Land force structure analysis

In 2009 FFI-project “Future Land Forces” was initiated, with the goal to analyse future requirements for the military land power in a national, allied, and multinational context. The main objective was to ensure cohesion and balance between resources and requirements in the development of military structures. In this project interactive constructive simulations were carried out to support evaluation of alternative land force structures [3][4]. Through a series of experiments the performance of five fundamentally different land force structures was tested in a set of chosen scenarios. The goal of the experiments was to rank these structures based on their relative performance.

Prior to the experiments, a number of different land force structures were developed [184] based on three war fighting concepts: manoeuvre theory, exchange theory, and positional theory [185].

Most of these structures where filtered out according to a capability-based method. Finally, we chose to evaluate the performance of five land force structures. Three of these structures were mechanized manoeuver structures. In addition we tested a light structure with units equipped with man-portable antitank weapons, and a distributed manoeuver structure largely based on network-centric warfare [186] and long-range precision-guided fire. The five land force structures were tested in three chosen tactical vignettes. We used a fixed opposing force for the experiments, which was based on a generic mechanized infantry brigade. Figure 5.6 illustrates this whole process.

FFI-rapport 2015/01579 87 Figure 5.6 Land force structure analysis at FFI ([4]).

The performance of the land force structures was evaluated through a set of simulation experiments. The approach was to use interactive constructive simulations with semi-automated forces (SAF), where humans were in the loop as military commanders to control the course of the battle. The main advantage of this type of simulation is utilization of human creativity, decision-making, and their ability to find solutions along the way. Military commanders plan and control the operations in the simulation, while the simulation system keeps track of the movement of the units and calculates the results of duels and indirect-fire attacks. This approach can be described as computer-aided wargaming. Figure 5.7 illustrates the concept behind this approach.

The simulation tool mōsbē from BreakAway was used in the experiments. The main reason for this choice was that mōsbē is based on technology for real-time strategy games, and has a user interface that makes it easy to control large groups of entities. Figure 5.8 shows examples of a two-dimensional theater view (to the left), and a three-dimensional tactical view (to the right) in mōsbē. The development of mōsbē has been discontinued, and the latest version was released in 2008.

Before the experiments, virtual representations of all units in the potential force structures had to be created. This included calibration of sensor capabilities and damage calculations. However, all simulation systems have shortfalls. To overcome these, we worked closely together with military SMEs.

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Figure 5.7 Simulation to support land force structure analysis ([3][4]).

Figure 5.8 Two-dimensional theater view (to the left), and three-dimensional tactical view (to the right) in mōsbē ([3][4]).

A total of 14 simulation clients were used in the experiments. Four of these clients were used for controlling red forces, while up to six clients were used by the blue players. The remaining four clients were reserved for the white cell. The white cell functioned as administrators and umpires, and handled issues not represented in the simulation system. Figure 5.9 shows a typical allocation of players on blue side. Red side was organized in a similar manner, with one player controlling the air units, one player controlling artillery, and two players controlling the manoeuvre battalions. I addition to the players operating the simulation clients, both sides had a brigade commander leading the battle.

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Figure 5.9 Example of the distribution of players on blue side ([4]).

Each simulation experiment began with a separate military planning session for each side, where the course of action (COA) was discussed and chosen. The simulation typically lasted between four and six wall clock hours, and was stopped when one side undoubtedly was unable to achieve its goal. After each simulation experiment there was an after-action review (AAR) session. This included discussions and evaluations regarding events on both tactical and operational levels. The combined-arms effects were typically evaluated through the AAR. Figure 5.10 shows a picture from a simulation session (to the left), and a picture from a planning session (to the right).

The main categories of collected data from the experiments were answers from questionnaires, experiences revealed during AAR sessions, and log files generated by the simulation system. The administrators also recorded video, took screenshots, and documented relevant events from the simulation sessions. Questionnaires were used to reveal each participant’s perception about the different force structures, both in terms of their expectations before the execution and afterwards, based on the outcome of the battle.

After the experiments the results were analysed and used in a larger context together with considerations about economy and force production. They were combined with outputs from the KOSTMOD⁹ cost model, and a model estimating the total force production, to arrive at land force structures that are effective both in battle and in terms of cost. Finally, this work resulted in a set of recommendations for potential new structures for the Norwegian military land power.

Figure 5.10 A simulation session (to the left) and a planning session (to the right) during the land force structure analysis at FFI ([3][4]).

9 KOSTMOD is the main cost model used in Norway and at FFI for long term defence planning.

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