Correlates of High-Level Diplomatic Visits: A case study of foreign visits by Chinese Presidents from 1993 to 2019.

(1)

Correlates of High-Level Diplomatic Visits:

A case study of foreign visits by Chinese Presidents from 1993 to 2019

Paul Michael Ocheme

Master’s thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies Department of Political Science

University of Oslo

15th November, 2021

26,530 Words

(2)

Abstract

Face-to-face diplomacy retains a strong place in international politics, owing to its influence on leaders’ actions, inaction, and the magnitude of signals it gives observers. China’s growing power, its increased global activism, and diplomacy draw adequate attention to warrant a closer study. Intrigued by why leaders visit some leaders and not others, and the patterns obtainable from these behaviors, I examine different theoretical perspectives on the subject using a new dataset of diplomatic visits by Chinese Presidents from 1993 to 2019. First, I posit that foreign trips by Chinese Presidents can be broadly approached from Strategic Interest and Bilateral Trade theoretical perspectives as obtained in some previous studies. Second, I consider the joint influence of both sets of strategic interest and bilateral trade factors on foreign visits by Chinese Presidents and subsequently test these factors along their respective theoretical grouping.

I develop and test hypotheses about the correlates of foreign visits by Chinese Presidents from 1993 to 2019, spanning the regimes of three Chinese Presidents. I find that the foreign travels of the Chinese Presidents converge along a set of priorities reflective of a stable set of national interests and trade interests which portray Beijing as a pragmatic actor whose foreign policies are influenced by ”Realpolitik”

concerns rather than ideological or revisionist leanings. I also find that the influence of the correlates on travels by the Chinese President is impacted by the choice of model and component factors applied by the researcher in a study

(3)

Dedication

This work is dedicated to the dream of a peaceful and happy world....

(4)

Acknowledgements

My gratitude goes to my friends Ebuka, Dee, Nwachukwu, and Tony. I could never have asked for a better support system! My appreciation goes to my friends Adela, Jaione, Ale, Douglas, Sofie, Chacha, Mirha, and Anne Kari, whose support has been invaluable in completing this paper. I also wish to acknowledge the guidance and patience of my supervisors Henrik St˚alhane Hiim and Neil Ketchley!

(5)

List of Figures

4.1 Hanging Rootogram. . . 53

4.2 Visit Map . . . 56

4.3 Bar Chart of Visit by Regions . . . 57

4.4 Bar Chart of Visits per President . . . 58

4.5 Bar Chart of Visits by Year . . . 59

A.1 Histogram of Visits by Chinese Presidents to a foreign state . . . 99

A.2 Bar Chart of Visits to Asian States by Chinese Presidents . . . 101

(9)

List of Tables

3.1 Typology of State Balancing Strategies (He & Feng, 2008, p. 373) . . 25

3.2 Power Disparity, Economic Dependence, and Balancing Strategies (He & Feng, 2008, p. 377). . . 26

4.1 Variables . . . 36

4.2 Hypothesis and Expectations . . . 45

4.3 Mean of the dependent variable . . . 52

4.4 Summary of the Dependent variable . . . 54

4.5 MI Nonlinear Predict . . . 55

5.1 Hausman Test . . . 63

5.2 Regression Output - Poisson . . . 65

5.3 Regression Output - Quasi-Poisson Models (Complete Case vs Multi- Imputation) . . . 68

5.4 Regression Output - Belt & Road Initiative model . . . 74

6.1 Checking the US . . . 78

6.2 Undermining the US . . . 80

6.3 Trade Considerations, & Energy & Raw Materials . . . 83

(10)

6.4 States signed to the OBOR . . . 86

A.1 Pair-wise Correlation . . . 100

A.2 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test . . . 100

A.3 Regression Output - Regression Models . . . 102

A.4 Regression Output - Quasi-Poisson and Zero Inflated Poisson . . . 103

A.5 Regression Output - Linear Probability Model (Country Fixed Effects and Country Clustered SEs . . . 104

A.6 MI Linear Predict xo mi=visit using miestLPM . . . 105

A.7 Regression Output - Strategic Interest model . . . 105

A.8 Regression Output - Bilateral Trade model . . . 106

A.9 Regression Output - Bilateral Trade including the BRI . . . 107

A.10 Regression Output - Authoritarian States . . . 108

A.11 Regression Output - Africa (SSA & MENA) . . . 109

A.12 Regression Output - Individual Chinese President . . . 110

(11)

Chapter 1 Introduction

The growth of China and its status as a great power in the international system has held the attention of many observers, making it one of the most important developments in international politics. The foundations of this growth from an isolated state to a regional power and subsequently to a great power with the capacity to yield influence globally were debatably laid during the Deng reforms period and took to flight under the leadership of Jiang Zemin. China’s influence spans a wide range of international relations areas – culture, security, economics, environment, politics, etc. As noted by Marc Lanteigne (2020), China’s ascent and potential of becoming a superpower alongside the United States of America creates questions such as what kind of global power will it be if (or when) it achieves this feat? This makes it ever important to study and understand China’s evolving foreign policy and the tools it employs towards meeting its foreign policy objectives. Amongst other tools, Phillip C. Saunders (2006) identified that China relies on Diplomatic tools (strategic partnerships, leadership travel, and meetings, regional organizations as “influence multipliers”, exercising influence on behalf of others) towards achieving its goals (Saunders, 2006, pp. 18). This paper focuses on the diplomatic tools, specifically leadership travels of Chinese Presidents, and how these interact with the other tools towards reaching Chinese foreign policy objectives, and the predictive patterns obtainable from studying these relationships.

The phenomena of high-level diplomatic visits have been researched by several scholars in International Relations (IR). Some scholars argue that leaders visit

(12)

other states; to signal states they wish to maintain stable relations in order to protect their strategic interests ((Erik, 2008); (Lebovic & Saunders, 2016) ), to boost bilateral trade between states (Nitsch, 2007), as an exchange between leaders to signal longevity of incumbent leaders (Malis & Smith, 2020), to project the status of the state in the international system (Erik, 2008), to signal their positioning as Revisionist or Status quo states (Kastner & Saunders, 2012), etc. Regardless of the purpose of the visit, leadership travels provide a good insight or guide for gauging Chinese diplomatic priorities. First, foreign visits by leaders involve a significant investment of personnel and material resources before the visit and during the visit.

Second, foreign visits come with a high opportunity cost owing to the absence of the leader from their normal duties, which is a very scarce resource in a system like China’s. Third, leadership travels may portray leadership priorities since the Chinese President has the final decision about who they visit or not (Kastner &

Saunders, 2012, pp. 165).

