FFI RAPPORT
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FREE ZONES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
HOLØIEN Linda Mari
FFI/RAPPORT-2006/02488
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FREE ZONES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
HOLØIEN Linda Mari
FFI/RAPPORT-2006/02488
FORSVARETS FORSKNINGSINSTITUTT Norwegian Defence Research Establishment P O Box 25, NO-2027 Kjeller, Norway
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WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FREE ZONES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (2nd Ed.)
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HOLØIEN Linda Mari
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7) INDEXING TERMS
IN ENGLISH: IN NORWEGIAN:
a) Weapons of mass destruction a) Masseødeleggelsesvåpen
b) Nuclear weapon free zones b) Kjernevåpenfrie soner
c) WMD free zones c) Masseødeleggelsesvåpenfrie soner
d) Middle East d) Midtøsten
e) Disarmament e) Nedrustning
THESAURUS REFERENCE:
8) ABSTRACT
The Middle East is the only region in the world where weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been used after 1945.
There have been some efforts to establish weapon of mass destruction free zones (WMDFZ) in the region, but none of them have succeeded so far. There are no WMDFZs in the world today, but there are several nuclear weapon free zones.
These zones provide important lessons for the establishment of a WMDFZ, and the prohibitions it should include. A zone should include all states in the Middle East, but alternatives for a gradual approach should be considered. It is possible to start with some countries while allowing others delayed entry. All states in the Middle East have in principle agreed to the establishment of a WMDFZ in the regional Forum for Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS). The ACRS forum was unable to create any agreement between the parties, and has not been active since 1995. This report suggests that the ACRS negotiations should be re-established, and that a step-by-step procedure towards a WMDFZ will be necessary.
9) DATE AUTHORIZED BY POSITION This page only
2007-02-08 Jan Ivar Botnan Director
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CONTENTS
Page
1 INTRODUCTION 7
2 BACKGROUND: THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT REGIME 8
2.1 The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 8
2.2 Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) 8
2.3 Regimes and Characteristics 9
2.4 Security Guarantees and Safeguards 10
3 NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES – HOW DO THEY WORK? 14
3.1 Reasons for Entering 14
3.2 Solving Security Issues 14
3.2.1 International Guarantees 14
3.2.2 Solving the Security Dilemma 14
3.3 Challenges Yet to Overcome 15
4 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 16
4.1 WMD Challenges 16
4.2 Why NPT and NWFZ Is Insufficient in the Middle East 17
4.3 Middle East Initiatives 18
5 ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR A WMDFZ IN THE MIDDLE EAST 19 5.1 WMDFZ in the Middle East: a Suggested Framework 19 5.2 The Scope of Prohibition for a Middle East WMDFZ 22
5.2.1 Nuclear Weapons 22
5.2.2 Chemical and Biological Weapons 23
5.3 The Geographical Scope 24
5.3.1 The Gulf Model 24
5.3.2 The Levant Model 26
5.3.3 The “All at Once” Model 27
6 PROSPECTS AND BARRIERS 28
6.1 Abandoning Weapons of Mass Destruction 28
6.2 Establishment of ACRS 29
6.2.1 Divergence of Interests and Objectives 30 6.2.2 States Outside the ACRS Negotiations 31 6.2.3 Challenging the Culture of Opacity 31 6.2.4 Creating Hopes for Successful Negotiations 32
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 32
7.1 Overcoming the Barriers: Realization of a WMDFZ 32
7.2 Conclusions 34 References 35
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FREE ZONES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
1 INTRODUCTION
This report focuses on the possibilities for creating a zone free for weapons of mass destruction (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. It presents options for arrangements that can make such a zone attainable.
The report first discusses the current nuclear disarmament regime. Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) are an important disarmament mechanism in the world today, and Latin America, Africa, parts of Asia and Oceania are covered by treaties declaring them free of nuclear weapons. There is no existing example of a WMDFZ, which makes it important to learn from the NWFZs in order to present possible arrangements for a Middle East WMDFZ.
A NWFZ framework generally defines prohibitions, security guarantees and nuclear safeguards. This makes such zones effective for the purpose of regional non-proliferation.
They have a positive impact on regional security for two reasons: (I) the negative security guarantees provided by the nuclear states and (II) the ability to foster regional cooperation – preventing situations where states proliferate out of fear of others’ capabilities.
Several states in the Middle East are under suspicion for having weapons of mass destruction (WMD), that is, they may have nuclear, biological or chemical weapons either in their arsenal or under development. This report shows that a WMDFZ in the Middle East therefore will have several advantages compared to a NWFZ. The motivation behind the establishment of a Middle East WMDFZ must be the prospect of a region free of all WMD.
With a few exceptions, the existing NWFZs did not have to handle the problem of pre-existing nuclear weapons in their region. In the Middle East, the presumed pre-existence of WMD makes it important to include a WMD reversal program. To facilitate WMD reversal, measures must be taken to create a fundamental trust between the parties. This can partly be done by regional dialogues, safeguard activities and a continuous exchange of reports. Special bilateral agreements between states who find it especially hard to trust each other should be considered.
Another challenge is to create a trustworthy verification regime, and this should preferably be done based on exiting verification regimes.
The report discusses prohibitions and models for geographical limitations in a prospective WMDFZ, and presents the prospects and obstacles for a WMDFZ. Despite the existence of severe obstacles in the Middle East today, the conclusion is that a WMDFZ might be possible with a step-by-step procedure and a long-term perspective.
