The date for coming on stream and production regularity are important factors for project economics and significant indicators of the quality of project execution.
A production profile presented in the PDO provides the basis for present-value calculations.
Delayed start-up and lost production from shutdowns and reduced output mean postponed revenues and thereby weakened profitability.
Goliat was assumed to come on stream in the third quarter of 2013, but this was postponed until 12 March 2016 because of all the delays. Figure 6-15a shows accumulated production to the end of 2018 compared with the PDO assumption.
Figure 6-15. Production from Goliat. (Source: Acona)
Figure 6-15b presents daily production (monthly average) from coming on stream until the end of 2018 – about 34 months. As the figure shows, and as described in chapter 3.7, many and to some extent lengthy shutdowns have occurred. A lot of these have been HSE-related – HC alarms and leaks, power cuts, damage to loading hoses and so forth. Figure 6-16a presents the course of production day by day over the first eight months.
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Figure 6-16. Daily and accumulated production in relation to the PDO profile. (Source: Acona) Figure 6-16b presents accumulated production in relation to the PDO profile after a specified number of months. The shutdowns have caused big fluctuations, but the trend appears to have become better and more stable over the past 10 months. After 34 months, accumulated output is about 70 per cent of that given by the PDO profile over the period.
If production capacity is defined as the highest monthly average attained, capacity utilisation over the first 34 months can be said to have been 56 per cent.
Ivar Aasen was assumed to come on stream in the fourth quarter of 2016. It actually did so on 24 December 2016, only a couple of months behind the PDO assumption. Figure 6-17a presents accumulated production until 31 December 2018 compared with the PDO
assumption. This shows that, although output began a couple of months late, it has been a little higher than expected on average. At 31 December 2019, accumulated production was almost identical with the PDO assumption.
Figure 6-17b presents daily output (monthly average) from coming on stream until 31 December 2018 – about 25 months. Production from Ivar Aasen is affected to some extent by its relationship with Edvard Grieg through production agreements and power supply.
Accumulated output over the first 25 months was 109 per cent of the PDO profile over the same period – a very positive result which indicates good quality and a high level of safety.
If production capacity is defined as the highest monthly average attained, capacity utilisation over the first 25 months can be said to have been about 80 per cent. (Output from Ivar Aasen comprises oil, gas and NGL. The relationship between these sales products can vary over time.)
Figure 6-17. Production from Ivar Aasen. (Source: Acona)
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Aasta Hansteen was assumed to come on stream in the third quarter of 2017, but did so on 16 December 2018 – more than a year behind the PDO date. Figure 6-18 shows accumulated output of export gas until 31 March 2019 compared with the PDO assumption.
Production from Aasta Hansteen comprises gas and condensate, and the relationship between these products will vary over time. Figure 6-18 presents daily gas exports (monthly average) for December 2018-March 2019 – about 3.5 months.
The accumulated volume of export gas in this period was 1.234 Gscm. Condensate output in the same period was 21 520 scm.
If production capacity is defined as the highest monthly average attained, capacity utilisation over the first 3.5 months can be said to have been 51 per cent.
Figure 6-18. Production from Aasta Hansteen. (Source: Acona)
Goliat production has been weak compared with the PDO assumptions. To begin with, start- up was delayed by 28 months. Once on stream, output in the first 34 months was about 70 per cent of the PDO profile over the same period. Many of the shutdowns can be attributed to HSE-related incidents. This had big negative consequences for revenues, but the safety systems/barriers have functioned so that incidents never threatened to escalate.
Production from Ivar Aasen began only a couple of months behind the date assumed in the PDO. Output has been good, and the accumulated quantity after 25 months is virtually identical with the PDO assumptions. While the project’s execution plan was tight and demanding, the final six months of preparations for coming on stream were characterised by good planning and control. The rapid production build-up, with good regularity, is an indication that the shortage of time did not undermine quality and safety.
Aasta Hansteen came on stream after a 15-month delay in relation to the PDO assumption.
