The ASEAN climate and energy paradox

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Energy and Climate Change

journalhomepage:www.elsevier.com/locate/egycc

The ASEAN climate and energy paradox

Indra Overland

^a^,^∗

, Haakon Fossum Sagbakken

^a

, Hoy-Yen Chan

^b

, Monika Merdekawati

^b

, Beni Suryadi

^b

, Nuki Agya Utama

^b

, Roman Vakulchuk

^a

aNorwegian Institute of International Aﬀairs (NUPI), NUPI, C.J Hambros Plass, 0139, Oslo, Norway

bASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE), Soemantri Brodjonegoro II Building, 6th ﬂ., Directorate General of Electricity, Jl. HR. Rasuna Said Blok X-2, Kav. 07-08, Jakarta 12950, Indonesia

a b s t r a c t

Thisarticlecarriesoutamultisectoralqualitativeanalysis(MSQA)andpolicyintegrationanalysisofsixsectorsimportantforclimatemitigationinSoutheastAsia inordertoassessthestatusoftheclimate-energynexusintheregion.ItconcludesthatSoutheastAsiawillbeheavilyaﬀectedbyclimatechangebutthemitigation eﬀortsofthememberstatesoftheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)areincommensuratewiththethreattheyface.Theirnationallydetermined contributionsundertheParisAgreementaremodest,theyhavealowproportionofrenewableenergyintheirenergymixes,amodesttargetforraisingtheshareof renewableenergyandtheyarenotlikelytoreachthistarget.TheASEANcountrieshavealsobeenslowtoadoptelectricvehiclesandtoaccedetotheInternational RenewableEnergyAgency(IRENA),whilecontinuingtoburntheirforests,channelsubsidiestofossilfuelsandinvestinnewcoalpowerplants.IfASEANaccelerated decarbonization,itcouldseizebusinessopportunities,secureitsstandingintheinternationalpoliticalsystemandclimatejusticediscussions,andincreaseitschances ofreachingtheUnitedNationsSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs).

1. Introduction

ThispaperbuildsontheconceptofaparadoxinASEAN’senergy policiesandclimateambitionsintroducedbyShi(2016)[1].Itstarts withapreliminarydiscussionofclimatevulnerabilityandthenationally determinedcontributions(NDCs)of theASEANmemberstatesunder theParisAgreement.Theparadoxisfurtherexploredthoughasystem- aticreviewofsixkeysectorswherethecontradictionbetweenASEAN climatevulnerabilityanddecarbonizationeﬀortsarenotable:(1)thede- velopmentofrenewableenergy;(2)handlingofemissionsinthetrans- portationsector;(3)coalpowerdevelopments;(4)fossilfuelsubsidies;

(5)forestmanagement; (6)theroleoftheASEANcountriesinglobal cleanenergycooperation.

The analytical framework for this paper draws on two separate strandsofliterature:multisectoralqualitativeanalysis(MSQA)andpol- icyintegrationanalysis.ThepurposeofMSQAistocomparestrengths andweaknessesacrossmultiplesectors[2–4].Thepurposeofpolicyin- tegrationanalysisistoassesswhetherpoliciesindiﬀerentsectorsare commensuratewitheachother[5–7].Policyintegrationanalysisisof- tencarriedoutwhenthereisaneedtoovercomepolicyincoherence, sometimesreferredtoas“silos”,forexamplebetweenclimateanden- ergypolicies[8–10].

Thisframeworkwaschosentomakeitpossibletobringtogetherin onediscussionthedisparateclimateandenergyissuesintheASEAN memberstatesandtobeabletodrawoverarching,policy-relevantcon- clusions.Thesemethodologicalchoicesalsomakeitpossibletoproduce somethingdiﬀerentfromandcomplementarytothemanyhighquality,

∗Correspondingauthor.

E-mailaddress:[email protected](I.Overland).

highlytechnicalandoftennarrowstudiesofenergyissuesinSoutheast Asia[11–14].Whilesuchstudiesproducerigorousinsightsintospeciﬁc issues[15–20],thereisagapintheliteratureintermsoflayingthebasis foroverarchingpolicyrecommendationsfortheASEANmemberstates.

1.1. SoutheastAsiaisvulnerabletoclimatechange

ClimatechangeisprojectedtohaveanoutsizedimpactontheASEAN memberstates,threateningtheirprosperityandwelfare.Theregionis oneofthemostvulnerabletoclimatechangeglobally.Myanmar,the Philippines,Thailand,andVietnamarealreadyamongthe10statesin theworldthathavesufferedthemostinhumanandmaterialtermsfrom climate-relatedweathereventsoverthepast20years[21].According tothe2020issueoftheGlobalClimateRiskIndex(GCRI),thePhilip- pineswasthe2ndmostaffectedcountryfromsucheventsin2018[22], sufferingdamagesofUSD4.5billionthatyearalone.In2015,theAsian DevelopmentBankpredictedthatclimatechangehasthepotentialto cuttheregion’sGDPby11%bytheendofthe21stcentury[23](see Table1forasummaryoftherisks).Lookingahead,theSoutheastAsian countriesface theprospectof increasinglysevere flooding,more ex- tremeweatherevents[24],andlarge-scalelossoffertilecoastalland.

Thiswillinturnimpacttheirwatersupply[25]andagriculture[26]. SoutheastAsia’svulnerabilitytoclimatechangeisrootedinthere- gion’suniquegeography[27].Mostoftheregion’smainlandpopulation livesinlow-lyingplainsorcoastalriverdeltas.Themajorislandstates, IndonesiaandthePhilippines,haveover54,000and36,000kmofcoast- linerespectively,andmostoftheirinhabitantsliveincoastalareas.Sea levelrisemaythereforehavemajorconsequencesforASEAN:ifallthe

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egycc.2020.100019

Received10March2020;Receivedinrevisedform11October2020;Accepted18November2020 Availableonline24November2020

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Table1

Climate-relatedrisksinSoutheastAsia.

