While the planning of the new university at the outskirts of Trondheim was well under way in the early 1970s, something else was unfolding in the center of Oslo. One of the main Norwegian banks, Den norske Creditbank (DnC), was engaged in a large-scale building development at Vaterland, a central urban area strongly affected by the construction of the city highway and the eastbound subway system. The project would, in its fifteen-year long process of planning (1965–80), get several iterations varying in size, organization and approach to the surrounding city. On one side, there were iterations conceptualized around the idea of a shopping-business center as an introvert urban megaform;211 and on the other, the ones conceptualized around the idea of an extrovert and fragmented development consisting of several interdependent volumes.
The first group occurred during the 1960s, at the beginning of the planning process, while the second group occurred in the 1970s as politicians, planning authorities and emerging public participation forces started challenging DnC’s plans. What characterizes the former is the increasing size of the proposals:
from the initial plan by architect Engh being around 100,000 m2; Platou’s first preliminary proposal from 1967 suggested a development of 130,000 m2; the second proposal from 1968 suggested 230,000 m2 (75) and the third one from 1969 suggested 260,000 m2. The latter group of iterations is characterized by the decreasing size of the proposals: in 1972–74, the size was approximately 175,000 m2, while in 1976, the size would go down to 135,000 m2.
DnC’s Vaterland project, along with its various iterations, is essential in the discussion on the development of large-scale architecture as it is one of the early large-scale interventions within the existing urban context in Norway.
Firstly, this project illustrates how top-down approach in the implementation of large-scale functioned within the framework of unfolding social-democratic modernization project. Within such a context, the dialectic relationship between large-scale private capital and its strong connection to the political establishment performed as one of the driving forces behind development in
211 The concept of megaform is taken from Kenneth Frampton’s lecture essay “Megaform as Urban Lands-cape,” University of Illinois/School of Architecture, 2010.
the central parts of Oslo.212 F.S. Platou, who facilitated this process, was one of the largest and most powerful architectural practices in Norway.213 Secondly, controversies surrounding the project represent an example of emerging bottom-up influence. The planning process of DnC’s Vaterland happened at the very moment of political upheavals of the late 1960s and early 1970s when political activism started making itself apparent.214 This project was one of the first cases where an articulate ideological critique towards the modernist planning paradigm and local planning procedures managed decisively to influence its process. As such, DnC’s Vaterland was a project where public opinion and politicization of planning practice became an essential modifying factor in the making of large-scale urban architecture. Thirdly, this project was planned amidst a changing approach to transportation and traffic infrastructure within urban areas. The critique of existing transportation plans (based on modernist principles and hegemony of vehicular traffic infrastructure) would become institutionalized, redirecting the focus at the idea of pedestrian realm and limitation of car footprint within the urban centers.215 DnC’s Vaterland project explicitly illustrates how this change influenced the conceptualization of large-scale architecture, as well as it sheds light on a changing understanding of the relationship between infrastructure and urbanity within the context of existing city center.
The following chapter addresses the project’s different iterations from 1960s to 1970s. Here, I discuss how the dialectic of translation unfolded, as the complexity within and around the project increased. The most compelling aspect within this project was its process, the intertwining of the architect’s intentions with the inherent and emerging modifying factors of the changing context. DnC’s project was in continuous transformation. If Larsen’s project at Dragvoll was an explicit product of a direct translation of the architect’s imaginaries into the physical form, being deeply rooted in the structuralist approach, this project was a product of an intense two-way translation process where modifying factors would strongly affect the architect’s imaginaries. This chapter endeavors to describe the dialectics of this process, especially in terms of what happened in the transformation of the project from a large-scale box into a fragmented project consisting of several interdependent volumes.
212 By 1972, the project’s design development had monthly expenses of 500,000 NOK (equivalent to 5 million today). Per Eggum Mauseth, Oslo bak fasaden (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1991), 31.
213 Wenche Findal, “FS Platou,” Norsk biografisk leksikon, https://nbl.snl.no/F_S_Platou.
214 Jan Carlsen, Regnbuebyen (Oslo: Pax forlag, 1993), 38–42.
215 After two years of preparation and legal procedures, Plan for Street Use in the Central Area of the City [Gatebruksplan for sentrale byområder] was approved by the city council in 1973. The Transport Analysis for Greater Oslo [Transportanalysen for Osloområdet] from 1965 was still the current plan, while this new plan could be seen as a reaction by the planning authorities towards the public’s changing attitude towards the large-scale infrastructural interventions. In this plan, focus was directed at how to reduce traffic from the urban streets – term streets was used, not roads – and how to implement soft elements and greenery in the urban landscape. For more, refer to Even Smith Wergeland, “From Utopia to Reality – the Motorway as a Work of Art” (PhD Diss., Arkitektur- og Designhøgskolen i Oslo, 2013), 333.
