Discussion of research question B

The six recommendations according the interviewees that can assist the IC with the problems it is encountering with its security approach are: (1) adopt a more

appropriate strategy; (2) increase manpower; (3) strengthen mandate; (4) improve

logistics; (5) more training to increase expertise; and (6) better relationship between AU and UN. A few observations can be made regarding these variables.

The strategy employed by the IC to provide for POC needs to be a peace enforcement operation, not a peacekeeping one. This strategy has an effect on the mandate, logistics, manpower and training variables. The current chapter VI mandate of the AU peacekeeping force dictates a lightly armed presence operating under the consent of the parties. This Chapter VI mandated mission is supposed to keep the peace so that a negotiated settlement can be reached. Stressed by Reeves, there appears no need for a peacekeeping mission since there is no peace to keep given the repeated violations to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (Reeves, 2006 [Interview]). As noted by the Tactic Manual for Nordic Peace Support Operations, a peace enforcement operation is required to compel the parties to comply with a specific course of action, which in the case of Darfur is the protection of civilians (Committee of Nordic Co-operated Arrangement for Military Peace Support, 2002).

Due to the warring parties’ non-compliance, a Chapter VII mandated mission is required. This translates into the need for a much more heavily armed force to achieve these ends (Ibid). According to the data the security presence in Darfur has basic logistic shortfalls, for example, vehicles and helicopters. If a mandate were in place to permit a much more robust force, the logistics involved would be much greater. So far just meeting basic transportation requirements has been a challenge. Questions arise as to

how such a force would be able to ramp-up its equipment to meet the logistic necessities of more proactive mandate.

Another factor to be aware of with the application of a more robust mandate would be its implications for the Rules of Engagement. A Chapter VII mandate would expand the Rules of Engagement (Ibid). The use of deadly force would no longer limit the IC’s security arm to its application in self-defense situations only. The tactical decision to protect civilians by the IC might have further reaching political consequences at higher levels if the IC’s troops are engaging the warring parties in combat in order to protect Darfur’s population. The possibility of misinterpretation by the IC’s well intended protection actions could have an unforeseen negative impact in other areas.

The recommendation for increased capacity of manpower is warranted to address the shortfall of personnel variable. Experts familiar with peace operations note there should be three and half soldiers for every 1,000 people in need of protection (Dobbins et al, 2005). This puts the number needed in Darfur at a minimum of 20,000 troops. As noted by Reeves this number can easily be expanded if you factor in the lack of infrastructure, hostile terrain, and the thousands of communities spread over long

distances (Reeves, 2006 [Telephone interview]). With the current strategy in place there needs to be a presence in order to protect. Pronk has suggested that 15,000 troops would suffice, but it appears that number needs to be higher, more in line with Reeves

recommendation of at least 20,000 (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]; Reeves, 2006 [ Telephone interview]). This increase in personnel might be a difficult task based on the deficit of manpower that the UNMIS is experiencing in the south of the country. The UNMIS is still 3,000 troops short of its mandated target of 10,000 since it first deployed 18 months ago (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]). Since the UNMIS is viewed by the IC as taking over security operations in Darfur, its under capacity of personnel in the south of Sudan might be evident to a similar problem that could occur in Darfur.

The lack of expertise variable which the data has mentioned concerning the AU personnel is only noted by the humanitarians. The view that humanitarians hold of their security counterparts might be culturally based given the different backgrounds of each

group. The AU troops hail from developing, mostly pre-modern countries in Africa, whereas the humanitarians are from developed, post-modern states. Initiatives have been funded by developed countries such as Norway with its Training for Peace (2003)

program to educate African police personnel on western police practices. Training for Peace helps provide a common platform which enable police and other peacekeeping personnel to be on the same operational level regardless of cultural background when working within internationally sponsored protection ventures (Ibid). These programs could be expanded to further standardize practices to better assist within protection activities which are diverse in their staff composition.

The salvation of the manpower, mandate, logistical, and expertise shortcomings of the AU’s security apparatus are believed by most of the interviewees to be most

effectively addressed by turning over the responsibility to provide for the physical security of the region to the UN. In mid-March 2006, the AU has in fact agreed in principle to make such a move. Yet as evident by remarks by Pronk and Kingabe, there will need to be a continued partnership between the two organizations because of the manpower shortages the UN is experiencing with operations in the south of Sudan (Pronk, 2006 [Interview]; Kingabe, 2006 [Interview]). The partnership between the two organizations is therefore vital for the protection activities.

The recommendation to have a 24-7 presence by the humanitarians in the camps to protect the displaced population when they are their most vulnerable might also have the unintended consequence of putting them in harm’s way as well. With the insecurity of Darfur well documented, the international staffing of camps might for good reason be limited. Until the physical security of the region improves the humanitarians are left with their hands tied regarding their activities.

In order to combat the obstructions put in place by the GoS, all actors who comprise the IC should project a unified stance. The smart sanctions recommended by the interviews can only work if all members of the IC honor them. Thus far there have

already been examples of member states having violated travel restrictions on GoS officials. For example, England permitted the head of the GoS’s intelligence services to receive medical treatment in London despite a record of human rights violations carried out against the civilians of Darfur (BBC News, 2006a). Acting as single entity in the eyes of the warring factions in Darfur is necessary for the IC to get the parties to adhere to the standards of protection the IC has demanded from them. Divisions within the IC will only impede the IC’s security and humanitarian efforts and could well be exploited by the GoS and warring factions.

5.3 Research Question C) What problems do a selected group of professionals think the