Erik Hansen

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Erik Hansen

Coping with it:

St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad Facing Reform

The NORBALT Living Conditions Project

Fafo-report 201

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Cover page: Agneta Kolstad

Printed in Norway by: Falch Hurtigtrykk

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Author's preface

This report contains the results from two parallel living condition surveys, carried out simultaneously in the city of St. Petersburg and the Kaliningrad endave in the autumn of 1994. These surveys were carried out as part of the NORBALT Living Conditions Project, which in addition to the two Russian areas also comprised nationwide surveys in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The NORBALT project rep

resents a continuation of the research into living conditions in the Baltic area car

ried out by Fafo since 1990.

The two areas are presented in one report, not only because they both face the Baltic Sea as Russia's «windows» to these waters, but also because, taken together, they contain both strilcing similarities as weU as provide a useful contrast in the portrayal of conditions of everyday life in a society under change.

This report has been written with severai objectives in mind. Firstly, it is intended to serve as a tool for policy-makers responsible for the formulation of social policies at alilevels in Russia. This aim, to remain as relevant for policy as possible, has been maintained through a dose dialogue with public authorities in the study region during the formulation of the survey design.

Secondly, a further aim has been to make updated and reliable information on the social development in the surveyed regions available to the international community. Policy planners in governmental bodies, NGOs and private enterpris

es, as weU as those with a personal interest in the region are among those for whom this book is intended.

Thirdly, the present survey has been intended to serve as a baseline, against which future developments can be measured through foUow-up monitoring of trends in living conditions.

It is still much too early to assess the true long-term effects of the reform process in Russia, and the author and Fafo have at no point wanted to pass value judgements or in other ways give scores to the policies foUowed by changing Rus

sian administrations.

A large number of persons and institutions have contributed to the success

ful completion of the project. The author is especially grateful to all the staff at SOTECO, Moscow, in particular Mr. Oleg L. Shahnazarov, who expertly handled initial negotiations, and Ms. Marina V. Panfilova, who was an invaluable assistant

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and reliable translator. I also wish to thank all involved personnel at the St. Peters

burg Social Science Centre, in particular Mr. Roman Mogilevsky, Director, for his accomodating attitude and support, as weU as Ms. Olga Divochkina and Mr. Sergey Khanzhin, who handled the coUection of data and their subsequent computerisa

tion to our full satisfaction. In Kaliningrad, I am especially grateful to Mr. Boris A Tregubov, Mr. Valeriy I. Boykov, Mr. Sergey Tsyplenkov and Mr. Igor Prokop

chuk of the Kaliningrad Centre for Sodal Research, who managed field operations under sometimes quite adverse conditions. Without their devotion and skilIs, this project could not have been undertaken. Also, I am deeply indebted to the inter

viewers, who diligently and patiently collected all the data. Last, but not least, I wish to thank all Fafo staff members involved, who have contributed in a multitude of ways to the final result: Mr. David Drury, for sharing his wealth of knowledge of survey research methods and execution, and his keen eye for detail; Mr. Steinar Tamsfoss, for his expert assistance with sampling; Mr. Aadne Aasland, for his sup

port and encouragement; Mr. Tor Bukkvoll, for his invaluable assistance during the fieldwork; Ms. Julia Ferkis, for her organisational skilIs and general good spirits, ^as weU as Mr. Jon Hanssen-Bauer and Mr. Jon Pedersen for their advice and contri

butions. Mr. Kåre Hagen, Fafo's leading expert in the research of living conditions, has provided both encouragement and eomments to the first draft. Ms. Agneta Kolstad and Mr. Jon Lahlum have expertly handled the typesetting and graphical layout. T he author alone remains responsible for any faetual or conceptual errors which roay oceur.

Oslo, June 1996

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Chapter 1 Introduction and Background to

the NORBALT Survey of Living Conditions in St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad

1.1 Political and social change

As a student of living conditions in Russia, one often encounters the statement that

«studying living conditions in Eastern Europe makes no sense, because everything there changes ⁵⁰fast», meaning that the proeesses of change render any analysis outdated and irrelevant within a very short time, and hence is a futile affair. This position, though understandable, can rather be seen an expression of the confusion generally felt by the Western public with respect to the reform proeess in Centr41 Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Indeed, this proeess is not only full of con

tradicdons, paradoxes and mutually antagonistic tendencies, but it is also a chal

lenge to established ways of viewing proeesses of sodal change.