The research question this study seeks to answer isWhat factors determine or influence high-level diplomatic visits by Chinese Presidents? I seek to study the correlates of high-level diplomatic visits by Chinese Presidents along two perspectives – Strategic interest and Bilateral Trade model. The Strategic Interests model opines that from a strategic perspective, diplomacy constitutes a medium via which states bargain, coordinate positions, and execute agreements to realize their strategic interests. States use diplomacy to follow interests that are determined (or influenced) by the military, economic, and political character of other states (Lebovic & Saun- ders, 2016, pp. 109). The Bilateral Trade model stresses that leaders use diplomacy (foreign visits) as a medium to discuss a range of economic issues from global economics, closer economic cooperation, joint investment projects, and resolution of trade disputes. Nitsch finds that state and official visits have on average a positive effect on exports, with a typical visit associated with higher bilateral exports by about 8 to 10 percent, holding other things constant (Nitsch, 2007, pp. 1798).

I assess these perspectives as explanations for the nature and pattern of high- level diplomatic visits by Chinese Presidents. Centering on Chinese Presidents, I analyze a new dataset - High-Level Visits dataset, that I created from gathering information from various internet sources, wherein I code all foreign visits by Chinese

(13)

Presidents from 1993 to 2019. The data consists of all visits made by Chinese Presidents and does not separate these into components of working visits, state visits, multilateral summits, etc, owing to differences in classification of visit types by various sources. This study represents either the first or one of a few robust attempts at studying foreign visits by all Chinese Presidents after the reform period to date and shows the consistency towards some foreign policy objectives by Chinese Presidents and change in travel behavior in line with the evolution of China’s foreign policy from a regional player to a global player. In contrast to previous studies where these visits were analyzed along solely strategic interests or bilateral trade factors, I argue for a more holistic approach that analyzes these visits using factors from both perspectives to obtain a more nuanced model that would provide a more robust result on the factors that determine and influence foreign visits by Chinese Presidents.

Subsequently, I returned to analyze the visits along the lines used by previous studies to buttress the impact “choice of model” (strategic interest or bilateral trade) and choice of variables have on the findings from the study. My study then analyses these visits vis-a-vis the various Chinese Presidents from 1993 to 2019, to appreciate the similarities and differences in their travel behavior and foreign policy direction.

I test my arguments using cross-sectional time-series Quasi-Poisson regression models. I find considerable evidence that the foreign travels of Chinese Presidents converge on a set of priorities rooted in stable foreign policies that uphold the national interest of China, its relationship with its military “allies”, access to energy and natural resources, and close relations with states that export to China. My findings portray China as a pragmatic international actor whose foreign policies are influenced more by Realpolitik concerns than ideological or revisionist goals. Since the data spans three different administrations, I also focused my analysis towards identifying differences in factors that influenced visits by the three different Chinese Presidents, reflecting some of the divergence in their individual (Jiang, Hu, and Xi) foreign policy objectives. As expected, I also found differences in the impact of some factors on foreign visits by Chinese Presidents depending on the model used by the researcher. This finding further emphasizes the need for a more robust approach to studying leadership visits as compared to using narrow models. I conclude the paper by providing some suggestions for further studies by researchers.

(14)

The High-Level Visit dataset and Stata Do-file used for this study will be provided upon request.

(15)

Chapter 2 Literature review

This chapter of the study focuses on literature review. I present a brief introduction to Foreign policy as a concept with a focus on the history/evolution, actors, and priorities of Chinese foreign policy. I then introduce diplomacy with a few definitions of the concept, before exploring the development of Chinese diplomacy from the early 1990s to date. I begin the literature review with a section on the importance of studying high-level diplomatic visits, followed by a review of existing literature on high-level diplomatic visits and literature on high-level diplomatic visits by Chinese leaders before rounding off the literature review section with the importance of analyzing high-level diplomatic visits by Chinese leaders.

2.1 Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and High-level Diplo- matic visits

2.1.1 Chinese Foreign Policy

The scope of Chinese foreign policy over the last 70 years has experienced expansion from being isolationist, regional, to global. Coupled with the expansion of its foreign policy, the institutions responsible for Chinese foreign policy development have been subjected to various reforms to ensure that they adjust and adapt to the changing domestic and international realities of China (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 2). China’s

(16)

foreign policy direction in terms of state-to-state relations has been founded on the Maoist doctrine of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence which includes 1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) Mutual non- aggression, 3) Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 4) Equality and mutual benefit, and 5). Peaceful co-existence. China’s current foreign policy is influenced strongly by Westphalian (state-centric) views on state sovereignty and guided by the ‘four No’s’ – 1) No hegemony, 2) No power politics, 3) No military alliances and, 4) No arms racing (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 11). Mikael Weissmann (2015) argued that when looking beyond principles, Chinese foreign policy objectives are defined as 1) domestic political stability, 2) sovereign security, territorial integrity, and national unification, and 3) China’s sustainable economic and social development (Weissmann, 2015, pp. 154).

The responsibility of policymaking like other sections of the government and administration, has undergone reforms and changes but remains highly influenced by the Chinese President/General Secretary. The influence of the Chinese President is also evident in the Chinese Communist Party which dominates and plays a leading role in the development of domestic and foreign policymaking. The CCP Politburo Standing Committee, which includes the President, Premier, and other high-level officials handle much of the overall decision-making concerning domestic and foreign affairs (Lanteigne, 2020, p. 30). During the Mao Zedong era, foreign policy was the responsibility of a closed elite that excluded much of the population and was centered around Mao. Deng employed a more open approach since he required more expertise to meet the reform and trade expertise needs of his government. His successors – Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping have all incorporated greater professionalism and education in the foreign policy arena (Lanteigne, 2020, p. 20). Unlike Mao and Deng who operated a more consolidated and centralized system, Jiang and Hu opted for a decentralized approach to foreign policymaking, with the involvement of more governmental and non-governmental actors in the process (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 28).

However, Xi Jinping has adopted a more centralized approach towards foreign policy decision-making with himself at the fore (Weissmann, 2015, pp. 158).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as China’s leading foreign policy body charged with the role of interpreting and often substantiating policy decisions made

(17)

by the country’s leadership. It also performs the pivotal role of being a source and providing information to Chinese policymakers (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 36). The For- eign Affairs Leading Group (FALG) is another agency that plays a role in the foreign policymaking in China, as it acts as a supra-ministerial policy actor coordinating foreign policy development. It brings together specialists from several agencies with different policy backgrounds to enable effective communication and interaction, to discuss areas of foreign policy development, and in the process bypass possible bu- reaucratic bottlenecks. The Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) is an important player in Chinese international relations and retains a central role in foreign policymaking (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 37-39).

2.1.2 Brief history of Chinese foreign policy focus

The first decade of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was characterized by a strong suspicion of the US by Beijing, owing to the former’s support of the defeated Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek and its continued support for Taiwan. The PRC aligned its foreign policy strongly with the Soviet Union and mutually supported the transfer of Communist revolution to other states (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 2). The 1960s would later see the growth of tension between the PRC and the Soviet Union with instances of small-scale clashes in 1969. Mao was wary of the Soviet leaders after Joseph Stalin – Nikita Krushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, who he considered as supporters of imperialist policies (Lanteigne, 2009, pp. 6). The early 1970s saw a shift in Chinese foreign policy from a strong fixation on the superpowers to interaction and focus on developing states. Beijing was able to establish diplomatic ties with many non-communist states and its position with the United States of America (US) had moved from non-existent to some diplomatic exchanges – the visits of Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon in 1971 and 1972 respectively (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 5).

