A big majority of the Senegalese are Muslim, and Islam might serve as a unifying factor in this multi-ethnic country (Madjiguene 2001). 98% of Muslims in Senegal reports that religion is very important in their lives, and most Senegalese Muslims belongs to a Sufi brotherhood (The Pew Forum 2012). Sufi Islam is omnipresent in Senegalese society, where images of Sufi saints are painted on public transportation and as murals in public space (Augis 2012).
Most children are sent to Qur’anic schools before they attend Western schools (Creevey 1996). Senegal is officially a secular state, and although there are no pure Muslim parties,
“the religious elite carry great weight in national politics; political discourse is replete with references and appeals to Islam; Islamic symbols are omnipresent, and a myriad of popular organisations centred around Islam are flourishing” (Villalón 1995, 2). Despite this
politicization of Islam, there are no significant religious cleavages in politics, neither between Muslim and non-Muslim, nor between different Muslim orders and brotherhoods (Leonardo
21 The electoral constituencies involves 14 administrative regions, 45 Departments, 64 municipalities, more than 100 sub-municipalities, and over 350 rural districts
A. Villalón 1995).
The Sufi brotherhoods are centred around the marabouts, and for most Senegalese, “relations with a marabout are an integral component of an individual’s life” (Villalon 1999, 134). The most important marabouts today are descendants of the founders of the different brotherhoods (Creevey 1996). The Mouride brotherhood have gained attention for their emphasis on work as a means to salvation, and have gained considerable economical power, both due to their control over peanut production and “their growing current importance in the urban economy, especially in Dakar” (Creevey 1996, 284). Touba is the sacred city of the Mouride
brotherhood, and was established by Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacké in 1887. The Mouride brotherhood “maintains absolute control over the holy city” and “wields real power over population, territory, and resources, and it does so outside of the state’s administrative structures” (Ross 1995, 222). The city’s leader is the Khalif, a descendant of Ahmadou Bamba. The holy city of Touba marks an interesting case in the implementation of the gender parity law that I will return to later in this thesis.
The followers of the marabouts are united in well-organised cells which “has placed
marabouts at the center of very highly structured and dynamic social networks with obvious political potential” (Villalon 1999, 134). The French colonists witnessed the social power these religious leaders held over the masses. The colonisers chose a cooperative approach with the marabouts in order to recruit the Senegalese as labourers and soldiers, and to maintain control over parts of the rural Senegalese territory where their direct authority did not reach (Creevey 1996, 275). As a consequence, the marabouts have since enjoyed political privileges. They also came to play an important economical role in Senegalese society when they started controlling peanut production. The collaborative relationship between the
marabouts and the state continued after independence, when president Senghor gathered votes and legitimacy through the marabouts’s approval in exchange for services and gifts (Augis 2012). This is all part of the traditionally clientilist and patrimonial character of Senegalese politics, where power networks involving marabouts and local bosses and politicians connects the political system to a local base (Coulon and Cruise O’Brien 1990). The recent presidents Abdoulaye Wade and Macky Sall have maintained contact with the marabouts, although in a less explicit manner. Villalón (1999) argues that the marabouts play an important part in the country’s political stability, where Islamic institutions have coexisted peacefully with a secular state without trying to challenge its power. However, he also claims that the dynamics
of religion and politics is changing, and that one sees tendencies of a less moderate Islam than before.
5 The adoption of the parity law
5.1 Introduction
Based on some of the factors in the previous chapter – particularly the subordinate role of women and the power of religious leaders – it appears surprising that Senegal ended up with one of the most radical quota laws in the world. On the other side, these factors are not necessarily a hindrance to quota adoption; after all, quotas are seen as a means to overcome a patriarchal culture. In this chapter I will discuss how some of the contextual factors in Senegal help explain the adoption of the Law on Parity. I will also identify the initiators, supporters and critics of the parity law, as well as present the main arguments behind it.
My findings show that parts of the philosophical framework used for legitimizing parity built upon women’s symbolic representation. There were expectations that more women to
decision-making instances would challenge perceptions of the political domain as something highly masculine, and would reinvent a new and more politically active feminine citizenship.
In the next chapter, I will investigate whether these expectations have been met or not. As for the adoption of the parity law, I identify several explanatory factors: A unified women’s movement with COSEF in front campaigned strategically allied with juridical resources in order to propose amendments to the electoral law. The role of former Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade was also of vital importance, and he and the women’s movement profited on each other’s support mutually. The adoption of the parity law coincided with Wade’s decreasing popularity, and his active support may have been inspired by prospects of electoral gains. In addition, during the last decades the international environment has promoted
women’s representation, which gave COSEF extra leverage to their demands for parity.
Combined with a strong president and a parliament that rarely votes down proposals, this helps explain the successful adoption of the parity law. Senegal borrowed the parity-concept from the French, and this framing of the quota project may have lessened the stigma
connected to gender quotas. Furthermore, religious authorities did not stop the law from being adopted, but they seem to have power to limit its implementation.