made up a sizable share of the contingent. At one point it was reported that more than 100,000 of those drafted had suspended sentences or previous convictions, and that an additional 50,000–
70,000 had been in trouble with the police.67 These figures were contested by the authorities.
According to the Military Prosecutor’s Office, the draft included 21,000 persons whose
convictions were overturned or had been removed from their records.68 In the years 2000–2008, young men with records were not drafted, although this was allowed by the law. Having been pressured by i.a. the Public Chamber (Obshchestvennaia palata), the advisory body that oversees relations between citizens and the state, military authorities decided to return to the pre-2009 practice, thereby reducing the contingent by 10,000–12,000 men.69
5 Russians’ perceptions of the Army and military service
A conscript army is obviously dependent on the population’s size and its physical and mental qualities as well as on the ability of state institutions to make the system work in a proper and efficient way. Moreover, the system also rests on the people’s support. The attitude of a state’s citizens towards its military and military service will be of fundamental importance to the effectiveness of conscription.
Since 1998, the Levada Analytical Centre in Moscow has conducted surveys at regular intervals to monitor the views of the people on matters of defence. The polls show that almost throughout Putin’s presidencies a majority of the respondents supported the transition to a professional army.
In 2008 they no longer constituted a majority, but they still outnumbered the opponents of professionalisation. However, the opponents had made up a significant minority all the way, and in the 2009 survey the balance tipped in their favour, with 47% supporting the draft against 43%
for professionalisation (Figure 5.1).70
67 Newsru.com, July 3, 2009.
68 Iuzbashev, “The draft has been completed. Prepare for a new one”.
69 Newsru.com, October 2, 2009.
70 As opposed to surveys where respondents are selected objectively, polls where people are invited to respond may, not surprisingly, give completely different results. In a programme on the radio channel Ekho Moskvy in April 2009, listeners were asked to call and vote for or against the maintenance of conscription.
86.2% of the 593 callers wanted to do away with the draft (Ekho Moskvy, “What kind of army do we need:
professional or conscript?”).
22 FFI-rapport 2010/00029
Should Russia preserve conscription or professionalise the Army?
1998 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Preserve conscription Professionalise Don't know
Figure 5.1: Russians’ views on conscription vs. professionalisation. Source: Levada Analytical Centre.
Respondents have also regularly been asked a question that makes the issue of conscription versus professionalisation a more personal matter: Would you want your son, brother, husband or other close relative to serve in the Army at present? Not surprisingly, the precentage who would want a close relative to serve is considerably lower than the share who support the draft (Figure 5.2).
Would you want your son, brother, husband or other close relative to serve in the Army at present?
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007 2008
No Yes Don't know
Figure 5.2: Russians’ views on military service for close relatives. Source: Levada Analytical Centre.
However, the views on service for close relatives have changed considerably since the end of the last decade, when only 13% answered positively. That the share of respondents who did not want their relatives to serve was substantially higher a decade ago is obviously related to some key developments and events of post-Soviet Russia. In the late 1990s, the probability that conscripts
FFI-rapport 2010/00029 23
might be sent to the high-risk zone of Chechnya had seemed greater. Continuing economic decline and dwindling defence allocations had had its effect both on the the material conditions of service as well as on the morale and discipline of an army that had been deeply humiliated by the Chechen separatists.71 From 1999 onwards, Russia experienced substantial economic growth.
Gradually this lead to a general rise in optimism among the population and enhanced self-esteem and pride in the country. It also influenced Russians’ perceptions of the Armed Forces. Growing budgets made it possible to resume military exercises and to start modernising equipment. The Army became more visible, and not just in connection with problems and failures. Military service came to be regarded in a less negative light.
Surveys conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM) show that the Army’s standing with the Russian public has improved over the last years (Figure 5.3). In January 2006, 32% of the respondents approved of the way the Army carried out its tasks. The approval rate had risen to 51% in June 2008. It then made a predictable jump in the wake of the successful war with Georgia and reached 59% in September. It has remained high since.
0 %
Figure 5.3: Ratings of social institutions. Source: Russian Public Opinion Researh Centre (VTsIOM).
The results of recent polls have been interpreted by some as a militaristic trend in Russian society.
People are fully aware of the existence of dedovshchina and other brutal and illegal practices, but still a growing number are sympathetic towards military service and tend to regard it as a
tempering experience that young men should go through.72 The new conscription model may have served to improve the Army’s standing. In a poll published by VTsIOM in October 2008, 54% expressed approval of the changes, while 29% disapproved.73
71 The two reasons most often referred to by those respondents who did not want their relatives to serve were dedovshchina and the risk of being wounded or killed in conflict.
72 Shmagun & Mertsalova, “Soldiers counted in spring”.
73 Vzgliad, October 9, 2008.
24 FFI-rapport 2010/00029
Polls will always be subject to uncertainties. The accuracy of the questions has consequences for the value and interpretation of the results, and more technical circumstances such as error margins will have to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, opinion polls must also be assessed with regard to the basis people have for forming informed opinions. In Russia, authorities exercise substantial control over mass media, mainly those media that dominate news distribution to the larger part of the population, i.e. first of all television. Critical coverage of problems and failing policies is limited. In media and publications that reach smaller audiences, in particular regionally and locally, critical journalism exists, but only a minority of Russians receive information from those sources. Through control of the media, the authorities can manipulate public opinion. In the case of Russia, another important aspect to consider is to what extent respondents answer
sincerely. There is reason to believe that many people tend to give the answers they think the authorities will prefer. Moreover, there is a divide between how people answer in an impersonal context with no commitments or obligations, and how they act when they are personally involved or affected. The attitude of Russians towards their Armed Forces is fundamentally ambivalent:
Most would agree that Russia should be powerful. Military force is then essential, and all Russians have a responsibility to contribute. Nevertheless, by their choices and acts they show that they see military service as the responsibility of someone else, not of themselves or someone in their family. Almost 70% of young people claim to be patriots and more than 50% say they would like to attend basic military training classes.74 Still, there is little doubt that the conscripts themselves are overwhelmingly negative towards military service.75 And in contrast to the above cited polls from the Levada Centre one may find references to other polls indicating that 90% of parents would do anything possible to help their sons avoid the draft.76