Within «dassical» modernisation theory, the emphasis is put on how tech

nological or organisational change leads to the emergence of new sodal classes, which in turn shifts the balance of power to create a new sodal and political regime (cf.

Moore). This type of change from «below», in which developments within the sodal organism break through to impose a new sodal order, contrasts with the reform proeesses in Russia, as this has typically been a process of change instituted from «above» through the political sphere. Rather than a process by which an aspiring middle dass of entrepreneurs have rebelled against an authoritarian regime, changes have been generated within the political sphere proper, desperately attempt

ing to create exactly such an entrepreneurial dass. Thus, political change has come first, with sodal change following, with evident fundamental implications not only for the population concerned, but also for the analyst of sodal change and living conditions.

The corolIary to this is that most of the change which has taken place in Russia over the last four to five years,

and which is highly visible and palpable, can

be seen as a response on the part (Jf the population to politically generated changes in the environment for economic and social action. This is not to say that these changes

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have been minor, or that their impact has not been thorough; on the contrary, even a casual visitor to any major Russian city will immediately notice how the face of society has been reshaped since 1991. The empty shops and long queues associated with the Soviet era are gone and have been replaced by a supply of consumer goods nearly on par with Western Europe; luxury cars cruise the streets, people sport their latest fashion clothes, along with an increasing number of homeless and beggars who have become an equally visible feature of Russian dties. These are obvious mani

festations that a process of sodal change has been set in motion, as people actively or passively adapt to the system-Ievel economic and sodal framework.

However, fundamental sodal change, in the form of shifts in the power struc

ture, social stratification and modes of production, is a much slower process. Sodal formations are by their very nature characterised by inertia and resistance to change, and in Russia, economic and political developments clearly proceed at a faster pace than the reformanon of structural traits of the sodal organism.

This raises the question as to what type of economy and society Russia today can be said to have. It is easy to forget that only five years ago the Soviet Union still existed. The main features of the Soviet system encompassed a centrally planned command economy, with public ownership, a system of physical and financial balances, plan ned allocation, production and distribution, as weU as non-compet

itive trade and industrial organisations. At least in theory, this amounted to full state control of all sectors of the economy. In the political field, the Communist Party held a monopoly of power, and opposition was forbidden. Though totalitarian by ideology, the Soviet system mostly functioned as an authoritarian dictatorship, exerting acquiesence from the citizens by use of force, or through the alm ost unlimited ability of the system to reward acquiesence and punish non-conformity.

Today, after somewhat more than four years of market-oriented reform, the Russian economy possesses only the most rudimentary of features of a framework for a workable market system. It should be borne in mind that an administrative establishment of a market economy by political engineering has no historical prec

edent, and is a formidable task in itself. However, many of the main tenets of the planned economy order have been done away with, and Russia's present economy is thereby neither a market economy in the sense of this word in the OECD area, nor is it a planned, or command economy in the «dassical» sense of this term as used until the demi se of the USSR. Instead, it has become an economy in a perma

nent state of transition, characterised by unpredictability and a high number of profound, system-Ievel dysfunctionalities.

To give a comprehensible overview of the reform process, hs implications and resulting present status is no simple task, given the complexity and numberof soeial and economic phenomena involved. In the foUowing, a short overview of the main political tendendes in the reform process will be given. Its main phases will

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be broadly summarised under the names of the figureheads with whom these phases were associated.

The Gorbachev reforms; Perestroika and glasnost

The foundation for reform of the Soviet economy was laid by General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, who was appoint

ed to this post by the Presidium of the CPSU in 1985. Soon after his inaugura

tion, General Secretary Gorbachev greatly surprised both the Party establishment, the Soviet people and the rest of the world by making political changes which were quite revolutionary in the Soviet context. Mr. Gorbachev chaUenged prevailing Communist dogmas by his insistence on economic reform and free speech. Gor

bachev's famous dictum, saying that �(the economy must be economic» was by no means as self-evident as it sounds. The background to this policy shift was the sor

ry state of the Soviet economy, and the realisation that the USSR was losing ground at an increasing speed in its competition with the market economies. The Brezhnev years had been characterised by huge spending on military-re1ated produetion and build-up, leaving Httle available for investment in renewal of the obsolete industrial base. The concomitant, permanent shortages of consumer goods were the most manifest symptom of these structural imbalances, and were also a permanent source of discontent in the population.

Gorbachev's reform prograrnme contained a series of measures to introduee incentives in the productive sphere, and sensitize producers to consumer preferences.

