Chapter 2. Theory and literature
2.4. Ambition theory
This thesis is about the action of a political coalition. It therefore necessarily rests upon a certain set of assumptions about political behaviour. I do not pretend to, nor do I think it to particularly virtuous to be, loyal to any one set of theory when it comes to a matter as broad and complex as human behaviour, even when that behaviour is structured by powerful institutions like legislative chambers, elections and political culture. Yet I have found some of the insights of one theoretical perspective particularly insightful for my discussion of southern Senators and the Civil Rights Act of 1957.
Two months before the final vote on the Civil Rights Act, in June 1957, the
American economist Anthony Downs published what was to become a classic work in the field of political science. In An Economic Theory of Democracy Downs argued that both the electorate and their political representatives behave as utility-optimizing rational actors.36 Politicians and their parties are not driven by ideology or moral convictions, only the desire to acquire office and control of the state apparatus and the power, prestige and money that comes with it, motivates legislators and political coalitions, according to Downs.37 Thus, according to Downs, politicians formulate public policies and take positions on issues “strictly as a means of gaining votes.” 38 Consequentially, since the politicians running the government “wishes to maximize political support,” it (the government) carries out those acts or the spending which “gain the most votes, by means of those acts or financing which lose the fewest votes.” 39
Downs approach to political behaviour has of course not been accepted without criticism. Political scientists Robert Shapiro and Lawrence Jacobs contradicts Downs thesis on empirical grounds.40 They find that politicians are far more ideological and less opportunist, or rational, than assumed by Downs. While politicians do engage in hosts of different, and time-consuming, activities aimed at shaping public opinion, they also, according to Shapiro and Jacobs, stick to their guns when the electorate resists being
36 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Prentice Hall, 1997).
37 Ibid., 30.
38 Ibid., 137.
39 Ibid., 52.
40 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation And The Loss Of Democratic Responsiveness, 2nd edition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
convinced of supporting their policies. In Shapiro and Jacobs’s 2000 study, this is seen most clearly by the fact that elected officials very rarely change their positions on issues, even in the face of overwhelming public opinion. 41
While it is very plausible that politicians are not as calculating and single-minded on gaining and maintaining elected office as the only worthwhile goal as Downs argued, ambition theory remains central to understanding the behaviour of elected officials. This is in no small part the result of Joseph Schlesinger influential 1994-study Political parties and the winning of office. 42 According to Schlesinger, rational-choice theories are at an advantage when studying “well-defined structures such as markets or political competition, where individuals work to satisfy specific wants.”43 Schlesinger argues that individual ambitions for office is the force motivating politicians, and stresses that political institutions work because they make the self-interest of elected officials obvious to the voters.44 Where Downs all-but removes ideology from the equation, Schlesinger argues that politicians might very well hold strong moral and ideological views, in fact they are likely to do so, but that the winning of elected office still takes precedence over all other concerns.45 Only by winning office can principle be carried out into public policy.
Not only is winning office seen as the most efficient way for parties and individual candidates to forward their ideological goals, and get results for the constituency they seek to represent, the individuals inside parties responsible for success in the electoral market-place can according to Schlesinger be readily identified. 46 Interestingly for my purpose Schlesinger, specifically discusses the ambitions of U.S senators. Schlesinger finds that the reason why so many U.S. senators run for President can be found in the unique ability of the Senate due to its six-year terms, to allow its members to chase greater ambitions, without necessarily jeopardizing the position they already have. From 1900 to 1988 twenty of the twenty-five senators running for president or vice-president, faced no risk of losing their senate-seats. 47
Both Downs and Schlesinger can, in my view reasonably, be accused of overstating the impact of electoral calculation and underestimating the moral and
ideological components of political action. Yet when faced with a question like civil rights
41 Ibid.
42 Joseph A. Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).
43 Ibid., 6.
44 Ibid., 34.
45 Ibid., 14.
46 Ibid., 15.
47 Ibid., 57.
in mid-century America, it is far easier to be overwhelmed by the philosophical,
ideological and moral dimensions of the questions, and forget that no political question can be understood by isolating it from the political, electoral and legislative strategies of politicians and parties that considered it. I have therefore consulted these theoretical perspectives in no small part as a reminder not to lose sight of some core truths about politics and the political process.
Despite their limitations, the ambition theories of Downs and Schlesinger, provide key insights that I will use frequently in my discussion of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Ambition theory is particularly useful for understanding the Senate debate on civil rights in 1956 and 1957 because the key legislative coalition, and the subject of my discussion, the Southern bloc was a quite cohesive legislative coalition, at least when it came to civil rights,48 and furthermore a political bloc clearly trying to act in a strategic manner seeing their struggle against federal civil rights legislation as a long game. 49
48 Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder, “Limiting Liberalism.”
49 Finley, Delaying the Dream, 7.