2 BACKGROUND: THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT REGIME
2.1 The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
The Disarmament Regime is based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) from 1968, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) from 1996
(Shapiro 2004). The NPT aims for total nuclear disarmament for all parties, but provides an unequal foundation for states when it comes to tolerance of their nuclear capabilities: While an overwhelming majority of the states are prohibited any possession of nuclear weapons, the traditional nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China) are allowed to possess nuclear weapons for an undefined period of time. The nuclear weapon states may assist each other in nuclear development and testing; they may receive nuclear weapons from any state; and they may decide for themselves to what degree they wish to accept international control on their peaceful nuclear activities.
The main provisions stated in the NPT are: (1) the non-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, (2) nuclear safeguards, performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (3) the right to peaceful nuclear energy, and (4) obligations to disarm. All states are obliged under the UN Charter to refrain from using force or threatening to use force, but other than this, there are no specific obligations in the NPT to ensure the security of the non-nuclear- weapon states. According to a UN resolution from 1968, the Soviet Union, the US and the UK pledged immediate assistance to non-nuclear states party to the NPT which were victims of or threatened by aggression with nuclear weapons (Goldblat 1994: 77- 83).
2.2 Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs)
Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) constitute another disarmament mechanism that may increase the possibilities for denuclearization and peace. They are based on the 1968 NPT which encourages such zones. NWFZs aim to prevent new nuclear weapon states from
occurring, and to remove regional causes for proliferation. NWFZs can serve as a “guarantee”
to states and convince them that their neighbour does not intend to get nuclear weapons.
NWFZs will lessen the security dilemma states experience since confidence building and improving trust and transparency between states are important steps in the creation of a NWFZ (Shapiro 2004).
In 1975 the UN reached a consensus on basic principles regarding NWFZs: (I) A NWFZ may include a large or a small number of states, entire continents or other large geographical areas, but may also be a single country. (II) The arrangement of such a zone must ensure that the zone remains free of all nuclear weapons. (III) States within the region should be the initiators, and participation in the NWFZ should be voluntary. (IV) The participation of militarily
significant states, preferably all states in the region, would enhance the effectiveness of the zone. (V) To ensure that all states live up to the agreed obligations, effective systems of verification must be included in the zone arrangement. (VI) Economic, scientific and technological development among zone members should be promoted though international
cooperation for peaceful use of nuclear energy. (VII) A treaty that establishes a NWFZ should be of unlimited duration (Goldblat 1994: 148).
A treaty that declares a zone non-nuclear is more than just a ban on nuclear weapons. It also provides the zone with a guarantee that nuclear states never will use, or threaten to use, their nuclear forces against its member states. To increase the transparency, the UN’s nuclear- monitoring branch IAEA is allowed to conduct both ad hoc and special inspections in the zones (Shapiro 2004).
2.3 Regimes and Characteristics
The existing nuclear weapon free zones in populated areas cover Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco 1967) (CNS 2005a), Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific Forum (Treaty of Rarotonga 1985) (CNS 2003a), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok 1995) (CNS 2005b), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba 1996) (CNS 2006b) and Central Asia (signed 2006) (CNS 2006a).
This implies that over 100 states in four different continents are covered by negotiated NWFZ arrangements. The treaty of Pelindaba is still to be ratified by enough countries to enter into force, but the three other zones are signed and in force. There is also an example of a single state declaring itself a NWFZ: In 1992, Mongolia proclaimed itself nuclear weapons free. The UN General Assembly accepted Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status in 1998, and in 2000 the status entered into force (Rauf 2000, CNS 2003b).
The Treaty of Tlatelolco is based on a draft resolution made under the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The draft resolution was presented by Brazil in the UN General Assembly, but it was not put to vote. A year later, five Latin American countries declared that they were about to sign a multilateral agreement, stating their position as nuclear weapon free states; this time the proposition was on Mexico’s initiative. The UN General Assembly accepted this
announcement, which led to the negotiation and finally the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by fourteen Latin American countries in 1967 (Goldblat 1994: 148-149).
The Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first of its kind in populated areas,1 and it stated an example for others to follow. The prohibitions in the agreement included:
“[...] testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means as well as the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Encouraging or authorizing or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon is equally prohibited.” (Goldblat 1994:149)
1 The 1959 Antarctic Treaty declared that the Antarctica was to be used solely for peaceful purposes. Any military establishment and manoeuvres are prohibited. The exception is the use of military personnel or equipment for peaceful purposes (Goldblat 1994: 142-144).
2.4 Security Guarantees and Safeguards
The Treaty of Tlatelolco included extra protocols open for signature by extra-zonal states: (I) External countries internationally responsible for territories within the zone are pledged to undertake the same nuclear weapon free status in their territories within the zone. (II) Nuclear states were asked to respect the denuclearized status and thereby promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the zone. Both protocols were signed and ratified by all states in question. The second protocol ensures states with negative security guarantees. Such protocols are a part of the goal and purpose of any NWFZ in order to make a nuclear attack against the zone less likely and unjustifiable. If this goal is to be achieved, it is also necessary to remove all nuclear weapon related support facilities that are serving the nuclear strategic systems of the great powers. The different treaties have chosen different strategies: The Treaty of Rarotonga forbids all kind of nuclear activities, including peaceful, except material for peaceful nuclear use under the NPT and the IAEA, while the Treaty of Tlatelolco does not specifically ban nuclear weapon related support facilities (Goldblat 1994: 148-158).
The treaties do not only have protocols that ensure security guarantees. In order to be properly enforced, all NWFZ treaties of have some kind of additional safeguards. This usually means IAEA safeguards. The Latin American states established OPANAL: the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. If one party to the treaty suspects another of violating the treaty, it will report to OPANAL. The council also worked on requests from countries which had been suspected of violations to give them the possibility of proving their innocence.