However, these changes should be introduced within the framework of the planned economy, which should be kept in its main, though more effident form. The reforms made way for small-scale private enterprise, in the form of formally worker-owned

«cooperatives)}. Soon, a number of such small businesses were estabHshed, in par

ticular to replace the perpetual bottleneck in the Soviet economy, the supply and retail sale of consumer goods. The economic part of the Gorbachev reforms had a much smaller impact on life in the USSR, as weU as the fate of the whole country than the famous glasnost initiative, which gave the Soviet people freedom of speech and organisation.

The Gaidar reforms: Monetarism and shock therapy

After Boris Yeltsin was elected President of Russia in 1991, he boldly set about reforming Russias economy. More or less forced by the circumstances, Yeltsin and his Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar introduced their «shock therapy» policy, in an attempt to kick-start market-oriented reform processes. The basic content of this therapy was based on monetarist prindples, as often prescribed by international

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agencies ^asmerucine for ailing economies, sometimes to good result, but invariably at high political and sodal cost. The therapy, which took effect from January 2nd, 1992, involved loosening prke controls of all but a small gro up of strategic com

modi ties, removal of state subsidies, and large-scale privatisation. State enterprises were to operate at a profit, without the massive transfers which formerly had kept the - most of ten fairly obsolete - plants running. The underlying idea was to let prkes balanee off supply and demand, while increased profit potential would at

tract new producers. In principle, this policy made a lot of sense, as the intro duc

tion of real forces of supply and demand into the system would let the market decide.

However, the first tangible effects of this therapy was skyrocketing inflation and a drastic fall in industrial output. Needless to say, the «shock therapy» measures were never implemented to full effect, and state enterprises continued to receive subsi

dies, and privatisation has still, four years later, not gathered very much momen

turn, particularly in manufacturing and agrkulture. Partly, this is because the re

formers never seriously addressed one of the hallmarks of the command economy;

institutional rigidity. Gaidar himself has acknowledged that his initial policies over

estimated the ability of the nascent market mechanisms to change the ways in whkh the obsolete industrial giants inherited from the USSR functioned. Moreover, Russia lacked a credible industrial policy and a coherent privatisation programme to encourage investment; neither did it have a sodal safety net. It has been pointed out that what essentially was intended to be a democratisation of the economy was introduced by extremely undemocratic means: from the top down in a manner reminiscent of the totalitarian regime it was supposed to replace. This also gave the market reforms a low degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the population, as the word

«market economy» mainly became associated with deprivation and impoverishment.

The Chernomyrdin reforms: Stabilisation

As parliamentary opposition to Gaidar's reform policy increased, he was forced to resign in December 1992. Instead, Viktor Chernomyrdin, former director of the state natura! gas production authority Gazprom, ^wasappointed to the post of Prime Minister. Chernomyrdin was committed to a program of continued reform, though at a more gradual and less painful tempo. The main objective of the Chernomyr

din administration was stabilisation of the economy, control of inflation and the exchange rate of the rouble. As of year-end 1995, these objectives had only partly been reached. There are some signs of improvement in the Russian economy, as the fall in production seems to have bottomed out, and there are even some signs of increase in industrial output in certain sectors. However, real recovery in economic life is still far off.

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Real privatisation in the productive sphere is still sluggish, for mainly three reasons.

Firstly, there is still powerful opposition to privatisation in parliament, and the principle of private ownership of production facilities, in particular of agricultural land, is still under dispute from old-style hardliners. Secondly, there is still no coherent industrial policy which can provide sufficient incentives and guarantees to investors. Instead, the funds-starved authorities have tended to react with con

fiscatory taxation at the first sign of profitability. Thirdly, fledgling entrepreneurs are routinely becoming subject to extortion by organised crime, and many are hes

itant to engage in business for fear of the notorious mafiya.

In terms of deve10pment of living conditions, it should be added that such change as can be observed may vary considerably both over regions and between sectors. Though not investigated in the present survey, there is ample reason to assume that the observed changes in the political framework have affected differ

ent parts of the country to varying degrees, and that hence the results presented in this report should expressively be regarded as representative only for the stated ar

eas. Further, the sensitivity and responsiveness to political change may vary over dif

ferent sectors and living conditions factors; whereas employment and income are like1y to respond quickly to shifts in the economic environment, factors like edu

cation, health and dwelling quality are less likely to fluctuate in the short run.

