Institutionalised participation

The most prominent provision of public participation in the countries, is the mandatory public hearings that are institutionalised through the EL/EIA process in the procurement phase, in which the locals participate directly. The second most prominent type of public participation is public hearings facilitated during the implementation phase of the project. This is not however mandatory, but dependent upon each developer, and differs more between the countries. These differences will be further discussed below.

8.3.1.1 Participation during licensing procedures – before the auction Neither the REI4P or the BNDES require within their policies, that developers involve local communities in the planning and decision-making of the projects. Public hearings are however required by law in both Brazil and South Africa. Usually these are conducted through the EL/EIA processes, in which is a compulsory element within the REA systems, and a criterion for submitting bids. In both countries, the participation in the procurement phase is mostly limited to these procedures. The public hearings are mainly characterised by tokenism, varying between information and consultation, with flawed ability or opportunity to influence (Arnstein, 1969). This is because the hearings in this phase usually presents the plans and decisions already conducted. Whether local views are considered in the final licensing decisions is somewhat unclear, but in South Africa, any objections must be implemented in the environmental reports that are submitted in the bids.

A problem especially in Brazil, is the lack of information about the roles of the communities in the public hearings and project processes (Informant 7, IBAMA). Ideally, they should be properly informed about the purpose of participatory activities, how they can take part and why they are given the opportunity to do so. The same challenges appear in South Africa.

Poor communication and clarity on the project proposals and the purpose of public hearings creates high expectations, both in terms of influence and distribution of outcomes (see more section 9.1.3).

8.3.1.2 Participation during the implementation – after the auction It is reasonable to suggest that participation within the implementation phase becomes

somewhat “symbolic”, since planning and decision-making is already undertaken. Sometimes however, it may nevertheless resemble placation, or even delegated power (Arnstein, 1969.

Table 3.2). The participation in this regard is connected to compensation planning for the communities. There are however some differences between the countries; whereas the compensation planning in Brazil resembles a bottom-up process, the South African case is rather implemented top-down.

In Brazil, the communities are able to negotiate with the developers for each project, and they can decide to have individual or collective compensation – or a combination of both. Because they negotiate, their participation during this phase resembles that of “partnership”, a degree of citizen power as suggested by Arnstein (1969. Table 3.2). Alternatively, it can be viewed as “interactive participation” (Cooksey & Kikula, 2005; Pretty, 1995. Table 3.3), as the communities are able to take some control over local decisions. Such as how resources are to be used or allocated for instance. Nevertheless, their participation is not necessarily

acknowledged –it may as likely be a means of achieving project goals. This evidently varies among different developers. Notably, unfortunate instances of briberies and threats occur in Brazil as well (Brown, 2012), and in such cases, any degree of participation or influence becomes unworthy, or simply that of manipulation. Since the participation in the

implementation phase is ad-hoc in Brazil, it is unclear whether these negotiations happen through fixed procedures.

In South Africa, the inclusion resembles more that of receiving benefits (distributive justice), rather than actively partaking and exercising influence during planning and decision-making procedures related to compensations. In this sense, the REI4P tackles the trade-offs in a distributive just way. Since the REI4P has initially outlined the compensation on their behalf, it can be argued that locals are included in a more representative way, with very limited participation in the process. For instance, they do not have the power or ability to choose the compensation mechanism. As such, they have less influence compared to Brazilian

communities. However, instead of negotiating specific compensation for each project, the locals are rather empowered after the implementation (Hochstetler, 2016:25), through community trusts and project ownership. In that sense, they are relatively excluded from the main planning and decision-making process itself, but nonetheless “secured” both resources and the right to engage in their own local development planning – after the project is

Whether the locals have complete control is also unclear for several reasons. First,

representatives are managing the trusts and concerns about the interests of these trustees have been raised. Second, on one hand – since the REI4P emphasises that revenues are to be directed towards building local industry and creating jobs – some developers have detailed plans for the spending of the funds (Wlokas, 2015), thus largely controlling it (McEwan, 2017). In that sense, parts of these decisions on how revenues are to be allocated, are already laid out on behalf of communities – without their participation. Moreover, as projects are sold off by developers after implementation (Informant 5), this makes it hard to know whom to hold accountable and may implicate the social acceptance of the projects (Nkoana, 2016:242).

This is a problem in both countries, but the community trust component in South Africa may serve as a safer condition for ensuring compensations. On the other hand, the community trusts have been argued to serve as a tactical strategy for avoiding resistance and gaining support for the projects. However, this is only subject to suspicion, and such claims can hardly be proved within this study. From the basis of power and whom holds it, it can

however be connected to, and possibly explained by, the fear of redistributing this power or of generating conflicts that will cause costly delays. From a participatory perspective, when communities are “bought off” with financial compensation – especially if empowerment is restricted within the utilisation of these funds – this can also be argued as a sort of

manipulation or persuasion without enabling influence on important decisions (Arnstein, 1969; Pretty, 1995).

In sum, it can be argued that local communities in both Brazil and South Africa have limited influence on the planning and decision-making processes of the RE projects. The processes are often top-down rather than bottom-up, and such processes are more likely to generate conflict (Wlokas & Soal, 2016:11). In that sense – although the ability to speak exists (Table 3.1) – it can be argued that the affected people to a greater extent becomes subjects to the exercise of power, rather than citizens (Tally, 1999:171). Yet, in cases where opposition occur, these may otherwise disprove such a framing (see discussion in 8.3.2). The same can be argued with South African projects, where the planning and decision-making initially are top-down but may potentially lead to bottom-up processes towards the end. Whether these processes are just and legitimate, depends on the importance of the decisions deemed by the communities that are excluded from them.