With the transfer of leadership to Deng Xiaoping (after the brief leadership of Hua Guofeng), China would enter a period of reform as Deng was keen on moving China from an isolated state to a more active international player. Deng busied himself with removing elements from the old Cultural Revolution and setting the foundations for reforms domestically, especially in the economic sphere,

(18)

and Chinese foreign policy. Deng recognized that a gradual opening of China to the international system was necessary for gaining essential foreign information and capital that China’s economy needed. The establishment of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in southern China in 1980 created unprecedented Chinese contact with international investors and global markets (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 7).

Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, was saddled with the task of repairing China’s image globally after the Tiananmen Square incident. Jiang focused on improving relations with China’s Asian neighbors and the great powers especially the US and Russia. During this period of “good neighbor diplomacy” and “periphery diplomacy”, the border issues with Russia and some members of the Shanghai Coop- eration Organization (SCO) were successfully resolved through nonviolent means (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 18). China embraced a policy of bilateral partnerships and increased multilateral cooperation through international organizations and increased diplomatic exchanges with other leaders to develop partnerships and other agreements (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 21). Upon succeeding Jiang in 2003, President Hu Jintao continued to build on the diplomatic successes of his predecessor. President Hu embarked on “cross-regional diplomacy” to expand Chinese diplomatic ties with states beyond the Asia-Pacific in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the South Pacific. Lanteigne (2009) argues that Chinese diplomacy in these regions was majorly motivated by trade, as China sought deals for regional com- modities and energy for its growing consumption (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 18). Hu’s foreign policy was structured within the concepts of “peaceful rise” (China would not grow by use of military force nor material acquisition) and “harmonious world”

(Hu’s preference for global peace and stability through cooperation) (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 22).

Xi Jinping’s government has developed numerous foreign policy initiatives, ranging from enhanced state-to-state relations to the Belt and Road Initiatives,

”Silk Road Economic Belt” and trade networks set to expand into Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Europe, and other regions. Policy expansion under Xi has occurred in tandem with the rapid development of Chinese economic power. Xi has been most willing to project more confidence in the Chinese foreign policy as shown in his more boisterous concepts of the “Chinese Dream” and the “ great rejuvenation of

(19)

the Chinese nation” (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 22). Contrary to the more cautious tone of his predecessors, Xi Jinping has been bolder on the direction China wishes to pursue globally. He had stated in December 2014 that ” China could no longer be a spectator and follower, but should participate and lead, make China’s voice heard and inject more Chinese elements into the international rule” (Chang-Liao, 2016, pp. 86).

The turn of the century has witnessed a growing Chinese involvement in multilateral organizations and multilateral security cooperation. China has evolved from being perceived as a “norm shaker” (meaning that it often directly challenged the norms and policies set down by Western powers) to a “norm taker” (accepting and even welcoming participation with international, including Western, regimes and institutions), to being a “norm maker” (developing new structures, regimes, and ideas which may run counter to those of the West) (Lanteigne, 2020, pp. 15).

2.1.3 Diplomacy and developments in Chinese Diplomacy

It is posited that diplomacy exists because of states and the modern system of sovereign territorial states. Some scholars of IR believe that the sovereign territorial state provides diplomacy’s raison d’ˆetre (Constantinou, Kerr, & Sharp, 2016, pp.15).

This compartmentalized approach to diplomacy creates fragmentation and incoher- ence, as diplomacy is presented as aspects of other issues. Furthermore, diplomacy viewed simply as the way a state ‘talks’ to other states is considered both unimpor- tant and in decline (Constantinou et al., 2016, pp.18). In mainstream IR (which is synonymous with the Traditionalist school), diplomacy is presented as an instrument of foreign policy along with propaganda, economic rewards and punishments, and the threat or use of force (Holsti 1967). The English School of IR argues that diplomacy is “the process of dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their purposes by means short of war” (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2015, pp.4). This definition relegates diplomacy to be simply an instrument of foreign policy. Costas Constantinou Paul Sharp (2016) point out that upon gravitation by states from simply talking to communicating threats and promises about policies, “then diplomacy moves from simply being an instrument of foreign policy to being a medium by which the possible use of the other instruments

(20)

is communicated”(Constantinou et al., 2016, pp.17).

In the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident and the end of the Cold War, Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy were aimed at ending Beijing’s diplomatic isolation and warding off economic sanctions. These efforts (named “good neighbor diplomacy”) were most fruitful with Japan and Southeast Asian countries who played a crucial role in supporting China’s re-entry into the international community ((Saunders, 2006, pp.5); (Zhu, 2016, pp.1)). China’s diplomatic reach was enhanced by widespread international recognition of Beijing’s economic potential in 1992-93, which facilitated its efforts to expand its diplomatic and economic ties with anti-communist countries such as South Korea, Indonesia, South Africa, and towards becoming active in Central Asia and the former Soviet Union, to deny Tai- wan diplomatic opportunities (Saunders, 2006, pp.5). The Taiwan Strait crisis and Beijing’s military encroachments in the South China Sea in 1995 - 96 produced China’s next diplomatic feat. China set about dousing concerns about the “China threat” by moderating its approach to territorial disputes in Asia and making over- tures towards improving its ties with European states and the US (Saunders, 2006, pp. 5). This period coincided with China’s acceptance of its status as a great power.

Its leaders focused their attention on 1) “omnidirectional diplomacy” to build stable relations with neighboring states in Asia (including the resolution of some border disputes, sometimes involving territorial concessions by Beijing) (Saunders, 2006, pp.5); 2) other great power states, resulting in Chinese leader travels to major capitals and invitations to foreign counterparts to visit Beijing (“great power diplomacy”), climaxing in President Jiang Zemin and President Bill Clinton’s exchange of visits in 1997 and 1998 (Zhu, 2010, p.1). China also became more active in regional (ASEAN, Shanghai Five etc) and international organizations (WTO) as it learned and improved its practice of multilateral diplomacy ((Saunders, 2006, pp.5); (Zhu, 2016, pp.2)).

The beginning of the 21st century has witnessed increased Chinese diplomatic activities towards dealing with the US – the dual action of checking the United States’ ability to check China, whilst maintaining cordial relations with the US ((Saunders, 2006). Chinese leaders have recognized (via unsuccessful attempts such as the 1999 – 2001 campaign to oppose the US ballistic missile defenses) that

(21)

posturing to mobilize other great powers to counterbalance the US is infeasible because of the high value other great powers place on their cooperation with the US ((Saunders, 2006, pp.5). Saunders (2006) states that Beijing’s stabilization of relations with Washington is a key part of China’s foreign policy, though China has continuously increased its efforts to create and strengthen ties with other countries wary of perceived US unilateralism and disregard for international norms (Saunders, 2006, pp.6).