On the other hand, and almost as important, are the psychological aspects of sodal change. It is sometimes difficult for a Western reader ^tofuHy assess the impact on modes of thinlring and established patterns of behaviour which has resulted from the reforms in Russia. The population has been forced to adapt to, and live with a wide scope of novel economic, social and cultural phenomena, and learn to survive in a societal context providing much less security than previously.

It is fairly easy to understand that this transition from a society which had been more or less stagnant for a number of decades, into a context of increasing job insecurity, high inflation, soaring crime rates, growing economic inequality and a confusing degree of political pluralism is perceived as both bewildering and threatening. The stagnant character of Russian society in the previous Soviet period also entails that for many, any change from the accustomed assumes connotations of a disaster.

The aim of the present report is to penetrate beneath the surface of this tran

sitional society, and present a picture of how the population lives, how people per

ceive their life situation, and what they do to cope in daily life. Focus will be placed on main tendencies and broad features, and results will be presented in the context of the transitional economy, wherever appropriate. This approach is based on two assumptions: Firstly, that living conditions are constituted by the totality of the life

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situation of the individual, and that hence, a hroad selection of parameters are required in order to adequately assess the given conditions1•

Secondly, that in times of economic dislocation and upheaval, purely eco

nomic measures alone are particularly inadequate to fully understand the welfare position of individuals and households. The following quotation illustrates the basic idea behind the chosen approach:

«A careful analysis of changes in living conditions therefore requires that condusions drawn on the basis of income-based welfare criteria be integrated with an analysis of changes in capabilities-based welfare measures. This latter dass of measures tries to determine changes in the ability of individuals to function, i.e.

on the basis of the 'quantity and quality of their lives'.» (UNICEF 1993, p. 14).

1 .2 Introduction to the survey area

St Petersburg

The city of St. Petershurg is located in the eastern end of the Bay of Finland, on the spot where Czar Peter the Great founded it in 1703. The city was constructed on a number of small islands in the delta of the river Neva, and partlyon dredged marshlands along the shallow riverhanks, causing many houses to be built on piles.

As many as 40, 000 forced labourers took part in the building effort, and many thousands perished in the process.

Already at the time of its foundation it was daimed that a worse location for the construction of a city could hardly be found, and particularly in winter, the climate of the city is cold, wet and humid. Mean temperatures are -8°C in January and February, and 18°C in July. Nevertheless, the city grew to be a monument to hs founder, and even today, the former grandeur of the city srunes through its some

what wom and decayed fa�des. The best architects of the time were fetched ftom Italy, most notahly the famous Rastrelli, who created the Winter Palace, as well as several other of the monumental buildings still seen in the city. Peter's main aim was to create a modem European capital, which could serve as an example to what he saw as an essentially hackward Russia. In 1718, Peter made the city capital of Russia, a role in which the dty remained until 1918.

The analytk concept behind the Scandinavian tradition of living conditions monitoring is described in Appendix 2.

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St. Petersburg was intended to serve as Russia's «window to Europe», a phrase coined by Russia's national poet Alexander Pushkin, who lived in the city, and praised it in several of his works. The city became the center of Russian political and cultural life throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, and is associated with several of the literary geniuses of the period, most notably the satirist Nikolay Gogol, who im

mortalised the city in his «Petersburg Stories», and novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky, whose works otten take the city as their scene.

The city suffered great damage during World War I and the battles foUow

ing the October Revolution, and in the five year period up to 1920, the popula

non was reduced to one third of its previous leve!.

Again, during World Wat Il, enormous suffering was inflicted upon the city, when German and Finnish troops besieged it from September 1941 undl January 1943. Under constant attillery fire, between 1 million and 1 .5 million inhabitants were killed or died from starvation.

In the Soviet period, the city was only rivaled by Moscow in national eco

nomic and industrial importance. The harbour was one of the latgest in the USSR, and even if the bay freezes over in winter, harbour traffic was kept going with ice

breakers. The city is connected to the sea via a 32 km. sea channel through the shal

low Neva Bay. The city forms the hub for nine major railway systems, which to

gether with several canal systems connect the city to the Russian heartland. In the Soviet period, the city accounted for 1 0 per cent of total industrial output in the USSR, concentrated in sectors such as metalworking and machine building, arma

ments, electrotechnical equipment, shipbuilding, textiles, wood processing and chemicals. The city was also a major centre for science and culture, with a univer

sity, founded in 1819, as weU as around 1 00 other seats of higher leatning. Its att collections in the Herrnitage and the Russian Museum are unrivaled, as ate the world famous performers from the Matiinsky (formerly Kirov) Theatre.

