V ICTIMS OF FRAUD IN THE EU ETS AND CDM

Knowing the victims to fraud is important to understand how to regulate fraud. After all, common frauds may be due to unassuming reasons, such as individual gullibility, and could be more directly targeted by raising awareness than by imposing regulation. Furthermore, it is also crucial to understand which fraud types put defenceless stakeholders such as future generations at a disadvantage, as these pose the least opposition to fraud and therefore need the government to intervene and represent them.

There are several possible victims, for example, that the two interacting parties steal from one another, steal from the tax office, or steal from the atmosphere. Before determining the victim of each fraud type, it is crucial to remember that one does not have to steal from the environment for this fraud to be linked to or facilitated by the environmental objectives, e.g.

the environmental complexity might also make deception of included or excluded parties easier. Due to the environmental context and the possibility of external implications, each fraud type can have more than one group of victims.

Computer crime is often carried out by external parties, which are not part of the daily interactions in the markets, e.g. hackers. It is not the environment which is victimised but mainly the firms who are obligated to use the market. The fact that these victims are numerous and dispersed means there are many possibilities for fraud to enter the market.

Therefore, the victims’ characteristics allow several small security liabilities in dispersed sources, through which the system’s vulnerability to cybercrime arises. As stated before, computer crime is not affected by the environmental context and therefore the victims are also not more vulnerable to cybercrime because of the environmental context.

In the state crime example, the environment is not victimised as the same number of credits are cancelled out, however this might not always be the case. The main victim here is the registry, as the Paris Exchange had to organise swap backs to maintain market stability. The fraud and the victim’s vulnerability to fraud is not increased by the environmental context specifically but by the intangibility of carbon.

Under tax fraud the main victim is the tax office. Because tax fraud benefits from large VAT rates, the nations with higher VAT rates and/or low enforcement might be particularly vulnerable. Victims of money laundering will also include stakeholders who were negatively impacted through the activities that created the illegal funds. But since these are case

specific, the bigger victim is also the tax office. The system’s environmental context does not increase its vulnerability to tax fraud. Therefore, the victims are also not more vulnerable to tax fraud because of the environmental context.

In cases of scamming, the victim is often one of the parties included in the transaction. The examples were mostly concerned with individuals being scammed, but in one case the environment is scammed:

• For individuals, the information asymmetries and the increased gullibility due to the complex environmental background make the victim more susceptible to scams.

Thus, the environmental context does increase the victims’ vulnerability to fraud.

However, it does not affect their ability to protect themselves against scams, as it was their own decision to trust the scammer. The victim’s lack of understanding increases the system’s vulnerability to fraud, e.g. since they are more dependable on other’s opinions, it is easier to influence their actions through security scams.

Therefore, one could argue that allowing the public to invest into the system increases its vulnerability to fraud. However, these cases do not generally steal from the environment if investors would not have invested in EUAs otherwise.

• In the emission factor case, the environment is victimised. The fraudsters benefit by exaggerating the amount of reductions, which negatively affects the system’s environmental objectives. This affects unprotected future generations and distant citizens.

In the bribery and corruption cases, the fraudsters steal from the environment. They do so by manipulating the emission factors or excluding the negative effects of projects from the decision making, such as the eucalyptus drying up the streams. Therefore, as the environment and local stakeholders are exploited, several groups which are unable to raise opposition are also impacted, such as future generations or distant citizens. Here, external parties are more vulnerable to fraud, because the spill-over effects from environmental transactions allowed their exploitation as not all costs or benefits are included in the negotiations. The environmental context and defencelessness of victims also makes it easier for fraudsters to avoid prosecution. Fraudsters may hide behind complex additionality calculations or behind utilitarian arguments, arguing that the relocation of some villages is beneficial if it results in environmental improvements.

Firms who bought fraudulent credits in good faith might benefit from lower prices, but if the fraud is detected, they face reputational damage. The firm’s interest in profit might increase the system’s vulnerability to fraud as the fraud would not be as desirable if buyers would focus on credit quality instead of simply credit acceptability. Once a big firm is linked to the credits, it is tempting for the press to mention them in the case. The environmental context likely increases the public’s disfavour, therefore the environmental context is expected to magnify the victims’ costs of fraud.

Structural issues allow fraud that victimises the environment through inadequate verification or the lack of regulation. Since the environment is exploited, this impacts several groups of possibly defenceless victims, such as next generations or indirectly affected citizens. The protection of the environment depends on precise and powerful regulation and enforcement.

Without that, fraud is incentivised as the negative externalities are excluded from the project negotiations. Therefore, the environmental context allows the fraudster to profit from the exclusion of some costs. Due to the complexity of the environment, it might be difficult to create regulations that successfully stop fraudsters from exploiting the environments’

vulnerabilities to fraud.

The proposed question was whether the environmental context affects the victims’

vulnerability to fraud. The environment is a central victim in the fraud cases related to bribery and corruption, structural issues and some scams. In these cases, there are numerous groups of victims which are affected by the wide effects of the exploitation of the environment, such as future generation and distant citizens. The problem is that these groups are often defenceless, for example, future generations do not have a powerful stakeholder who is solely concerned with defending their rights. Additionally, these victims may not be aware of the fraud and therefore unable to raise opposition, which possibly delays fraud discovery and increases their exposure to negative side effects. They largely depend on the government to regulate current behaviour in a way to avoid reduced quality of life in the future. Therefore, the victims are more vulnerable to fraud due to the environmental context.

The inter-generational, non-excludable effects of the environmental quality have likely greatly complicated the design of the market.