The rapid growth of the Chinese economy since its reform has simultaneously necessitated a large supply and consumption of resources, especially energy and raw materials. China has sought energy and natural resources in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia - a process which has been coined as “energy diplomacy”

- necessitating diplomatic relations with these states and the expansion of Chinese foreign policy (Zhu, 2016, pp.2). China’s diplomatic objective in these countries is not limited to seeking and preserving energy but extends to investments and foreign asset purchases in these states (Zhu, 2016, pp.2). Another important facet of Chinese diplomacy is its use of “public diplomacy” in “projecting a new national image as a responsible, friendly and peaceful player in the international system”. It employs tools such as cultural and educational exchanges, tourism, sports, cultural exposition, etc., to this end (Zhu, 2016, pp.5). Zhu (2016) believes that China’s good neighbor diplomacy, great power diplomacy, energy diplomacy, and public diplomacy are all means to achieve the PRC’s major foreign policy objectives, intended to help develop China into a major economic, political, cultural, and military power by the mid-21st century (Zhu, 2016, pp.5).

Saunders (2006) identified tools deployed individually or combined by China in achieving its foreign policy objectives. These include Economic tools (trade, investments, foreign aid, currency), Diplomatic tools (strategic partnerships, leadership travel, and meetings, regional organizations as “influence multipliers”, exercising influence on behalf of others), Defence Cooperation (arms exports, increased emphasis on military diplomacy, security assistance, and training, exports of military technology), Soft Power, and Military Power (Saunders, 2006, pp.18). This paper focuses on the diplomatic tools, specifically leadership travels and meetings, and how these interact with the other tools towards pursuing Chinese foreign policy

(22)

objectives.

2.1.4 Why bother about High-level Diplomatic Visits?

High-level visits are considered the most common forms of diplomatic engagement between countries towards developing and enhancing bilateral relations (Tan & Chin, 2020, pp.220). It is a practice that has survived through pre-medieval period to the present ((Constantinou et al., 2016, pp.13); (Goldstein, 2008, pp.153)), despite the strides made in technology which could easily replace the need for face-to-face leader meetings (Malis & Smith, 2020). Malis and Smith point to the general upward trend in the frequency of high-level diplomatic visits over time and argue that in-person visits serve a purpose beyond the mere exchange of ideas and information (Malis

& Smith, 2020) and this reflects their general utility to the conduct of diplomacy (Goldstein, 2008, pp.178). These (high-level diplomatic visits) include: state visit, official visit, working visit, and private visit (Tan & Chin, 2020, pp.220). Volker Nitsch (2007) notes that state visits rank as the highest form of diplomatic contact between two states. He also posits that state visits are also viewed as being effective in consensus building and agreements. Nitsch cited the view of the office of the German President on state visits, noting that:

Such visits make a valuable contribution to foreign relations, for although the Federal Republic of Germany is represented abroad by its embassies, it is often only through face-to-face talks between leaders that productive outcomes fair to both sides can be found. Whether the objective is coordinating policy, explaining German interests, or resolving any bilateral problems that may arise from time to time, the kind of informal talks the Federal President has with foreign leaders during his trips abroad can be most helpful (Nitsch, 2007, pp.1798).

Tan and Chin (2020) consider official visits as the second-highest rank of visits, followed by working visits and private visits, in that order (Tan & Chin, 2020, pp.220). High-level diplomatic visits provide a platform for face-to-face leader meetings that facilitate dialogue which allows information exchange, trust, and rapport building. These visits allow for quick decision-making by leaders (as they are the chief policymakers in their state) by boycotting the traditional bottlenecks posed by

(23)

bureaucracy from lower-level personnel such as foreign ministers (Tan & Chin, 2020, pp.221). Importantly, these visits also provide insight into the foreign policy priorities of a state and its conduct of diplomacy (Kastner & Saunders, 2012, pp.165), and though the purpose of the high-level visit is generally aimed at developing and enhancing bilateral relations, its focus may range on a plethora of issues such as political issues, human rights, environmental protection, cultural contacts, or other themes (Nitsch, 2007, pp.1797).

In this paper, high-level diplomatic visits constitute all face-to-face diplomatic visits between foreign leaders, with an emphasis on Heads of State and Government.

Opting for an encompassing definition is informed by the absence of a uniform or standard definition for visits between leaders - these vary from state to state and from period to period (Goldstein, 2008, pp.153). Thus, high-level diplomatic visits in this study will include state visits, official visits, working visits, private visits and stop-overs leading to meetings between Heads of State and Government of host states and Chinese Presidents.

2.2 Existing literature on High-level diplomatic visits

The phenomena of high-level diplomatic visits have been researched by several scholars in IR. Some scholars argue that leaders visit other states; to signal states they wish to maintain stable relations in order to protect their strategic interests ((Erik, 2008); (Lebovic & Saunders, 2016), to boost bilateral trade between states (Nitsch, 2007), as an exchange between leaders to signal longevity of incumbent leaders (Malis & Smith, 2020), to project the status of the state in the international system (Erik, 2008), to signal their positioning as Revisionist or Status quo states (Kastner

& Saunders, 2012), etc.

(24)

2.2.1 High-level diplomatic visits for Strategic Interests

Erik Goldstein (2008) posits that leaders visit other leaders for various reasons amongst which was to indicate to specific actors (states) and the global audience where the visiting leader’s country’s interest is laid. He buttressed this by pointing to the tradition of newly elected US Presidents paying their first state visits to either Mexico or Canada, the choice of British monarchs George V and George VI paying their first state visits to France. Goldstein argues that these visits serve to indicate to the international audience states that leaders considered important and wished to maintain stable relations with (Goldstein, 2008, pp.154). Goldstein (2008) also argues that leaders use high-level visits to warm-up relations with states they wish to build better or closer relationships with, using the attention that such important visits create to signal to the public the direction that the government intends moving (Goldstein, 2008, pp.167). Examples of this include US President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s state visit to the US in 1959 (Goldstein, 2008, pp.169).

Lebovic and Saunders (2016) argued that leaders focused their visits on meetings with their allies, major powers, and other states with strategic impact. In their research, Lebovic and Saunders developed a framework for comparing models of diplomacy, drawn from the three theoretical approaches - strategic interests, domestic influences, and international practice — to explain the global and temporal distribution of high-level diplomatic visits (Lebovic & Saunders, 2016, pp.109). At the most constrained end of this spectrum, they found that states visit other states for strategic reasons. They argue that from a strategic perspective, diplomacy constitutes a medium via which states bargain, coordinate positions and execute agreements to realize strategic interests (Lebovic & Saunders, 2016, pp.109).