In 1992, OPANAL’s role was reduced and IAEA’s role enhanced. The IAEA got exclusive power to carry out special inspections, while the OPANAL was reduced to performing
inspections on IAEA’s request. This change was supposed to facilitate the full entry into force of the treaty. Still, it may have unfortunate consequences, since countries experiencing
international tensions might be unwilling to entrust the protection and security interest to an international organization (Goldblat 1994: 148-158).
Additional enforcement mechanisms are included in the different zones in order to secure the goals and intentions of each nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Bangkok complement the IAEA safeguards with exchanging reports and information within the NWFZ. The Treaty of Bangkok includes a fact-finding mandate that gives each State Party the right to ask another State Party for clarification and fact-finding to resolve doubts about compliances. If any divergence from the treaty is found, the State Party will be given a reasonable time to bring itself into full compliance with the treaty. Should the country fail to do this, the Commission shall decide on any appropriate measure for the given situation.
This includes submission of the matter to the IAEA and if there is a danger to international peace and security, to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.
In the Treaty of Pelindaba it was decided to form the African Commission on Nuclear Energy to ensure compliance with the undertakings of the treaty. The commission collects reports on Member States’ nuclear activities and other matters related to the treaty. It arranges both consultations and conferences on issues regarding the implementation of the treaty, and it
reviews application to IAEA safeguards regarding nuclear activities. If a party has reason to complain on another party, it shall bring the matter to the suspected party’s attention, and if the complaint is not resolved, it is brought to the Commission. The Commission will bring the subject to the IAEA’s attention and call for an inspection. If the Commission becomes aware of issues in conflict with the treaty, the Parties will arrange an extraordinary session to discuss the matter. In the end, the United Nations Security Council may be involved by the
Organization of African Unity.
The Treaty of Pelindaba also mandates a nuclear weapon reversal program. This implies that the Parties undertake the destruction of all capabilities for the manufacture of nuclear devices.
They shall dismantle and destroy any previously manufactured nuclear explosive devices and any facilities for their manufacture. If possible the devices are to be converted into peaceful use, and the IAEA shall verify the dismantling process. Peaceful activities are allowed, and the requirement is IAEA verification of the peaceful character of such activities. The Treaty of Pelindaba encourages mutual cooperation for peaceful use of nuclear energy (CNS 2006b).
The treaty also stipulates that “each party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations...”
It is the only treaty to include such a provision (Umebayashi 2004).
Table 2.1 provides a brief summary of the existing NWFZs.
Comparative Table: Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Special Protocols
Treaty Zone of
Application
Basic Prohibitions Significant Differences
Protocol Signed
Enforcement
I: Application of
denuclearized status to states with territories in the zone
France, the Nether- lands, UK, US Treaty of
Tlatelolco:
-Signed:
1967 -In force:
1968 -Duration:
Indefinite
Mexico, the Caribbean, Central America and South America
- testing, use, manufacturing, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons
- receiving, storing, installing, deploying or possessing nuclear weapons in any way
- allows Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in
conformity with the treaty articles that ban nuclear weapons
II: Respect for denuclearized status: no use or threat to use NWs against the zone
France, China, UK, US, USSR
Bilateral or multinational agreements with IAEA2 for safeguard activities.
OPANAL3 ensures that conditions are met.
I: Application of
denuclearized status to NWS with territories in the SPNFZ5
France, UK, US*
Treaty of Rarotonga -Signed:
1985 -In force:
1986 -Duration:
Indefinite
Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga,4 Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa
- manufacturing, acquiring, possession or control of any nuclear device inside or outside the treaty zone
- to encourage the above, no fissile material or related equipment provided to NWS or NNWS unless under IAEA regulations - no radioactive storage or dumping at sea or elsewhere
- prohibits all nuclear activity, included peaceful with the exception of export of material for peaceful use under NPT and IAEA
II: NWS shall not use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices at any territory located within the zone
France, China, UK, US*, USSR
Exchanging reports and information;
IAEA safeguards.
Treaty of Bangkok:
-Signed:
1995 -In force:
1997 -Duration:
Indefinite
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,6 Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, the Lao People’s Republic, Cambodia and Myanmar
- development, manufacture,
acquisition, possession or having control over nuclear weapons - testing or using nuclear weapons inside or outside the treaty zone
- manufacture or provision of
fissionable material or equipment to any NWS or NNWS, unless under NPT and IAEA regulation.
- no radioactive dumping or storage
- allows peaceful safeguarded nuclear programs - states decide for themselves whether to allow foreign nuclear weapons passage through their territory
A protocol is open for signing: The NWS would undertake to a) respect the treaty, and not contribute to any act in violation with the treaty;
b) not to threaten or to use nuclear weapons against the zone
None Reports by members, exchange of information and
application of IAEA safeguards.
Fact-finding mandate between State Parties.
2 International Atomic Energy Agency
3 Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
4 Not ratified.
5 South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone
6 Not ratified.
I: NWS shall not use or threaten to use nuclear explosives against any Party to the treaty
France, China, UK, US*, Russia*
II: NWS shall not test or assist/
encourage testing of any nuclear explosives within the zone
France, China, UK, US*, Russia*
Treaty of Pelindaba:
-Signed:
1996 -In force:
Requires 28 ratifica- tions; has yet to be entered into force -Duration:
Indefinite
Africa, island state members of PAU/AU
- research, development, production,
acquisition, assistance, control, testing of nuclear explosive devices
- assistance, or encouragement of the point above
- armed attack of nuclear installations - the treaty mandates reversal of nuclear capabilities according to IAEA procedures
- Mandates nuclear weapon program reversal.
III: Countries with a de jure or de facto responsibility for territories within the zone should apply to the provisions of the treaty
France7
Exchange of report by members.
African Commission on Nuclear Energy ensures compliance with the undertakings of the treaty.