S O U R C E S
Besides the municipal negotiation documents, there are two articles about DnC Vaterland project: Helge Ramstad’s article “Vaterland – 15 års arbeid for hva?”
published in the magazine Kontrast (5, 1969), and Francis Sejersted’s article
“En «Banque d’Affairs»” published in En storbank i blandingsøkonomien – Den norske Creditbank 1957–1982 (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1982). The latter article was republished as a working paper “Hvem kan redde city?
Vaterlandprosjektet 1954–1979” in Fosfor, TMV-senteret/University of Oslo, no. 21, May 1990.
These articles frame the DnC Vaterland project from the socio-political perspective. Ramstad’s article, being strongly colored by the leftist ideology of the late 1960s, had been written as the project was developed and could be read more as a critique of the political decision making processes surrounding the project itself.216 Sejersted’s article, however, written some years after the cancellation of the project, was published in DnC’s 125-year anniversary book that illustrated the bank’s evolution in the period 1957–82. This article discusses Vaterland in terms of how the political and planning decision-making process unfolded and intertwined (and subsequently contradicted) with the private capital as explicated through the notion of DnC as a Banque d’Affairs.
The primary empirical basis for this analysis will be the architect’s drawings and descriptions obtained from Platou Arkitekter (previously F.S. Platou, the architect behind the DnC Vaterland project). I have also used written documents – letters and meeting minutes exchanged between the municipality, the bank and the architect – all of which have been found at the Oslo City Archives [Oslo Byarkiv]. Additionally, I will draw on the above-mentioned article by Francis Sejersted, since it contains a considerable amount of empirical data obtained from the DnC archives [Banksjef Melanders håndarkiv]. In addition, an important empirical input comes from interviews with Jan Georg Digerud, the project architect working for F.S. Platou in the late 1960s and Jon Platou, architect and F.S.Platou’s son.
S O C I E T Y
The Bank in the Mixed Economy
The post-war period in Norway was the era of modernization and democratization. The welfare project was being developed under the leadership of the Norwegian Labor Party, characterized by the state’s planning control and regulatory approach. Yet, there was also the commercial banking sector
216 The documentation supporting this article was collected by the group KANAL (more info on this group will be presented later). Helge Ramstad, a member of KANAL, edited the material into this article.
where the private initiative and its capital thrived.217 What was important for the commercial banking sector was the ability to adapt itself to the state financial and credit policies, and subsequently to exploit those potentials that these had offered. Sometimes these commercial banks would also influence policymaking. Such context formed a unique condition in the post-war economy, known as the ‘mixed economy’:218
The policy making by the state and the shifts in the market itself were mutually intertwined – adaptation to and exploitation of political conditions were related to the equivalent adaptation to and exploitation of the changing conditions within the market – and for a commercial bank such a context would be highly challenging.219
In the mid-1960s, DnC became clearly the largest commercial bank in Norway.
Simultaneously with its expansion, the bank acted as Banque d’Affaires – a merchant bank providing both capital to companies in the form of share ownership instead of loans, and counseling on corporate matters to the firms it engaged with. There were three key projects through which this unfolded:
Sør-Norge Aluminium A/S, UNION and Vaterland. The first two were industry related, while the last one was an urban development. It is through such large and inventive projects that the bank tried to establish its position as an important player in the development of society.
This could be seen in relation to the democratization and modernization processes that would also start influencing the sphere of private commerce, a measure initiated by the government. The way of thinking, which previously characterized private businesses, was seen as too narrow and not applicable in relation to the decisions that were to be taken by the banks in general. These tendencies would entail that the commercial banks had a special and central societal function with a responsibility larger than what was previously expected from a privately owned company. The decision-making by the banks would be seen as comparable to decision-making by the state apparatus, because their decisions had a capacity to affect the society as a whole. 220
DnC’s Vaterland project was to be an effective and modern center placed on a strategic position in the city. Still, one may question DnC’s motivation
217 Its growth was not as impressive as the growth within the credit market, something that had to do with the strict credit policies imposed by the state. Still, the main actors responsible for the growth were the state banks, such as Husbanken and Lånekassen. Francis Sejersted, “Innledning,” in En storbank i blandingøkonomien – Den norske Creditbank 1957–1982, ed. by Sejersted Francis (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag A/S, 1982), 12.