2.2.2 High-level diplomatic visits and Bilateral Trade

Volker Nitsch (2007) examined the importance of high-level visits and the large array of purposes these can be channeled towards – political issues, human rights etc. Nitsch noted that such visits often address economic relations between the meeting states. Leaders use this medium to discuss a range of economic issues

(25)

from global economics, closer economic cooperation, joint investment projects, and resolution of trade disputes. Also, the visiting heads of state and their hosts often attend such meetings with a high-ranking delegation of businesspeople to facilitate the discussions and agreements. Nitsch finds that state and official visits have on average a positive effect on exports. A typical visit is associated with higher bilateral exports by about 8 to 10 percent, holding other things constant (Nitsch, 2007, pp.1798). Nitsch based his research on data gathered on the travel activities of the heads of state of France, Germany, and the US from 1948 to 2003, and found that state and official visits were positively correlated with exports (Nitsch, 2007, pp.1816). Goldstein (2008) opined that state visits are used by states to facilitate important trade deals – a powerful state may offer a less powerful state a visit to help boost trade between both states, and a leader may visit another state to improve on trade relations with such states. Goldstein cited that the destination of many visits by G7 nations’ leaders often targeted important export markets. Also, in the 1970s, the appeal of trading with Romanian dictator President Nicolae Ceausescu’s government proved too strong for the pro-liberal British and French governments (Goldstein, 2008, pp.169).

2.2.3 High-level diplomatic visits and recognition of a State’s status in the international system

Erik Goldstein (2008), in his typology of state visits, identified that established leaders exchanged visits with other leaders to signal acceptance of the latter into the international community. He stressed that a state visit can be used to mark the acceptance of a state as a fully accepted member of the international community (Goldstein, 2008, pp.170). Goldstein cited the example of China’s international ostracization after the Tiananmen massacre. China experienced a drought in state visits and had to embark on inviting many of its old rivals such as Vietnam, South Korea, and Japan to Beijing for state visits, as well as lobbying for state visits to European states and the US (which came only in 1997) (Goldstein, 2008, pp.172).

Goldstein also extends this to newly independent states who wish to indicate their full membership of the international community by joining in the network of state visits, former Pariah states who wish to show their change in foreign policy, former

(26)

colonies who now want to interact with other states as equals in the international system (Goldstein, 2008, pp.170-173).

2.2.4 High-level diplomatic visits and Leader Survival

Matt Malis and Alastair Smith (2020) put forward a rationalist explanation for state visits, positing that foreign powers have an incentive to invest in relationships with strong incumbents. A foreign power selectively assigns visits to incumbents who are more likely to survive in office, and this selection process publicly reveals the foreign power’s private assessment of regime strength. This serves as a signal of the incumbent’s strength to domestic challengers, who become deterred in their pursuit of regime change (Malis & Smith, 2020, pp.14). However, there exists a “payback”

mechanism to this relationship, as the incumbent becomes indebted to the foreign power, who expect to reap future policy concessions from the incumbent. They argue that there is a dynamic to determining who gets visited by a foreign; 1) a selection process leads the foreign power to conduct visits with leaders who are ex-ante more secure in office, 2) the selection and subsequent visit reveal information to the challengers on the strength incumbent, which serves as a deterrent and strengthens the power of the incumbent. This deterrent effect is informed by incomplete information on the part of the leader’s domestic opponents, and belief that the visitor is privy to important information they have not factored — information pertaining to the leader’s political health, the nature and severity of the threats he or she faces, or any international factors that may affect the domestic balance of power.

2.3 Existing literature on High-level diplomatic visits by Chinese leaders

Beijing’s leaders (since Jiang Zemin) have progressively increased their interaction with the world (Lanteigne, 2020, pp.67). This has necessitated increased travels by Chinese leaders to other countries and international organizations (Lanteigne, 2009, pp.21). China’s increased diplomatic activity has generated studies by scholars, linking China’s diplomatic activities to; its active participation in international in-

(27)

stitutions ((Feng & He, 2017); (Chang-Liao, 2016)), growing its economic reach and access to global markets ((Jianting & Bo, 2021);(C.-Y. Lee, 2019); (Gu, Humphrey,

& Messner, 2008)), its role as a revisionist or status quo state in the international system (Kastner & Saunders, 2012) and generally building its relationship with states across the globe (Lanteigne, 2020). It is important to note that though there exist several literature on the broader global consequences of China’s rise (Kastner

& Saunders, 2012, pp.163), there is dearth in literature centred on high-level diplomatic visits by Chinese leaders.

Fan Jianting and Lu Bo (2021) selected 168 countries that have diplomatic relations with China and analyzed the impact of the exchange of visits between China and the former from 2001 to 2017 on bilateral trade. They concluded that:

first, the mutual visits between China and the foreign states show the basic pattern of coordinated promotion of peripheral and big country diplomacy; second, regression results showed that exchange of visits between Chinese leaders and trading partners significantly promoted bilateral export and import trade flows; third, the impact of mutual visits by leaders on imports and exports is mainly evident in the relatively weaker side of the trade, that is, the expansion of trade opportunities for non-competitive products to enter the other market; fourth, trade promotion role of leaders’ mutual visits is stronger in the peripheral diplomacy and small country diplomacy (Jianting & Bo, 2021, pp.155). Faqin Lin, Wenshou Yan, and Xiaosong Wang (2017) studied all state visits between Africa and China between 1990 and 2012 to explore any effects of state visits on international trade between China and African countries. They found that: 1) visits by African leaders to China could stimulate only Chinese exports to Africa, and 2) evidence that African leaders’ visit to China significantly increases China’s official aid and exports by SOEs to African countries (Lin, Yan, & Wang, 2017, pp.324). Wooi Yee Tan and Chong Foh Chin (2020) carried out a study to examine the frequency of high-level visits between China and Southeast Asian states from 2008 to 2019. The study concluded that 1) the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) has encouraged more high-level exchanges between China and Southeast Asian states as the latter seek to seize the new opportunities offered by the BRI, 2) the high frequency of visits to China by Southeast Asian leaders is largely attributable to the BRI, but also influenced by the insti- tutionalization of bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanism between China

(28)

and the Southeast Asian states, which has increased the close bond between both sides (Tan & Chin, 2020, pp.241). Chia-Yi Lee (2019) explored how China’s foreign policymaking is influenced by its energy security concern, focusing on three foreign policy instruments – partnerships, foreign aid, and leadership visits. The findings portray that China was more likely to form partnerships with and pay high-level visits to countries that produce more oil. The paper also concludes that partnerships and high-level visits by China are influenced by foreign direct investment (FDI), bilateral trade and oil endowments (C.-Y. Lee, 2019, pp.584).

Scott Kastner and Phillip Saunders (2012) provide a wide-ranging contribution to the scarce literature on high-level visits by Chinese leaders. Using data on all foreign trips by the Chinese President and Premier from 1998 to 2008, Kastner and Saunders sought to explore if the pattern of these visits indicated if Chinese leaders were likely to visit a particular country. They then used this information towards exploring China’s role as either a status quo state or a revisionist state in the US-dominated international system. In addition, their work also sought to allow for testing other arguments about Chinese foreign policy priorities - the independent variables tested in the study comprise of economic and political indicators, which provides the study a more multifaceted approach than some previous literature on the subject (Kastner & Saunders, 2012, pp.175). They identified patterns of Chi- nese leadership travel to four types of countries—rogue states, other rising powers, states with antagonistic relations with the US, and US regional allies — that could inform the debate over whether China is a challenger or a status quo state. The study found that China’s leaders exhibited travel behavior consistent with a status quo state, and continuity in some Chinese foreign policy priorities, such as visits to states with shared borders (neighbors), large populations, and major powers in the international system.

