International law for the Anthropocene? Shifting perspectives in regulation of the oceans, environment and genetic resources

Review

International law for the Anthropocene? Shifting perspectives in regulation of the oceans, environment and genetic resources

Davor Vidas*, Ole Kristian Fauchald, Øystein Jensen, Morten Walløe Tvedt

TheFridtjofNansenInstitute,POBox326,1326Lysaker,Norway

ARTICLE INFO

Articlehistory:

Received5April2015

Receivedinrevisedform26June2015 Accepted30June2015

Availableonlinexxx

Keywords:

Sovereignequalityofstates Sovereigntyoverterritory Sea-levelrise

Sustainabledevelopment Biologicaldiversity Geneticresources

ABSTRACT

This articlereviewsthe potentialimplicationsof theAnthropoceneforthe futuredevelopmentof internationallawingeneral,andforitsdistinctfieldsofthelawofthesea,environmentallaw,andrules governing genetic resources in particular. Stability is deeply embedded in the fundamentals of internationallaw,whereitoperatesontwolevels.Oneistheconsciousobjectiveofworkingtowards legallyguaranteedstabilityininternationalrelations,inturnpronetofrequentpoliticalchange.Theother levelofstabilityisimplied:itistheassumption,basedonhumanexperiencesofar,oftherelativelystable circumstancesofthelateHolocene.TheonsetoftheAnthropoceneandthechangesintroducedinthat underlyingelementofstabilityentailthepotentialforanunprecedentedtypeoftensionininter-state relations.Thismayspillovertoandaggravateexistingtensionsbetweentheterritorialintegrityofstates andterritorialclaims,coupledwiththefactofimmensegeopoliticaldifferences,ontheonehand,and sovereignequalityofstatesasthefoundingpostulateofinternationallaw,ontheother.Theinternational legalorderwillalwaysbeinsearchofstabilityand,ultimately,solutionstofacilitatepeaceandprevent conflict.However,withafundamentalchangeofthecontextinwhichinternationallawoperates–and withthechallengesincreasinglyrecognizedastheconsequencesofnatural,notonlypolitical,change– newlegalaxiomswillhavetoevolve.

ã2015ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.

Contents

1. Introduction ... 00

2. InternationallawandtheAnthropocene:introductoryconsiderations ... 00

2.1. Internationallaw:basicfeaturesandtensions ... 00

2.2. TheAnthropocene:thetensionoftheEarthsystemunderhuman-inducedchange ... 00

2.3. InternationallawbeyondthestabilityofthelateHolocene ... 00

3. ThelawoftheseaandtheAnthropocene ... 00

3.1. Thelawofthesea:basiccharacteristicsanddrivingforces ... 00

3.2. TheAnthropoceneandimpactsontheoceans ... 00

3.2.1. Regulatingacrossthemaritimezones:anewfunctionalneed ... 00

3.2.2. Limitsofthemaritimezones:sea-levelriseperspective ... 00

3.3. ResilienceofthelawoftheseasysteminthechangingAnthropoceneconditions ... 00

4. InternationalenvironmentallawfortheAnthropocene ... 00

4.1. Somebasiccharacteristicsofinternationalenvironmentallaw ... 00

4.2. Sovereignty,sovereignrightsandjurisdiction ... 00

4.3. Changingtheprinciplesofinternationalenvironmentallaw? ... 00

4.4. Issuesregardingresilience—respondingtochallenges ... 00

5. Geneticresources:betweenpatentlawandsovereignrights ... 00

5.1. Basicsoflawgoverninggeneticresources ... 00

5.2. Sovereignrights,exclusiveprivaterights,andjurisdiction ... 00

* Correspondingauthor.Fax:+4767111910.

E-mailaddress:davor.vidas@fni.no(D.Vidas).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ancene.2015.06.003 2213-3054/ã2015ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.

xxx–xxx ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Anthropocene

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s ev i er . c o m / l o c a t e/ a n c en e

5.3. Issuesregardingresilience ... 00

5.4. Responsestochallenges ... 00

6. Conclusions ... 00

Acknowledgments ... 00

References ... 00

1.Introduction

TheAnthropoceneisaconceptthathasspreadrapidlyinrecent years.Initiallyaninformalscientifictermproposedtoindicatethat humanimprintontheEarthsystemmayhavealreadyreacheda geological magnitude (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; Crutzen, 2002),theAnthropocenehypothesisisnowunderscrutinywithin stratigraphy.In2009,theInternationalCommissiononStratigra- phy established the Anthropocene Working Group,¹ in order to examinewhether,basedonstratigraphicevidence,theEarthmay beundergoingashiftfromtheHoloceneEpochandenteringanew interval of geological time—the Anthropocene. Findings of the AnthropoceneWorkingGroupareexpectedin2016.

The Holocene, comprising the past 11,700 years,² has been characterized,especiallyinitslaterstage,bythelongestrelative stability in environmental conditions on the Earth since the appearanceofHomosapienssome200,000yearsago.Unlikethe Holocene, however, the Anthropocene is seen as thoroughly characterizedbychange,uncertaintyand,probably,considerable instabilityinthebehaviouroftheEarthsystem(Zalasiewiczetal., 2012;Williamsetal.,2015).

WhatisfundamentallynewintheAnthropoceneconceptisits focusontherole of humansin thedestabilizationoftheEarth system,andnotjustthehumanimpactontheenvironment,asin variousearlierapproaches(HamiltonandGrinevald,2015).³The Anthropoceneconceptoffersabroadframeworkforbridgingthe perceived divide between nature (the Earth system we find ourselvesin)ontheonehand,andhumans(andthepoliticalworld wehavecreated),ontheother.

TheAnthropocenehypothesishasalreadypassedbeyondthe boundaries of natural science, emerging as a new way of understandingthehumanroleandtheimplicationsofouractions fortheworldweliveinanditsfuture.Amongthemanysocietal consequences (Dalby, 2009; Tickell, 2011), there arises the question of possible implications for international law on the horizon of this convergence of geological epochs (Vidas, 2010, 2014;Falk,2010).

Thisarticlefirstreviewssomegeneralaspectsofinternational lawand thepotential implications of theAnthropocene for its development. We then ask: how does international law – in particular the law of the sea, environmental law, and rules governinggeneticresources–relate,andmight respond,tothe challengeslikelytoappearwithashiftfromtheHolocenetothe conditionsoftheAnthropocene?

2.InternationallawandtheAnthropocene:introductory considerations

2.1.Internationallaw:basicfeaturesandtensions

International law is, unlike national law, marked by the sovereigntyofitsprincipalsubjects,theStates⁴;eachoftheseis a sovereign possessing supreme authority within its own jurisdiction.Nolegalauthorityorpower–nolegislatororruler –isbyitselfhierarchicallyaboveanymemberofthatkeygroupof subjectsofinternationallaw.Thus,internationallawisbasedon theprincipleofsovereignequalityofstatesintheirmutualrelations (seeTomuschat,2001;Kokott,2011);thisprincipleisreflectedin Article2(1)of theUN Charterandis in thefundamentsof the UnitedNations.