Following some running-in problems primarily attributable to cleaning and starting up wells, the field is now producing at full capacity. Gas exports in March 2019 averaged 22.6 Mscm/
day, which means Aasta Hansteen reached full capacity just 2.5 months after start-up.
6.3.1 HSE in the production phase
The Goliat platform’s many safety challenges in the production phase have attracted great attention in the Norwegian media. Much time has been devoted to following up the project and operator by the PSA, which has resorted to enforcement powers not commonly deployed against operator companies and licensees.
Eni’s operations organisation faced major challenges on taking over the facility. This was primarily because an integrated operations team had not been adequately involved in the engineering, construction and completion phases, but also reflected the methods used by Eni’s completion management in South Korea to conceal all types of deficiencies – including safety-critical ones.
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This meant that the operations organisation took over a facility where it was not possible in practice to establish a complete overview of all the faults and deficiencies. Despite all the work devoted to corrective measures from arrival in Norway in 2015 until consent to come on stream was obtained in 2016, the platform still had substantial hidden shortcomings.
The deficiencies eventually came to light from unexpected shutdowns. Over time, the field operators became more familiar with the design details and got the causes under control.
Goliat represents an important income source for Eni Norge (now Vår Energi), which the operations team is naturally aware of this at all times. In addition, the team experienced heavy and direct pressure from the company’s central management to establish high and stable production from day one.
Goliat operations opted to try and balance its handling of the dilemma by staying on stream while correcting identified faults. However, this meant that the quantity of registered faults increased far more than the number of corrections performed.
The Goliat operations team has faced fairly substantial challenges in securing sufficient latitude to repair all faults and deficiencies. This has led the PSA to issue several orders to implement measures and to order a shutdown until the identified safety-critical faults had been corrected. Several orders have been unusual, including telling Eni to change priorities so that attention focused on safety and requesting Statoil’s assessment of the condition of the electrical systems on the FPSO (Statoil is the only partner in the Goliat licence).
In interviews, Goliat operations has said that the PSA’s orders had a legitimising effect in relation to resource allocation so that necessary repairs and other corrective measures could be implemented. That underlines the special challenge this organisation has had in getting support from the management of its own company. The last PSA order given to Goliat was in December 2018, based on an audit of Eni Norge earlier that autumn. From 10 December, Eni Norge and Point Resources merged to form Vår Energi AS. Nothing has so far emerged which suggests that the new operator will not manage to give safety the necessary priority.
The Aasta Hansteen platform had only been in operation for a short time when this study was completed. Equinor is the NCS operator with by far the greatest experience of running offshore facilities, and has therefore had no need to develop a dedicated management system for this field. It is utilising its established and well-proven solution for running offshore facilities, where managing HSE is an integrated component.
Equinor also has the advantage of a large organisation to recruit personnel from for all phases of a development. Where the operations team is concerned, this ensures access to relevant experience. That increases the organisation’s robustness and can be important if special challenges arise. The platform faced some minor challenges in the start-up phase which affected production, but which have had no impact on HSE.
At the present moment, the Ivar Aasen development has a good two years of production behind it. The platform gets power from Edvard Grieg, and has experienced more or less planned suspension of these supplies. Losing main power has not affected safety on the platform, and Ivar Aasen generates sufficient electricity itself to keep comfort functions going until power deliveries resume. The decision to install a main generator of its own was taken after the PSA audited the design of the platform’s electrical system, and the
operations management has confirmed that this has had great positive significance.
Over these two years, modification projects have been implemented on the platform along with remote operation. This work has largely been conducted in parallel with regular operation without reports of any special HSE incidents or challenges. Nor has the merger of Det Norske and BP Norge to create Aker BP in 2016 had any significant negative effects on platform operation. After the merger, the company has rapidly implemented restructurings of its key management systems and procedures. Ivar Aasen’s operations organisation has given priority to meeting its production goals and to implementing projects as planned while simultaneously maintaining satisfactory HSE management. The consequence of shielding platform operation from certain key changes is that not all governing documents and systems used on Ivar Aasen accord with Aker BP’s centrally.
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