Climate and geography Socioeconomic

• Rising sea level

• Frequent and more severe ﬂooding

• Increased extremity of weather events

• Loss of fertile coastal land

• Negative impact on irrigation systems

• Large general economic losses (11% of GDP by 2100)

• Severe impact on agriculture and ﬁsheries

• Rising unemployment

• Higher domestic, intra-regional and inter-regional migration

• Negative impact on urban centers

• Rising food insecurity and hunger

• Rising poverty

• Severe health risks

• Spread of diseases

iceonGreenlandmelts,globalsealevelswillriseby7m.Inthemost extremescenario,ifAntarctica’sicemelts,sealevelswillriseby65m [28].Risingsealevelswillintensifydomestic,intra-regionalandinter- regionalmigration,exacerbatingsocial,economicandpoliticalrisksto memberstates.

However,fortheASEANeconomies,evenaminorsealevelriseis athreat.WhileSingaporehassofarsuccessfullyadaptedbyreclaiming landandenhancingcoastalbarriers,thelargerASEANstatesfaceimme- diatechallengeswhichmaybemoredifficulttosolve.Forinstance,the MekongDeltacurrentlymeetsover50%ofVietnamesericedemand,yet thisricebaskethasrecentlybeenfoundtohaveonlyameanelevation abovesea-levelofonly0.8m,contrarytotheexistingofficialestimate of2.6m[29].This underlinestheprecarityofrelyingonadaptation strategiessuchasdikesandbarriers,ashashithertobeenthestrategy forpreventingthesalinizationofthedelta[30].Withameaneleva- tionof3m,partsofMyanmar’sIrrawaddyDeltafacesimilarchallenges [31].Thailandtoo,asamajorglobalriceexporter,isvulnerable[32]. TheagriculturallyproductiveanddenselypopulatedChaoPhrayaDelta isthreatenedbysalinization[33].AlsoCambodia’slowmeanelevation leavesitvulnerabletofloodingfromtheprojectedsea-levelrise.

MostofSoutheastAsia’sfertilelandislocatedincoastalareas[34]. Withoutmajortechnologicalimprovementstoreduceclimatevulnera- bility,the2100riceyieldsofIndonesia,thePhilippines,Thailand,and Vietnamcoulddropby50%from1990-levels[35].Despiteanemerging trendofregionaltechnicalcooperationtoenhancetheclimateresilience ofASEANagriculture[36],thelossofkeylow-lyingagriculturalareas indenselypopulatedandpartlymountainouscountrieswouldhavea seriousimpactonfoodproduction.Similarly,thefisheriesarelikelyto undergoseriousnegativechangesinvolvingrisksforfoodsecurityin theregion[37,38]. Alongwithhotterdryseasons ininlandareas of stateslikeCambodia[39,40]andMyanmar[41],whereover60million inhabitantsstillfacefoodinsecurity[42],thiscouldthreatenregional progresstowardsSustainableDevelopmentGoal(SDG)2,whichcon- cernshunger.Itmayalsomakeitmoredifficulttoreduceunemploy- ment(SDG8),asalargeshareofASEAN’spopulationisemployedin agriculture,forestry,andthefisheries,allof whicharevulnerableto climatechange[27].

Therapidurbanization[43]intheASEANmemberstatesmagniﬁes theimpactofclimate-inducedenvironmentalhazardsonmajorpopula- tioncenters.MajorcitieslikeBangkok,HoChiMinhCity,Manila,and Yangonarehighlyvulnerabletoevenmoderatesea-levelrise[44].In- donesiaisalreadygrapplingwiththis;thegovernmentdecidedin2019 torelocatethecityfromtheislandofJavatoEastKalimantan,partly becausenorthJakartaissinkingduetothecombinationoflandsub- sidenceandsealevelrise[45].Thenewcapital’spricetagisatleast USD33billion[45].EventhePrimeMinisterofSingapore,whichisrel- ativelywell-equippedtoadapttoclimaterisksintermsofwealthand governance[21],warnedthat“forus,climatechangeisexistential” in his2019NationalDayRallyspeech[46].Apartfromtherisingsealevel

posingathreattotheislandstate’ssmallanddenselypopulatedterri- tory,temperaturesarerisingtwiceasfastinSingaporeasintherestof theworld,creatinghealthrisksinthehumidtropicalenvironment[47]. 2. SoutheastAsianeﬀortstomitigateclimatechange

Iflarge-scalenegativeimpactsofclimatechangearetobeavoided, theglobaltemperaturerisemustbelimitedto1.5°C.Inordertoreach thisgoal,non-fossilenergysourcesmustmeet80%ofglobalprimaryen- ergydemandalreadyby2030,and100%by2050[48].Thiscanonlybe achievedifallcountriesmakeasigniﬁcantcontribution.Thatgivesrise tothequestionthatdrivestheremainderofthisarticle:isthecontribu- tionoftheASEANmemberstatestothemitigationofclimatechange commensuratewiththethreatthatclimatechangeposestothemaslaid outintheﬁrstpartofthearticle?

