FORMAL RATIONALITY

Proponents of formal rationality as represented in logical positivism and critical rationalism view scientific rationality as immutable, meaning that it does not change over time. This immutability is very implicit in all genuine science through different periods of its development. The two main theories that expound this view of scientific rationality are confirmationism and falsificationism. Confirmationism drives from Rudolf Carnap´s discussion on Inductive Logic. According to this view, scientists should accept theories that are probably true, given the evidence. However, Popper maintained with his critical rationalism that we do not use evidence to prove theories.

We use it to criticise theories. Likewise, we decide what evidence to acquire by looking at our best theories and what evidence would allow us to say that a particular event is explained by one theory but not another. Critical rationalism, therefore, illustrates that scientific theories, and any other claims to knowledge, can and should be rationally criticized, and (if they have empirical content) can and should be subjected to tests which may refute them. In other words, Popper´s theory of scientific rationality has its foundation in critical rationalism. Falsificationism shows that scientist should reject theories that make false predictions about observable and replace them with theories that conform to all available evidence.

The two theories mentioned above are regarded as standard conception of scientific rationality. They will be briefly discussed to show how they have sought to account for scientific progress. The discussion will enable us to see in what ways the historiographies of scientific revolution have truly brought transformation to our understanding of science and how they have impacted greatly on the evolution of the trends in Philosophy of Science.

3.2.1.1 CONFIRMATIONISM

In the Logical Foundations of Probability (1950) Carnap Rudolf rejects a statistical frequency basis for probability in favour of a logical relation between two statements or propositions. Its central tenets are that all inductive inference is probabilistic, that the required concept of probability derives from logical relations between evidence and

hypotheses, and that inductive inferences are therefore analytic. Probability "is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given evidence (or premises)."²⁵⁸ Furthermore, all principles and theorems of inductive logic are analytic, and the entire system is to be constructed by means of symbolic logic and semantic methods. This means that the author confines himself to the formalistic procedures of word and symbol systems. The resulting sentence or language structures are presumed to separate off logic from all subjectivist or psychological elements.

The probability of a statement is the degree of confirmation the empirical evidence gives to the statement. For example, the statement “the score is five” receives a partial confirmation by the evidence; its degree of confirmation is one sixth. Carnap devoted himself to giving an account of the probability as a degree of confirmation. The philosophically most significant consequences of his research arise from his assertion that the probability of a statement, with respect to a given body of evidence, is a logical relation between the statement and the evidence. Thus it is necessary to build an inductive logic; that is, a logic which studies the logical relations between statements and evidence. Inductive logic would give us a mathematical method of evaluating the reliability of a hypothesis. In this way inductive logic would answer the problem raised by David Hume’s analysis of induction. Of course, we cannot be sure that a hypothesis is true; but we can evaluate its degree of confirmation and we can thus compare alternative theories.

In spite of the abundance of logical and mathematical methods Carnap used in his own research on the inductive logic, he was not able to formulate a theory of the inductive confirmation of scientific laws. In fact, in Carnap’s inductive logic, the degree of confirmation of every universal law is always zero. However, Carnap tried to employ the physical-mathematical theory of thermodynamic entropy to develop a comprehensive theory of inductive logic, but his plan never progressed beyond an outline stage. His works on entropy were published posthumously.

258 Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962[1950]), p. v; See also Rudolf Carnap, ¨On inductive Logic¨, Philosophy of Science,1945, 12(2) p. 72

The confirmationist account of scientific progress implies that scientists are

´confirmation agents´ that operate roughly as follows. Scientists start with hypotheses that they use to make predictions about observable phenomena. If experiments or other observations show that the predictions are true, then the hypotheses are said to be confirmed. A hypothesis that has received substantial empirical confirmation can be accepted as true, or at least as empirically adequate.²⁵⁹

3.2.1.2 FALSIFICATIONISM

The term ¨falsifiable¨ does not mean something is made false, but rather that, if it is false, it can be shown by observation or experiment. Falsificationism is a rival account of the processes involved in scientific research as earlier demonstrated by inductivism.

Inductivism holds that science proceeds from observation to theory, beginning with observations derived from experiments, and extrapolating from these to general laws.

Falsificationism suggests that science proceeds in the opposite direction, beginning with scientific theories or ¨conjectures¨, and then conducting experiments and eliminating those theories that are falsified by results. Invariably, scientific progress results from the continued cycles of conjectures and refutations.

Falsificationism exploits an important logical point: falsifying instances are more significant than confirming instances. If we have a general law, and conduct an experiment that confirms it, then we still do not know whether the law is true. It remains a live option, but nothing more. If, on the other hand, our experiment contradicts the theory, then we have discovered that the theory is false. Unexpected experimental results are far more significant than expected results. Falsificationism, thus, rejects the logical positivist demarcation criterion of verifiability (or confirmability) by demonstrating that empirical theories cannot be verified but falsified. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper argued that scientists should not aim for confirmation, but should operate as the following sort of falsification agents. Scientist use hypotheses to

259 See Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of scientific explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Hempel, C.

G., “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation.” Mind, 54, 1945; See also Franz Huber, ¨Hempel´s Logic of Confirmation¨, in Philosophical Studies, 2008, 139: 181-189, for analysis of Hempel´s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation

make predictions, but their primary aim should be to find evidence that contradicts the predicted results, leading to the rejection of hypotheses rather than their acceptance.

For a theory to be considered falsifiable or empirical it must divide ¨the class of all possible basic statements unambiguously into the following two non-empty subclasses.¨²⁶⁰ These two classes are: 1) the class containing all the basic statements that are inconsistent with the theory (or which it rules out, or prohibits) and 2) the class containing all the basic statements allowed or permitted by the theory. The former class is the important one for falsificationism and is dubbed the class of ¨potential falsifiers¨

by Popper. Thus, the class of potential falsifiers must not be empty if a theory is to be falsifiable.²⁶¹ In addition to being falsifiable; a scientific or empirical theory must be consistent, since from any inconsistent system all possible statements may be derived.

Hence, he wrote that ¨agreement upon the acceptance or rejection of basic statements is reached, as a rule, on the occasion of applying a theory; the agreement, in fact, is part of an application which puts the theory to the test.²⁶²

Scientific progress, therefore, occurs when one testable theory succeeds another, and such theory is able to retain the successes of its predecessor and provided correction for its mistakes. In this way, falsificationism not only demonstrates the continuity within science it also demonstrates scientific rationality as the ´super-standard´ which demarcates genuine science from non-science and pseudo-science.

Popper presents ´falsifiability´, and not verifiability (or confirmationism), as the distinguishing mark of scientific theories. He was apparently fond of referring to ´the soaring edifice of science´, an indication that scientific knowledge is cumulative.

However, falsificationism has lots of inherent problems which provoke various philosophical questions demanding for clarification. For instance, assuming falsificationism is true, how can we rationally distinguish between a highly

¨corroborated¨ theory and a new theory? Even if corroboration is different from confirmation in that it is only ¨backward-looking¨, how can it be rationally justified?

260Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 70, 96

261 Ibid., p. 95

262 Ibid., p. 88

Since the main motive of this work is not to discuss the intricate problems involved in the divergent views between falsificationism and confirmationism on the nature of scientific theories, It will not go into analysis of the debates that ensued from the deficiencies in both theories. Our interest in this part of the work is to understand the fundamental issues that spurred the various reactions in the historiographies of scientific revolution as regards the question of scientific rationality. The principal reaction to such question would be recapitulated as informal rationality.