If we approach digital technology only through romantic notions of immateriality, of some ethereal half-life or as an isolated in-between state removed or ever at distance from the real world, we will continue to ascribe to a simplistic realism that bogs down in net-cartesian distinctions which create an illusion of separateness. (Knoespel and Zhu 2008, 244)
The notion of digital immateriality is a problematic starting point for any discussion about digital artifacts — even more so, within the context of digital preservation, How can one construct a framework for preserving our bit-based heritage, if digital technology is ascribed with the intrinsic property of
immateriality? As in the case of Negroponte (1995, 11), bits become colorless, sizeless and weightless states of being. If we extrapolate on such a view, the
properties of the digital world seem more closely related to the properties of the mind than to the corporeal — he treats digital objects as purely logical objects, somewhat separated from their actual dimensions in time and space.
Imagine that we are constructing a framework for preserving software and that our point of departure involves a characterization of the software at hand as a sizeless and weightless entity. What we are left with is a digital object that is purely logical — a unit of pure information. However, the rendition of bits as pure
information, as something that exists in some kind of abstract non-physical space, may lead us down the treacherous path of ascribing bits with the property of immortality. This is evident in the assertions of George Paul (2009, 19) when he claims that digital writing does not depend on the alteration of matter, and should be considered as something that is very close to pure information. In writing today, he states, “we deal in pure information objects, unfettered by matter.” (Ibid., 19) However, if bits are unfettered by matter, bits should not be vulnerable to material decay.
Nevertheless, both Negroponte and Paul are correct in asserting the logical and informational dimension of digital objects. The problem, however, arises when the logical and the material aspects of digital artifacts are dichotomized. The presence of logical properties does not exclude materiality and vice versa. Take a mechanical watch, for instance; when energy is applied, it moves several precision-cut gears at a specific pace, allowing for an accurate representation of time. After a second, the second hand moves, after a minute, the minute hand moves and after an hour, the hour hand moves. The mechanical watch adheres to some set rules that are incorporated in the very parts of the machine, a logical scheme that allows it to express information. The logical aspect of a mechanical watch is not separated from its mechanical function; it is produced by the material parts that comprises it.
Similarly, the logical aspect of a digital computer, although far more complex in its workings, is a subsequent event of the rule-bound manipulation of its parts through the suppliance of energy. In relation to digital preservation, one must deal with a digital artifact both as a logical and a material unit, and recognize that these aspects are intertwined — not a matter of either-or. If the materiality of digital artifacts is overlooked, we may fail to acknowledge the vulnerabilities that it causes.
In his article, “Overview of Technological Approaches to Digital
Preservation and Challenges in Coming Years”, Kenneth Thibodeau recognizes this. Although separating between the terms physical and logical, he demonstrates the multifaceted and composite materiality of digital entities. The materiality, he proposes, is threefold — the digital object is a physical, logical and a conceptual object. (Thibodeau 2002, 6–8) At the primary level, he argues, the digital object appears as inscriptions of signs on a medium, carrying no “morphology, syntax or semantics.” (Ibid., 6) This means that the interpretation of the bits is not defined at the level of inscription. (Ibid., 7)
At the second level, the “digital information object is a logical object according to the logic of some application software”, and thus at the logical level it is determined “how the input stream is transformed into the system’s memory and output for presentation.” (Ibid., 7) The logical aspect is in this regard tied to the computer’s ability to process the inscriptions according to some set of rules. This allows the inscriptions to be processed and transformed into something that is humanly meaningful — that is a conceptual object. Thibodeau describes the conceptual aspect as what we deal with in the ‘real’ world, “an entity we would recognize as a meaningful unit of information.” (Ibid., 8) The conceptual content can, however, be represented in a wide range of digital encodings, and hence, a similar output can be produced in many different ways. The content of a text document, for instance, “may be encoded digitally as a page image or in a character-oriented word processing document.” (Ibid., 8)
In terms of preserving digital objects, Thibodeau (Ibid., 7) states that although we have to preserve digital objects as physical inscriptions, it is
insufficient in regards to preserving its function. In order to maintain its function, we need to consider the logical aspect of the digital object and know “the correct requirements for correct processing of each object’s data type and what software can perform correct processing." (Ibid.,8) In addition, the conceptual object is not necessarily equal to the logical units that comprise it. For instance, a single text document in a word-processing format could consist of several subdocuments, leaving one single conceptual object stored as multiple logical objects. (Ibid., 11) It would thus appear as a single document to the reader, and as multiple documents to the computer. The conceptual object can in this regard be produced in many
different ways. The product is however always bound to the material components of the computer.
For the sake of clarity; there is a difference between ascribing conceptual properties to a digital object and asserting its immateriality. The ability to produce a conceptually similar object from a diverse set of states is not the same as it being liberated from its material or physical underpinnings. Even though the conceptual aspect can be encoded in a number of ways, it is always embodied in some kind of physical substance or phenomena. It is important to refute the notion of digital immateriality because such a belief may cause us to steer off target when we are trying to preserve these kinds of artifacts. To tackle the challenges of digital preservation, one must realize that the difficulty of ensuring these kinds of objects comes not from their alleged appearance in some kind of abstract non-physical space. Rather, the issues at hand are rooted in the dichotomy between machine and human language — a non-semantical and a semantical level — and in the complex workings of digital environments. To a human being, the microscopic bit
inscriptions on the surface of an optical hard disk are not semantically meaningful.
Issues related to digital preservation are, however, not merely caused by the encrypted nature of the digital artifacts themselves, but by the complexity of the encryption and the means required to interpret and translate the encrypted
information. If I were to read a book written in Parsi, I would need a Parsi speaking human intermediary to translate it for me. However, in order to translate a
bitstream, I would have to rely on a computer intermediary — and not just any computer intermediary — the right computer with the correct hardware setup, running a certain operating system that pertains to the file system needed to read the artifact. While the contents of a book may be directly available to someone, bits do not mean anything to anyone but a computer with the compatible hardware and software.
For a piece of software to function properly, we need to run it in an
appropriate environment that complies with the dependencies of the executable file.
This interdependent relationship between the artifact and its environment lies at the heart of the problem because the interdependencies between a piece of software and its environment cause another dependency — namely that between the human and the machine. By this, I mean that our access to digital artifacts depend on
having a specific computer intermediary that knows how to process the bits and output them for presentation. In turn, external factors such as obsolescence further threaten these artifacts as they remove our ability to access to the environment needed to process and output them.