2.1. Nationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)

TheNDCsoftheASEANmembersstatesundertheParisAgreement do notstand outasparticularlyambitious(seeTable2).Targetsare characterizedbyanemphasisoncontinuingemissionsgrowthforthe foreseeablefuture.OnlySingaporehassetagoalofemissionspeaking ataspeciﬁcpointintime,andthatisnotbefore2030[49].However, eveninSingapore’scasethisishedgedwiththemodiﬁer“around” and itisnotclearhowmanyyearsofdivergencethatallows.Chinaalsoaims topeakitsemissionsthatsameyear[50].However,Chinaisoneofthe world’sfastestgrowingdevelopingeconomieswithamuchlowerGDP percapitathanSingapore,possessinglargedomesticfossilfuelreserves andmorecomplexindustryandinfrastructure.

Moreover,theASEANNDCsareunlikelytobeachievedwithcurrent policies.Initsbusinessasusual(BAU)scenarioproducedin2017,the ASEANCenterforEnergy(ACE)predictedthattheregion’sCO2emis- sionspercapitawouldincrease140%between2015and2040[51].This wouldderailbothregionalandglobalclimateeﬀorts.Researchersatthe MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology(MIT)estimatedthattheregion mustloweritsemissionsby11%relativetothecurrenttrajectoryjustto meetthegoalsofitsmoderateNDCs[52].However,asACEforecasts, evenifthenationalrenewableenergyandenergyeﬃciencytargetssetin 2015wereachieved,ASEAN’semissionspercapitawouldriseby50%

by2040[51].Bycontrast,India,apoorercountrythanmost ASEAN states,hasrecentlyreviseditsNDCpowergenerationtargetaftermak- ingrapidprogressonthedeploymentofrenewablesinthepastyears.

Indiaisontracktomeetits(alsomodest[53])NDC,whichisdeemedin linewithlimitingwarmingto2°C,andtheIndiangovernmenthasstated thatitwillconsidermakingthetargetsmoreambitious[54].AlsoPak- istanhasrecentlyraiseditsambitions,aimingforsolarandwindpower combinedtoproduce20%ofelectricityby2025[55].Bycontrast,none ofthelargerASEANstatesarelikelytomeettheirNDCsifthecurrent energyplansareimplemented[56]andtheIEAestimatedthatcurrent policieswouldleadtotheregion’sCO2emissionsincreasingseventimes asfastastheglobalaverageduringtheperiod2018–2040[56]. 2.2. Renewableenergy

Despite positive publicstatements at both national andmultina- tionallevels,ASEAN’sprogressonadoptingrenewableenergyhasbeen outpacedbytheregion’srapaciousenergydemand.Duringtheperiod 2000–2018,fossilfuelsaccountedfor85%ofthegrowthinprimaryen- ergydemandandtheshareofrenewablesin theprimaryenergymix stagnated[56,57].

ASEANaimsforrenewablesourcestoaccount for23%oftheregion’stotalprimaryenergysupply(TPES)by2025.However,ASEAN hasweakenedthistargetbyputtingthequaliﬁerer"aspirational"infront ofitandtheIEAandotherobserverspredictthatitwillnotbereached [58],asthecurrentnationalenergypolicyframeworksarestillcentered onfossilfuels[56].Renewablescovered15%ofregionalenergydemand

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Table2

ASEANNDCsundertheParisagreement.

Conditional emissions reduction targets

Unconditional emissions reduction targets Ref. point Target year

Indonesia 41% 29% BAU 2030

Myanmar — 20% electricity saving, 30% RE in rural electriﬁcation, 9.4 GW hydroelectric,

260,000 units of energy eﬃcient cookstoves, 30% reserved and protected forest BAU 2030

Thailand 25% 20% BAU 2030

Malaysia 45% (per unit of GDP) 35% (per unit of GDP) 2005 2030

Singapore — 36% (per unit of GDP) 2005 2030

Brunei — 63% energy consumption reduction, 10% renewables in primary energy mix 2035

Philippines 70% – BAU 2030

Vietnam 25% 8% BAU 2030

Laos — 30% RE in energy consumption, 191 ktCO2e/year from transportation, 16,284 ktCO2 avoidance from hydroelectricity, 70% forest cover

2000–2015 2015–2030

Cambodia — 27% BAU 2030

Datasource:UNFCCC2020[1].

in2019,so23%by2025isnotanunreasonabletarget,alsoconsidering thattheEUhadaratioof16.7%[59]in2015andaimsfor32%by2030.

TheEUtargetisbindingformemberstates,andevensomeoftheEU’s poorestmembers—includingBulgaria,Greece,andLithuania—areal- readyoverperforming[60].ACEpredictedin2017thatwithoutchanges incurrentpolicies,renewableswouldconstituteonly13%ofTPESby 2040[51].TheInternationalRenewableEnergyAgency(IRENA)sim- ilarlypredictsashortfallinrenewableenergydeploymentin ASEAN, risingtoonly17%ofTPESby2025[61].Thesameorganizationesti- matedin2018thatrenewableslooklikelytomeetonly21%ofASEAN energydemandby2040,withpowergenerationaccountingforthebulk ofGHG-emissionsasgrowingelectricitydemand willbemetbycoal [56].

IfitseemsunfairtocompareASEANtotheEU,onecaninsteadcom- pareittoemergingeconomiesinotherpartsoftheworld.Nicaragua standsoutforaimingtomakealeapfroma50%shareofrenewablesin thepowermixin2013to90%in2020[62].Evenmoreimpressively,the Guatemalansaimforan80%shareofrenewables,inacountrywhere fossilfuelsmadeup85%ofelectricitygenerationcapacitylessthana decadeago[63].