Duetothelackof alegislativeprocess asknownwithinthe nationallegalsystemsofindividualstates,internationaltreaties– inpractice,themostfrequentlyusedsourceofinternationallaw⁵– arenegotiatedbystatesthemselves;andstatesbecomeboundby treaties only with their explicit consent, through ratification, accessionorotherproceduralmeans.⁶Likewise,astatemustgive itsacceptancein ordertobesubjectedtothejurisdictionof an internationalcourtorarbitraltribunalinanygivencase,whether byacceptingthejurisdictioninadvanceforsometypesofcases,or subsequenttotheemergenceofanindividualcase.Stateconsent andreciprocityareamongfundamentalingredientsofinternation- allaw.Nonetheless,theexplicitconsentofallstatesisnotrequired for,e.g.theemergenceofauniversalcustomarylawrule,inturn binding on all states. Moreover, while international law as a

‘horizontal’legalsystemrestsuponthelogicofreciprocity(Simma, 2008,p.6),whichisinherentinthelawoftreatiesingeneral,some treaties,asinthesphereofhumanrights,maycontainobligations thatarenotsubjecttoreciprocity.⁷

Each state has its own territory over which it exercises sovereignty. Rulesof international lawabout theacquisitionof territoryand itsspatialextension(alsomaritime andaerial), as wellasaboutthedelimitationofboundariesbetweenstates,apply equallytoallstates.Andyet,onthegeopoliticalmapoftheworld, statesareprofoundlydifferent.Thisisclearlyseenalreadyfromthe

1OntheAnthropoceneworkinggroup,seeat:http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/

workinggroups/anthropocene/.

2ThelowerboundaryoftheHolocene,asformallyacceptedandratifiedthrough stratigraphicprocessin2008.ThelowerboundaryforthelateHoloceneiscurrently proposedat4200yearsBP(Walkeretal.,2012).

3Hamilton andGrinevald(2015) explainthat‘theEarthasatotalcomplex

“ecosystem”,includingtheglobalclimatesystem,isaveryrecentinterdisciplinary andparadigmaticconceptdevelopedinthe1980sand1990s’,andofficiallyadopted bythemajorinternationalscientificcooperationprogrammesonlyintheearly 2000s.

4 Othersubjectsofinternationallaw,includinginternationalorganizationsand, sometimes,alsoindividualsandtheirassociations,areallindirectlyordirectly relatedtothestateastheprincipalsubjectofinternationallaw.Ingeneral,subjects ofinternationallawmaybedefinedas‘entitieswhicharecapableofpossessing internationalrightsandduties’;seeBrownlie’sPrinciplesofPublicInternational Law(Crawford,ed.,2012),115–126pp.;Oppenheim’sInternationalLaw(Jennings andWatts,eds,1992),119–120pp.;andWalter,2007.

5 AnauthoritativestatementofthesourcesofinternationallawisfoundinArticle 38(1)oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice.TheStatuteisanintegral partoftheUNCharter,andtheCourtistheprincipaljudicialorganoftheUN.

6 Internationaltreatiesmaybindtwoormore states,andcanthereforebe bilateralormultilateral.However,rulesinscribedintheprovisionsofinternational treaties canreflect customary law. Customary internationallaw and general principlesoflaw–theothertwomainsourcesofinternationallawstatedinArticle 38(1)oftheICJStatute–canbebindingonallstatesandtherebycanhaveuniversal application(Charney,1993).

7 Onaspectsofreciprocityinenvironmentaltreaties,seeSection4below.

xxx–xxx

size of theirterritory– from thebiggest (Russia, withover 17 millionsq.km)tothesmallest(Monaco,lessthan2sqkm)–aswell aspopulationsize,rangingfromChinaandIndia(with1.36and 1.26billion,respectively)alltoNauruandTuvalu(withonly10to 11 thousand inhabitants).⁸ Uneven in their political influence, economicandtechnologicaldevelopment,militarypower,strate- gicplacement, scientificcapabilities,and inmanyotherfactors, statesconstituteahighlyheterogeneousgroup.Whileconsidered equalassubjectsofinternationallaw,statesspanthebroadscale from ‘micro-states’ (see Grant, 2013) to ‘Great Powers’, even

‘Superpowers’ (see Kammerhofer, 2009). Various periods in history have witnessed the hegemonic rolesof some states in theinternationalsphere(Thürer,2011);mostrecently,theUSAin thepost-ColdWarsituationsincethe1990s,andespeciallywith the‘WaronTerror’lateron.

International law, however, operates with the idea of the international community as its declared objective⁹ – not an internationalarenaorthe‘clashofcivilizations’(seeHuntington, 1993).Ininternationallaw,RussiaandMonaco,ChinaandNauru, andtheUSA(comparedwithanyotherstate)–eachofthemcanbe onlyonestatepartytoaninternationaltreaty,oronlyonemember of aninternational organization. While promotingfundamental principlesuponwhichlegalrulesinrelationsbetweenstatesare based, international law is, however, not an abstract system detached from political, economic or other relevant contexts.

Probablythebest-knownexampleisprovidedbytheUNCharter, which—whileguaranteeingoneseataswellasanequalvotetoall itsmembersin theGeneral Assembly, grantsthefivepowers– China,France,Russia,UKandtheUSA–permanentmembershipon theSecurityCouncilandtheeffectiverightofvetooverCouncil’s decisionsonmattersofsubstance.¹⁰Anotherexampleisthe1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,theentryintoforceofwhichrequirednotonlyacertain numberofratificationsbystates(55),butalsotheinclusionofa specified minimum percentage of CO2 emissions (55%) to be representedbythosestates.

Theunderlyingprincipleofinternationallawremainsthatany state is bound by these and other provisions of international treaties,including those establishingan internationalorganiza- tion,onlyafterfreelydecidingtoaccedetothem.However,the reach of state’s consent in international law can neither be understoodinabstractnorasabsolute;andalreadytheincreasing multilateralizationofinternationalrelationsandthenecessityof regulatingemergingneedsininternationallifemakeitdifficultfor statestoremainunboundbyvarioustreaties.Thereachofstates’ consentininternationallawhasthereforebeencarefullyexplored anddiscussedinthemorerecentinternationallawliterature(see Charney,1993;Tomuschat,1993;Kirsch,2014).

Moderninternationallaw,especiallyasithasdevelopedsince themid-20thcentury,hasbeenmarkedbytwomainspheresof constanttension.First,thetensionbetweensovereignequalityof states on the one hand, and their political, military, strategic, economicandotherdifferencesontheother.Second,thetension betweenthelegal guaranteeof territorialintegrity ofsovereign statesontheonehand,andclaims,nurturedbyamyriadoffactors fromeconomictoethnic,inthepoliticaldivisionoftheworld,on theother.Inbothspheresoftension,theobjectiveofinternational lawhasbeentofacilitatepoliticalstabilityininterstaterelations

throughinternationalcooperationand tomaintaininternational peaceandsecurity(UNCharter,Art.1(1)and(3)).Theonsetofthe Anthropocene introduces a third, fundamentally different and profoundlynewtypeoftension.

Thetensionbetweenthesovereignequalityofstatesandtheir geopoliticaldifferenceshasbeenoftenpresentedascausedbythe

‘horizontal’natureofinternationallawontheonehand,andthe

‘vertical’realityduetothemanydifferencesbetweenstatesonthe other.AsnotedbyFalk(2014,p.87):

the problematic character of world order premised on the interplayofterritorialsovereigntyandhegemonicgeopolitics (thatis,itshorizontaljuridicalaspectoftheequalityofstates, anditsverticalpoliticalaspectofcontrolexertedbytheleading stateacts)isunabletoaddressinasatisfactoryfashionanyof humanity’smost urgentchallenges: climatechange, nuclear weaponry, globalpoverty, unregulated worldeconomy, pan- demics,geneticengineering,preservingbiodiversity.Reduced to fundamentals, the deficiencies of world order can be summarized as the fragmenting of a unified approach to problemsolvingbyallowingunevenlysituatedstatestopursue theirdistinctnationalinterestsattheexpenseoftheoverall humaninterest.