218 The English translation of term blandingsøkonomien – the mixed economy – is taken form Francis Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
219 Francis Sejersted, “Innledning,” in En storbank i blandingøkonomien – Den norske Creditbank 1957–1982, ed. by Sejersted Francis (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag A/S, 1982), 12.
220 Ibid., 13–14.
for such a building assignment beyond the narratives of profitability and effectiveness. What would direct DnC in an assignment of such a great size and importance (which at one point would have become the largest single investment in Norway)? 221 Was it the general idea of societal responsibility, as Sejersted discusses, through which the bank was seen as an integral participant in the development of the Norwegian society? Alternatively, was it a specific mentality derived from the overarching social-democratic welfare project?
Either way, it is necessary to keep in mind two aspects from which DnC’s Vaterland project cannot be separated. The rise of the mixed economy had created a societal framework – the macro conditions; while DnC’s intention to act as the Banque d’Affaires had created the corporate ambitions – the micro conditions.
The Site: Generic City
Dutch timber merchants named the area Vaterland in the 17th century – Waterland – at that time Oslo Fjord (Bjørvika) went further inland and Vaterland was a swampy area used by the Dutch to load timber. In the course of two hundred years, the fjord’s shoreline moved further south and Vaterland grew as an informal settlement in the 19th century. (76) In 1839, the area became incorporated into the city’s administrative borders. For many years, Vaterland was decaying and there had been few attempts to reverse this tendency. It was first in 1954 that the city council decided to initiate the rezoning processes.
(77) By the early 1970s, almost the whole of Vaterland was demolished.
Partially, this was a consequence of the already planned infrastructural projects in the area: the establishment of the new city road system, the expansion of the eastbound railway station and the plans for the eastbound subway system.
Due to its strategic position in relation to regional and local infrastructural systems, Vaterland would contain projects that would (in terms of type and size of programs) facilitate the city at large: the area may be characterized as Oslo’s central business district.222
In addition, Vaterland is a place where different ideological planning regimes have been projecting their stratagems from the mid-20th century to present day. DnC and Platou’s plans from 1960s represent the first stage of the area’s transformation defined by the modernist doctrine. LPO’s plans from the 1980s
221 As this thesis discusses, DnC’s role in the (unrealized) development of Vaterland is indisputable. In the late 1980s, DnC would move its headquarters to the newly built waterfront area of Aker Brygge, while in 2012 DnB would relocate to Bjørvika’s Barcode. I would argue that the story of how DnC/DnB’s large-scale capital moved within the city in the last fifty years could be seen as the story of how Oslo was modernized and transformed.
DnC/DnB would directly and indirectly be an important partaker in some of the central urban developments in Oslo, from Vaterland, Aker Brygge to Bjørvika.
222 The list of large-scale programs at Vaterland is long. Just to mention some: The main national/regional/local infrastructural hub, Oslo S, Bus Terminal and all subway lines; until recently, the postal service depot Postens Brevsentral; the main indoor arena Oslo Spectrum; one of the main shopping malls, Oslo City; Radisson Plaza, and numerous office buildings housing some of the main financial and political subjects.
represent the second stage defined by the postmodern reinvention of traditional European urbanity, while the current undertakings by the state agency ENTRA to redevelop properties Postgirobygget and Lilletorget 1 represent large-scale capital’s attempt seamlessly to integrate the notion of sustainability into large-scale urban complexes. As such, Vaterland is Norway’s prime, if not the only example, of generic city.223 DnC’s project for the area may be seen as an endeavor that initiated and subsequently established the very character of Vaterland itself: being a site of a continuous modernization urban project; and therefore it is at the focus of this thesis.
B U I L D I N G A S S I G N M E N T The Foreplay
Oslo’s city council had decided that most of the area was to be expropriated for the purpose of redevelopment, but this decision would not be executed unless the involved property owners implemented the rezoning plan themselves within suggested deadlines. The plan from 1955 ignored the existing city structure and the property lines in a true tabula rasa manner – no wonder that the council’s decision was not implemented by the local owners. (78) An additional attempt to redevelop the area was tried through the stock-based firm “Andelslaget Vaterland Sanering”, established in 1953, into which local property owners would voluntarily join.224 Not even this had managed to have an effect, and by the end of 1959, the municipality decided that expropriation of the area was to be implemented.