Theinstalledcapacityofnon-hydropowerrenewablesforelectricity productioninASEANgrewfrom6to15GWbetween2000and2016but madesignificantlylessprogressthanmostotherregionsandcountries inAsia[64].Forexample,Pakistanincreaseditsinstalledsolarpower capacityfrom4to1568MWbetween2009and2018[64].Bycompari- son,Indonesia’ssolarpowercapacityrosefrom13to60MWduringthe sameperiod[64],despitepoliciesthataimedhigher[65].Solarpower stillrepresentsanegligibleshareofelectricityproductionin2020.The relativeshareofrenewablesintheprimaryenergymixisprojectedto remainlowwithcurrentpolicy-frameworksduetotherapidgrowthof aggregatedemand[51].Thisisdespitethefactthatthelevelizedcostof electricity(LCOE)ofsolarPVinASEANfellby65%between2013and 2018[56].However,theLCOEofsolarpowerremained90%higherin ASEANthanChinaorIndia[61],indicatingthatpolicyimplementation andcostreductioneffortswillbeneededtoaccelerateASEAN’senergy transition[63].SomeASEANstatesaremakingprogressindeploying renewables[63,64,67],buttheirgrowthwillneedtoaccelerateanddi- versifysignificantlyiftheregionistomeetitsclimatecommitments [68–74].Vietnamhassubstantiallyexpandeditsuseofhydropowerin recentyears,meetingupto37%ofitselectricitydemandin2017[57]. Similarly,Laoshasexpandeditshydropowercapacity,mainlyforex- portpurposes.Forstateswithsmallerhydropowerresources,fossilfuel sourcescontinuetodominate:renewableenergyaccountedforapprox- imately5%of installedelectricitygenerationcapacityin Malaysiain 2017[75].Alreadyin2018,theIndonesianMinisterforEnergyandMin- eralResourcespubliclyadmittedthatIndonesiawasunlikelytomeetthe targetof23%renewablesby2025[61].Renewablesaccountedfor23%

ofPhilippineelectricityproductionin2018[76],butgenerationfrom

coalhasdoubledsince2011,andin2018accountedfor53%[76].Solar powerrepresentedonly1.35%ofelectricityproductioninthecountryin 2018[76],whichissurprisingconsideringthatfossilfuelimportdepen- dencycontributestomakingthenationalelectricityrateAsia’shighest [77].

SomebelievethatsolarpowerinASEANwillalwaysbeprohibitively expensive becausetheASEAN countrieshave lessperfectconditions thantheMiddleEasterncountriesthathaveachievedthelowestprices sofar.Itistruethattheconditionsintropical,lowcloud-cover,densely populatedASEANareasigniﬁcantdisadvantagecompared totheex- tremelyfavorableconditionsinthesparselypopulateddesertcountries oftheMiddleEast.However,ifGermanycouldundergoasolarrevolu- tionwithitshighpopulationdensityandNorthEuropeanclimatewith anaverageof1000kWh/m²ofsolarradiation[78],thensocanequato- rialASEANwithinsolationlevelsbetween1460and1892kWh/m2.The realachievablecostforsolarpowerinASEANcannotbeknownuntilthe ASEANcountriesestablishanattractivebusinessclimateforrenewable energyinvestmentandtryoutthelarge-scale,long-termauctionsthat havebroughtdramaticpricereductionsinotherpartsoftheworld.

HydropowerexpansionwasanaturalchoiceforseveralASEANcoun- tries between2010and2020: itis lessdependent onnoveltechnol- ogy, special incentives for foreigninvestment, or policy adaptation.

ThedominanceofcheaphydropowerinLaos,Myanmar,andVietnam, coupledwithinsufficientgovernmentfinancialcapabilitiestosupport the introductionof otherrenewable energysourcesuntil theyreach a critical massto become financially self-sustaining hasmade non- hydropowerrenewableenergyunattractiveforinvestors[79,80].Viet- nam’shydropowerpotentialisnowalmostexhausted[79],andtoavoid importdependence,thecountryisexpandingitsuseofdomesticcoal reserves[81].However,unlikeIndonesia,Vietnamesereservesarein- sufficienttopreventitbecomingalargenetimporteroverthecoming decades[82]. Thus,thelimitedinvestment inwindandsolarpower, evenconsideringthegrowthobserved in2019[83],over timecould hurtVietnam’senergysecurityaswellasitstradebalance.

Fig.1highlightsASEAN’ssluggishprogressondiversifyingitsrenew- ableenergyresourcesbeyondhydropower.Neglectoflong-term,robust investmentschemesacrossASEANhaslimitedwindandsolartominor roles,andgeothermalsourcesareonlyavailableinafewstates.There- fore,unlikehydropower,theirpotentialremainslargelyuntappedacross ASEAN[84].CambodiaandMyanmararestillplanningtolaunchre- newableenergystrategiestoenhanceruralelectriﬁcation,althoughlack ofﬁnancingandtechnicalcompetenceremainobstacles[56,69,72].So- phisticatedpolicyinstrumentsinMalaysia[85,86]didboostsolarpower investmentintheearly2010s[61,87],butriskperceptionsamongin- vestorsandlingeringfossilfuelsubsidies[85]havehamperedsustained growthinrecentyears.Malaysiaalongtimeenergyexporter,nowfaces theprospectofbecominganetenergyimporterunlessitmassivelyex- pandsrenewables,whichwillrequirerigorouspolicyimplementation

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Fig.1. AggregateinstalledcapacityofrenewableenergysourcesinASEAN,excludinghydropower(datasource:IRENA2019).

andreassurancesforinvestors.Thailandistheexceptiontotherule, havingseenstrongerandmoreconsistentgrowthinsolarpowerthan itsneighbors[66,88].

