The Australian government during the Hawke-Keating period constructed a new national myth (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006). Through this project Labor hoped to transcend the
dominant Anglo-centric regional identity which dominated Australian political discourse. The policymakers believed this was Australia’s destiny (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006). Labor
cultivated a distinctive regional and multilateral emphasis. To cement this myth into foreign policy, the government further enmeshed Australia into the Asia-Pacific through trade. This embrace of Asia was premised on substantial East Asian economic growth (Jones &
Benvenuti, 2006). For instance, Australian exports to its Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) neighbours increased by 24% between 1977 and 1988 (as cited in Jones &
Benvenuti, 2006, p. 107). Contrastingly, and prior to the UK entering the European Economic Community and severing its preferential trade agreement with Australia, exports to the
United Kingdom and continental Europe had heavily declined. Moreover, Australia’s meagre growth, coupled with recession in the early 1990s, contrasted with the 6 to 8% per annum Gross Domestic Produce growth of various ASEAN and North East Asian economies (as cited in Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, p. 107). These global and regional trends, in the view of K.S. Nathan, necessitated a compelling reassessment of Australia’s political, cultural, economic and strategic approach to Southeast Asia (Nathan, 1991, p. 336). This provided a catalyst for the Hawke-Keating government to ideationally reposition Australia. Indeed, this change was linked to ideas associated with national security.
Government policy during this period constituted social and cultural change through intelligentsia intervention. Elites manufactured and implemented Australia’s ideational relocation (McAllister & Ravenhill, 1998). This is illustrated by Gareth Evans the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Hawke-Keating era. For example, Evans proclaimed that Australia was unconstrained by “the reality of its own geography” and was neither an Anglo-American outpost nor a transplanted European nation in Asia. In contrast, Australia was a constituent of Asia and “[t]he old perceptions… based on “Asian” and “European identities””
were antiquated (as cited in Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 272). Accordingly, Evans promoted the idea domestically:
Our future lies, inevitably, in the Asia Pacific region. This is where we must live, must survive strategically and economically, and find a place and a role if we are to develop our full potential as a nation (as cited in G. Smith & Lowe, 2005, p. 462).
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The reimagining project of the Australian identity by Labor is explained by the concept of liminality (Higgott & Nossal, 1997). This idea helps to analyse the ideational shift in Australia’s international location. Originally employed by anthropologists, this term describes the threshold experienced by people undergoing rites of passage. An individual subsequently experiences two existences simultaneously (Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 170).
This transitional phase, between the positions assigned by law, custom, convention and ceremony, confuses the individual (Turner, 1969, p. 95). This confusion stems from the contradictory identity adjustment process because a person occupies a position with both incongruous outlooks.
Liminality literature highlights the ambiguities the Labor reimagining project catalysed within Australia. During this period Australians largely identified with the Anglo-American world (Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 171). This was because most Australians had familial roots in the British Isles. Furthermore, the cultural referents and institutions of the community - political, economic, social, educational, religious, cultural, sporting - despite evolving local characteristics, traced their origins to the imperial centres of either Britain or the United States (Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 171). This subsequently conflicted with the new Asian identity the government had manufactured.
The main proponents of Australia’s ideational redefinition were institutional and elite driven. This movement was advanced primarily by the government (Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 175). Australian policymakers during the Hawke-Keating era crafted this myth within Australia’s foreign policy discourse. This reflects an attempt to engineer a new national identity by renegotiating Australia’s ideational place (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006). The
government ideationally repositioned Australia by reconceptualising Asia within the national imagination. The agenda of this action was twofold: undermine the dominant Anglo-centric discourse and emphasise Asia’s importance to Australia (Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 174). By refashioning Australia ideologically, the government hoped to assert a stronger nationalist sentiment domestically. Through strengthening society’s national partisanship, this would help manoeuvre Australia into a more ideationally distinct place within foreign affairs (Jones
& Benvenuti, 2006, pp. 106-107). Through this Labor portrayed its actions as necessary for the country’s development. Adopting this mindset, as depicted to the public, contributed towards national security because Australian prosperity required engaging differently with world.
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However, this new regionalist myth was paradoxical. This narrative was riddled with ambiguities because Asia was depicted monolithically (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, p. 108). In its language the government unrecognised the nuances of Asia and eschewed pursuing bilateral relations of varying intensity (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006, p. 108). This homogenous regionalism reinforced the dominant perceptions that Asians were inherently different from Australians. Indeed, these portrayals undermined the reimagining project envisioned by Hawke and Keating.
The government’s alternate foreign policy direction was additionally weakened by its internal contradictions (Higgott & Nossal, 1997). These ideational constructions coexisted with a highly antagonistic defence posture towards Asia. For example, the government spent approximately $10 billion annually against security threats that could singly originate from regional neighbours (as cited in Higgott & Nossal, 1997, p. 176). Thus, defence policies were designed to protect Australia from threats emanating from Asia. This is illustrated by the 1994 Defence White Paper:
our region is one of great dynamism, strategically as well as economically. The next fifteen years will see great change in our strategic environment. With the end of the Cold War, important new uncertainties have emerged about the future strategic situation in Asia. Economic growth will increase the power of nations in our region, and political change may make their policies less predictable. Because of these uncertainties, we acknowledge the possibility that our security environment could deteriorate, perhaps quite seriously in the future. We recognise that at some time in the future armed force could be used against us and that we need to be prepared to meet it (as cited in Government, 1994, p. 4)
Furthermore, during the Hawke-Keating period Australia was committed to maintaining an intimate alliance with the US. The American connection for Australia remained prescient to protect territorial national security. The Australia-US alliance continued to be perceived as integral to safeguarding Australia’s security. Thus, Hawke eagerly supported the United States and was determined to keep the Americans enthused towards Australia (Firth, 2011, p.
37). Hawke proclaimed that both countries would be “together forever” and confirmed this commitment by telling US President Ronald Regan that Australia was the US’ most reliant ally (as cited in Firth, 2011, p. 37). According to Hawke in his 1983 election victory speech, Australia’s “alliance relationship with the United States… [was] close and constructive [in]
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nature” and with Labor’s ascension to power had “been reaffirmed”. The United States “has given us a position of influence from which to work positively for peace” (Hawke, 1987).
Evidently, this illustrates the Constructivist myth and normative partisan framework theories. The Labor government constructed a new national myth to reshape the Australian identity. This development was elite driven and stemmed from Labor’s intersubjective expectation of progress. Labor policymakers attempted to reshape and cohere the Australian public and portrayed these measures has helping Australia to overcome its ideational
confusion. The government grounded its rhetoric in shared normative understandings within Australian society and projected the idea its actions were both necessary and positive.
Adopting this mindset was depicted as benefiting national security because Australia needed to newly engage with the world to prosper. However, given the inherent ambiguities and contradictions within its arguments, this project within Australian society reinforced its holistic cultural and social alienation from Asia. Indeed, this coexisted with maintaining an antagonistic defence posture towards Asia and ultimately aligned with the United States. This illustrates the normative partisan framework because all important political actors similarly understood the Australian military’s role. These examples identify the role Australian policymakers’ views and agency regarding normative concerns have had in structuring the ADF to protect Australia from an unidentified Asian threat. The Constructivist theoretical framework subsequently provides insights into Australian behaviour. Hence, Australia’s alliance behaviour towards the United States is founded upon contradictory viewpoints. This has resulted because Australian national security policy is framed by dissimilar
conceptualisations and is socially constructed. This thesis affirms that Australia has cultivated an idiosyncratic foreign policy.
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