It was obvious that the original plan, from which the redevelopment process had started, was outdated and was to be changed – it was more of a tool for initiating the processes than actually an image of an ambition through which Vaterland was to be redeveloped. The architect John Engh, who was involved in some of the preliminary rezoning work done for “Andelslaget Vaterland Sanering”, was hired by the city planning office to work on zoning. The new plan was presented in 1961 (79–80): Vaterland was suggested to be zoned as a pure retail district primarily due to its proximity to the main railway and subway stations. This new development, of some 100,000 m2 was to consist of one 20-floor tower and several 4–5 story-building volumes some of which would be connected with “pedestrian bridges with kiosks, like some kind of
223 The term generic city is used as defined by Rem Koolhaas, “Generic City,” in S,M,L,XL, edited by Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, (New York/Rotterdam: Monacelli Press/010 Publishers, 1995), 1239–1264.
224 “Sak 171, Sanering av Vaterland,” Aktstykker vedkommende Oslo Kommune – Oslobystyres forhandlinger 1954–1955, June 1 1954 (1955): 93–94.
76: K.F. Keller, medieval Oslo and a schematic depiction of the current road system. (Illustra-tion: taken from Mastering the City II, page 33).
77: Vaterland in 1952. (Image: Widerøes Flyveselskap AS/Vilhelm Skappel).
78: Zoning plan for Vaterland, 1954. (Drawing: “Sak 170, Regulering av Vaterland,” Aktstykker vedkommende Oslo Kommune – Oslobystyres forhandlinger 1954–1955, June 1, 1954 (1955), page 87).
79: Zoning plan for Vaterland, 1965. (Drawing: “Sak 198, Overenskomst om bortfeste, sanering m.v. samt regulerings- og bebyggelsesplan for Vaterland,” Oslo Bystyre – Saker til behandling (1965), September 23, 1965).
80: Model photo, 1965/6 (Source: Unknown, found at Oslo Plan- og Bygningsetaten).
Ponte Vecchio.”225 The building program included two department stores, a supermarket, restaurants, offices and a four-story parking house for 560 cars (with additional 500 parking spaces spread throughout the project). The plan had a commercial frontage of 1,430 meters on the street level and 500 meters on the gallery level, as a comparison the main shopping street in Oslo at the time, Karl Johan’s gate, was 1,000 meters long from Østbanen to Nationaltheateret.
The development of the new plan happened simultaneously with the work to find potential investors. Several parties were interested in the project, and by October 1961, negotiations were initiated with a consortium of Christiania Bank, Kreditkasse and DnC. In 1962, Christiania Bank and Kreditkasse withdrew.226 DnC would set up an ad hoc 15-million NOK company (150 million today), Vaterland A/S, thereafter remaining the sole player in the project.227
It was clear that the intention to lease the land to one instance was synonymous with the intention of a singular building, despite the fact that the suggested plan was fragmented in several building volumes. Undoubtedly, it was the seductive image of a grand new future that set a pretext for the planning procedures. The whole site was to be leased at once to one instance, as it turned out, this instance would be a private organization, which in this case was the largest commercial bank in Norway. In 1965, the city council approved Engh’s plan. It was to be the basis for the lease contract, which would be signed a year later – DnC was to lease the land for the next ninety-nine years. The basis for a large-scale development at Vaterland was therefore created.
DnC and F.S. Platou Take Command
DnC was highly interested in the project from the very start, primarily because the bank’s current headquarters was getting too small, and to build a new headquarters at Vaterland was seen as a unique opportunity. By the end of 1961, a group of DnC high representatives led by the bank’s CEO Johan Melander and Aage Biering, the CEO of contractor firm Gustaf Aspelin, met with the architect F.S. Platou. He was to serve as an advisor in the process of rezoning.228 Their mission was to clarify the economic rationale of the project in terms of its potential risks, profitability and financing. The conclusions were positive. The total financial responsibility for the project, including demolition
225 Engh’s description from January 10, 1961. This source comes from Francis Sejersted’s “Hvem kan redde
225 Engh’s description from January 10, 1961. This source comes from Francis Sejersted’s “Hvem kan redde