3 Foreign policy traditions, foreign policy towards Afghanistan, U.S. Afghan aid,
3.4 American interests in Afghanistan
American interests in Afghanistan can in many ways be compared with Truman’s speech cited in part 1.4: There was a militant minority (Al-Qaeda) threatening the stability in
Afghanistan, in addition also threatening the safety of American citizens in the USA. Foreign aid has also proven to be essential for the American ability to influence Afghan development.
What is more important in relation to the definition of self-interest is what Truman said of totalitarian regimes: “… totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples … undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.”121 This is what I have argued is a link between the Truman Doctrine and realpolitik and I argue that this is also applicable for the case of Afghanistan. The initial intervention in Afghanistan, as discussed earlier, was deeply rooted in the Jacksonian tradition in which one of two major goals of Jacksonianism is to provide security for American citizens. Because Al-Qaeda threatened the security of both international peace, and the security of American citizens, it is closely related to the American use of realpolitik, proven with the example of the Truman Doctrine, because the security issue created an incentive for action. This was a pragmatic decision forced to the surface by the terrorist attack in the USA. The American interest of security for its own citizens did, in the case of Afghanistan, enable an evolvement that exceeded the initial reasoning for intervention, leading to other strategies and goals for both spreading and protecting American interests. Specifically, the American interests evolved from providing security for American citizens to spreading American ideals.
As in the case of the Truman Doctrine, by re-building and assisting Afghan authorities, the U.S. government was able to actively exercise influence on the future development of the Afghan society, both economically and democratically. Referring to Williams, American bilateral relations in most cases are based on promoting American interests, so it is reasonable to assume it is also the case for Afghanistan. In William’s book (referenced in part 1.4) it was also possible to establish that his Weltanschauung had some important main points that also can be applied for the case of Afghanistan: “… A penchant for externalizing evil … [and] [a]n unshakable confidence in American Exceptionalism and American beneficence.”122 The first point is relatable because the belief that domestic issues are related, or have roots abroad, meant that action was necessary in order to address the issue of security at home. In the case of the terrorist attacks it is not possible to disagree with
121 Truman, "Recommendation for Assistance," 3.
122 Williams, Gardner, and Bacevich, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 319-20.
this belief, which lead to the intervention in Afghanistan. The second point is relatable because American exceptionalist thought is not necessarily related to expanding American territory, but the spread of American ideals is important because, to some, it provides the base for a better world.
The definition of self-interest in relation to foreign aid has within this thesis been defined as foreign aid allocated for other purposes than pure humanitarian help, in which it fulfils a goal of the political strategy being used. In that context some possible areas of self-interests will be discussed. One that will not be discussed further is American economic interest in Afghanistan because, as stated earlier, the withdrawal of American troops was arguably necessary in order to release funds that could help tackle domestic economic issues, but also because there seems to have been no economic advantages for the U.S. by investing in Afghanistan.
The first American interest is the U.S. government’s wish to correct the mistakes of the past, referring to how the U.S. government abandoned Afghanistan after aiding the Mujahedeen in the fight against the Soviet backed government. This was specifically mentioned in one of the Senate hearings cited in part 3.1, and seems to have become an argument for continued American support in Afghanistan, particularly regarding aid for civilians. The question then is, what does the U.S. government gain from this? In essence they could be able to forge a better relationship to both Afghan citizens and the Afghan authorities, but Afghanistan being a state ravaged by war for centuries, it is understandable that this relationship will take time to build, and it is dependent on American aid that is consistent and enables development. On the other hand, the use of the phrase ‘to correct the mistakes of the past’ may also be a strategic move by the U.S. government to be able to fulfil other American interests by constructing an initial trust between Afghan authorities and the U.S. government. There are particularly two American interests that may be fulfilled by using that strategy: Strategic interests and spreading American ideals.
American self-interest in the strategic positioning of Afghanistan can ultimately be summarized as geographical strategic interests, and the forging of friendly bonds to a state where the population predominantly are Muslims. American co-operation and forging of alliance with a predominantly Muslim state could potentially take the edge of some of the conflicting opinions between Western and Muslim states. It could work as a mitigating element against increasing hostility towards Western values. Building a Muslim state partly on Western ideals and forms of government, in which it actually functions well and enables development, can be a powerful tool, spreading incentive for similar states to perhaps
consider being willing to move in the same direction. Afghanistan’s geographic position is an important aspect of the strategic self-interest of the U.S. because it borders to both Iran and Pakistan. Having an allied state in that region could enable an increased degree of American pressure and control of those states via military co-operation with Afghanistan, as well as possibly building American military bases in Afghanistan. The latter does not seem to be within reach for a long time, but in the future, where the Afghan-American relationship possibly has strengthened, it may be an option the Afghan authorities and citizens would be able to support. Both these aspects of strategic interests are connected to two other interests that will be discussed at a later point: Stabilising the region, and forcing a closer co-operation with Pakistan (continuing the fight against extreme Islamism).