The second, related sphere of tension stems from the fact that the world is territorially divided into many parts, each under sovereignty of a distinct state (currently some 200 of these),delimitedbyinterstateboundaries(incompleteinsome cases). The adjoining maritime areas of states with their own coasts are divided as well (see further in Section 3, below).

Whatremainsbeyondisonepartofawatercolumnunderthe sovereigntyor sovereignrightsofnostate(thehighseas);and one part of the seabed lying beyond the limits of national jurisdiction(theinternationalseabedarea).¹¹Competing claims to territories, land and maritime, have abounded through history,oftenleadingtowarsortoterritorialchangesbasedon political power. In the same geographical spaces, new states haveemergedandotherscollapsed,frequentlythroughviolence and power politics. Therefore, facilitating the peaceful settle- ment of territorialdisputesbased ontherulesofinternational law is amongthe highest achievements of human civilization thus far.

Yet,internationallawhadpreviouslyshownanotherface as well. The emergence of classical international law has been largely intertwined with the‘discoveries’of overseaslands by European powers; and their expansion has often included territorial acquisition (see Mégret, 2009). International law doctrines, concepts andrules have been affectingthe political shape of the globefor quitesome time.The key international documents that followedColumbus’ 1492 voyageintroduceda demarcationline.IndiscoveringtheGlobe,wehavenotseenthe Earth—wehaveaimedatdividingtheWorld.UndertheTreatyof Tordesillas, agreed by Spain and Portugal in 1494, the ‘New World’, including any lands yet to be ‘discovered’, was to be divided betweenthem by a ‘boundary or straight line... drawn northandsouth,frompoletopole,onthesaidoceansea,from theArctictotheAntarcticpole’.WhenlandsdistantfromEurope becamebetterknownandtheirrichesrevealed,others,including England under Queen Elizabeth I, demanded different ‘lines’: first of all, the lines of unimpeded maritime trade and participation in theaccumulationof profit.

8 Duetotheirexceptionalaspects,theHolySeeandtheOrderofMaltahavenot beenincludedinthisillustrationspan.

9 Therearealsolegalimplicationsinrelationtothe‘internationalcommunity’,as inthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(Article53),oraselaboratedin somedecisionsoftheInternationalCourtofJustice.

10 Articles23(1)and27(3)oftheUNCharter.

11TheAntarctic,understoodastheareasouthof60Slatitude,hasauniquestatus, governedunderthe1959AntarcticTreaty,whichisthelegalbasisoftheAntarctic TreatySystemapplyingtothisarea(seeStokkeandVidas,1996;andespeciallyfor theAntarcticmaritimearea,Vidas,2000).

xxx–xxx

Sincetheearlydaysofinternationallawasadiscipline,ourkeen interestintheEarth–thoughperhapsperceivedasaglobeonthe face of which the political world is being shaped – cannot be denied.Geographyhasbecomefirmlyanddeeplyembeddedinthe fundamentsofinternationallaw(Bethlehem,2014).

2.2.TheAnthropocene:thetensionoftheEarthsystemunderhuman- inducedchange

A new sphere of tension is emerging—and its primary dimensionis notunrelatedtotheworlddividedintoterritories of states (with their adjoining exclusive economic zones and continentalshelves),andaportionofcommonareasbeyondthese.

Thisnewtension,however,hastodowiththeEarthasawhole, seenasaunique,singlenaturalsystem.Showingrelativestability throughoutrecenthumanhistory,theunderlyingconditionofthe Earthsystemhasbeentakenasagiven—anduponthatpremiseour politicalstructureswerecreated.Therelationshipofinternational lawwiththeobservedgeographicalfeaturesandindeedtheoverall geological dimension of the Earth system has generally been confinedtoanimplicitassumptionabouttheundetermined,long- termhorizonofcurrentconditions—asanobjectivecircumstance surroundingus since time immemorial. We areaccustomed to understandingchangesintheEarthsystemwithinthecontextof geologicaltime,eventsstretchingbackmillennia,ormillionsand evenbillionsofyears—asopposedtopoliticallyrelevanttimeand therelatedpaceofchange,whetherembodiedinnationalelection horizons,pre-andpost-warperiods,newlyemergingordissolved worldalliances,theadoptionandentryintoforceofinternational treaties, creation of international organizations, or other mile- stonesonthatscale.

Stabilityisdeeplyembeddedinthefundamentalsofinterna- tionallaw,whereitoperatesattwolevels.Oneistheconscious objective of working towards legally guaranteed stability in internationalrelations,inturnpronetofrequentpoliticalchange.

Theotherlevelofstabilityisimplied:itistheassumption,basedon ourexperiencesofar,ofconstantlystablecircumstancesofthelate Holocene.Manyaspectsof internationallawarebased onsuch understandingofthestabilityoftheEarthconditions.¹²Indeed,the definitionofcurrentinternationallawis,inmanyrespects,thatofa system of rules resting on foundations that evolved under the circumstances of the late Holocene, assumed to be ever-lasting.

International law takes the conditions of the Holocene for granted—and on that premise, a huge edifice of international lawhas been constructed over the past several centuries. The changeintroducedinthatunderlyingelementofstability –and thatiswhatthetransitionfromtheHolocenetotheAnthropocene involves– contains the potential foran unprecedented type of tensionin relations betweenstates. This can spill over to and aggravate existing tensions between the territorialintegrity of statesand territorialclaims—coupledwiththefact ofimmense geopoliticaldifferences,ontheonehand,andsovereignequalityof statesasthefoundingpostulateofinternationallaw,ontheother.

2.3.InternationallawbeyondthestabilityofthelateHolocene Manyaspectsofinternationallawrelyonanimplicitpre-textof thefamiliarconditionsofstability.Forinstance,adefinedterritory –indeed,havingaterritory–isabasiccriterionofstatehoodunder

international law (as codified in Article 1(a) of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States). The perspectiveofsea-levelriseisbutoneofmanysymptomsinthe outlook of an Anthropocene world—and challenges to the continuity of statehood of some low-lying small island states are bound to emerge. In the not-too-distant future, important questions may arise, requiring re-examination of currently acceptedparadigmsofinternationallaw(seeVidas,2014).

Someoftheseriouschangesareconceivableinthecourseofthe 21stcentury—withintheperspectiveofahumanlifetime(see,e.g.

Intergovernmental PanelonClimate Change,IPCC, 2014;World Bank,2014;butalsoRyeetal.,2014;Hayetal.,2015).Thismeans that the rules we start to discuss at present will in future perspectiveofthelate21stcenturygovernthelivingconditionsof some who are already born today, instead of just relating in abstract,tosomehypothetical‘futuregenerations’.Otherpotential human-inducedchangesare,however,conceivableasimminent:

considertheconsequencesofthepossibleuseofnuclearweapons available today. Indeed, the hypothesis on the onset of the Anthropocene, now supported by a large majority of the Anthropocene Working Group members (Zalasiewicz et al., 2015),relatesittothemid-20thcentury,inparticulartothefirst nuclear bomb detonation (16 July 1945 at Alamogordo, New Mexico)followedbyadditionaldetonationsatanaveragerateof oneevery9.6daysuntil1988.

Theinternationallegalorderwillalwaysbeinsearchofstability and,ultimately,solutionstofacilitatepeaceandpreventconflict.

