Fideism and epistemic heroism - Chapter

1 Chapter – Introduction

1.5 Fideism and epistemic heroism

"What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?" Tertullian's question, asked in the third century, questions what, reason (Athens) and Jerusalem (the Christian faith), may and ought to have with one another.³ Kierkegaard's position, probably much like Tertullian, is that they are two separate realms, and that the rules that apply to the one cannot be assumed to apply to the other. This makes Kierkegaard a fideist. Tertullian is usually credited with being the first of the important Christian fideists, later great names in Christian fideism are Blaise Pascal, William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and of course Søren Kierkegaard himself.⁴

3 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Fideism", Richard Amesbury, 19.04.2020 URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/fideism/>.

4 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Fideism", Richard Amesbury, 19.04.2020 URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/fideism/>.

Those that tries to understand or approach faith by reason has misunderstood the nature of faith, and probably the nature of reason too. It is important to remember that this does not entail that Kierkegaard dismiss reason altogether, far from it. Also Athens has much too teach us, and one of Kierkegaard's greatest heroes is Socrates. But Christianity, or at least true Christianity, is not science, it is not philosophy and it is not a political ideology. It is fundamentally otherworldly, in that its purpose is to help humans bridge the gap between our own limited reasoning, and God, whose knowledge and wisdoms transcends all human understanding. For humans to try to comprehend God as they would a mathematical problem or an ethical dilemma is not only an insult towards God, but also inherently ridiculous. Why should we have any right to expect Christianity to make sense to us rationally?

Epistemic heroism insists that not only are there no genuine tension between true faith and human rationality, but that they in fact corroborate one another. Religious beliefs can be proven, by epistemic means, to be perfectly rational and objectively compelling: so that anyone objectively assessing the epistemic evidence will also accept the conclusion that a certain religious faith is true or false. In its most radical form, epistemic heroism claims that there are a priori evidence(s) for the existence of God, that is, evidence that can be

accepted without experience, or at least that there are a priori considerations that makes it likely that God exists. Swinburne believes it to be possible to at least make it logically probable that Christianity is true, based on a priori argumentation alone.⁵ That may be part of why he puts relatively little emphasis upon what might be described more as a posteriori argumentation: for example that God must exist because objective morals do exist, or because historical evidence makes it probable that Jesus was the Son of God. Swinburne disbelieves the former, as we will consider more in depth later on. As for the historical dimension, Swinburne do consider the gospels to be overall at least quite historically

reliable, though he shows relatively little interest in the subject.⁶ (Something he shares with Kierkegaard, who more or less dismiss all historical research of Christ and Christianity.) There are however many apologists who puts great importance on the historicity of the

5 Swinburne, "Why Believe That There Is a God?", p. 5-6

6 That is not to say that he altogether dismisses it. In Was Jesus God?, for example, Swinburne frequently discuss the historicity of Jesus, particularly in chapter 7 and 8. It is however safe to say that this is not where Swinburne has devoted the majority of his philosophical thinking, neither explicitly Christian or otherwise.

earliest Christianity, like William Lane Craig and N.T. Wright. Likewise, many apologists considers the (purported) existence of objective morals a compelling evidence for the existence of God. As such, Swinburne's position is somewhat radical, also in the Christian apologetic tradition. He is however in accordance with the central point of classical

apologetics: The point of the discipline of apologists is that there is as such no truly inherent conflict between objective rationality and subjective faith, because true faith is not

subjective at all, but objectively true. Apologetics, or so it may seem, is really not that different, if different at all, from the standard natural sciences. It is all a question of

evidentialism, the more evidence, the stronger the claim. The less evidence, the weaker the claim.