Today, St. Petersburg has earned itself a reputation as a liberal-minded and modernising city, under the leadership of the popular Mayor Anatoly Sobchak.

However, the city is burdened with a heavy heritage from the Soviet era, with the characteristically oversized and inefficient industrial units, and a lot of militaty

related production, which must be converted to civilian use. The city and its dti

zens are vigorously seeking a new place for themselves in the changing drcumstances, induding foreign partnership in rebuilding an economic base, suited for life in a word of markets.

Kaliningrad

Kaliningrad oblast is located in the south-eastern corner of the Eastern Baltic Sea

boatd, wedged between Lithuania and Poland. The area is administratively a part

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of the Russian Federation, even if it is separated by Belarus and Lithuania from the nearest Russian territory by 400 kilometers. The county eovers an area of 15,000 sq.km., and is home to somewhat more than 900,000 people.

The regional capital, Kaliningrad city, has approx. 400,000 inhabitants. It is located on the river Pregolya, 7 km. upstream from where the river runs into the Kaliningrad Bay. The city is also connected by a eanal to the sea and thus to its external port of Baltiysk.

The first written history of the area dates from the 13th century, when the Teutonic Order first settIed in the area, and came into contact with the Kursian and Baltic tri bes who constituted the native population. The city of Koningsberg was founded in 1255, achieved town status in 1292, and joined the Hansa League in 1340. The Albertus University was founded in 1544 (dosed 1945). Through the late Middle ages, Konigsberg became a centre for the later German «Drang naeh Osten» . One of the most famous inhabitants of Konigsberg was the philosopher Immanuel Kant, who never left the city in his entire lifetime. His tomb can be seen adjacent to the Cathedral, which was left in ruins by wartime bombing, but is in the proeess of restoration.

In 1939, Konigsberg had 372,000 inhabitants, Le. not significantly fewer than today. In the final days of World War Il, the area was occupied by the Red Army. Its indusion into the USSR was first decided at Yalta, and this decision was confirmed at the Potsdam Conferenee. The region was formally annexed into the USSR as a separate administrative unit in 1947 . Almost the entire German popu

lation had fled with the retreating German army, and those remaining were later evicted to Germany or deported to other parts of the USSR. This policy of russifi

cation of the area also comprised systematie renaming of all settlements, and many of the placenames in the eounty bear strong «Soviet» or militaristic connotations, e.g. Gvardeysk-Guards; Kanonernoye-Gunner; Krasnoznamensk-Red Banner;

Pionersky-Pioneer. Konigsberg was renamed Kaliningrad in 1946 on Stalins or

ders, after the former dtular president of the USSR, Mikhail Kalinin.

The present Kaliningrad county comprises approximately one third of the former Eastern Prussia (the remainder being part of Poland).

Throughout the Soviet period, the region was strongly militarised, and one of the main ports for the USSR Baltic Fleet. Due to this military presence, the en

dre region was off limits to foreigners until 1991. The exact volume of the present military presenee is still a secret, and has been the subject of much speculation, with some estimates of troop numbers going as high as 200,000. Though, recent reportS indicate that the number of troops stationed with the Navy numbered 40,000 in Oetober 1994, and will be further redueed to 26,000 (Petersen 1994, p.2).

Kaliningrad also has a major fishing industty; which in 1990 employed some 60,000 people on several hundred ocean-going vessels and in the shore-based proeessing

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industry. Other major industries are wood proeessing and metalworking. In 1990 , these three industries combined employed approximately two thirds of the work

force.

After strong pressures from local authorities on the central government in Moscow, the oblast was established as the Kaliningrad Free Trade Zone «y antar»

(<<Amber») as of January 1st, 1994 . So far, the efforts to boost private enterprise in the region have met with Httle success, though there has been a spate of investments mostly in trade and services, largely from Poland and Germany. As in other parts of Russia, investors are reluctant to engage due to the political instability and the lack of a proper legal framework. T here are also uncertainties connected to the continued military presence in the area, as it will be difficult to combine the role of a free economic zone with a dominant military sector.

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Chapter 2 Demography, Population and Migration

2.1 Introduction

In a survey of living conditions, it is vital to have a grasp of the main demographic features and trends of the society being studied. Firstly, the composition of the population will outline some main challenges to welfare policies; e.g. the age pyramid will reveal the number of elderly in rdauon to the working population, ^as well as the number of children who must be supplied with day-care and educational facilities.