The Central Asian Nuclear- Weapon- Free Zone:
-Signed:
2006 -In force:
Has yet to be entered into force -Duration:
Indefinite
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
All members
required to comply fully with the Comprehen sive-Test- Ban-Treaty.
(CTBT)
Enhanced
IAEA safeguards on nuclear materials.
Table 2.1 Existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. NWS and NNWS are short for “nuclear weapon states” and “non nuclear weapon states,” respectively. The table is based on CNS 2006a, 2006b, 2005a, 2005b, 2003a, 2003b and 2002.
7 Spain neither signed nor ratified.
* Not ratified
3 NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES – HOW DO THEY WORK?
3.1 Reasons for Entering
States which enter a NWFZ are motivated by an interest in ensuring that their neighbourhood is free from nuclear weapons (Blix et al. 2006). NWFZs improve trust and transparency by providing confidence building measures and non-proliferation norms (Shapiro 2004). NWFZs reduce the likelihood of war, they reduce the costs of preparing for war, and finally they reduce the costs of war.
A NWFZ is a complementary element to the non-proliferation regime established by the NPT.
It represents a higher level of commitment and constitutes a normative structure beyond the NPT. NWFZs are therefore important in building and maintaining non-proliferation norms.
NWFZs block the further development of nuclear weapons by fencing entire regions off from such weapons. It provides transparency and verification measures and makes nuclear weapons easier to live without. NWFZs effectively hinder horizontal proliferation including the
deployment of nuclear weapons controlled by nuclear states in non-nuclear states. Another advantage has been the prevention of nuclear tests in a region, which was an important motivation for both the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Treaty of Rarotonga (Parish & du Preez 2006).
3.2 Solving Security Issues
First of all, NWFZs will reduce the likeliness for a state to become involved in a nuclear conflict. There is an objective of general and complete disarmament, but there is also an immediate objective to consolidate the security of the member states. This can be done by a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons in the region and negative security assurances from the nuclear states (Román-Morey 1997).
3.2.1 International Guarantees
If a NWFZ is to be effectively fenced off from the world of nuclear weapons, it is important to obtain security guarantees from the nuclear powers (Parish & du Preez 2006). Thus, all treaties that declare a NWFZ contain special protocols open for signing by the nuclear weapon states.
By giving the NWFZ negative security assurances, that is, a non-use obligation, the nuclear weapon states promise to respect the denuclearized status of the zone. This makes it
illegitimate to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states within the zone (Goldblat 1994: 148-158).
3.2.2 Solving the Security Dilemma
Regional security dilemmas, where states proliferate out of fear of the neighbour’s capabilities, can be reduced by introducing effective means of confidence building in the zone. A NWFZ
will foster a broader regional cooperation between the states (Parish & du Preez 2006).
Implementation of IAEA safeguards and exchange of information are important steps towards an increasing level of transparency and confidence, removing a state’s fear for its neighbours’
nuclear capabilities: “While NPT seeks to achieve that States around the world commit themselves to a non-nuclear status, NWFZ seek to assure that neighbours in a region are committed” (Blix 1997).
3.3 Challenges Yet to Overcome
There are still shortcomings in existing NWFZs. According to Parish and du Preez (2006), nuclear weapon states are unlikely to support NWFZs in regions were they have security interests themselves. The establishment of the Central Asian NWFZ is complicated by US and Russian security interests which make it harder to carry the treaty off. None of the nuclear weapon states have signed the Treaty of Bangkok. The protocols of the other treaties are signed by the nuclear powers, but both the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Pelindaba are yet to be fully ratified by all nuclear powers. The Treaty of Pelindaba also lack ratification by states within the zone, and it will not enter into force until at least 28 states (out of 54 African states) have ratified the treaty (CNS 2003a, Shapiro 2004, Parish & du Preez 2006).
The lack of signing and ratification is for the case of the US based on some general demands which are decisive for their support of a NWFZ. First of all, the impact on security and national interests is considered. Then there are six criteria that judges whether the US are to support such a treaty or not: (I) The initiative has to come from the region concerned. (II) All important states must be involved. (III) The arrangement must provide for adequate
verification of compliance. (IV) The zone must enhance regional and international security, and not be detrimental to existing security arrangements. (V) The zonal treaty should not interfere with existing rights of its parties under international law, such as transit privileges, port calls or overflights of nuclear powered and capable ships and aircrafts from non-party nations. (VI) The zone must not impose restrictions on the exercise of rights under
international law, as high seas freedom of navigation and overflight, including the right of innocent passage of territorial seas (Scheinmann 2005).
The creation of new NWFZs can be even harder in the future since analysts have suggested that the existing NWFZs were the “easy zones.” The existing zones are mainly located in parts of the world where there are no nuclear weapons, and where the incentives to obtain such weapons are low. It is unlikely that nuclear weapon states would want to deploy nuclear weapons in the existing NWFZs. The regions not included in NWFZs today are countries in South Asia, Northeast Asia, the Middle East, North America and Europe: What they all have in common is that they either include nuclear weapon states or border on them. There is also a core problem with the NPT: Some of the NPT states are allowed to possess nuclear weapons while others are not. The regions not covered by NWFZ treaties today stand out from the established NWFZs: They often not only need treaties assuring that they keep the weapons out but will also need disarmament agreements. Verification measures must then be more intrusive
than in the existing zones: it is hard to imagine that IAEA safeguards and additional protocol will be sufficient (Parish & du Preez 2006, Shapiro 2004).
4 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
4.1 WMD Challenges
The Middle East is the only region where WMD has been used after 1945 (Alani 2005).
Existing weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East are likely to include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Several states in the Middle East have not signed and/or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC). Israel is the only state in the Middle East which is not a party to the NPT.
