ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCES

9 CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC

One factor relates to the practical access, either to internet, or because of long traveling distances. Another factor relates to the presentation of the information, that tends to be technical and poorly communicated. This indicates that the information may not be sufficiently adapted to the recipients (Knudsen et al., 2015; Gross, 2007; Smith &

McDonough, 2001). Both factors make it difficult for the locals to assess the reports prior to the public hearings and accordingly “to learn about the impacts, to question the reports and to debate with each other about the possible benefits or burdens in order to take a well-informed position on the project” (Santos, 2016:165).

In South Africa, the SED proposals are vague at the time of the hearings, giving non-concise information that is very general and hardly able to comment. Public hearings also fail to communicate the impacts on the communities sufficiently, and rather focus on the conducted assessments, results and contributions. While in South Africa they tend to focus mainly on the positive aspects of the projects, in Brazil, there are clear indications of misleading

information. This is argued to be a means of achieving the locals’ support for the projects (Santos, 2016; Tait, 2012; Informant 10, Instituto Socioambiental). In that case, the hearings are more informative than consultative, or even manipulative, and the participation is thus passive (Cooksey & Kikula, 2005; Pretty, 1995; Arnstein, 1969). This concurs with other critics, arguing that the way NGOs and developers attempt to promote community

participation in specific projects, is rather a means of reaching legitimacy for their projects.

That is, the procedure is not necessarily the core objective (Cornwall & Coelho, 2007).

Reasonable participation requires knowledge about the REA systems, the purpose of the projects and its aims. If this is not adequate, this may lead to resistance later, if presentations and promises do not concur with the outcomes. Similarly, manipulative public hearings cause participation to be non-reasonable, and moreover, a waste of time and resources for both parties. This risk generating demands later on, requiring extra time and resources to be spent.

9.1.2 Outsourcing and lack of guidance

Both REA systems can be understood as organised in a way that outsources public services to

There is however a main difference. In the Brazilian system this is an indirect result of the requirements of the BNDES and the wide autonomy given to developers. The BNDES seem to have initiated local content requirements out of previously bad experience with

infrastructural projects in the country, as a means of compensation (Informant 10, Instituto Socioambiental). However, this appear to operate parallelly to the REA system, as the requirements only apply to developers seeking their financial support. In that case, these requirements can be understood as not being particularly embedded in the Brazilian REA system or policies. Accordingly, only the South African system were explicitly designed to incorporate both objectives. The SED serves as incentives for developers in the REI4P, as the more they (propose to) contribute to community benefits, the higher score they get in the bidding processes (Eberhard et.al., 2014:29). In that sense, the trade-off between sustainable development and human rights has already been taken into account in the REI4P policy because the SED in local communities are made a requirement to participate in bids.

Since these projects are outsourced to the private sector, it comes with a certain autonomy among the developers. They are obligated to comply with several requirements and criteria – such as contribution to local or national development, and mandatory EL/EIA processes – but in both countries, these are relatively vague. They are critically argued to lack sufficient guidelines, especially as to how developers ought to manage their interaction with the communities, and in particular, how locals should be involved (Wlokas & Soal, 2016:4).

This critique is most evident in South Africa. Although the REI4P requires developers to identify community needs (Eberhard et.al., 2014:25), according to Wlokas et.al. (2017:36) it makes no reference to participatory practices and overlooks an experienced community development history in South Africa (ibid:39). However, it can be argued that the REI4P has already taken it into account, by empowering locals through community trusts and, a quite weak, but existent, ownership component.

As guidelines for participation is also sought to enhance the service delivery (Fischer, 2012) and legitimacy (Tait, 2012:51), one may question why the REI4P and the BNDES have not provided these more clearly. A possible explanation can be rooted in elements within the public-private partnership cultures. For instance, as the REA systems are competitive, the already strict requirements for development contributions, supplemented with additional

interfering procedural guidelines for community involvement, may in fact serve as

disincentivising. Accordingly, the lack of proper guidelines can be understood as a result of the outsourcing – hence governments do not interfere much with how developers engage with locals in the planning and decision-making.

Moreover, outsourcing this responsibility to the private sector is arguably pragmatic, as the governments obtain assistance in meeting the public demands – demands that they may not otherwise have the capacity to sufficiently manage. Lack of capacity seem to be a clear justification and objective for the outsourcing, especially in South Africa, as the government is largely in need of improving the unemployment situation. This is probably also why the REI4P turned out as regulated as it did.

However, recent findings indicate that the SED plans submitted in the REI4P, may not be taken into consideration during the approval or rejection of bid proposals (Wlokas, 2015:3).