Secondly, changes in the demographic picture can also in themseIves often be interpreted as reflections of changing living conditions. For example with dete

rio rating living conditions, we expect to tind higher rates of mortality and changes in fertility patterns.

In the following, we shall attempt to establish a sketch of the main demo

graphic trends as they are reflected in St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad.

2.2 Demographie trends in Russia

Before going into a detailed description and analysis of the demographie picture in the survey areas, it will be useful to look at some main demographie trends in Russia as a whole. The composition of the population is formed by demographic trends, which can be both long-term and short-term. These trends cannot be extracted from survey data, so this chapter will to a large extent reIy on official demographic statistics. With some minor exceptions, the statistical information produced in the USSR in the tidd of demographics seems to be rdiable, and thus poses less problems for analytical purposes than e.g. economic stadstics, which are widely believed ^tobe unreliable.

These official stadstical sources indicate that a major 'demographic adjust

ment' has taken pla^cein Russia after the intro duetion of economic reforms. This represents a response on the part of the households to such central population parameters as family formation, reproductive behaviour and mortality. In Russia,

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these factors in combination have caused a

net natural decrease o/the population.

Par

tieularly in the long term, this development is likely to negatively influenee poten

tials for eeonomie growth, unless a revers al of present trends oceurs in the near future.

i). Family formation and marriage rates

In Russia, the erude marriage rate (the number of marriages per 1,000 midyear population) fell by dose to 30 per cent from 1989 to 1993. Although the marriage rate began to fall in the 1980's, mostly for demographie reasons (Le. due to a drop in the size of the age eohorts reaehing the age of most frequent marriage), the sharp dedine sinee 1991 seems mainly to be attributable to 'eeonomie inseeurity'. This is eonfirmed by the net marriage rate (per 1,000 women over 15 years of age), cor

roborating the condusion that the dedine is due to non-demographie faetors (UNICEF 1993, p.15).

Several cireumstanees can be offered as explanations for this dedine in the proclivity of young people to start a family. Firstly, the 16-24 year age group has been severely affected by unemployment, causing many to prolong their education, or through not having a stable source of income have deferred the formation of a family. Secondly, the housing situation, which has been an obstacle to family for

mation throughout the history of the USSR, seems to have worsened, as there has been a contraction in the completion of new housing units. Together with the pri

vatisation and liberalisation of the housing market, this has severely curtailed the possibility for young couples to find proper and affordable housing. A further fac

tor is found in the increased mortality among males in the 20-39 year age group, which has reduced the number of available bridegrooms (ibid.).

ii). Reproduetive behaviour: Fertility

Among other factors, this reluctance to form families has in Russia led to an un

precedented decline in fertility. In fact, the crude birth rate (live births per 1,000 inhabitants) dropped by 35 per cent in the period 1989-1992, and estimates for the consecutive years point to a further drop. Commonly, this reduction in fertil

ity is attributed to several effects: Firstly, the share of women in the most fertile age bracket (20-29 years) declined by 10 per cent in Russia, as the cohorts of women who enter reproductive age have become smaller. However, this natural, demograph

ically determined factor cannot explain the entire observed drop in birth rates.

Secondly, as pointed out above, the reduced marriage rates have produced a smaller share of married women in the reproductive age groups. Thirdly, the average fertil

ity rate of married women in these age groups has dedined, leading to a dedine in the total fertility rate (i.e. the average number of children per woman) of 12 per cent in Russia from 1989 to 1992. On average, for every woman in fertile age in

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Russia, there is 1.55 children, i.e. significantly lower than the level required to re

produce the population (generally accepted as approximately 2.10). Total fertility rates in Russia have been consistently below this replacement level since 1965 (ibid.

p.17).

iii). Mortality

Simultaneously, Russia has seen a steep rise in mortality. The crude death rate (i.e.

the number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants) increased by 33 per cent from 1989 to 1993, with the main increase from 1992 to 1993. As an illustration of the ex

tent of this phenomenon, the first six months of 1993 brought 178,000 additional deaths (as weU as 120,000 fewer births) in relation to the same period ofI992. Even if part of this increase in mortality is explained by the gradual aging of the popula

tion, the majority of these additional deaths are due to increments in the age-specific mortality rates for practically all age groups. Further, this latest developments rep

resent an accentuation of previous trends in Russian mortality. The tendency to

wards increasing mortality among males, and constant mortality among females has been recorded since 1964, and is thus not a new phenomenon, though no final and valid explanation has been found to this demographic development, which is al

most unprecedented in any country in peacetime.