2.3. Electriﬁcationoftransportation

Alackofproactivepolicymakinghasalsoplayedapartinpreventing theASEANmemberstatesfrommakingprogressonlimitingemissions fromtheirrapidlygrowingtransportationsectors.Transportationhas thelowestpenetrationofrenewablesinanyenergysub-sectorinASEAN [51,89],andaccountedfor27%oftheregion’sCO2-emissionsin2018 [57].Emissionsofnitrogenoxides(NO_x),chieﬂyoriginatingfromoil useintransportation,werein2019projectedtogrowby40%by2040 [57].

Widespreadadoptionofelectricvehicles(EVs)wouldreducemicro- levelpollutioninSoutheastAsiancities.However,ascoalisthemarginal fuelforelectricitygenerationinmostASEANmemberstates—thatisto say,theﬁrstsourcethatisreducedorincreasedwhenelectricitycon- sumptionchanges—electriﬁcationoftransportationinASEANmightin factleadtogreateroverallairpollutionandgreenhouseemissionsinthe ASEANcountries[90].

Analternativetoelectriﬁcationof thetransportationsector is in- creaseduseofbiofuels.However,thiscouldleadtothedecimationof rainforestsandwildlifeinSoutheastAsia.Asrainforestsareimportant carbonsinks,itwouldagainmeanthatASEANwouldunderperformin termsofclimatemitigationundertheParisAgreement.Asrainforests arealsocrucialforglobalbiodiversity,symbolicallyimportantinglobal aﬀairs,andresistancetopalmoilisrisingaroundtheworld,therepu- tationalcostsfortheASEANmemberstatescouldalsobeconsiderable.

Furthermore,biofuelswouldnothelpreducethelocalairpollutionand traﬃccongestionchallenges.

Theobvioussolutionthenwouldappeartobegreateremphasison publictransportation infrastructure.Thiswouldservetolimitfurther trafficcongestion:asfour-wheelvehicleownershiprisesintheregion, trafficcongestionislikelytoworsenunlessconvenientalternativeforms ofurbanpersonaltransportationaremadeavailable.SomeSoutheast Asiancountriesareshowingpromiseinthisregard,despiteseverede- lays[91],andtheASEANgovernmentsmightbenefitfromobserving andlearningfromeachother.Forexample,thehighlydevelopedpublic

transitsystemsinBangkokandSingaporecouldbeemulatedbyother citiesintheregion.

2.4. Subsidiesforfossilfuels

FossilfuelsubsidiesamountedtoUSD35billioninASEANin2018 [56].ThiscontrastswithASEAN’sinvestmentinrenewableenergythat yearofslightlymorethanUSD7billion[151].Despiteimprovingre- newableenergyincentives,fossilfuelsubsidiesinseveralASEANstates haveunderminedthecompetitivenessofrenewableenergyinelectricity generation[1].

Whileofficiallyintendedtosupportlow-incomecitizens,fossilfuel subsidies tend tostrongly benefithigher-income households (which havehigherenergyconsumption)andindustrialconsumerswhiledrain- ingfiscalresources[92].Forexample,inIndonesia,fossilfuelsubsidies wereequalto11%ofGDPin2015[93].Thegovernmentdecidedto removegasolinesubsidiesin2016,savingtheIndonesianstatebudget USD8billion[93].Thesesavingswerespentoninfrastructuredevelop- mentandsocialprogramsacrossthecountry.However,whenoilprices startedgrowingagainandstrainingconsumersin2017,theIndonesian government cavedin andadoptednewfuelsubsidies[93]. By2018, Indonesiawasagainthefifthlargestfossilfuelsubsidizerintheworld [94].Fig.2highlightsIndonesia’sroleasASEAN’smainfuelsubsidizer andalsoshowsthatcumulativeregionalsubsidiesbetween2010and 2018amountedtooverUSD322billion.

2.5. Rapidexpansionofcoalpower

SoutheastAsiawasoneofveryfewregionsintheworldinwhich coal’sshareinelectricityproductiongrewin2018[56].EventheUnited States,whichhadoneoftheworld’smostclimate-skepticgovernments andhaddeclaredthatitwouldexittheParisAgreement,waspivot- ingawayfromcoal[95].Bycontrast,between2010and2015,ASEAN added25GWofcoalcapacity,accountingfor42%oftotaladdedelec- tricitygenerationcapacityduringthisperiod[96](seeFig.3).

Whileglobaldemandforcoalwillremainﬂat,itisexpectedtogrow 3%peryearinASEANupto2040[56].Coalisprojectedtoaccountfor over50%ofelectricityproductioninVietnamby2030[96].Italready accountsformorethan50%ofelectricityproductioninthePhilippines [76]andinlate2017thecountryhadover10GWofnewcoalpowerin thepipeline[97].EvenLaos,whichhashistoricallybeenalmostwholly

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Fig.2.FossilfuelconsumptionsubsidiesinASEANstates,2010–2018(sourceofdata:IEA,2018).

Fig.3.ExistingandaddedcoalpowercapacityinASEAN,2008–2017 (sourceofdata:ACE[98]).

reliantonhydropower forelectricity,hasseen coal-fueledelectricity productionrisefromnegligibleamountstoover10000GWhin2017 [98].By2030,itisprojectedthatcoalwillovertakenaturalgas,aless dirtyfuel,asthemainpowersourceinASEAN[56].Ifthetrendcontin- ues,coalwillaccountforalmost50%ofASEAN’sprojected2.4gigatons ofCO2emissionsin2040[56].

Thesedevelopmentsareparadoxicalforseveralreasons.First,only Indonesiahassuﬃcientcoalreservestoavoidimportsinthelong-term.

