The Wider Peacekeeping conceptual approach described throws up seven useful general lessons that apply to the direction and conduct of post Cold War peacekeeping at all levels:
First, the presence or absence of a workable modicum of consent is the determining criterion between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
Second, peacekeeping and peace enforcement strategies require sepa-rate and mutually exclusive actions. Whilst there may be variations within each category, no spectrum links them and the identification of middle-ground will continue to lead to much confusion, and possibly bloodshed.
Their techniques cannot and should not be mixed - a hard political choice has to be made between the strategies required. If peacekeeping is selected as the preferred option, then the UN, national governments and practition-ers alike should act consistently with that choice - whether it be in the formulation of mandates or the daily conduct of operations on the ground.
Thus far, the UN management of several peacekeeping operation has failed to make a choice and its management has accordinglY been grossly incon-sistent. A journalist has eloquently highlighted this problem in Bosnia:
... the international community ... has reji/Sed to choose between the two courses oJ action open to it... It is impossible to Jollow both courses at the same time ... The international military Jorce in Yugoslavia is
deployed and configuredJor the humanitarian mission. Its members consequently are vulnerable when the UN and NATO make Iheir inlermittent stabs al doing justice. When NATO air Jorces slruck
Serbian troops al Gorazde, Ihe Serbs promplly arrested or sequestered UN soldiers andprivale relieJworkers ... There has to be a decision ...
There are Iwo possibilities. One is ... Ihallhe Bosnian viclims oJ aggres-sion ml/St be armed .. and sllpporled ... Inlhat case the humanitarian
mission must end and its personnel be pulled out. The UN cannot
support one side in this war and expect to be treated as a neutral by the other side.49
Thirdly, mandates for peacekeeping operations should follow peacekeeping principles - especially impartiality, minimum force and credibility. Certain mandates for UNPROFOR and UNOSOM have had a gravely destabilizing influence on their theatres of operations. The UN should never again betray the security or credibility of its peacekeepers by saddling them with mandates that are unmanageable or demonstrate partiality.
Fourth, a strong consensual peacekeeping framework at the operational level marginalizes opposition and facilitates the use of minimum necessary force. An analysis of the consent divide will furnish detailed guidance for
judgements concerning the use of force.
Fifth, the use of force or a UN Charter Chapter VII mandate does not
therefore necessarily equate to peace enforcement. The absence or presence of consent is the detennining criterion. UNOSOM II, trumpeted as a peace
enforcement operation because it was mandated under Chapter VII could arguably have remained a peacekeeping mission using its mandates only to combat banditry and restore popular confidence in law and order. Chapter VII no more equates to peace enforcement than Chapter VI equates to peacekeep-ing.
Sixth, in order to protect, sustain, promote and transmit consen~ psycho-logically-orientated techniques, by addressing perceptions and attitudes, have the greatest potential in peacekeeping. It is in this area that the key to success-ful peacekeeping of the future lies. Influencing favourably the attitudes of factions and population alike should constitute the main effort of any peace-keeping campaign. As part of a wider political process, the development of peacekeeping strategy, concepts and doctrine should focus on this aspect.
Lastly, strategic direction and military doctrine deriving from spectrum-based 'middle ground' theories should be treated with caution! A common Wider Peacekeeping doctrine is required for UN troop-contributing nations.
134 DEFENCE STUDIES 4/1994
Notes
I Army Doctrine Publication 'Operations', dated 14 Dec 93.
, Ibid.
J Ibid.
•
•
•
J The latest unclassified version of 'NATO Doctrine for Peace SuppOrt Operations' dated 28 February 1994 defines peacekeeping as: " ... the containment, moderation and/or termination ofhostilities between or within Slates. through the medium of an impartial third party intervention. organized and directed internationally, lIsing
military forces, and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace. "
•
J An Agenda/or Peace (published in June 1992) dejinedpeacekeeping as: "the deployment of a UN presence in the field hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned .. " (italics added). The Secretary Gel/eral's subsequent report to the 48th session of the General Assembly on 14 March /994 revised the definition of peacekeeping, omitting 'hitherto '.
{; Levels of direction and activity referred to in this article are described as follows:
Strategic level refers to direction and activity emanating/ram olltside the theatre a/operations - most commonly from UN/ora or the governments of
troop-contributing nations. Operational level describes the senior level of command, control and representation in theatre. It is at the operational level that strategic direction is translated into campaign design. Tactical level covers oilfield operations. Campaign plans give rise to tactical activity.
7 Statement on UNPROFOR made to UN Security Council by the Secretary General in 1993.
11 UNPROFOR Commander British Forces Post Operational Report dated 13 November 1993.
11 UNPROFOR Unit Commander's Post Operational Report dated February 1994.
/0 UNPROFOR Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron Commander's Post Operational Report dated A/arch 1994.