2 Chapter 2 – Presenting thinkers and types of thinking

2.1 Kierkegaard's poetry and the sick soul

It is often somewhat difficult to ascertain Kierkegaard’s exact philosophical position, due to his complicated habit of frequently writing under various pseudonyms, which again seems to have been an intentional scheme on his part to create distance between his own person and his works.⁷ These various pseudonyms again occasionally attacked each other and the viewpoints they presented. It is thus exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to say with certainty which of them Kierkegaard himself supported, if any. And yet, it is through the pseudonyms that some of Kierkegaard’s most famous thoughts, ideas and expressions are presented. The pseudonyms are therefore important, though as Kierkegaard himself stated, they should not necessarily be viewed as his own opinions. In fact, one of the advantages of this heavy use of pseudonyms is that it becomes more difficult to ascertain what the author actually thinks himself. The reader must think him/herself.⁸ I will therefore note when I do quote or refer to one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, and from which one. But apart from that, I will not spend time and space debating how much Kierkegaard agrees or disagrees with the particular pseudonym, unless I deem this absolutely necessary, that is to say if two viewpoints made by different pseudonyms seem to disagree with each other. It then follows that Kierkegaard must disagree with at least one of them and perhaps both. Nonetheless,

7 Eriksen, Den fromme spotteren (Finland: Forlaget Press, 2013), p. 47.

8 McKinnon, "Kierekgaard's pseudonyms", p. 116-117

they are after all ultimately all authored by him; and are therefore he is responsible for them. Of Kierkegaard's extensive authorship, I shall in this paper contend myself with the following books: Filosofiske smuler, Avsluttende uvitenskapelige efterskrift and Frygt og

Bæven. I have also read the short essay Lilien paa marken og Fuglen under Himlen.

Of course, Kierkegaard often wrote under his own name as well, and that he made a

distinction between explicitly religious (though of course still of a quite philosophical nature) writings, which he signed with his own name, and the more philosophical (though by no means irreligious) texts, which he tended to sign with various pseudonyms. Kierkegaard himself distinguished by texts written by “his right hand and his left hand”, where the more religious texts typically were by written by his "right hand" and without pseudonyms, the more philosophical texts by his "left hand" and under pseudonyms.⁹ This also underscores which of the two he considered the most important. It is unlikely that he would appreciate the fact that his "left hand" made a far wider impact on the world than his "right one" did, but then again, no one has the right to determine his or her own legacy.

Finally, when referring to Kierkegaard and quoting his works, I have elected to stand by his original language, and written them in Danish. When reading him, I have overwhelmingly read the original source material, and it is of course always best to use the original source, when this is possible. Kierkegaardian quotes will therefore all be in Danish. Apart from this, the text in its entirety is in English; including, of course, my reflections and opinions on what Kierkegaard thinks.

Why faith?

As both Kierkegaard and Swinburne are Christians, it follows that they both consider religious faith to be empirically true; that is to say, that they think it originates from a true source: The existence of God, which it is possible for human beings to have a degree of interaction with. As Christian writers, they must also necessarily regard the experience of religious faith as something fundamentally positive: By faith in Jesus Christ, humanity may obtain a form of salvation. It is the reason for faith as such that interests me here though;

because the two thinkers’ different approaches towards how also leads to a different

9 Mjaaland, introduction in Kierkegaard, Liljen på marken og fuglen under himmelen (Verbum. Print Best Printing Company, Estland), p. 8

approach towards why we should have religious faith. What problem is religious faith

supposed to solve, and/or what gap is it supposed to fill?

