armed and have been involved in the majority of the fighting (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]). The Arab militias have been the extension of the GoS’s military in Darfur and if such involved groups are nonexistent from the peace negotiations, it could cause serious implementation problems for the peace agreement.

Pronk also brings attention to the fact that in past negotiations that produced agreements like the Humanitarian Ceasefire, the Arab militias were not included and as previously mentioned the results of its execution were disastrous (Ibid). With having just three parties present in Abuja, the GoS and the two rebel groups, the SLM and the JEM, the exclusive nature of the peace process raises the question of legitimacy.

The legitimacy variable could very well have a negative impact on the application to any agreement reached in Abuja. The implementation of any agreement would be severely questioned and even challenged if it does not have the backing of the people and all the parties involved. This factor warrants further attention in order to secure a lasting solution in the peace process.

5.3.2.2 Fragmentation. The second variable is the split within the opposition parties. Pronk recognizes that divisions within the parties are hampering the IC’s political efforts in Abuja (Ibid). Hansen remarks that these rebel groups are:

‘…split, lack of unity, they lack good leaders and good negotiators. They have added to the situation by messing everything up. They haven’t understood the worst thing you can do for yourself is not be unified’ (Hansen, 2006 [Interview]).

The SLM has at times fielded two separate delegations at the negotiation table.

Given the different backgrounds of the JEM and SLM, these groups have fought among themselves, slowing down the negotiations. A three or sometimes four way negotiation process between the opposition parties and the GoS in Abuja has certainly created a challenging atmosphere in forging a satisfactory peace accord for all parties and the region of Darfur as a whole.

5.3.2.3 Quality of leadership. The quality of the leadership within the rebel movements is another impediment weakening the peace talks. Hansen comments on the rebel leadership, ‘The few academic leaders, they have been chased out. The only ones left in the leadership role are warlords that believe the only power is only in the barrel of a gun. They are in command’ (Ibid). This lack of a political mindset within the ranks of the rebel factions makes the diplomatic activities all the more difficult in achieving a settlement.

5.3.2.4 Quality of the negotiators. As is the case with legitimacy of the people and parties, the negotiators of the opposition movements are seen as not even representing the interests of their own groups. Pronk tells of meeting with the rebel leaders in Abuja, saying:

‘If you talk with the leaders in Abuja and you ask where do you live?

Birmingham, sir; Amsterdam, sir; I am coming from Chicago. They all come from outside. It really means they don’t have a real life need to change their own situation outside’ (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]).

The absence of negotiators actually residing in Darfur plays into the previously mentioned legitimacy issue. Besides not representing the people, they also have a disconnection with their own groups who are carrying out the fighting. There is no real incentive for the rebel negotiators to reach an agreement for their own sakes. In fact, those familiar with the talks wonder if the desire by the negotiators might be to drag out the talks due to other misguided factors by the IC in assisting the peace process.

5.3.2.5 Overfacilitation of peace talks. The Abuja process is faulted by Pronk as being overfacilitated by the IC. This is in contrast to past peace processes where

negotiations broke down because they weren’t facilitated at all. Pronk comments that the negotiators,

‘They are being paid to negotiate, not being paid to reach a result. To reach a result would mean for many they would not get a per diem anymore. They don’t have a power organization. So why should they reach a result? […] I sense a

greater desire to get peace on the ground at all sides, the GoS on the ground, the rebels on the ground than I sense in Abuja’ (Ibid).

The monetary compensation which the IC is paying the rebel delegations might have the unintended consequence of prolonging the peace talks. Most of the interviewees remark about the delay and express apprehension concerning the extended amount of time taken to finalize a settlement. This factor coupled with the division within the ranks of the opposite factions, the quality of leadership and the lack of association to the conflict situation might be extending the peace process and have added to an increased likelihood that an agreement reached in Abuja might not be an enduring one.