The CWC entered into force in 1997, and it completely bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. The CWC also contains strict verification measures, and all future development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons are prohibited. The CWC requires all participants to destroy all of their chemical weapons by 2007, with a possible extension to 2012. The CWC has not been signed by Egypt, Iraq and Syria, and it has not been ratified by Israel. Iran and Saudi Arabia are parties to the CWC.
The BTWC was signed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. The development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of biological and toxin weapons are banned, and the destruction of such weapons and delivery means are required. Biological weapons are outlawed by the treaty, and a heavy international stigma follows the acknowledgment of such weapons. No states in the Middle East acknowledge the existence of biological weapons within their borders. The BTWC states the right to retain biological agents and toxins for peaceful and protective purposes, and the absence of verification measures makes it hard to determine whether any given biological agents are intended for offensive purposes or not. The BTWC has not been signed by Israel, and it has not been ratified by Egypt and Syria. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia are parties to the BTWC (Blix et al. 2006: 39-40, 114-115, OPCW 2005).
The country most likely to possess nuclear weapons is Israel; even though the state has never officially admitted to having such weapons. According to unofficial estimates, the Israeli stockpile could be larger than the British and include both fission and fusion bombs. Israel has a non-safeguarded plutonium reactor as well as non-safeguarded reprocessing capabilities and possibly uranium enrichment capabilities, along with various other uranium processing facilities. Israel is the only state in the Middle East which is not party to the NPT. No other countries in the Middle East are believed to possess nuclear weapons, but there are suspicions about an Iranian early stage nuclear program. The Iraqi nuclear weapons programs was attacked by Israel in 1981 and UN forces in 1991, and it was later completely destroyed under
Weapons Weapon programs
Research and development
Treaty / convention
Not ratified
Nuclear
weapons Israel —
Egypt, Syria, Iran
NPT Israel*
Biological and
Toxin Weapons — Syria, Iran
Egypt,
Israel BTWC
Israel*, Egypt, Syria Chemical
Weapons —
Egypt, Syria, Iran
Israel CWC
Egypt*, Irak*, Syria*, Israel
* Not signed
Table 4.1 Existing WMD in the Middle East and status of the relevant treaties. The table is based on Shtauber & Shapir (2006) from Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies (JCSS).
IAEA supervision. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is not signed by Syria and Saudi Arabia, and it is not ratified by Egypt, Iran and Israel (Blix et al. 2006: 39).
Table 4.1 summarises the current WMD status in the Middle East.
4.2 Why NPT and NWFZ Is Insufficient in the Middle East
The NPT may not be the best way to enhance non-proliferation in troubled regions for two reasons:
(I) A NWFZ agreement will go further than the NPT because it eliminates some important motivations for retaining huge and flexible arsenals. States are reassured that no new nuclear weapons states will emerge, and there will be less need for nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee for national security. A NWFZ also provides legally binding negative security assurances not found in the NPT. A zonal agreement will provide more security combined with reduced motivation for countering perceived threats by nuclear means.
(II) The NPT has not been ideally adapted to the particular political and strategic conditions in certain regions. This can be exemplified by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was established to impose more far-reaching commitments than the NPT regime. In troubled regions like the Middle East, a zonal agreement will help organizing the regional security environment in a way that will make abandoning WMD more feasible (Müller 1997).
The conditions in the Middle East call on a further widening of the concept of NWFZs. The problems in the Middle East do not only concern nuclear weapons; all three categories of WMD are represented in the region. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons will have to be
equally addressed, thereby creating a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ).
The most important motivation behind entering such a zone is to ensure that your
neighbourhood is free of WMD. States are not likely to give up their WMD if they have reason to believe that any such weapons exist in other states in the region: Syria, for example, is believed to maintain chemical weapons to compensate for Israel’s nuclear capability (Jones 2005).
4.3 Middle East Initiatives
All states in the Middle East have supported a WMDFZ for a long time, even though the conflict level in the area makes the realization of such a zone difficult. There have been some initiatives from countries in the Middle East, and the need to establish a WMDFZ (not just a NWFZ) is emphasized in all of the initiatives:
• A NWFZ in the Middle East was first proposed by Egypt and Iran in 1974, and in 1990 President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt proposed a WMDFZ. The WMDFZ would be based on three important components: (I) The prohibition of all WMD without exception. (II) The equal and reciprocal commitment of all states in the region without exception. (III) The establishment of verification measures and modalities to assure full compliance by all states in the region (Shaker 1997). The mounting evidence of the existence of chemical and biological weapons and Israel’s apparent interpretation of its own nuclear capability as a deterrent against these weapons convinced the Egyptian president that a WMDFZ would be better than a NWFZ (Baumgart & Müller 2004-2005).
• In 2003 Libya unexpectedly dismantled their nuclear and chemical weapons program.
There are a few other cases of countries deciding to abandon WMD programs of their own political will, but Libya is the only one that did not partly happen as a result of a major regime change or domestic political transformation. President Muhammar al-Qadhafi’s decision to dismantle may have far-reaching significance both in the region as well as in the rest of the world. Libya’s WMD were considered a great threat to Israel, and the
voluntary dismantlement combined with international inspections is an obvious net gain for Israeli security considerations (Cohen in Russel 2006).
• In 2004 the Gulf Research Centre (GRC) in Dubai presented an initiative to create a WMDFZ in the Gulf region. A meeting in Stockholm, where government representatives from all Gulf countries were brought together, ended with a commitment from all the countries to present the Gulf WMDFZ to their governments. The countries included in this initiative are Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Iran and Yemen. A WMDFZ in the Gulf could provide the groundwork for a subsequent arrangement encompassing the entire Middle East (Alani 2005).