However, with a fundamental change of the context in which internationallawoperates–andwiththechallengesincreasingly recognized as the consequences of natural, not only political, change–newlegalaxiomswillhavetoevolve.Thattransformation willhavetoembracethefundamentalprinciplesoftheinterna- tional law architecture—with geography firmly and deeply embeddedinitscore.Ifinternationallawistobeabletomeet the newchallenges of changing circumstances and achieve its overarchingobjectivesoffacilitatinginternationalcooperationand maintaining international peace and stability, humankind may havetoorganize society intheAnthropocene epochdifferently fromwhatwehaveknownsofar.Inthatbroadframeworkofour needsand purposes looming onan Anthropocene horizon, the primacygivenininternationallawtotheassertionofsovereign rights over territory may have to be reconsidered, while the emphasisonpopulationandhumanrightsmayhavetogainin prominenceandfindexpressioninnewformsofinternationallaw subjectivity. As international law rests on thick sediments of politicalpowerandaccumulatedvestedinterests,thechallengesin changingthecurrentcoursearedeep-reaching,andinvolvemany difficult questions. Whether and when these will be raised in practicewilldependonthechanging gravityofchallengesover time.Theinitialexaminationofthosequestionsintheacademic international law debate has only started—in the literature,in researchprojects,¹³andintheactivityofacademicsocietieslike theInternationalLawAssociation.¹⁴

12Exceptionsfoundininternationallawtotheoverallconditionsofstabilityare alsobasedonexperience:thechangingcoursesofrivers(andtherelatedruleson interstateboundariesinsuchsituations);orthechangingcoastalgeographyin somelargeriverdeltas(andtherelatedrulesinthelawofthesea;seefurther Section3).

13Inspring2011,theFridtjofNansenInstitutelaunchedathree-yearresearch projecton‘InternationalLawforanAnthropoceneEpoch’;seewww.fni.no/projects/

anthropocene_law.html.Sincethen,otherresearchprojectsontheAnthropocene andinternationallawhavebeeninitiated,includingbytheUniversityofSydney FacultyofLawinautumn2014;seehttp://sydney.edu.au/environment-institute/

blog/international-law-and-the-anthropocene/. Moreover, in October 2014 the FridtjofNansenInstitutefollowedwithaninternationalinterdisciplinaryresearch projecton‘Climatechangeandsea-levelriseintheAnthropocene:challengesfor internationallawinthe21stcentury’,seewww.fni.no/projects/climate_change_- and_sea_level_rise.html.

14OntheILACommitteeonInternationalLawandSeaLevelRise,whichaddressed theAnthropocenecontextintheproposalforitsestablishment,see:www.ila-hq.

org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1043.

xxx–xxx

Besides addressing the overall challenges of and perspectives introducedbytheAnthropocene,whichhavesofaronlyinitially beentakenupintheliteratureongeneralaspectsofinternational law(seeNaganandOtvos,2010;Falk,2010,2014),somefieldsor areasofinternationallawregulationsmayfacespecificchallenges.

Studies relating the Anthropocene to such distinct fields of internationallawhavebeeninitiatedonlyrecently:thisconcerns theliteratureonthetraditionalinternationallawfieldsuchasthe lawofthesea(seeVidas,2010,2011),followedbyseveralstudiesin the more recent field of international environmental law (see Robinson,2012,2013,2014;Ebbesson,2014;Scott,2013;Kimand Bosselmann,2013;Kotzé,2014).Thenextthreesectionsillustrate issues–anddifferences–involvedintheoutlookfortheabovetwo fieldsofinternationallawandoneadditionalissue-area,i.e.the onerelatedtothelegalregulationofgeneticresources.

3.ThelawoftheseaandtheAnthropocene

3.1.Thelawofthesea:basiccharacteristicsanddrivingforces Thedevelopmentofthelawoftheseaspansseveralcenturies, sincetheEuropeanoverseasdiscoveriesbySpainandPortugalin thelate15thandearly16thcenturies,andtheemergenceofthe new maritime powers of England and the Netherlands in the secondhalfofthe16thandearly17thcenturies.AftertheSecond World War, the USA grew into a political and economic force decisively impacting law-of-the-sea developments, prompted largelyby technologicaladvances. In the1960s and 1970s, the demandsofmanydevelopingstates,includingnewlycreatedones, inturnledtotheThirdUNConferenceontheLawoftheSea(1973– 1982).

Muchofthiscenturies-longdevelopmentultimatelyresultedin thesinglelaw-of-the-seaframework:the1982UNConventionon theLawoftheSea(UNCLOS).Aninternationaltreatyinforcesince 1994,UNCLOScontainsbothcodificationofcustomarynormsand progressivedevelopmentofinternationallaw.¹⁵ TheConvention regulateshowseasandoceans aretobedividedamong coastal states (currently, some 150 states) in various maritime zones, includingtheterritorialsea,theexclusiveeconomiczoneandthe continentalshelf.Coastal statesovereigntyextendstotheouter limitoftheterritorialsea;inEEZsandthecontinentalshelf,certain sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state apply.Beyondthosezonesisthehighseas,whereallstates(also land-lockedones)–andallshipsflyingtheirflags–enjoyfreedom ofthesea.Further,theseabedbeyondthelimitsofcoastalstate jurisdiction is, along with its resources, an international area regulatedasthecommonheritageofmankind.

UNCLOSisoftenreferredtoastheConstitutionoftheoceans:a legalframeworkthatgovernsallmajorissuesoftheentireocean space. Despite some initial difficulties in attracting broader support,asof3January2015UNCLOSisbindingon167parties (166StatesandtheEU).¹⁶Ontheonehand,thereisabroadpolitical consensusthatUNCLOScontainsthelegalframeworktheintegrity ofwhichneedstobemaintained.Ontheotherhand,thepaceof changeistremendous:populationtrends,advancesintechnology, scientificachievements–withresultantusesof,andimpactson, theseas.Thelawofthesea,centredonUNCLOS,istosomeextent flexibleandadjustableasaframeworkforfutureregulation,butis alsodeeplyrootedinearlierdevelopments.

Thelawoftheseahasgraduallydevelopedasanexponentof twomaindrivingforces,theconsequencesofbothnowcapturedin UNCLOS.Onedrivingforcehasbeenthatofterritorialappropria- tionoftheseas.Insomeperiods,territorialclaimswerereducedto a relativelynarrow beltof the seanearthecoast. In thepost- SecondWorldWarperiod,however,theterritorialdrivingforce returned in the form of claims for segments of sovereignty – sovereignrightsandexclusivejurisdiction–tobeextendedbeyond theouterlimitsof theterritorialsea(see Oxman,2006).These claims related tofisheriesresources in vast areasof the water column,aswellastothemineral(primarilyoil)resourcesofthe continentalshelf.¹⁷Inconsequence,therearenowmaritimezones in which, although found beyond the coastal state’s (land and maritime)territory,¹⁸sovereignrightsandexclusivejurisdictionof thecoastalstateapply:theEEZandthecontinentalshelf.

TheotherdrivingforceinthedevelopmentoftheLawoftheSea wasthatofeconomicprofitbyfunctionalasopposedtoterritorial access;andofsecuringstrategicgainsofnavalpowersindistant seaareas.Bothwerepromotedbytheconceptofthe‘freedomof theseas’,asinitiallyconceivedinHugoGrotius'MareLiberumof 1609(Grotius,1609;Scott,1916;Armitage,2004;Fenstra,2009).

Thisconcept cametooffer anideologicalplatform forsecuring unimpeded international trade for emerging (and thereupon established)maritimepowers,withthedualgoalsofmaximizing profitsfor theireconomies and increasingtheirstrategicdomi- nanceovernewterritories(see,e.g.vanIttersum,2006).