IntheotherASEANcountries,therisingcoalconsumptionwillincreas- inglyalsobecomeaburdenonthetradebalance.Second,renewables arerapidlybecomingcost-eﬃcientworldwideandmayleavecoalassets strandedandinvestmentslost.IthasbeenestimatedthatinIndonesia, thePhilippines,andVietnamitwillbecheapertobuildnewsolarpower thannewcoalplantsby2022;andby2029itwillbecheapertobuild newsolarpowerthantousealreadybuiltcoalplantsinallthreecoun- tries[99–102].Third,coalmayalsobedetrimentalfortourism,whichis

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oneofthemainsourcesofforeigncurrencyearningsandemployment insmall-andmedium-sizedenterprisesinSoutheastAsia.Fourth,the adverselocalhealth[103],harvest[104]andenvironmentaleffectsof coal-firedpowerplantsarewell-known,threateningtoderailASEAN’s trajectorytoachieveSDG4,concerninghealth.One recentstudyput excessannualdeathsresultingfromcoalemissionsinASEANataround 20000,whichwithcurrentenergyplanswouldrisetonearly70000 in2030[105].Airpollutionisthesecond-leadingglobalcauseofnon- communicablediseases,accountingfor1.36milliondeathsinIndone- siaalonein2016,equivalentto73%ofalldeathsinthecountry[106]. Thus,thecurrentenergytrajectorymighthaveunintendedsocialcon- sequencesrelatedtopublichealth[107],whichisanotherSDGtarget thatASEANlooksunlikelytoachieve.Fifth,manyinvestmentsinSouth- eastAsiancoalpowerplantsaremadebyChinesefirms,whoselimited engagementwithlocalcommunitiesaggravatelocalskepticism[108].

ThereisvocallocaloppositiontosomecoalpowerprojectsinIndone- sia,thePhilippines,andThailand[109].InThailand,thishascausedthe authoritiestoreconsidertheviabilityofcoal.Ascoalisunpopularwith partsofthepopulation,anddomesticgasreservesaredwindling,the Thaigovernmentfacesachoiceastowhethertoimportmorecoaland naturalgasorexpandtheroleofrenewables[110].Thisisachoicethat mostASEANstateswillface.

2.6. Forestmanagement

While the ASEAN member states have expanded coal utilization swiftly,actiontohaltthedeforestation hasbeenslow,althoughim- provingrecently.LaosandVietnamhavesettargetsforforestcover- age of their territories at70% and45%respectively. Indonesiastill hasoneofthehighest deforestationrates intheworld, eventhough improvedlawenforcementandlegalprotections[111]havelowered itsomewhat[112]afteryearsofineﬃcientpolicies[113–116],public discontent[117],andinternationalpressure.Regionalcooperationhas inadequatelyfocusedonprotectingtheforestsinIndonesiatoprevent localsmog[113,116],yettheburningofforestsanddrainingofpeat- lands[118–123]alsoraisesIndonesia’stotalemissionstoalevelthat makesitthethirdlargest GHG-emitterintheworldafterChinaand theUSA[112].Meanwhile,Myanmar’sdeforestationrateisoneofthe fastestgrowingintheworldduetomismanagementandillegallogging [122].AccordingtotheBurmeseForestDepartment,forestsoccupied 39millionhectaresinMyanmarin1990buthaddroppedto29million hectaresby2015[123].

Forests function as carbon sinks, not only counteracting GHG- emissions,butalsogivingstateslikeIndonesiaandMalaysiacredibility andleverage ininternationalclimatenegotiations.Unlikemostother ASEANmemberstates,whichhavetofocusoncuttingemissionsfrom powergenerationandtransportation,Indonesiacouldfulfillmuchof its NDCsimply bypreventingforestfires[112]. Indonesia’songoing partnershipwiththeUNprogramReducingEmissionsfromDeforesta- tionandForestDegradation(REDD+)[124]isoneexampleofhowthe ASEANcountriescancraftsuccessfulinternationalagreementsthatben- efitthemselves,butitremainsarelativelyuncommonexampleofinter- nationalclimatecooperationbyanASEANmemberstate.

2.7. TheroleofASEANinglobalenergycooperation

TheSoutheastAsianstatesvaryintermsofglobalenergycoopera- tion,butmostarekeepingalowproﬁle.Almostallthecountriesinthe worldhavejoinedIRENA,includingmajorhydrocarbonexporterssuch asIraq,Russia,andSaudiArabia[125].Bycontrast,nearlyhalfofthe ASEANcountriesstillstandoutsideIRENA[125].Cambodiahasbelat- edlychosentojoinandisnowattheaccessionstage,alongwithafew otherremainingstragglerssuchasBurundi,theDemocraticRepublicof theCongo,Libya,andSyria[125].Laos,Myanmar,andVietnamhave yettoapplyforformalmembership,whichcouldbringexpertiseand

resourcestotheirenergytransition.Insum,asmallerratioofSoutheast AsianstatesaremembersofIRENAthananyotherregionintheworld.

OnlyCambodiaisamemberoftheInternationalSolarAlliance,and onlyMalaysiaandthePhilippinesparticipateintheFriendsof Fossil FuelSubsidyReform. NoASEANmemberstateparticipatesin initia- tivesliketheCartagenaDialogueortheCarbonNeutralityCoalition, andonlythePhilippineProvinceofNegrosOrientalisamemberofthe PoweringPastCoalAlliance,withnoASEANcountriesrepresentedat thenation-statelevel[126].Curiously,ASEANaﬃliationwiththeinter- governmentalRenewablesClubhasthusfarbeenlimitedtotheAsian GolfIndustryFederation,basedinSingapore.