5 ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR A WMDFZ IN THE MIDDLE EAST
5.1 WMDFZ in the Middle East: a Suggested Framework
The existing NWFZs provide some basic ideas that may be used as a basis for a WMDFZ in the Middle East. According to Director General Mohamed ElBaradei of the IAEA (in Siegel 2005), NWFZs have an important function as regional security fora. Reasons for insecurity vary from region to region, and the NWFZs do not represent a “one size fits all” package.
Therefore, regional dialogues taking place under a NWFZ may prove to be useful. Regional talks may enhance transparency and verification measures, thereby making the security dilemma in the Middle East manageable. A regional, governmental expert group should be convened with the purpose of producing consensus documents on the transparency and verification elements of a potential WMDFZ. All NWFZs are based on the creation of a fundamental trust between the participating states, and this must also be part of the basis for a WMDFZ in the Middle East. The existing NWFZs rely largely on the IAEA to perform safeguard activities, thereby ensuring other states in the zones that the agreed conditions are met. Reports and other information are commonly exchanged between states to enhance the transparency. Similar measures could prove useful also in the Middle East. It will be crucial to establish a process towards WMD disarmament in which no vital interests of any party are compromised (Baumgart & Müller 2004-2005). Any WMDFZ presupposes agreement upon transparency and verification measures, and this may induce all relevant states to sign and ratify the NPT, the CWC and the BTWC. For this purpose, the inclusion of a fact-finding mandate should also be considered.
Another way to reduce WMD concerns between states enduring longstanding hostility in the Middle East may be specific bilateral agreements. Brazil and Argentina have a history of nuclear concerns: in 1970 they started programs that could eventually have led to the production of nuclear weapons. Using bilateral agreements and understandings, these two states have chosen instead to renounce nuclear weapons and to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Blix et al. 2006).
Leonard & Prawitz (1999) suggest two extra protocols for regulating the relationship to states outside the zone: (I) Negative security guarantees by the nuclear weapon states. This implies that they will guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against zonal states. (II) A protocol open for signature by neighbouring states not parties to the WMDFZ. Thereby, these states will commit themselves to support the zone regime and to assist in its
implementation, particularly regarding border policies. Both protocols should include a commitment not to direct prohibited missiles against targets in the zone. (III) In addition to this, a protocol signed by important non-state actors like the PLO, Hamas and Hezbollah is conceivable. These organizations should be asked to accept and respect the WMD free status of the zone and undertake to follow the general obligations of the treaty.
While the IAEA verifies the non-existence of nuclear weapons, the non-existence of chemical weapons is to be verified by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The CWC requires the elimination of all chemical weapons under universally applied international control. When it comes to biological and toxin weapons, no such
verification measure has been organized, despite the fact that biological and toxin weapons are banned (Blix et al. 2006: 34). This is partly because dual use complicates the control, detection and prohibition of proliferation relevant exports. Nearly all materials and equipment used to make chemical and biological agents are dual-use products. The dual use of equipment and materials is a challenge for the verification regime. The verification regime also has to manage the problem of easily accessible chemical warfare agents: They are easy to manufacture, and there exists open scientific literature on the topic (Tucker 2001).
A BTWC verification regime will have to manage several difficult issues in order to be
successful. Microorganisms and toxins that could be employed as biological warfare agents are widely available both from the natural environment and from culture collections. Nutrient media are widely traded, and bacteria multiply exponentially under optimal conditions, making it possible to produce a biological or toxin arsenal in a matter of weeks. Dangerous pathogens have become commercial products. This makes the dual-use problem of biological agents even more severe than the dual use of chemical agents. Possible verification and transparency measures for biological weapons are further complicated because technological advances have made it possible to produce large quantities of biological agents in small facilities and to remove all telltales of biological weapons in a matter of hours (Tucker 2001).
According to Tucker (1998) some countries favour using the basic elements of the CWC verification regime in a verification regime for biological weapons. This can partly be done, but he emphasizes important differences between chemical and biological weapons which should be considered when creating such a regime. While militarily significant quantities of microbiological and toxin agents are measured in kilograms, chemical nerve agents are measured in tons. The production of a chemical arsenal requires a large industrial plant, while biological and toxin agents only require a pilot-scale facility. Cheating is easier for biological weapons than for chemical. Distinguishing permitted research from prohibited research is a great challenge under the BTWC. To create an efficient verification regime based on the CWC, these differences must be kept in mind. Tucker (1998) has suggested the following for a verification regime for biological and toxin weapons:
• Mutually reinforcing measures ranging from facility declarations to on-site inspections must be implemented. The on-site activities should be based on a combination of short- notice routine visits (no more than 24 hours notice) and occasional challenge inspections.
• A “carrots and sticks” system should also be implemented in order to reward states that comply with the treaty and punish those not performing according to the provisions.
• Absolute quantitative ceilings for possession of biological and toxin agents are not feasible.
• Safeguarding national security is a necessity; inspectors should be screened and held accountable for the protection of privileged information.
• Sampling and analysis is harder for biological and toxin agents than for chemical; still techniques are available to allow inspectors to analyse samples on site without
compromising proprietary information.
• Investigators should be allowed to investigate allegations of use and unusual outbreaks of diseases. They should also be guaranteed access to all relevant areas for this purpose.
• Biological export controls should minimize restrictions on dual-use biotechnological products important for health, agriculture and the economic growth of developing countries.
• Finally, a separate BTWC monitoring agency (like the OPCW) should implement the compliance protocol, including processing data declarations and conducting on-site inspections. This agency should share administrative and support services with the OPCW in The Hague.