For Kierkegaard the answer for what faith ultimately is and means, is release from despair and anxiety, which normally haunts all humans, when faced as they are with the infiniteness of the world versus their own finite existences. The absence of God leaves the universe, and human existence, in such a terrible, excruciating maelstrom of meaninglessness that it becomes untenably bleak and meaningless for anyone that genuinely thinks about it for any meaningful length of time. It is worth mentioning that while Kierkegaard very much strives towards being as devout a Christian as he possibly can, his philosophy and writings do not concern themselves with the afterlife, and any mentioning of heaven or hell is next to non-existent. Kierkegaard’s Christianity is very much a faith that looks toward this life and this world.¹⁰ In the Kierkegaardian bibliography, there is a running theme that humanity has the freedom to themselves make their earthly existence a heaven or a hell, by turning towards or away from God. As would become more or less typical in later existentialism, both of the Christian and the atheist kind, the self is in Kierkegaard always free to define itself at any moment. This is however not only positive, because it also highlights the limitations of unbound freedom. You, the self, can never be still and can never stop choosing. A moment of perfect bliss and satisfaction can never last for more than a moment. This, combined with the mercilessness of time, means that anything we create, be it ourselves or in the world around us, is bound to change, any traces we leave behind will fade as time goes by. This knowledge is hard, perhaps unbearable for humans, and we suffer under it. Our only hope for lasting salvation, something beyond temporary reprieve, is in absolute obedience towards, and trust in, God. God represents what is truly infinite, yet never changing. He is the first and final source of everything, and therefore everything is contained within Him.

Human well-being therefore ultimately is preconditioned to depend upon Him. This person is The Religious Man (Det Religiøse Menneske), who live in a state of something akin to unity with God, and who has distanced himself from everything else, for nothing may be equal to God. That is not to say that Kierkegaard encourages us to separate ourselves from

10 It may very well be that as a so-called knight of faith, Kierkegaard’s ultimately hope and believes that he will in some way be reunited with his great love Regine Olsen, if not on earth so at least in heaven. But I do not think that this is ultimately important for his views of God and heaven, the reason which I hope to make clear further on in this paper.

the mundane world, like some Christians have chosen, e.g. monasticism. Devotion towards God is something we always can have and always do, everywhere. We always, at least after having discovered Christianity, have the possibility and opportunity to become fully and truly religious, the choice is always there, for us to make. As I hope I have made clear by now, for Kierkegaard true religious faith is not an act of reason, but of passion. It is not science or logical calculations, but the ultimate form of love, from which true faith comes.

God is so all-encompassing and completely demanding that it does seem as if for

Kierkegaard, there can be room for nothing, or no one, else.

To be sure, the idea of illustrating the relationship between God and humans as that of lovers, is not something Kierkegaard has invented, but is an old Christian tradition hailing at least from the purported medieval notion of courtly love; the chaste yet passionate love between a knight and his beloved lady, where the lover becomes a substitute for God.¹¹ It is also central to bridal mystique, where Christ is made into the groom, and the believer into the bride, and in the churchly tradition of referring to the church as the bride of Christ.¹² It is also implicit in the superiority of the theological virtues: Faith, Hope and Charity, above the philosophical virtues Wisdom, Temperance, Justice and Courage. It is not clear-eyed

wisdom, but passionate devotion, that is the final goal and the key to salvation.

Faith as a stage in life

Kierkegaard in his writings famously differentiates between three ways of attempting to overcome the meaninglessness of despair. These are the aesthetical, the ethical and the

religious.¹³ The aesthetical stage is where humans try to free themselves from gloomy thoughts by

amusing, or at least entertaining, distractions. This has often been interpreted as stooping into nihilistic libertinism and hedonism, but that is not necessarily the case. The aesthetical concerns itself with beauty, joy and self-fulfilment, and this may or may not be immoral;

artists, musicians and writers, as well as lovers, diners and gamers may be said to operate within the aesthetical. The main characteristic they share is that they are engaged in

something that is supposed to give them pleasure to do. It is also self-centred; the pleasure is hedonistic and selfish. They are enjoying themselves, or at least they are supposed to.

11 Bonneuil, "Arrival of Courtly Love" , p. 265

12Kenda, Practicing passion (USA: Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 2004), p. 124-126

13 This is an old division, which amongst others can be found in Plato's Republic: The life of desire, the life of duty and the life of wisdom.