Theideologylaunchedintheearly17thcentury,expoundedin MareLiberum–arguingforthefreedomofnavigationinorderto secure participation in international trade and, ultimately, accumulation of profitfrom overseas ventures– facilitated the development of the forces that were to lead tothe Industrial Revolutionandeventually,inthecourseofthe20thcentury,tothe levelsofdevelopmentthathaveresultedin ever-greaterhuman impactsontheEarthSystem.TheendoftheSecondWorldWarin 1945wasalsothetimewhenthelast‘tectonicchange’inthelawof theseabegan.Outofthatwarcamevariousnewtechnologies– manyofwhichrepresentednewapplicationsforfossilfuels–anda commitment by governments in some industrially advanced countriesto subsidiseresearchand development. Only months after the war ended, the USA initiated articulation of the continental shelf as a concept of international law, in which geological information has played a crucial role. We still can observethefinaloutcomes:thecurrentprocessofdetermination of theouterlimitsofthecontinentalshelf beyond200nautical miles,facilitatedbytheworkoftheCommissionontheLimitsof theContinentalShelf(Jensen,2014).

ThelinkagesbetweenthedevelopmentoftheLawoftheSea andtheonsetoftheAnthropoceneepochmaybeseenastwo-fold (Vidas, 2011).First, there is a linkageof origin.The ideological foundationsof the Lawof theSea, especially asfound inMare Liberumoftheearly17thcentury,involve‘deep-time’originsfor the later processes which have ultimately brought about the Anthropocene. Second, there may be a renewed linkage in interaction. Geological information has promptedkey develop- mentssincetheintroductionofthecontinentalshelfasapolitical andtheninternationallawconceptinthemid-20thcentury;inthe early21stcenturygeologymayagainprovideanimpetusfornew law-of-the-seatrends.

This is now directing our attention to the changing ocean component of the Earth System in the Anthropocene.

15 Inthepastthreedecades,manyUNCLOSrulesgrewintocustomarylaw,too(see Treves,2010).

16 BeyondtheEU,severalUNCLOSpartiesarenon-membersoftheUN:Cook Islands,HolySee,Niue,andtheStateofPalestine.

17TheclaimswerecontainedintwounilateralactsissuedbytheUSAin1945:the USPresidentialProclamationNos.2667and2668.

18IncontrasttotheEEZandthecontinentalshelf,theterritorialseaisapartof state’sterritory.

xxx–xxx

Consequencesfor theLawoftheSeamaybeseenin twomain directions.First,there alreadyare seriousconsequences forthe biologicalandchemicalconditionsoftheoceansacrossdifferent legalmaritimezones.Second,thereareconsequencesofphysical nature on the horizon, impacting how the limits of various maritimezoneswillbedeterminedintheforeseeablefuture.

3.2.TheAnthropoceneandimpactsontheoceans

3.2.1.Regulatingacrossthemaritimezones:anewfunctionalneed Asasourceoffood,fishingisavitalhumanactivity;however, overfishinghasalreadyledtoseriousdepletionofmanyfishstocks andeventheextinctionofsomespecies.Massiveoceanictradeis centralinenablingtheindustrialsocietiestofunction;around90%

ofinternationaltradegoesbysea.Withglobalizationandmodern maritimetechnology,impactsfromoneplacecanrapidlybecome feltelsewhere.Forinstance,thegrowthoftheshippingindustryin thepastcenturybroughtadramaticincreaseinthetransferofnon- indigenous,potentiallyharmfulandinvasivespeciesandaquatic organismsbyvectorslikeballastwaterandhull fouling.Atany given moment, thousands of different species are being trans- ported between bio-geographic regions in ballast tanks. That development is unprecedented and outstrips various natural migrationsinthehistoryoftheEarth(Zalasiewicz,2008).

Worldoceansareexposedtohuman-inducedchangesthatgo well beyond overfishing, transport of invasive species, or oil pollutionfromships—allofwhicharerecognizedasconstituting increasinglyserioushumanimpactsontheoceanenvironmentand resources. Many factors have negative impacts that interact synergistically.

Withinanypartofthesea–underterritorialsovereigntyand jurisdictionornot–weshouldbeguidedbysomeofthesame, sharedconcerns.Thatiswhereweshouldfirstlookforsolutions.

The overarching need is now not primarily freedom of, but responsibilityfortheseas(seeVidas,2010).Thatisaresponsibility embodied in concepts that question neither territorial states’ extent of sovereignty and sovereign rights nor sustainable maritimetradeandindustrybenefits—adding,however,elements gravelyneededtoenableustodealwithhumanimpactsonthe marinecomponent of theEarth System. Those impacts do not dependprimarilyontheboundariesbetweenstatesorthedriving forcesshapingthem.Withfewexceptions,however,today’srules regulatehumanimpactsontheoceansinterms ofthepolitical boundaries of sovereigntyand jurisdiction, translatedinto law.

Thisiswhatisexpressedthroughthemaritimezonesandthebasic division of jurisdictional competences among coastal and flag states.Infact,manyrealconcernsareglobalortransboundaryin character:they neitherdepend on norcan be limited by such divisions.Regulatoryapproacheslikeecosystem-based manage- mentandintegratedcoastalandoceanmanagementneedtobe applied in areas located both under national jurisdiction and beyondit(Golitsyn,2010).Newapproachesmustenvisagemarine areaswithinandoutsidenationaljurisdictionasawhole(Treves, 2010).Andthatwillrequirenewlydevisedcoordinatingmecha- nisms.

3.2.2.Limitsofthemaritimezones:sea-levelriseperspective Thecomplexroleoftheoceansintheclimatesystemisnow wellacknowledged:theseasareacrucialheatbufferandabsorba significantshare of the CO2 released into theatmosphere. The seeminglyinsignificantincrease in seatemperaturein thepast centuryhasalreadyledtoglobalwarmingoftheupperoceanlayer.

Waterexpandsasitheats,contributingtosea-levelrise.Themajor impact,intheperspectiveofglobalwarming,concernsthegradual meltingofGreenlandandWestAntarcticicesheets,withstudies confirming early signs already (see reports: Intergovernmental

PanelonClimateChange,IPCC,2014;andWorldBank,2014aswell as,inliterature:Nichollsetal.,2011;Ryeetal.,2014;Hayetal., 2015).

NegotiatorsofUNCLOSdidnotforeseesubstantialchangesin coastalgeography, and certainly notcaused bya major natural phenomenonsuchassea-levelrise.¹⁹However,availablescientific studiescontainprojectionsofasignificantincreaseinsealevels alreadyinthepresentcentury.Whiletheexactamountandpaceof sea-level rise are uncertain, the projected range indicatesthat challengesforthecurrentLawoftheSeaareboundtoemerge.

Withrisingsealevels,thebaselinesfromwhichthebreadthof theterritorialseaismeasuredwillmovelandward,affectingthe outerlimitsofvariousmaritimezones.Ultimately,sea-levelrise maycallintoquestiontheentirestructureofthemaritimezones undertoday’sLawoftheSea:thebasisforallmaritimezonesas codifiedin UNCLOS is just oneline, determined byreliance on coastalgeography—thebaseline.Iteitherdirectlyfollowsthecoast (‘normalbaseline’);ordependsonthespecificconfigurationofthe coastlineandothercoastalfeatures(achainofislands,fjords,etc.), inwhich case itis calledthe‘straight’baseline,and everything landwardofitisconsideredtheinternalwatersofthecoastalstate.