An ad hoc working group of the parties to the BTWC was established in 1991. This group was designed to identify and examine potential verification measures for the BTWC. The group started its work in 1995, and in 1997 it transitioned a rolling text for a protocol to strengthen the regime. After 1999 the group focused on the final framework for the Protocol, and its proposal was completed in 2001. This document was up for approval the same year, but the US revised its opinion and did not support it after all (BTWC 2006, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2002). The rolling text is without the prejudice of the positions of the delegations, thus there are still many issues to be resolved.
The rolling text for a Protocol to the BTWC has many similarities to the Verification Annex of the CWC, and it includes the following key elements:
• Compliance measures:
o Lists and criteria of agents and equipment
o Declarations of relevant facilities and biological and toxin programmes
o Declarations of vaccine production facilities, biological containment facilities and work with listed agents and/or toxins
o Declarations of international transfers of biological agents and toxins, and relevant equipment
o On-site visits at declared facilities
o Investigations to address concerns of non-compliance with the Convention o Declarations and investigations of unusual outbreaks of disease
• Confidentiality provisions to ensure that sensitive information is protected
• Assistance and protection against biological and toxin weapons
• Scientific and technological exchange for peaceful purposes
• Confidence-building measures
• Establishment of an organisation similar to the OPCW to implement the Protocol
In conclusion, verification measures of the rolling text for a Protocol to the BTWC may serve as the foundation to develop and agree on a coherent model for a verification regime for biological and toxin weapons to be implemented in the Middle East WMDFZ.
5.2 The Scope of Prohibition for a Middle East WMDFZ
A treaty that establishes a WMDFZ in the Middle East should be based on the NPT, the BTWC and the CWC and share the general objectives of those treaties. The general treaty design should be tailor-made to ensure three important measures in the Middle East: (I) The non-possession of prohibited weapons by the zonal states; (II) the non-stationing of prohibited weapons by any state within the geographical area of the zone; and (III) the non-use or non- threat of use of prohibited weapons throughout the zone or against targets within the zone (Leonard & Prawitz 1999).
5.2.1 Nuclear Weapons
Like in the case of the NWFZs, the prohibition of nuclear weapons in the Middle East should be based on the NPT. This includes allowing IAEA safeguards for the purpose of verification of obligations, as well as undertakings not to transfer, receive or manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Research and development and the use of peaceful nuclear energy is encouraged (NPT 2005). In the NPT, the term “nuclear weapon” is understood as nuclear bombs and warheads, but beyond this, the NPT does not define nuclear weapons.
NWFZs have therefore adapted definitions on their own. The definitions serve as a foundation for prohibitions and allowances, as is apparent from the existing definitions:
The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), Article 5:
“For the purpose of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not indivisible part thereof.”
The Treaty of Pelindaba (1996), Article I(c):
““Nuclear Explosive device” means any nuclear weapon, or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it.”
The last definition is the most common, and it is also used in the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Bangkok (Shaker 1997).
The treaty of Pelindaba can serve as a good example since it is the only zone where nuclear weapons actually have existed. Since the Treaty of Pelindaba and a WMDFZ in the Middle East will partly overlap or at least share a border, it will be favourable with some cooperation.
A Middle Eastern WMDFZ should particularly note the prohibition of armed attacks on nuclear installations, for which none of the other zones provide regulations.
The possibility to aim for a prohibition of all nuclear activities, including peaceful activities (except for export of equipment and materials for peaceful nuclear use under the NPT and the IAEA), should be considered. This has been done in the Treaty of Rarotonga, and it can prevent situations where states doubt another state’s peaceful intentions.
5.2.2 Chemical and Biological Weapons
The 1925 Geneva Protocol is a principal international instrument against the use of chemical and biological weapons. Even if the protocol bans the use of such weapons, it does not ban their production or possession. It eventually failed to cope with the recent development within areas like production, use, acquisition and stockpiling. Later, the CWC and the BTWC have completely banned chemical and biological weapons (Blix et al. 2006: 34).
A WMDFZ will be essential in the Middle East, despite the pre-existing ban on chemical and biological weapons:
• A WMDFZ will be designed to provide credible verification and transparency measures across all existing categories of WMD. If states confirm mutual non-proliferation of WMD, it can help to solve the current deadlock these states are in. No states in the Middle East today want to take the first step against non-proliferation, and this is a severe obstacle for the prohibition of WMD.
• A trade-off system between various weapon systems and the purposes of the weapon systems are one requirement for arms control. The trade-offs do not have to be equal, but the trade-off process needs to produce a situation of equal and enhanced security once the process has led to an agreement. The goal is to attain a situation of balance and equal security even if the abandoned weapons do not constitute an equal force (Jones 1997).
Egypt’s position is that it will only consider accession to the CWC if Israel accesses the NPT, and this is supported by several other states in the region. Some Israeli politicians have indicated that chemical and biological weapons in hostile regional countries would be a justification for a nuclear deterrent (Baumgart & Müller 2004-2005). This suggests that a WMDFZ in the Middle East can represent such a trade-off system; it will provide a
framework for the abandonment of WMD in different countries. The eventual objective is a situation of improved security, and it will ultimately benefit the Middle East as a whole.
• Combined with the transparency and the verification measures discussed above, the negative security guarantees, promises of greater international support and the entry of non-proliferation norms may induce states in “difficult” regions to participate in non- proliferation activities.
The existing prohibitions under the CWC and the BTWC should also be used in a WMDFZ.
The CWC prohibitions in article I-1 include “(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; (b) To use chemical weapons; (c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” The CWC also includes several definitions which together with the general prohibitions can build a basis for chemical
weapons prohibitions in a WMDFZ in the Middle East (OPCW 2005). The parties are required to declare any chemical weapons related activities and to destroy any stockpile of chemical weapons. They are obliged to inactivate and eliminate any chemical weapons production capacity within their jurisdiction. The verification is carried out by the OPCW (Blix et al.