3. Discussion:howtoaddresstheparadox?

Climatechange todateis largelynot thefaultof ASEANbutthe industrializedcountriesofEurope,NorthAmerica,andEastAsia.How- ever,duetoitsgeography,SoutheastAsia’sfutureprosperityandsecu- ritydependonthesuccessofclimatemitigation.Itisthereforeparadox- icalthattheSoutheastAsianstatesarenotparticipatingmoreproac- tivelyintheglobalmitigationeﬀort.Astrongerenvironmentalstance nowcouldalsoprovideabetterbasisfordemandsforclimatejustice.

ASEANhasreceivedlessinternationalattentionthanlargenation- stateGHG-emitters like Brazil,China,andIndia,butthis islikely to change.ASEAN’spopulationisalreadygreaterthanthatoftheEUand isprojectedtoexceed715millionby2030[127].ASEANisalsolikely tobecometheworld’sfourthlargesteconomyby2030[96].Thus,its weightinglobalenergyaﬀairswillcomeintothelimelightinthenext decadeandglobalscrutinyofitsenergyandclimatepolicieswilllikely grow.BoththeinternationalstandingandcompetitivenessoftheSouth- eastAsianstateswillbeaﬀectedbythepolicydecisionstheymake.In thenextparagraphs, wesuggestsix policy measuresthatcouldhelp theASEANcountriesaddresstheclimate-energyparadoxandachieve greaterpolicycoherenceinthemediumandlongrun.

Avoidtheshort-termaﬀordabilityperspectiveinenergypolicyplanning.

ASEAN’slimitedNDCsandrenewableenergytargets,andtheconsider- ableriskthattheywillnotbereached,areoftenattributedtotheneed toprovideaﬀordableandsecureenergy[1].However,rapidlychanging globaltrendschallengethisnarrative.Thecostofrenewablesisfalling dramatically,whiletheASEANmemberstates,apartfromIndonesia, lackthedomesticenergyresourcestocontinuethecurrentrelianceon fossilfuels.Emphasisonlong-termcontractsforrenewablepowerpro- ducerscanalsodrivedowncosts[70,81].Thus,afocusonshort-term, perceivedaﬀordabilityandenergysecurityparadoxicallymayleadto strandedassets andthreatenASEAN energysecurityin thelongrun [128].ItalsoexposestheASEANcountriestostrandedassetriskinthe longtermascoalplantsmaybecomeobsolete.InIndonesia,thePhilip- pines,andVietnam,energyassetsworth USD60 billionmaybecome strandedasearlyasthe2020s[102].

Intheoryandatapurelytechnicallevel,carboncaptureandstorage (CCS)couldbeusedtomitigateemissionsfromcoalplants[129–131]. However,sofar,cost-eﬀectiveCCShasnotbeensuccessfullydeveloped, despitebillionsofdollarsofinvestmentinresearchandtestfacilitiesat multiplelocationsaroundtheworld.WhileCCScouldpotentiallyen- ablecoalusageinindustrialprocessesrequiringintenseheat,suchas cementandmetalsproduction,itshighcostsareunlikelytoeverbecome competitiveinpowergeneration,especiallyconsideringhowrapidlythe costsofrenewableenergyandenergystoragearefalling.Finally,the ASEANcountriesarenotattheforefrontofCCSresearch.EvenifCCS issuccessfulatsomepointinthefuture,itislikelytotakeevenlonger beforesuchtechnologyisdeployedintheASEANcountries.Currently, mostcoalplantsinSoutheastAsiadonotevenusethemosteﬃcient coalcombustiontechnologies.

Focusonleapfrogginginbuildingrenewableenergyinfrastructure.Inar- easwithwell-establishedenergyinfrastructuresuchastheEUorJapan, theenergytransitionrequiresexpensiveanddiﬃcultadaptationmea- suresandthelossofsubstantialsunkcosts.ASEANhasthechanceto

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avoidfallingintothistrapbydevelopingpowergenerationsystemswith a large shareof renewableenergy from theoutset. Thailand’srapid progresstowardsits 2030solarpowerinstallationtargetssignalsthe potentialthatplummetingrenewableenergycostsholdfortheASEAN countries[110],asdoesthesteepriseinregionalinvestmentinsolar powerin 2019[56].Investmentin renewableenergycanbe further rampedupbyenhancingregionalenergyconnectivitytohelphandlethe intermittencyofrenewables[132].Furthermore,solutionslikeHome- townInvestmentTrusts(HIT)[133],throughwhichlocalinvestorsfund localrenewableenergyprojects,couldbefurtherexploredbyallASEAN governmentsasasupplementaryapproachinordertoaccelerateoﬀ-grid renewablepowerdevelopment.

At first glance, nuclear power might represent an alternative emissions-freeandstableenergyleap-froggingtarget[134].Asidefrom thehighcapitalinvestmentcostsofnuclearplants,thelocationofsev- eralASEANstateswithintheseismicallyunstableCircum-PacificRing ofFireheightenstherisksforsuchplantsinlargestateslikeIndonesia andthePhilippines.Inaddition,mostoftheASEANmemberstateslack bothatechnologicalandscientificadvantagewhenitcomestonuclear energyandwouldbeheavilydependentonforeigntechnologiesandex- pertise.Theyalsolackindigenousnuclearfuelsources.Thus,amove towardsnuclearpowerwouldalsobeamovetowardsenergydepen- dence,energyinsecurityandanegativecontributiontotradebalances.

Thesumof thesepoints isthatitisunlikelythatnuclearpower can competewithrenewablesintheASEANcountries.