11 UNPROFOR Unit Commander's Post Operational Report dated ,August 1993.
"UNSCR 818 of /4 AprU 1993,850 of911/(v 1993, and 882 of5 November 1993.
IJ Washington Post of I 3 May 1994, pAO.
w'Throug/z Aussie Eyes" - Photographs of the Australian Defence Force in Somalia 1993. Gory Ramage and Bob Breen (Department ofDejence:National Capital Printing, Canberra), p.lIO.
•
JJ Improving the UN's Response to Conflict-Related Emergencies - Oxfam Briefing Number 6, dated November 1993, p. 2-4.
J6 UNPROFOR-UNOSOM: An Assessment a/Peace Support Operations' by John Mackilllay dated July 1993,
17 The Blue Helmets - A Review 0/ UN Peacekeeping - Second Edition UN Publication 1990.
•
•
•
18 United Nations Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus, deployed to Cyprusfrom 1964 to the present day,
19 United Natiolls Emergency Force, deployed to Egypt and Sinai, 1956-1979,
~o United Nations deplo.ved to Golan Heightsfrom 1974 to the present day,
11 Operation Des Nations Unies All Congo (UN Operation in the Congo) deployed to Conga, 1960-1964.
12 United Nations Security Force, deployed to West Irian (formerly West New Guinea) 1962-1963.
23 United Nations Temporary £'J;eclltive Authority, deployed to West Irjan (formerly New West Guinea) 1962-1963.
14 Afulti-National Force I and /J, deployed to Beirut 1982-1984.
15 United Nations Treaty Supervision Organization, deployed to Palestine from 1948 to the present day.
16 United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission, deployed to India and Pakistan, 1965-1966.
17 Commonwealth Monitoring Force, deployed to RhodesiaiZimbabwe, 1979-1980.
111 Interests, Conscience and Somalia by Richard COllnallghton. dOled December 1992.
19 The Lessons 0 / Yugoslavia, paper presented to Centre for Defence Stuides seminar, King's College, London, 7 December 1993.
•
•
3/1 Preliminary Study 0/ Lessons Learnt by the UNTAC Alilitary Component - UN Report submitted on 31 August 1993.
JJ Operation Lecturer - Post-Operation Report on the UK's ll'filftary Participation in UNAMIC alld UNTAC 1991-1993.
32 Lecture to the North Atlantic Assembly Rose Roth Seminar -22 February 1994.
3J The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance ill Complex
Emergencies-•
•
•
136 DEFENCE STUDIES 4/1994
produced by the Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in Humanitarian Assistance, convened by the Program on Humanitarian Assistance World Conference on Religion and Peace - February 1994, p. 3,
" Ibid. p. 10.
JJ The UN and Humanitarian Assistance - Save the Children Position Paper-April 1994, p. 4.
J61mproving the UN's Response to Conflict-Related Emergencies - Oxfam Briefing Number 6. dated November 1993. p. 2-4.
"Ibid. p. 11.
JR Army Field Afanllal 'Wider Peacekeeping' (Fourth Draft)
JP Non-Paper: US Views on Improving UN Peace Operations, dated 6 Alay 1994, p. 3.
40 The term 'Chapter V11iJ . was first coined by Dog Hammarslg'old ill 1961 to illustrate the fact that neither Chapters VI nor VII of the UN Charter (or.
indeed, any other part o/the Charter) covered the activity a/peacekeeping.
n 'Valldering in the Void - Charting the UN's New Strategic Role by John Gerard Ruggie - Foreign Affairs. November/December 1993. p. 31.
41 A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993 by John Afackinlay and Jarat Chopra - The Thomas J Watson Jr Institute for International Studies, Brown University - Afarcll 1993, p.5.
4J Time to Clear the Doctrine Dilemma by Richard COnfJaugliton - Jane 's.
Defence Week(v dated 9 April 1994, p. 20.
U The Crisis in Peacekeeping by Adam Roberts - Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies, Forsvarsstudier 21i994. p. 17. See also article in this edition of
·Survival'.
"Ibid. P 27.
"Ibid. p. 38.
4i Whither UN Peacekeeping? _ Ade/phi Paper 281 dated October 1993 by Alats
R Berdal, p.76. .
48 Beyond Peacekeeping? _ Reflection on the Evolution oJ International
Peacekeeping After the Cold War'. by Dr Mats Berdal - a paper for the Japan Institute for International Affairs. ToA.yo, 2-3 June 1994, p. 6. Dr Berdal
expresses extreme scepticism Jor middle-ground theories ill this article.
49 You Call'! Have It Both Ways ill Bosnia, by William Pfaff -international