However, as all pleasures are temporal, and no activity is really that amusing for a long time, certainly not for eternity. The esthetical approach is doomed to fail. Soon enough boredom will set in, and through boredom despair, because the self will realize that the aesthetical cannot offer any meaningful and permanent distraction. From there, life and the universe

will feel meaningless and dull, and despair will return, with a vengeance.¹⁴ Moving on from the aesthetical stage, there is the ethical stage, where humans submit and

repress their personal urges and desires for something more worthwhile, a greater good.

This can be your family, your country, your career, your people, an ideology, the

environment or even mankind in general. Here, the individual devotes himself/herself to something that (they believe) is truly good and ethical. The ethical person serves others, and sacrifice on their behalf. Kierkegaard symbolises this stage with marriage. Marriage is built upon commitment, and a duty to love and care for another human being, not only yourself.

This is a higher stage, in part because it is more moral, but also because the individual becomes a part of something greater; it takes responsibility for something more than simply its own happiness and pleasure. Meaning and purpose become deeper, and the

ramifications of the individual's choices are grander. Kierkegaard agrees that this is more praiseworthy than the aesthetical life, but in the end the ethical life does not provide any lasting comforts either. Because also here the results and consequences of our choices are temporary, and they cannot offer us a stable and safe identity. For still the self, as the universe, is in constant motion, and it cannot sit still. In the end, no matter the amount sacrificed, or the amount built, nothing lasts forever. Everything we build will in the end come to nothing. This realization, whether subconscious or not, will cause despair also for the ethical human being.¹⁵ Presumably, there is amongst the ethical that Kierkegaard would place Swinburne and his type of apologetics. Swinburne's project is heartfelt enough, and aims to benefit humanity in general and Christians in particular, but due to its reliance on approximations, doubt and intellectual reservations, it is no better than more secular ideologies. Though Swinburne may think so, there is nothing eternal or genuinely steadfast about his thinking, and it will continue to evolve and change until it is forgotten or else

changed into something unrecognisable.

14 Craig, Reasonable Faith (Illinois, Good News Publishers, 2008), p. 69

15 Craig, Reasonable Faith (Illinois, Good News Publishers, 2008), p. 69-70

Finally, we have the religious stage, though Kierkegaard does divide this into two parts:

Religiosity A and Religiosity B. The first group's religiosity is misguided, or at least

insufficient, the other's the path towards genuine faith and salvation.

Religiosity A is concerned with genuine devotion. It leads to a state where one genuinely wishes to follow God's will. And by personal effort and willpower, one hopes to reach God.

This is however not truly possible. We, as humans, cannot rise above our temporality to eternity and God. It is not possible, no matter how intensely we long for it or how hard we

try.

This brings us to religiosity B. God, unlike humans and their choices, is eternal and

unchanging. Any union between ourselves and Him is therefore impossible. And yet, God can make the impossible, and in Christianity, He has. This is the Paradox, manifest in Jesus, who proves that a humans may be fully reconciled with God. And those that manage to come into direct contact with him, will find God. Their choices will be God's choices, and therefore will always be the best possible choice to make. The (truly) religious human being will always make the right choice, and know that the choice is meaningful, and will know that through God also he or she will be eternal.¹⁶ This life will not be free of suffering, far from it, yet even so, those that walk with God will know that everything will in the end turn out for the best.

The Religious Man and faith in God as simply put a reduction of choices. This then becomes Kierkegaard’s life project – recognizing the individual human being’s gift of endless choices, endless possibilities, and then freeing us from them by reducing an infinite number of choices to two: Choosing or not choosing God. If, as it follows from Christian doctrine, God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omnitemporal and omniscient, God becomes the ultimate source of everything good. Electing to submit oneself to Him then means that one pledge one’s freedom to what is good, just, wise and eternal; to not choose God then ultimately becomes rejecting all of these, ensuring damnation in the form of eternal despair. God is the

In document Faith, reason and the human mind – love triangle or ménage à trois? (sider 12-0)