Accelerateregionalpower interconnectivityandprepareroadmapsfor facilitatingfutureelectricitytrade.ASEANhasmadesignificantprogress atthesub-regionallevelinexploringthepotentialforpowertrade,a longstandingflagshipprojectoftheassociation[135].Arecentstudy bytheUnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCommissionforAsiaand thePacific(ESCAP)highlightsavarietyofstrategicoptionsavailable for ASEAN both as a self-contained region and as a component of broader power interconnectivity in the Asia Pacific [136,137]. The ASEANPowerGrid(APG)andpowerintegrationprojectssuchasthe GreaterMekongRegion[138],whichincludesChina,canenablesig- nificantpowerpurchasingandpotentiallyanintegratedpowertrading market.Thiscaninturnincentivizefurtherdeploymentofintermittent renewableenergyacrossASEANasitcanhelpbalancegridsandvari- ableproductionfromrenewablesources[139–141].Despitehighup- frontcapitalinvestmentcosts,itwouldalsoreducelong-termelectric- itycostsforASEANandconstitutea significantsteptowardsgreater regionalintegration,anambitioninitsownrightforASEAN.Regula- toryalignmentwouldbeanimportantearlysteptoacceleratethiseffort [142].

Phaseoutfossilfuelsubsidiesandpromotelocalmicro-gridandoff-grid solutions.Solarpowerisrapidlybecomingthecheapestsourceofelec- tricityglobally[143]andcanberolledoutsignificantlyfasterthancoal- poweredplants,whicharesubsidizedacrossASEAN[92].Theexpansion ofcoalanditssubsidizationareclaimedtobeneededtoincreaseelectri- ficationratesandlimitthefinancialburdenonlow-incomehouseholds [1].AccordingtotheIEAinlate2019,over45millionASEANcitizens lackaccesstoelectricity[56],manyoftheminCambodiaandMyanmar, andtoalesser extentIndonesia,Laos,andthePhilippines[57](lack toaccessof electricity is defined in accordance withIEA guidelines [144]).However,communitieslackingelectricityareconcentratedin remoteareasandcanlikelybe electrifiedmostcost-efficientlybylo- calmicro-gridandoff-gridsolutionsratherthanlarge-scalecoalpower plants[145,146]. Suchcommunitiestherefore do notbenefitgreatly fromcurrentsubsidies,whichmainlybenefitindustrialconsumers[92]. Recognizetheenergytransitionasabusinessopportunity.Climatemiti- gationisnotonlyaburden.AscountriesasdifferentasChinaandDen- markhavedemonstrated,theenergytransitionrepresentsamajorop- portunityforbusinesses,exports,andjobcreation.Manycountriesare positioningthemselvesaggressivelytoreaptheseopportunities.Ifother countrieswishtohaveachanceintherace,theyneedtoactswiftly.

Malaysiahassuccessfullyemergedasamajorproducerofsolarpanels

fortheglobalmarket[147],butparadoxicallyhasyettofullycapital- izeonthisfordomesticpowergeneration.Singaporecouldleverageits roleasafinancialhubtopromotecleanenergyinvestmentthroughout ASEAN,buthasyettomaximizethispotential[148].Indeed,consid- eringthesignificantfinancialrisksassociatedwithcoalplantsandthe economiceffectsofclimatechange,thebroaderASEANbankingsector couldfocusmoreongreenfinanceandrenewables[149].

Enhance capacity buildingthrough ASEAN,IRENA, UN ESCAP and other internationalorganizations. The decliningcost of renewable energy makes itincreasingly feasiblefor theASEAN member statesto embraceaclimate-orientedenergytrajectory—ifnationalgovernments seizetheopportunity.Whilelimitedstateﬁnancesandlackofexpertise remainchallengesinsomecases,thecapacityforcoordinationoﬀered byASEANasaregionalbodycouldhelpcompensateforthis[150].In ordertostrengthentheircapacity,theASEANcountriescouldalsoex- pandcooperationwithUNESCAPandjoinIRENA.

4. Conclusion

ItisparadoxicalthatASEAN’sclimatechangemitigationeﬀortsto datearenotcommensuratewiththemultifacetedthreatsthatclimate changeposestotheregion.Thecontinuedemphasisonandsubsidiza- tionoffossilfuelsisquadruplyparadoxicalbecauseitisnotonlydetri- mentalfortheclimatebutalsoposesapublichealthhazard,iscostly intheshortterm,andcarriesalonger-termstrandedassetrisk.ASEAN couldinvestmoreinpublictransportationinfrastructuretolimitboth currentandfuturegreenhousegasemissions,improveurbanairqual- ity astheregionrapidlyurbanizes,andincrease themobilityof the poor.ForestmanagementinSoutheastAsiacanalsobe improved,as cantheregion’sengagementininternationalcooperationonenergyis- sues.ASEAN’seﬀortstocombatclimatechangeareintimatelylinkedto itseconomicprospectsandabilitytodeliveronmultipleSDGs.While thechallengesarebynomeansinsurmountable,thecountriesofSouth- eastAsiahaveanarrowwindowofopportunitytocapitalizeontheir strengths before the economic, reputational, ecological andpolitical consequencesofclimatechangefortheregionbecomeunmanageable.

DeclarationofCompetingInterest

Theauthorsdeclarethattheyhavenoknowncompetingﬁnancial interestsorpersonalrelationshipsthatcouldhaveappearedtoinﬂuence theworkreportedinthispaper.

Funding

ThisarticleisaproductoftheASEANClimateandEnergyProject (ACCEPT),whichissupportedbyASEANandtheNorwegianMinistryof ForeignAffairsandcarriedoutjointlybytheASEANCenterforEnergy andtheNorwegianInstituteofInternationalAffairs.Thefundingsources didnotplayaroleindeterminingthedesignorconductofthestudy andits findingsdo notnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsof anyof the institutions involvedandarethesoleresponsibilityof theindividual researchersinvolved.

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