2.3.1 Why High-level diplomatic visits by Chinese Presi- dents matter

China’s growing great power status reflected in its economic, political, military, and foreign policy activities, and its potential role in the future of the international

(29)

system (i.e a revisionist or a status quo player), make it an important actor to study.

In tandem with other scholars ((Kastner & Saunders, 2012);(Lebovic & Saunders, 2016) ), I believe that the study and analysis of the pattern of foreign visits by China’s leaders serve as important indicators of its foreign policy goals currently and in the future. The President’s decision to travel to a specific country does not on its own inform us whether the bilateral relations between Beijing and the host country are good or bad, but does indicate that the bilateral relationship is a priority for China’s leaders (Kastner & Saunders, 2012, pp.175).

Kastner and Saunders argue that the study and analysis of high-level Chinese leadership travel patterns provide important insight into Chinese diplomatic priorities in the following ways (Kastner & Saunders, 2012, pp.165). First, high-level diplomatic visits involve a significant commitment of resources that comes with a high opportunity cost, especially the time of the Chinese President, a very scarce resource. They posit that the opportunity cost of the President’s time is especially high in the Chinese political system, where the President/General Secretary plays important symbolic and functional roles in decision making and in mobiliz- ing government action on behalf of priorities. Second, high-level diplomatic visits come after extensive and detailed preparations by lower-level officials and the Chi- nese embassy in the host country. The President is also accompanied by a large company of both government and business personnel, and the visits often include announcements of Chinese aid commitments, investment deals, and the signing of various political, economic, and cultural agreements. Therefore, a visit by the Chi- nese President typically involves a large commitment of the Chinese government’s economic and foreign policy resources. Third, high-level diplomatic visits by the Chinese President may be clear indicators of Chinese leadership priorities, as the final decision on such visits is made by the President and other top leaders in the government. Fourth, these visits serve as a useful “leading indicator” of Chinese diplomatic priorities and commitments and serve as a platform for setting future goals and targets for bilateral relations for Chinese leaders (Kastner & Saunders, 2012, pp.165).

In this paper, while my work shares some similarities with existing research on high-level diplomatic visits by Chinese leaders, especially that of Kastner and

(30)

Saunders, the scope of my study begins from 1993 and extends into 2019 (11 years after the scope of Kastner and Saunders’ scope). Thus, providing a more recent, and wider study of foreign visits by Chinese Presidents. This paper adds to the few existing quantitative literature on high-level visits by Chinese Presidents and aspires as a base to reflect or review previous conclusions drawn on Chinese leadership travels and foreign policies. This paper also provides a broader spectrum of plausible factors – strategic and economic, that may inform the choice of visits by Chinese leaders.

(31)

Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of the study traces the theoretical perspectives from the grand theories, down to sub-theories, and finally, the drawing the hypothesis for the study from these theories. In the subsections that follow, I briefly explored the arguments of the grand IR theories of Realism and Liberalism and subsequently delved into the following sub-theories of Balance of Power theory and Economic Interdependence theory, derived from the broader schools of Realism and Liberalism to provide my discourse more focus. My choice of grand theories and “sub-theories”

is informed by the fit between the theories and the models – Strategic Interest model and Bilateral Trade model – I apply subsequently towards unraveling the research question of “What factors determine high-level diplomatic visits by Chinese Presidents?”.

3.1 Realism and Foreign Policy

Realism is a school of thought that emphasizes the competitive and conflictual side of international relations (McGlinchey, Walters, & Scheinpflug, 2017, pp.15). Re- alism is based on some core assumptions. First, the nation-state is the principal actor in international relations. Other actors such as individuals and organizations exist, but their power is limited. Second, the state is a unitary actor and national interests guide the state to speak and act with one voice. Third, decision-makers are rational actors in the sense that rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of the

(32)

national interest. Leaders strive to ensure the strength and survival of the state in a competitive environment, and actions that weaken the state or make it vulnerable are considered irrational. Finally, states exist in an anarchical international system devoid of a sole state in-charge (McGlinchey et al., 2017, pp.15).

Realism offers the following arguments about how the world works – Groupism (humans interact with other humans as members of (different) groups. These groups rely on group solidarity for survival, and this in-group unity creates the likelihood for conflict with other groups; Egoism (political behaviour in human societies is driven fundamentally by self-interest, and though man is capable of being altruistic in certain conditions, egoism is ingrained in human nature); and Power-centrism (power is the ultimate feature of politics) (Smith, Hadfield, & Dunne, 2016, pp.36).

When applied to international politics, the realist’s perspective infers that the group an individual identifies with will exert a major influence on human affairs: that the group’s collective interest and survival will be paramount in its politics: “that ne- cessity as the group interest defines it will trump any putatively universal morality and ethics: and thus that humankind is unlikely ever to wholly transcend power politics through the progressive power of reason” (Smith et al., 2016, pp.37).

3.1.1 Realist perspectives on China in the international sys- tem

The realist perspectives on China are as divergent as the several subsets of thought in Realism. Power transition theorists approach China’s rise with some suspicion, arguing that when a hegemonic power at the top of the global hierarchy (US) is challenged by a new actor which is both rising and dissatisfied with the status quo, the possibility of conflict between both states is heightened unless the two actors can find room to co-exist. Offensive realism is doubtful about China’s ability to rise peacefully in the international system, noting the past (historical) conflicts between great powers and the anarchic nature of the international system. Theorists here hold that great powers pursue maximizing their power, and therefore often find themselves in policy rivalries that could lead to conflict (Lanteigne, 2020, pp.3). The defensive realists are more expectant about the prospects of conflict being avoided

(33)

between China and the US. They argue that great powers may also pursue balancing each other rather than risking a great power conflict, given the damage that both actors could exert on each other (Lanteigne, 2020, pp.3). Neo-classical realists advocate understanding the direction of Chinese foreign policy by viewing the role and actions of domestic level actors and issues, such as internal Chinese politics, domestic reforms, inter-party politics in the CCP, etc (Lanteigne, 2020, pp.3).

Given the scope of this paper, my focus will be on the arguments and asser- tions of the Balance of Power theory of realism vis-`a-vis Chinese foreign policy.

3.1.2 Balance of Power theory and Soft-Balancing theory

The Balance of Power theory posits that states will guide against threatening con- centrations of power by consolidating their own capabilities (internal balancing) or aggregating their capabilities with other states in alliances (external balancing).