2006: 34).
BTWC article I includes a prohibition not to “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.” Transferring agents, toxins, equipment or means of delivery, as well as assisting or encouraging the manufacture or acquisition of such are also prohibited (BTWC 1972).
Applying prohibitions similar to those in existing NWFZs should also be considered. For example, a prohibition of armed attack on suspected or de facto chemical and biological installations could be included.
5.3 The Geographical Scope
It is important to aim for the inclusion of all states that are of primary security relevance to each other. Since most states in the Middle East experience some regional security issues, the problem with this approach is that it will have to include a very large number of states, which in turn makes a WMDFZ harder to realize (Leonard & Prawitz 1999). The first two models presented below start out with a small core of states, and they must be designed for later expansion: The Gulf Model and The Levant Model are both based on the realization that the geographical scope of a Middle East WMDFZ should grow out of a core that includes only a few states. A realistic zone regime should start out small and later finally encompass the entire basic area, a realization also made by Leonard and Prawitz (1999). The last model below is the
“All at Once” model. In this model, the important conflict lines in the Middle East are used as a foundation to propose a zone that will embrace all Middle Eastern states with regional security issues. Figure 5.1 shows possible zonal arrangements in the Middle East.
5.3.1 The Gulf Model
According to the Gulf model, a WMDFZ should grow out of an existing initiative. Such an initiative already exists in the Middle East; in 2004 Gulf States representatives meeting in Stockholm agreed to present a WMDFZ initiative to their governments. It was initiated by the Gulf Research Centre, and the argument was that the Gulf States can play a critical role in the start-up phase of a WMDFZ. It is also based on the argument that WMD have not only been made for use in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They have also been created for use in conflicts among Arabs, or Arabs versus Iran (Jones 2005). The Gulf Model includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Iraq. It will provide the groundwork for an arrangement eventually encompassing the entire Middle East.
Figure 5.1 Suggested WMDFZs in the Middle East. The grey area shows the countries included in the Gulf Model, and the white area shows the Levant Model. The countries of both these areas together constitute the “All at Once” Model. The map is modified from one found on www.maps.com.
Initiatives on models including the whole Middle East have not been successful so far. The zone created in the Gulf Model will have an “open-door policy” to encourage the accession of other states. A WMDFZ in the Gulf may be a step on the way to security in the wider Middle Eastern region (Alani 2005).
Geographically, this zone will be designed to ease the inter-Arab and Arab-Iranian conflicts in the Gulf first. According to Buzan and Wæver (2003) the Gulf security complex was formed after the British withdrawal from the area in 1971. It is centred on a triangular rivalry among Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia. A peripheral rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Yemen has generated a lot of local wars. The Gulf Arabs consist of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, and in 1981 they formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC was a weak sub-regional strategic partnership, formed in a response to the Iran-Iraq war, thus excluding those two; probably out of fear for them. Iran and Iraq have fought over several border disputes, rivalry of power leader’s power ambitions, problems with Kurdish minorities, and the fate of the Shiite population in the south of Iraq. The Iranian – Saudi Arabian rivalry got a sharp ideological edge after the 1979
revolution in Iran.
Iran is one of the greatest concerns for the realization of a WMDFZ in the Gulf today.
Destruction of Saddam’s regime in Iraq meant a security gain for Iran, but the American presence next door is likely to make the Iranians uncomfortable. When Iraq initiated the use of chemical weapons against Iran, a clear violation of the Geneva Protocol, the international community failed to come to Iran’s aid. This has created a sense in Iran that security
guarantees will not be sufficient in a possible WMD attack against Iran (Jones 2005). The hope is that the many advantages of a WMDFZ, including negative security assurances, increased transparency, norms building and confidence-building measures, will induce Iran to participate in a WMDFZ. It is also important to remember that both the African NWFZ and the Latin American NWFZ started out with only a few states. According to Jones (2005), the zone may have to wait for changes in the political circumstances, similar to the earlier case of the Latin American NWFZ. The ideas and norms created under a WMDFZ show other states that such a zone can be created, and make it more likely that they will take part later. This model might seemingly start out small, but in the long run it can prove to be a successful way to handle the non-proliferation questions in the Middle East.
Nations with various levels of nuclear capabilities will be incorporated in a long-term process as they did in Latin America, where a zone was established between a few states while other states were allowed delayed entry. It will be important that Middle Eastern states which delay entry are firmly linked to the treaty, and they must be committed to taking no further actions contrary to the treaty’s objectives. In the Treaty of Tlatelolco there is a separation between contracting states and signatory states, and this should provide useful lessons for the Middle East (Redick 1998-2000). If states outside the zone can be convinced to support the regime, and assist in its implementation, the road toward a WMDFZ including the entire Middle East may be an obtainable goal.
Regional dialogues to establish bilateral and multilateral agreements between the contracting states and the signatory states should be a continuous process. This will be important in order to create a foundation for confidence building measures, exchange of reports and information, fact-finding mandates and transparency between the states that are allowed a delayed entry.
5.3.2 The Levant Model
The Levant Model is based on the recognition that the most acute states need to be included first. A UN study from 19908 separated “core countries” from “peripheral countries.” The argument was that the Middle Eastern countries involved in the conflict between Israel and the Arabs should be included first. The remaining states in the area did not necessarily have to take part in the zone from the beginning, but could be included later (Shaker 1997). Leonard and Prawitz (1999) support the claim that such a zone will have to include the states that
experience the Middle Eastern security dilemma. They also admit that this will have to cover a large number of states. They maintain that a WMDFZ in the Middle East should at least
8 A/45/435: Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East, Report of the Secretary General, 10 October 1990.