The second interest that can be related to correcting the mistakes of the past is as mentioned spreading American ideals, specifically freedom and democracy. As established in part 3.1 on American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, the development of the Afghan state, by introducing democratic principles, is an important goal of the American aid efforts in Afghanistan. It is not just a foreign policy goal, but it is related to foreign policy traditions through Wilsonianism, and in addition it is also observable in the results of the quantitative analysis, mainly by the extensive funding of nation-building projects. Nation-building
projects partly try to establish an Afghan identity, which could create acceptance between the different tribal societies, connecting it to social values. The society-building projects aim to build a pluralistic society based on citizenship in the current Western model. Although the society-building projects were the least prioritized in regard to the total amount of funding, there were definitively most society-building projects. The society-building goal of engaging the civic society could potentially help the mitigation between different communities. This connects nation- and society-building, possibly creating a mutual increase of effect for both strategies. Because the American effort to do both nation-building and society-building are so strong, and because those two ways of developing a society are based on creating
democracies through national identities and citizenship, there is a significant connection between the American effort to do nation- and society-building, and American self-interest.
Spreading American ideals is a combination of American Exceptionalism and
expansionism. The belief that America is an exceptional state with exceptional ideals that are set to life through the governmental system is in my opinion essential in the wish to spread these ideals. The ability to lead by example and to display that these ideals actually have a function is important for those that wish to spread them, but more so to those that the U.S.
government try to spread them to. Expansionism is a critical step in the process of spreading
these ideals abroad. If there was no willingness to spread democracy and freedom, these ideals would only appear in the USA, hence Wilsonianism seems to be an important factor, because it is based on spreading American ideals.
On the other hand, traits of Jacksonianism functions as incentive for the stabilisation of the Central Asia region. The stabilisation of the region is in a large degree connected to strategic interests, because stabilisation of Afghanistan will possibly provide for the physical security of American citizens by preventing a terrorist safe haven. These two aspects
intermingle in the sense that the means of stabilisation and strategic interests are potentially attained in the same way; by intervention to remove the old authoritarian regime with ties to a militant minority. This is off course what the U.S. government did in 2001, and by removing the Taliban government and developing the Afghan society towards a democracy, it was in large extent able to stabilise the region, also pushing Al-Qaeda to the brinks, meaning that they disabled the terrorist organisation’s ability to plan and execute attacks in the U.S. This strategy has not necessarily worked in the long run, but for the years researched it had a significant effect.
The efforts to dissolve Al-Qaeda lead to several of the organization’s leaders to hide in Pakistan, among them i.e. Osama bin Laden. Taliban leaders did the same, resulting in a difficult situation for the U.S. government to dismantle both groups entirely. This brings forward the point on strategic interest’s connection with forcing a closer co-operation with Pakistan. In the explanation of U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, I brought attention to the increasing focus on Pakistan during Senate hearings. The initial intervention in Afghanistan was not to put pressure on Pakistan, but as American policy and policy goals evolved over time according to the realpolitik strategy, there was established an increasing pressure on the Obama Administration to co-operate more with Pakistan. Both Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders were hiding in Pakistan, and the Pakistani authorities were not willing to extradite these persons. It would never have been an option to intervene in Pakistan because, even though it is not a state as developed as Western states, it has a significant degree of sovereignty, and among different vital aspects, it possesses nuclear weapons. The wish for increased co-operation, or perhaps influence on Pakistan, was rooted in the belief that Pakistan was a greater risk for American citizens security than Afghanistan was in the researched years 2010-2012.
The belief that Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan, was more important indicates that, in the U.S. government’s opinion, some of its most important interests in Afghanistan were realized, or that the U.S. policy goals had become exhausted and it was time for the U.S.
government move on to the next conflict. On the other hand, it could also be that the U.S.
government realized that the Jihadist insurgency was regional, or even global in nature, and therefore the vast amount of expenditure in Afghanistan was no longer logical. That does not mean that the American efforts in Afghanistan are completed, but the security aspect,
stabilising the state in such an extent that allows American withdrawal, must have been fulfilled in the view of the Obama Administration. The stabilisation of Afghanistan is also connected to the realization of building the Afghan state on democratic principles, and the ability to provide American citizens with physical security. The correction of past mistakes is still an interest that has not been fulfilled, as that will take many years and a lot of funding, but I will argue that if the U.S. government are willing to turn their aid projects towards nation-building again, it could possibly lead to a long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan with reasonable prospects of further development.