Neither are they given any feedback on these plans (Ibid:4). As such, the SED may fade within the 30% “package” and is not the main focus. This implies that by outsourcing, the responsibility for communities and how to interact with them has also been left to the private sector. One explanation may nevertheless be, that the goal of the REA systems is mainly to meet or supplement the energy demands, not the services. Hence, since the goal is the driver, the processes of reaching it, nor the issue of improving those services, is not prioritised.

Due to the great extent of autonomy for developers, the result is that their engagement with the locals, and effort to involve them, is highly variable (Wlokas, 2015; Hochstetler, 2016).

The interaction with communities is thus a shared concern within both countries, and several sources points towards good communication as key for successful accomplishments and social acceptance (Informant 7, IBAMA; Informant 3, GIZ; Baker & Wlokas, 2015; Wlokas, Boyd & Andolfi, 2012). Although it is not required by the REA systems, it is common to hire consultants to make sure it is managed properly. Interestingly, this constitute an additional link of outsourcing. What this means for the ability to participate, and whether it makes a difference or not, provides potential for future research. According to Wlokas (2015:3), the competition between different developers in the REA system also lead them to isolate most of

Some developers are very engaged. In South Africa there have been efforts to establish community organisations to promote community needs and empowerment in local development (Tait et.al., 2013; Tait, 2012:44). However, many developers also appoint remotely located not-for-profit organisations to manage and represent the local development.

Consequently, the locals remain without ability to participate and influence their own development (Nkoana, 2016:242). McEwan (2017:8) argues that while the private sector controls how the SED revenues are spent, this lacks accountability, and there are no mechanisms in place to improve community engagement and representation. Thus,

institutions for public participation may not be sufficiently developed (Wlokas, 2015), and largely depend upon the efforts within the private sector.

Among many developers, the participatory aspect is shown to be perceived as an obstacle or hamper to the project process (Informant 5). This can be explained in different ways. First, encompassing social impact assessments and public hearings are criticised for being too time-consuming (Hochstetler, 2017). A public hearing is often set out because it is either required or expected. Second, potential resistance and opposition to the implementation causes problems for the developers, such as expensive delays. This was made very clear by a South African developer (Informant 5).

Accordingly, it must be acknowledged that it is probably in the best interest of the developers to manage these relationships cautiously, because if they fail to do so, it may cause

encompassing costs on them. Accordingly, many of them intend to provide for peaceful processes, to minimise the risks (Informant 5). Further, many may be willing to do their best to comply with the values of participation and justice, although they are not explicitly

required. When developers manage to be sufficiently engaged, and take these responsibilities seriously, the SED component have great potential to promote both participation and justice.

9.1.3 The facilitation of participation and the bid requirements

Participation is usually anticipated in a positive manner; it is sought to be a good thing for planning, implementation and outcomes, as well as public acceptance for such developments (see Chapter 3.2). It is likely to reduce conflicts and project delays (Hochstetler, 2016).

Participation is perceived as both necessary, and as a right – both a general human right, and a political and environmental right in particular.

In Brazil and South Africa, inclusion is regarded as facilitated too late in the planning process, when decisions are already taken (Wlokas, Boyd & Andolfi, 2012; Tait etal., 2013; McEwan, 2016; Informant 7, IBAMA). This concurs with a study from Australia, and accordingly, is not special to these cases (Gross, 2007). On one hand, this is an obstacle to participatory rights, as it is argued that the affected should be included earlier, where they can contribute to main decisions about siting and other practical matters related to the construction process.

When it is facilitated too late, it causes the participation to be more symbolic, or characterised by tokenism (Arnstein, 1969). It is conducted, but rather because it is “ought to” or required, and don’t necessarily have any effect upon the planning and decision-making process. Based on the framework of procedural and distributive justice, procedures that are inclusive, fair and legitimate are less likely to meet opposition. Assumedly then, participation in the

implementation phase, or the risk of facing additional demands, is probably somewhat avoidable if the process is participatory from the start.

On the other hand, it may be necessary to limit early participation, at least until the project is contracted, to avoid creating expectations. In South Africa in particular, the preliminary SED plans could alternatively be presented in detail after the project is contracted, not before.

However, within the accomplishment of the mandatory EL/EIA public hearings, developers are required to inform the surrounding communities. Raising certain expectations during these hearings is probably unavoidable. As projects will have more or less consequences for the local communities surrounding the sites, it is likely to cause engagement. In that sense, participation to a certain extent in the early planning stage is – no matter how complicated it potentially make the process – inevitable. In this sense, the design of the SED-requirements, or the REI4P moreover, creates contradicting issues between the rights and needs to include local people, but also to limit participation.