Because states are always looking to the future to anticipate possible problems, balancing may occur even before any one state or alliance has gained an obvious power edge (Smith et al., 2016, pp.40). Paul Fritz and Kevin Sweeney (2004) argued that great powers are most likely to balance – “ally with the weaker side – when significantly threatened” (Fritz & Sweeney, 2004, pp.286). Otherwise, great powers, when unchallenged by a significant threat, tend to follow their interests and bandwagon with the stronger side to profit in the international system (Fritz & Sweeney, 2004, pp.286). The theory is criticized for its methodological, empirical weaknesses and historical anomalies, and on its general failure to predict the timing in which balance of power occurs (Paul, Wirtz, & Fortmann, 2004, pp.9). Liberalists point to its failure and inability to proffer long-term solutions to the security dilemma when applied to foreign policy behaviour, and opine that it is economic interdependence and globalization that constrain balance of power politics, and; institutions that ameliorate the security dilemma (Paul et al., 2004, pp.10).

The absence of Chinese hard balancing against the US in the form of military alliances among the great powers has puzzled realists (Feng & He, 2017, pp.364).

However, some scholars argue that the highly concentrated power of a unipolar world neither changes the anarchic nature of the international system nor does it

(34)

change states’ suspicion of power or desire for security. Therefore, regardless of the nature of the international system i.e unipolar or multipolar, states will balance, as 1) balancing is a state behaviour causally linked to the systemic concentration of power and, 2) balancing under unipolarity may be operationalised in different forms – hard-balancing or soft-balancing, as states are not limited to a specific form of balancing (Feng & He, 2017, pp.366). Robert Pape (2005) argues that the dynamics of hard-balancing against a unipolar leader is a collective task involving several second-ranked states due to the sheer disparity in strength between the unipolar state and the second-ranked states. Pape (2005) identified coordination as a major obstacle to hard-balancing by several second-ranked states, therefore, second-ranked states that cannot solve their coordination issues by traditional means turn to the safer option of soft-balancing measures to achieve this aim (Pape, 2005, pp.17). Soft balancing is defined by T.V Paul (2004) as involving the:

tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft-balancing is often based on a limited arms build-up, ad-hoc cooperative exercise, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening (Paul et al., 2004, pp.3).

Pape (2005) posits that soft-balancing measures are not aimed directly to challenge the unipolar state, but rather, they act to delay, complicate, or increase the costs of using that extraordinary power. To this end, scholars such as He and Feng (2008), Lanteigne (2012) etc., argue that the relationship between China and the US in the unipolar system can be described via soft balancing. It is important to state that balancing (either hard or soft balancing ) is not the sole prerogative of the second-ranked or weaker state (in this scenario, China), rather, all states in the system including the unipolar state (in this scenario, USA), may opt to employ balancing measures in their interactions with other states such as America’s

“containment” measures against China (Feng & He, 2017, pp.380).

He and Feng (2008) identify that soft-balancing faces a concept-stretching problem owing to the loosely defined notion of security in the anarchical interna-

(35)

tional system, which allows scholars to simply use military means to differentiate soft-balancing from hard-balancing – hard-balancing refers to military-related policies while soft-balancing refers to non-military state behaviours for the same security goals. They proposed an alternative way to approach soft-balancing by employing the “relative power concept” – the comparison of power status among states in the system (He & Feng, 2008, pp.371). The more power a state has, the more security it possesses, and the more of a threat such a state poses to other states.

Therefore, they defined balancing “as a rational, self-help behaviour to increase the relative power of a state for security under anarchy” (He & Feng, 2008, pp.372).

Building on this definition, He and Feng proffered two ways to increase the relative power of a state: 1) strengthening power through domestic military build-ups or through external alliance formation by military hard-balancing and non-military hard-balancing (the non-military efforts to increase a state’s or a group of states’

collective assets against the threatening power), 2) undermine the power and constrain the influence of the threatening state without direct military confrontation by military soft-balancing and non-military soft-balancing (He & Feng, 2008, pp.372).

Military soft-balancing employs military-related measures to undermine the relative power of the threatening state, such as weapon sales to rivals of the threatening state, arms control negotiations to constrain and undermine the relative power of the threatening state etc. Non-military soft balancing employs non-military efforts to undermine the rival’s relative power with economic embargoes, economic sanctions, strategic non-cooperation etc.

Definition Military Non-Military

Hard Balancing (increase a state’s own power versus rivals)

Military hard balancing - internal military balancing:

arms races, military mobilization - external military balancing:

alliance formation, etc.

Non-Military hard balancing - strategic technology transfer to its allies

- strategic economic aid to its allies, etc.

Soft Balancing (undermine the rival’s relative power to increase security)

Military soft balancing

- arms sales to the ”enemy of the enemy”

- arms control efforts targeting the threatening state, etc.

Non-military soft balancing - economic sanctions and embargo

- strategic non-cooperation, etc.

Table 3.1: Typology of State Balancing Strategies (He & Feng, 2008, p. 373)

(36)

He and Feng (2008) presented two factors that influence a state’s choice of a balancing strategy: 1) power disparity between the state and its rival and, 2) the level of economic dependence of the state on its rival (He & Feng, 2008, pp.373).

This relationship is illustrated in table 3.2.

Economic Dependence

High Low

Power Disparity High

Soft Balance

Cost: High Effectiveness: Low

Soft balance >Hard balance

Cost: Low Effectiveness: Low

Low

Hard balance = Soft balance

Cost: High Effectiveness: High

Hard balance >Soft balance

Cost: Low Effectiveness: High

Table 3.2: Power Disparity, Economic Dependence, and Balancing Strategies (He &

Feng, 2008, p. 377).

The relationship between the US (the unipolar power) and China (the second- ranked state) is best captured in the first quadrant. The power disparity between the US and China is high, so also the level of economic dependence (interdependence) (Lanteigne, 2020, pp.74). Therefore, hard balancing is an unfavourable strategy due to its high cost to both the US and China. If the US applies hard-balancing measures against China, it will become the focus of enmity and court more aggression from other states (Pape, 2005), and the huge power gap in the military of both states decreases the effectiveness of hard-balancing (Lanteigne, 2020, pp.8). China has an incentive to balance against the US, but the large power gap hinders effective hard balancing unless China is faced with an imminent threat. Therefore, soft-balancing is a feasible balancing strategy for both states (He & Feng, 2008, pp.378). Note that states do not remain inactive to balancing actions against them, as this is irrational and will make such states vulnerable. Instead, states try to check or reduce the effects of balancing from their rivals.

In the section below, using the Strategic Interest model, I argue that Chinese leaders travel to other states to pursue their soft-balancing measures against the

(37)

US, while also using soft-balancing to check against the balancing measures aimed at China by the US.

Strategic Interests model

The Strategic Interests model stresses that states use diplomacy to follow interests that are determined by the military, economic, and political character of other states. Lebovic and Saunders (2016) argued from a realist’s perspective that leaders focused their visits on meetings with their allies, major powers, and other states with outsized strategic impact. They argue that from a strategic perspective, diplomacy constitutes a medium via which states bargain, coordinate positions and execute agreements to realize their strategic interests (Lebovic & Saunders, 2016, pp.109).

