The dialectics of discourse

The narrow discursive practice contain certain language choices, such as an inherent focus on individual vulnerability as a societal risk, which align it more closely with the discursive order of the radicalisation discourse. However, it is arguably not only the securitising radicalisation discourse that advances this individualised focus, as there are clearly other rhetoric forces and ideological assumptions at play here. By analysing the orders of discourse, CDA allows for examining which discourses are present within a field, what interests they serve, and what ideological structures are prioritised over others. This can be done by analysing how discursive practices are networked together in the social ordering within a field, which draw attention to power, as some ways of making meaning are more dominant or mainstream in a particular order of discourse, while others are marginal or alternative (Fairclough, 2003).

Analysing the orders of discourse revealed not only the presence of the narrow and wide discourses on the prevention of radicalisation and

violent extremism but also a discourse on neoliberal governance (Lindekilde, 2012b) and a discourse on the therapeutisation of education (Biesta, 2009). Hence, the popularity of the psychological well-being of students can be an example of how the discursive practice of therapeutisation in education is dominating other educational discourses (Durodié, 2016). This may be suggestive of a hegemonic process in the orders of discourse or a particular way of conceptualising power to universalise a particular representation of the world, namely how radicalisation is represented as an existential threat caused by vulnerable young lives. Thus, the democratic and egalitarian elements of good education that promote subjectification, emancipation and resilience in schools, might be coexisting with a securitisation paradigm that manifests itself in an authoritarian element of detecting and controlling students as threat objects. The latter discourse is foremost a political and ideological project that restructures social relations in accord with the security demands of the unrestrained Global War on Terror doctrine.

Any capacity to exercise hegemony depends on the degree to which one representation dominates others, yet Fairclough (2003) argues that the effectiveness of hegemonic processes links to how pervasively the meaning relations are repeated in various types of texts and how alternatives are excluded. Thus, it might be that we are witnessing the securitising radicalisation discourse colonising other discursive orders, most notably the utilitarian and instrumental discourse on neoliberal governance, where students can be seen as subject to state interventions that promote competition and efficiency, and also the discourse on therapeutic interventions, with its emphasis on student pathology.

Yet, alternative explanations for this hegemonic process should be considered, and one interesting suggestion is provided by Durodié (2016) who argues that the focus on the securitisation of education might be one-sided. He claims that there is reason to surmise that fields of security and education could be understood to overlap and interact with each other through a dialectic relationship, in which it is worth exploring

[W]hereby the language and practice of security appear to be being transformed by certain actions and assumptions already common to the world education. Instead of asking how the new security discourse and associated legislation affect education, we will examine aspects of how […] it may rather be the therapeutisation of security that we are really observing (pp. 21-22).

The same might arguably be the case with the neoliberal discourse on governance. For Lindekilde (2012b), the popularity of the radicalisation discourse is illustrated by the ease with which it fuses with neoliberal governance. He argue that the preventive ideals that are embedded in the radicalisation discourse connect with the mode of regulation of neo-liberal governmentality, where the individual’s free choice is made the locus of change and regulation. Yet, Lindekilde (2012b, p. 115) recognises that there are matters at play within the radicalisation discourse that might not be very consistent with the democratic ideals of changing behaviours by influencing attitudes. For instance, there is the use of harder security measures, including profiling, surveillance and zero-tolerance strategies, which are problematic social practices.

Although the radicalisation discourse, with its emphasis on individual trajectories and vulnerability factors, has become accepted in the political realm, these approaches have produced inconclusive results in terms of preventing radicalisation and violent extremism (O’Donnell, 2016b). The dominant focus on individual vulnerability as a threat to security can also lead to a new discourse arrangement, where schools become arenas for instructing students to think and behave in certain ways, so as not to become terrorists (Mattsson, 2018b). This inherent focus on vulnerable individuals tends to divert attention from structural reasons for why people commit to terrorism (Pape, 2003, 2005), thus, it removes the political from political violence. Yet, any structural reasons driving terrorists will persist and, thus, may continue to enable people to commit to political violence and terrorism (Mattsson, 2018b).

These dilemmas are arguably one of the main reasons why this study discovered resistance towards the radicalisation discourse. After

all, people do not normally turn to teaching in order to prevent terrorism, and the idea of protecting the state from students may not sit easily with educators. This scepticism is mirrored in similar research (Busher et al., 2017; Kühle & Lindekilde, 2010; Mattsson, 2018a), as counter-radicalisation efforts can cause harmful and exclusionary practices that arguably do not reduce risk in schools, but may very well add to it.