Several suggestions have been made, though. Some authors have argued that the precipitous fall in male life expectancy is attributable to the general economic decline and the increased hardship which has been brought upon the Russian peo

ple. It is argued that economic dislocation and impoverishment have entailed a high degree of social stress, resulting in increased mortality (Cornia 1995, p. 32ff.).

Against this position, it can be argued that general economic dislocation have been even more proQ.ounced e.g. in the Ukraine, where mortality has not increased to the same extent. Simultaneously, the same trend towards increased mortality is observed in the former East Germany, where there has been relatively little direct impoverishment.

Others have focused on increased mortality in the light of a cohort effect.

This effect concerns those cohorts of males who were bom during World War Il and in the immediately preceding years, and whose childhood and adolesence took place during the war years. It can be assumed that this relatively difficult start in life has entailed higher death risks as the cohorts enter old age, and push the aver

age age at death towards the lower end of the prime death interval. Further analy

sis, however, shows that the increase in mortality also comprises age cohorts bom immediately after World War Il.

Still others have attributed the constantly sinking life expectancy to tradi

tional Russian vices, like alcohol consumption, arguing that the sudden increase in mortality observed after 1992 is a «catching-up» effect, connected to the repeal

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of Gorbachev's anti-alcohol laws. (Avdeevet al. 1996, p. 13ff.). There was actually a slight, but noticeable rise in life expectancy in Russia after the enactment of these laws; however, it is complicated to establish whether present mortality trends chiefly relate to those who have a high alcohol consumption. Still other authors blame cigarette smoking for the increased mortality from cardio-vascular diseases (Qiao

& Murray 1995, p. 28ff.). However, excessive smoking would also most likely result in increased occurence of cancer, the levels of which are not higher in Russia than elsewhere. So, it must be conduded that all these explanations offered are at best partial, and so far, the debate over the rising mortality in Russia is incondusive.

Still, irrespective of cause, increasing mortality has produced a net natural population dedine in Russia, and even including migration, a net absolute dedine of the population of dose to 100,000 persons was registered from 1992 to 1993 (UNICEF 1993, p. 70). The increase in mortality accounts for two thirds of the natural population dedine, which at present is accellerating. However, two factors should be taken into account. As will be seen in this report, this decline is geograph

ically unevenly distributed; not all regions show the same demographic trend. In fact, there are considerable regional variations to this picture. Secondly, the effect of migration on the total composition of the population has not been taken into account, as this will be treated later in this chapter. The break-up of the USSR, unrest and civil war in some border areas, and nationalisation policies in the newly inde

pendent former USSR republies have all contributed to migratory movement which in some areas will counteract, in other areas exacerbate these main trends.

2.3 Population and population development

St. Petersburg

Due to her turbulent modem history, St. Petersburg has experienced mass demo

graphic upheavals. Twice during this century, the city has lived through drastic population reductions, first after the October Revoludon and the ensuing civil war, the second time during World War Il, during the siege and constant bombardment.

Both these events caused dramatic suffering and loss of human life, as weU as mass exodus from the city. The demographic after-effects of WWII still linger on, as can be seen in the older age groups, where women still ournumber men. Because of these dramatie events, the demographic development of the city has been characterised by sudden jumps and turns, and has proceeded in a less than natural manner.

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As of]anuary 1st, 1994, a total of 4,320,900 persons were registered as inhabitants of the city. This is the num ber of persons living inside the city limits proper; in addition, another 561,700 persons live in areas administradvely subject to the St.

Petersburg city government, in outlying suburbs (Kolpino, Pushkin, Lomonosov, Petrodvorets, Sestroretsk, and some other minor settlements), but these are not part of this survey.

Kaliningrad

When studying the population ofKaliningrad County, it should be borne in mind that the area was established as Soviet territory only in 1947, when it was declared part of the USSR. At that time, most of the area was totally devastated by the war, and almost all the former mosdy German-speaking - population had fled. Against this background, the population of Kaliningrad County has grown fairly rapidly over the last decades, as shown by the figure below:

Figure 2.1. Population development, Kaliningrad

1992

1989

1979

1970

1959

o 200000 400000 600000

(Source: Goskomstat 1993,p. 7. Census data)

800000

Rural III Urban

• Total

1000000

N umber of inhabitants

Much of this growth can be ascribed to the importance attached to the area as a naval base, and the military build-up. As can be seen, all this population growth has been on the part of the towns, and the rural population has decreased through

out this period. This tendency towards urbanisation was common to the entire USSR, as a consequence of the planned economy's emphasis on industrialisation.