Building on this model, I argue that China’s strategic interests include 1) its soft-balancing measures against the US, and 2) its interaction with its allies, neutral states and states that are estranged from the US-led international system, to check the impact of US “containment policies” (balancing) against it. Saunders (2006) argues that China’s strategic track is “driven primarily by international threats and opportunities and China’s changing role in the global balance of power (and especially its relationship with the US)” (Saunders, 2006, pp.14). To this end, I would expect that China grants favourable diplomatic consideration to its allies, powerful states, pariah/estranged states, and trade partners as it tries to maintain its relationship with them and avoid confrontation with these important actors.

Therefore, the frequency of leadership visits to such states by Chinese leaders should be high.

A way for Chinese leaders to soft balance against the US is to court or support pariah states that are on unpleasant terms with the US. By visiting such states and maintaining bilateral relations with them which could allow for the exchange of military expertise, or arms sales, or support for Beijing in the UN General Assembly and other multilateral organizations, Beijing can aid such states in undermining the relative power of the US. Following the strategic model, it is imperative that China visits other powerful states (these would include allies of the US such as France and Germany etc and other rising powers such as Brazil, India etc) and coordinate with

(38)

these powers towards curbing the strength of the US (for example, the international opposition led by France, Germany and China against the US war in Iraq (Pape, 2005, pp.10)). This approach also helps China to check against US soft-balancing measures aimed at it. For example, Chinese diplomatic lobbying in 2004-5 resulted in some European states debating on lifting the post-1989 arms embargo against China (Lanteigne, 2020, pp.205). I also expect Chinese leaders to visit neighbouring states in Asia to resolve conflicting issues (such as borders) diplomatically and strengthen bilateral relations, to ensure regional stability and a good environment for Chinese economic development (Chang-Liao, 2016, pp.84). In addition, due to the nature of the overarching importance of these strategic states to China, I do not expect that the individual bias of Chinese Presidents would matter, as China would continuously treat these states as important and pursue leader visits between them, as national interest comes first (Lebovic & Saunders, 2016, pp.110).

China’s integration and participation in multilateral organizations serve as a ready platform for pursuing its soft-balancing objectives. China’s structural power (meaning the ability to accrue what it wants through skilful engagement of organi- sations and norms internationally) continues growing vis-`a-vis its increased capacity and participation in the international system, as it “socialises” with other actors in foreign relations to gain either material resources or political goods such as prestige and diplomatic power” (Lanteigne, 2020, pp.86). Feng and He (2017), maintain that China’s foreign policies towards challenging the US-led international order are two-pronged – inclusive and exclusive institutional balancing (Feng & He, 2017, pp.24). They argue that China is likely to use inclusive institutional balancing - that is, to join and reform the rules and norms of existing institutions to maximize its economic gains in the liberal economic order. China is likely to apply exclusive institutional balancing such as establishing and strengthening non-US-involved multilateralism when dealing with security pressures and threats from US-led West- ern alliances (Feng & He, 2017, pp.24). Therefore, I expect that being an active player in the international system, Chinese Presidents and top-level diplomats will travel to attend meetings of international organizations (I focus on the United Na- tions General Assembly in this study) of which it is a member and/or observing.

These leadership visits and summits (Summitry diplomacy) provide a platform for influencing, signalling, and coordination for Chinese leaders and other states to soft

(39)

balance against the US and pursue their national interests.

The arguments above lead to the following hypotheses:

SIi: The Chinese President’s visits are aimed at pursuing soft balancing measures that undermine the US.

SIii: The Chinese President’s visits are influenced by measures to check against the US’ soft balancing measures against China.

SIiii: Chinese Presidents visit states that vote in the same pattern as China in the UN.

3.2 Liberalism and Foreign policy

Liberalism is centred on the importance of the freedom of the individual and ensur- ing the right of the individual to life, liberty, and property (McGlinchey et al., 2017, pp.22). Liberalist‘s approach to foreign policy highlights how individuals and the ideas and ideals they promote (such as human rights, liberty, and democracy), social forces (capitalism, markets), and political institutions (democracy, representation) can have direct effects on foreign relations (Smith et al., 2016, pp.55). Liberal- ists concern themselves fundamentally with how to develop a political system that can allow states to protect themselves from foreign threats without subverting the individual liberty of its citizenry (McGlinchey et al., 2017, pp.23).

The first effect of liberalism on the foreign relations of liberal states is the establishment of peace among liberal states – “Democratic peace”. The second effect of liberalism has been described by David Hume as “imprudent vehemence”

or aggression against or enmity towards non-liberals (Hume 1963: 346-347). The third effect of liberalism on the foreign relations of liberal states is complaisance towards threats, which takes two forms: 1) the failure to support liberal allies, 2) failure to oppose enemies (Smith et al., 2016, pp.56-64).

(40)

3.2.1 Liberalists Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy

Liberalists Interdependence theorists argue that intense economic activity results in more ties and greater influence among the nations that engage in such economic activity. Therefore, it is argued by several liberal scholars (Oneal and Russet 1997;

Erik Gartzke 2007) that trade and economic interdependence lessens the likelihood of conflict as one economy becomes bound to another and to the international economic system. Liberalist interdependence theorists argue that given China’s investments in the global economy, it would pursue peace and avoid conflict which could be detrimental to its national interests (Hudda, 2015). Neo-liberalism suggests that developing international level institutions help check the harmful effects of anarchy and produce a stage more suitable for communication and cooperation as opposed to conflict. Neo-liberalists argue that given China’s rise in a multilateral world and one in which it participates actively in these institutions, there are many opportunities for China to obtain needed goods and information from the international system through engaging these institutions (Lanteigne, 2020, pp.4).

Liberal Economic Interdependence scholars argue that economic interdependence reduces conflict because conflict discourages commerce (Hegre, Oneal, & Rus- sett, 2010, pp.764). They posit that conflict and the use of force reduce the gains from trade and hinder the flow of information necessary for the development of mutual understanding (Hegre et al., 2010, pp.764). Commercial relations between countries increase the probability of peace because trade and investment make costly signals possible (Hegre et al., 2010, pp.764). Economic interdependence has two meanings – “first, a group of countries is considered interdependent if economic conditions in one country are contingent on those found in the others” (Mansfield

& Pollins, 2009, pp.11), for instance, the change in the exchange rate of a country affects the economic conditions of other countries that trade with that country (Tanious, 2018, pp.39). Second, “countries are considered interdependent if it would be costly for them to rupture or forego their relationship” (Mansfield & Pollins, 2009, pp.11), as would be the case if relations between the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the advanced industrial countries (which rely heavily on petroleum imports) were severed (Tanious, 2018, pp.40). The first relationship is referred to as sensitivity interdependence, while the second relationship is referred

Correlates of High-Level Diplomatic Visits: A case study of foreign visits by Chinese Presidents from 1993 to 2019.