From the baselines (whether normal or straight), different maritime zones of coastal states are measured and, in conse- quence, the high seas are determined. Thisobjective criterion, whichreliesonagivencoastalgeography,servesnotonlyasthe basisforthevariousmaritimezonesofacoastalstate;itisalso centraltothedelimitationofmaritimeboundariesbetweenstates.

Thepurposeof thoserules ofinternational lawof theseaisto maintain certainty and predictability. Sea-level rise may bring increasinguncertainty.

Seekingtofindasolution,mostlaw-of-the-seaexpertshaveso farproposedthedevelopmentofanewruleofinternationallaw that would have the effect of freezing the baselines, or permanentlyfixingtheboundariesofmaritime zonesattoday’s status—byfixingthemonachart,orsuch-like(Caron,1990,2009;

Soons,1990;Jesus,2003;Hayashi,2011).Inotherwords,proposals for dealing withsea-level rise aimat preserving a static legal situationinthefaceofanincreasinglydynamicprocessofnatural change. Thisillustrates a core dilemma: On the one hand, the natural processes of convergence between the Holocene and Anthropoceneconditionswillrequirearesponseortransformation inaccordancewiththeneedsandpurposesinthenewsituation, ratherthantheimposition,byanalogyorprecedent,ofstaticforms thatwerebuiltonthebasisofanearlier,nolongervalid,situation.

Ontheotherhand,theinternationallegalorderwillalwaysbein searchofstabilityand,ultimately,solutionstofacilitatepeaceand preventconflict.InthecaseoftheLawoftheSeaandthemethods for determining baselines and their domino effect on other maritime zones, a gradual solution between the ‘freezing’ of currentlegalstatusandpermanentfluctuationofthelimitsmaybe foundinanewcoordinatingmechanismdevisedspecificallywith theeffects ofsea-levelriseonbaselinesand maritimezonesin mind.Whiletheprocessofestablishingacoordinatingmechanism ofthatsort,aswellasitscompositionandcompetencies,remains tobeclarified,theexampleoftheCommissionontheLimitsofthe ContinentalShelfmightofferusefulexperience.

19The‘Bangladeshexception’–Article7(2)ofUNCLOS,applyingprimarilyto

highlyunstablecoastlinescausedbyriverdeltasandtherelatedimpactonstraight baselines–isoflimitedreachandistargetedtospecificsituations.Argumentuma contrario,itconfirmsthemainruleasfurtherdescribedbelow.

xxx–xxx

3.3.Resilienceofthelawoftheseasysteminthechanging Anthropoceneconditions

The foundations of today’s law of the sea are basically the productof centuriesof often-antagonistic strugglesamong and between dominant human forces. These forces have produced impressive technological capabilities and made possible the modernwayoflifeinindustrializedsocieties,buttheyalsoseem tohavecontributedsubstantiallytowardsthreateningthestable conditionsoftheHolocene—andbringingaboutourentryintothe Anthropocene.

The law of the sea is today a well-developed legal system, addressinghumanusesoftheseasandoceans,organizedthrough variousmaritimezoneswheretherightsandduties ofstates(andthe manystakeholdersinvolved)arecarefullybalanced.Thelaw-of-the- sea system aims at facilitating stable international relations regardingthemaritimespacesandtheiruses,aswellaspromoting thepeacefulsettlementofdisputesthatmayarise.

Evolving over centuries and resulting in the current legal frameworkthatemergedinthesecondhalfofthe20thcentury,the Law of the Sea is aimedprimarily at addressing the changing politicalandeconomiccircumstances—notchangesintheoverall naturalconditionsaswell.Thisisa legalsystemtailoredtothe circumstancesoftheHolocene,implicitlyheldtobepermanently valid.

Withtheprofoundly differentcircumstancesontheAnthro- pocenehorizon,respondingtothechallengesfortheLawoftheSea mayincreasinglyinvolvemorethanmerelyamendingoradjusting the rules of individual treaties, or adding new ones. The very foundationsofthislegalsystemanditscurrentparametersmay needre-evaluation.Certain cornerstoneconceptsof thelaw-of- the-seaarchitecture,liketherulespertainingtobaselinesandthe consequentdetermination of themaritime zones, mayhave to undergo thorough scrutiny and be supplemented by new rules—with new coordinating mechanisms to enable their implementation.

4.InternationalenvironmentallawfortheAnthropocene

4.1.Somebasiccharacteristicsofinternationalenvironmentallaw International environmental law (IEL) – a recent subject of publiclawatthenationallevel(sincethemid-20thcentury)anda relativelynewdisciplinewithinpublicinternationallaw(sincethe 1970s)–isstillintheformativestages.Ithasdevelopedlargelyasa response tothe developments that have triggered theAnthro- pocene,althoughthescaleofchangesattheEarthSystemlevelhas been recognized only quite recently. Examples of particularly relevantelementsofIELincludetreatiesdatingbacktothe1960s concerning nuclear activities as well as cases before the International Court of Justice regarding nuclear weapons.²⁰ Importantly, IEL is the field of international law that aims at addressing these challenges from an inter-generational perspective.

Many countries are still in the process of elaborating environmental legislation and designing related domestic

institutions. In addition come the tasks of ensuring that the environment isappropriatelyintegratedinthedecision-making processesofrelevantpublicauthorities,and establishingappro- priatedivisionsofworkbetweencentralandlocalauthorities.All this meansthat countrieshave highly differing starting points whentheyparticipateininternational-levelnegotiations.

Unlike the law of the sea, environmental treaties and their associated institutional structures are in general ad hoc and fragmented.Moreover,arelativelycommonapproachinIEListo adopt framework treaties as a first binding step on the road towards agreement onmore specific commitments. Amongthe characteristicsofenvironmentaltreatiesistheirlackofreciprocity, in the sense that suspension of obligations is generally not accepted as an appropriate response tothe non-compliance of othercountries.Thelogic,ofcourse,isthatdestroyingenviron- mental goods is not an adequate response to other countries’ violation of theirobligations.Environmental treaties frequently lackcomplianceandenforcementmeasures,andarebasedonnon- confrontation and facilitative approaches to assist countries in theireffortstocomply.

Customary international law in thefieldof IEL is essentially based on principles of good neighbourliness and state sover- eignty. Customarylawhassofarhadlimitedimportanceinthe field of IEL, in terms of leading to changes in the policies of countries.AtpresentIELcannotbesaidtoconstituteasufficient basis for ‘global environmental governance’, when that is understood as ‘normative institutional regulatory intervention andsocialconstructthatispredominantlybasedonlawandthat aims to influence how people interact with the global environment’ (Kotzé,2014,pp.141 ff.).

A challengefornational and internationallawis tofindthe appropriatelevelofintegrationofenvironmentalissuesinother fields oflaw. Oneexample isthe relationshipbetweenIEL and internationaltradelaw,wherethereissignificantoverlap,largely becauseIEL frequently resortstotrade-related measures,while internationaltradelawoftentakesupenvironmentalissuesincase law.A mainvehicleforintegration ofenvironmental issueshas been to include references to the objective of environmental protection and sustainable development in the preambles of treatiesinotherfields,asinthe1994AgreementEstablishingthe World Trade Organization. However, such references have generally had little impact on the operative clauses or the implementationofsuchtreaties.

4.2.Sovereignty,sovereignrightsandjurisdiction

The emergence of the Anthropocene raises the question whether we should amendfundamentally or reject aspects of statesovereignty(seeEbbesson,2014,p.84).Thelackofresultsin importantfieldsofIEL,suchasbiodiversityandclimatechange, hasledgovernmentsandIELscholarstoraisesimilarquestions.