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Kaliningrad City dominates the settlement pattern in the county, with 46 per cent of the total population, and 58 per cent of the urban population (in 1992). This share has been remarkably stable over the last three decades, suggesting that the minor towns in the area have absorbed a relatively higher share of the stream of im

migrants. Further features of the migration patterns will be treated separately, be

low.

This makes the county fairly urbanised, as 78 per cent of the population are reported to live in urban-type settlements, as opposed ^to73 per cent for Russia as a whole. This is evidently also a consequence of the predominance of the military forces in the formation of the settlement pattern.

2.4 Age structure

Figure 2.2 shows the age pyramid for the population of St. Petersburg as of 1994.

The figure displays the characteristic «uen» shape, which has become typical of many developed sodeties. Though, the tendency towards Iow birth rates, evident from the narrow bands at the bottom of the figure, is even more pronounced than in Russia as a whole, as well as in most comparable countries. Likewise, the top of the figure is evidence to the discrepancies in life expectancy between men and women, which are typical for Russia; in the older age groups (over 60), women far ournumber men.

Figure 2.2: Population, St. Petersburg

Age group

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70+

Men

_ 65-69

60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 1 6- 1 9 1 0- 1 5 6-9 3-5 0-2

Women

300 250 200 1 50 1 00 50 O O 50 1 00 1 50 200 250 300

In thousands

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In Kaliningrad as in other parts ofRussia, women outnumber men by a significant margin in the total population. This is mainly due ^totwo factors; firscly, the signif

icantly higher life expectancy for women. On average, women in Russia outlive men by more than ten years. (71 .9 years, as opposed to 58.9 years for men) (Vishnevsky 1 996, p. 68). Secondly, here also, the demographic effects of the loss of human life in Russia during World War Il still linger on. However, the latter effect is gradually hecoming weaker; whereas today, women account for 5 1.9 per cent of the pop ula

don in Kaliningrad county, this proportion was 55.1 per cent in 1 959. (Goskomstat 1 993, p. 98). Still, there are 1 ,079 women for every 1,000 men in the county, though the surplus of women is mostly found in the age groups above 50.

As in other parts of Russia, the population is aging. This is reflected in the relative increase in the proportion of persons above retirement age (60 years for men, 55 years for women). This share has gone up from 6 per cent in 1 959 to 1 8 per cent in 1992. With sinking birth rates, the share of persons under 16 years of age has been similarly reduced from 33 per cent in 1 959, to 23 per cent in 1 992.

(Goskomstat 1993, p. 43). The county has seemingly been hit by a demographic wave, as the numher of retirees have increased much faster than other population groups; from 1 989 to 1 992,the number of retirees increased by 1 5,000 individuals, whereas the population within working age increased by a mere 6,000 persons.

(ibid.). However, the share of the elderly in the population is still lower than in e.g.

St. Petersburg, where this group accounts for close to 22 per cent.

2.5 Fertil it y and mortality

In St. Petersburg, the overall demographic situation is even more drastically marked than in Russia as a whole. In 1 989, a total of 6 1 ,634 births (1 2.3 per 1 ,000 inhab

itants) were registered in the city, and 58,464 deaths ( 1 1 .6 per 1 ,000), resulting in a net positive natural population growth of 3, 1 70 persons, or equal to 0.7 persons per 1 ,000 inhabitants. (Goskomstat 1 99 1 , p. 62). The same figures for 1 994 were 34, 500 births (7. 1 per 1 ,000 inhahitants) and 84,000 deaths (17.4 per 1 ,000), resulting in a net natural population dedine of 49,500 persons, or equal to a neg

ative growth of 1 0.3 per 1 ,000 inhabitants.1 Thus, whereas fertility has decreased, mortality has increased dramatically, and even more than patterns ohserved for Russia as a whole. As can he ascertained from the figures, the net decline in the population is mainly due to increased mortality.

Fig ures for 1 994 from St. Petersburg Statistkal Office, supplied by St. Petersburg Sodal Science Centre.

Erik Hansen

Erik Hansen

Coping with it:

St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad Facing Reform

The NORBALT Living Conditions Project

Contents

Author's preface

Chapter 1

Introduction and Background to

the NORBALT Survey of Living Conditions in St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad

and which is highly visible and palpable, can

Chapter 2

Demography, Population and Migration

net natural decrease o/the population.

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