Manyenvironmentaltreatieshavemodifiedthegeneralprinciple of‘sovereignequality’amongcountries,themainexamplebeing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, wheresomeaddthephrase‘andrespectivecapabilities’.Given the controversies surrounding the classification of states into

‘developed’, ‘emerging’, ‘developing’ and ‘least developed’, the futureof this principleis currentlyamong themost contested issuesinIEL.

Another aspect of sovereignty is territorial sovereignty; in particular the right of states to regulate activities within their territoryandthedutyofotherstatesnottotakeorallowactions that violatetheterritorialintegrity ofotherstates. Anessential element is a country's sovereign right to regulate its natural resources.Thisrightis,however,challengedbyrulesofinterna- tionaleconomic lawthat safeguardtheinterests ofotherstates

20TreatyBanningNuclearWeaponTestsintheAtmosphere,inOuterSpaceand underWater(1963)andTreatyfortheProhibitionofNuclearWeaponsinLatin AmericaandtheCaribbean(1967),aswellastheNuclearTestsCasesinitiatedby NewZealandandAustraliaagainstFrancein1973beforetheInternationalCourtof Justice.

xxx–xxx

thataredependentonaccesstosuchresources.²¹Thestrugglefor accesstonaturalresourcesandtherighttorestrictaccesstosuch resourceswillbecomeincreasingly important inthe Anthropo- cene.Perhapstheregulatoryfreedomofcountrieswillneedtobe restrictedbyintroducingenvironmentalrightsattheinternational and/or the national constitutional level (see Robinson, 2014, 15–17pp.).

The duty not to allow activities that violate the territorial integrityofotherstateshasbeenviewedintheliteratureasacore elementofcustomaryinternationallaw.Althoughthisrule,which extendsto‘areasbeyondthelimitsofnationaljurisdiction’(see Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development),hasbeenformulatedinverystricttermsandcould have significantimplications for countries’ duty toprotect the environment, there have been few cases in which it hasbeen invokedand appliedbyinternationalcourtsand tribunals. One importantimplicationofthisaspectofterritorialsovereigntyisthe duty of states to cooperate—for example, to consult with neighbouring states when planning activities that may have significanttransbordereffects.Elaboratingandimplementingthe latter aspects of territorial sovereignty may prove essential to prevent deteriorating environmental conditions during the Anthropocene.

Sovereigntyisalsocloselylinkedtotheextenttowhichstates canactunilaterallytoprotecttheenvironmentby‘forcing’other statestoadoptsimilarpolicies.Examplesofsuchunilateralismare the imposition of environmental product standards by key importingcountries, and requirementsthatstates joinenviron- mentaltreaties in ordertoenjoypreferential traderelations. A related issue is the extraterritorial application of national legislation,forexamplebyprohibitingdomesticcompaniesfrom conductingenvironmentallyharmfulactivitiesintheiroperations abroad.Unilateralismandextraterritorialityareimportanttoolsof powerfulstates. Theyhave been controversial and their status remainscontestedunderinternationallaw.Willtheemergenceof theAnthropocenenecessitateincreaseduseofsuchtools?

4.3.Changingtheprinciplesofinternationalenvironmentallaw?

DiscussionaboutthefoundingprinciplesofIELishighonthe agenda of states, international institutions, stakeholders and scholars. While significant political consensus has emerged on someprinciples,²²suchassustainabledevelopmentandprevention, otherprinciples have beencontroversial, as exemplified by the precautionary principle. There have come numerous calls for reconsiderationofprinciples,alsoregardingprinciplesthat have receivedbroadpoliticalsupport.Inparticular,scholars andnon- governmentalorganizationshavearguedthattoday’sapproachesto theprincipleof‘sustainabledevelopment’areinadequate,andthat, withtheemergenceoftheAnthropocene,ourcurrentunderstanding of the principle should be replaced by a concept of ‘strong sustainability’(Kotzé,2014,137pp.and152–154;Robinson,2014, p. 15). Moreover, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities can be questioned from the perspective of the effectivenessof IEL, as it is in theclimate change negotiations.

However,thisprinciplecanalsobeseenasanessentialprecondition for states to move forward in negotiations, giventheir varying resourcesandcapabilities(Ebbesson,2014,p.90).

AsobservedbyKotzé(2014,p.144):

The newglobalised realityof the Anthropoceneentails that environmentallawyerswillhavetorevisittheseorthodox,and often archaic, social constructs that have been designed as institutionalresponsestolesscomplicatedorcomplexregula- toryissuesthatexistedduringtheHoloceneepoch,whichin turnmight requirea wholesalereviewof currentregulatory interventions leading to proposals to reconceptualise and redesignourlawandgovernanceconstructs.

Someevencallforanentirelynewsetoffoundingprinciplesin IEL.KimandBosselmann(2013)advocatethedevelopmentofa

‘Grundnorm’thatcangiveIEL(andotherfieldsofinternationallaw) a shared purpose to which their specific objectives must contribute. Robinson (2014, 17–24 pp.) has argued for a new paradigmbasedonprinciplesofcooperation,biophiliaandnature stewardship,resilience,foresight,sharingandsufficiency,wellbe- ing,and justiceforhumansand nature.Hismainargumentfor rethinkingtheprinciplesandforhisselectionofnewprinciplesis that,tobecomeeffectiveagentsforchange,theprinciplesmustbe firmlybasedonexistingnorms,reflectingacceptedpartsofhuman nature.

Hence, while the current situation of IEL demonstrates an importantwillingness–amongscholarsandincreasinglyamong statesandotherstakeholders–toreconsiderbasicprinciples,the emergenceoftheAnthropocenehasledsomeauthorstocallfor fundamental newapproaches tothe foundingprinciplesof IEL.

However,theneedforstabilityandpredictabilityaswellasthe need to build legal structures step by step remain essential considerations.

4.4.Issuesregardingresilience—respondingtochallenges

Normally, the discussion of resilience in the context of the Anthropocene focuses on law as a means to achieve ‘social- ecologicalresilience’(GarmestaniandAllen,2014).Thecontextfor the discussion here is somewhat different. We focus on the resilienceofIELassuch,inotherwordstheabilityofIELasitis currentlydesignedtorespondtoupcoming challenges(seealso Scott,2013,356–357pp.).Therearetwomainchallengesthatwe want to consider: (1) factors that build the ability of IEL to withstandpressurefrominterestgroupsseekingtorealizeshort- term benefits at the expense of longer-term interests; and (2) factorsthatpromoteflexibilityandabilitytorespondtoemerging challenges.

Astothefirst:arguablythemostseriousconcernregardingthe prevailing paradigm of democracy in Western countries is its inabilitytosafeguardtheinterestsoffuturegenerations.IELisa mechanismbywhichcountriesmayachievestabilityinenviron- mentalpolicieswithprioritytolonger-termbenefits.Againstthis background,therearestrongargumentsthatIELshouldseekahigh degree of resilience in the sense of enhancing its ability to safeguardexisting rules and institutionsagainst initiativesthat weakentheirabilitytomitigatelong-termenvironmental prob- lems. Oneexampleisthecurrent discussionofhow IELshould respondtogeoengineering(Scott,2013).

Therelativelystrongtraditionofconsensuswhennegotiating environmentaltreatiesmeansthatIELisconsiderablyresilientto subsequentchanges.Suchtreatiesarethereforerarelyopenedfor renegotiation.However,ifconsensusismeasuredaccordingtothe extent to which countries finally join the treaties, the picture becomesmorenuanced.Whilesometreatiesenjoynear-universal acceptance(liketheConventiononBiologicalDiversityandtheUN FrameworkConventiononClimateChange),others(e.g.treaties regardingliabilityforenvironmentaldamage)havefailedtoenter intoforceduetoacceptancebytoofewcountries.Therearelimited

21Forexample,thecasesbroughtbyJapan,theEUandtheUSAagainstChinain theWTOregardingexportrestrictionsoncertainminerals:seeChina—Measures RelatedtotheExportationofRareEarths,TungstenandMolybdenum,WTOcases nos.DS431-433.

22ThemainstartingpointwhenconsideringtheprinciplesofIEListhe1992Rio Declaration.

xxx–xxx

meansavailableforencouragingcountriestojoinenvironmental treaties orto refrain fromwithdrawing. Environmentaltreaties frequently encourage participation by establishing funds and providing for sharing of knowledge and technologies among participating countries. However, these arrangements depend extensivelyonthewillingnessofsomecountriestocontributeto fundsand make technologies available, thereby incurringaddi- tionalburdensfromparticipating.Whethercountriesduringthe Anthropocenewill bemore willingto contributetotheimple- mentation of environmental treaties according to their ability remainstobeseen.Moreover,althoughithasnotbeencommonfor countriestowithdrawfromenvironmentaltreaties,thefateofthe KyotoProtocolmayindicatethatthismaybecomemorefrequent intheAnthropocene.Againstthisbackground,IELcannotbesaidto beveryresilientifcountriesseektoundermineitseffectiveness duetoshort-terminterests.

Astothesecondpoint,thereareseveralfactorsthatcontribute toIEL’sflexibilityandabilitytorespondtoemergingchallengesof the Anthropocene. There is significant focus on establishing commonknowledgebasesregardingenvironmentalthreats,their development, and means to deal with them within IEL. Such initiativesrangefromtheUNIntergovernmentalPanelonClimate Change, to clearing houses for information-sharing under the Biosafety Protocol. These arrangements promote science-based approachestothedesignofIELandcontributetotheabilityofIEL towithstandcriticismandchangingpoliticalpriorities.Theyalso promotescience-basedreformsofIEL.

Further,theresortto‘framework’treatiesandtheroleof‘soft law’inIELareprimeexamplesoffactorscontributingtoflexibility.

Frameworktreatiesarepartofthetraditionofbuildingconsensus stepwise, and represent the first formalization of consensus.

However,inordertomakeprogressinachievingtheirobjectives, such framework treaties must be followed by development of

‘hard’and‘soft’law²³thatfurtherregulateandguidetheactsof countries.SoftlawismuchusedinIELtospecifyhowstatesshould actinordertofulfiltheirdutiesundertreaties,forexamplethrough documentsonbestpracticesandguidelines.Suchdocumentscan readilybeupdatedandmaythusaddflexibilitytoadjustthetreaty regime tonew knowledge.The success storyof mitigating the depletionoftheozonelayerthroughnegotiationofaframework treaty and subsequent protocols alongside efforts to develop related knowledge of causes and effects has beena model for subsequentenvironmentaltreaties.Thereisthussignificantroom for‘reflexivity’andadaptabilityunderIEL(Kotzé,2014,146–147;

Ebbesson,2014,p.80).

The emergence of the Anthropocene and the problems associated with effective implementation of IEL have moved countriesfromfocusingonmitigationofenvironmentaldegrada- tiontofocusingonadaptation.Thishasbeenmostclearlyseenin the field of climate change (Kotzé, 2014,149–150). This often involvesreformingexistingtreaties,butcanalsobeaquestionof negotiatingnewtreaties.

5.Geneticresources:betweenpatentlawandsovereignrights

5.1.Basicsoflawgoverninggeneticresources

Humanshavebeenutilizinggeneticresourceseversincethey settled down and began growing their own food. With the rediscovery of the ‘Mendelian laws’ of inheritance and the developmentof bio- and gene technology in the life sciences,

thevalueofgeneticresourceshasincreased.IntheAnthropocene, thevalueofgeneticresourcesfordevelopingnewplantvarieties and animal breeds for agriculture, new active compounds for medicines, and industrial production, is likely to increase significantly. Main reasons why we are likely to see such developments includethecurrent lossofbiodiversity, theneed for ways of respondingto newsituations (for example,due to changing climatic conditions and ocean acidification), and the growing human population with the consequent demand for increasedfoodproduction.

Three maintendenciesinlegaldevelopmentsince the1950s canbeidentified.First,inplantbreedingthereisbroadrecognition of the need for access togenetic resources so that new plant varietiescanbebred.Thishasledtotheemergenceofpubliclyheld collectionsofplantgermplasm,governedininternationallawbya multilateral system for theirexchange, embedded in the 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and AgricultureundertheUNFoodandAgricultureOrganization(FAO).

Thecollectionsofplantgeneticresourcesinthemembersofthe ConsortiumofInternationalAgriculturalResearchCentersandthe back-upSvalbard Global SeedVaultare alsoexpressionsof the recognitionthatvarietiesmustbepreservedandsecuredforthe future (see Fowler, 2008). In addition to promoting plant propagation, such collections make plant genetic resources availableforresearch.

Second, duringthe 1950sintellectualproperty protection of plantvarieties(plantvarietyprotection)wasestablishedinsome industrializedcountries.Suchrules,includingrequirementsthat countries introduce exclusive rights tothecommercialsales of plant varieties, emerged in treaty law during the 1960s, in particular with the adoption in 1961 of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.

Industrialized countries had patent systems for technological invention. Because of gene-technological developments, during the1980sindustrializedcountriesstartedtoapplypatentlawand grant patents to bio-inventions. In order to oblige developing countriestointroducestricterprotectionofintellectualproperty rights,includingtogeneticresources,rulesregardingpatentswere broughtintothetradenegotiationsthatledtothe1994Agreement onTrade-Related Aspects of IntellectualProperty Rights(TRIPS Agreement)undertheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).Themain rationaleforstrengtheningintellectualpropertyrightsistohelpto createprivateincentivesforinvestingininnovation.

And third, in parallel and probably also in response to the strengtheningofintellectualpropertyrights,rulesrecognizingthe sovereign rights of countries to their genetic resources were negotiated under the 1992Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).Thistreatyisbasedontheconceptthatcountriescanuse theirsovereignrightstoobtainafairandequitableshareofthe benefitsderivedfromtheirgeneticresources,andthatthevalue thus assigned to genetic resources will provide incentives for conservingthem.TheCBD,anenvironmentallawtreaty,provides theframeworkforbalancingrightstogeneticresourceswithtrade andcommerciallaw.

Aswithinternationalenvironmentallaw,inthefieldofgenetic resources there is a tension between the commercialand the environmental aspects. Thechanging conditions of theAnthro- pocene,already in thecourseof thecurrentcentury, aresetto increasethesetensions.

5.2.Sovereignrights,exclusiveprivaterights,andjurisdiction There remain significant concerns regarding the extent to whichtheobjectivesofmaintainingaccesstogeneticresources, promotinginnovationbasedonsuchresources,andensuringtheir conservationhave beenachieved.Afterall,theseobjectives are

23While‘hard’lawislegallybinding,‘soft’lawisnot.However,thisdistinction, essentialfromalegalperspective,maynotbedecisivefortheimpactof‘hard’and

‘soft’lawhaveontheconductofcountries.

xxx–xxx