The Problem of Intuitional Transcendence

Taking it that the problem of transcendence is to be specified as the problem of intuitional transcendence, in what does the problem consist? Why should the possibility of rationally positing objects that are not adequately given be so enigmatic? To answer this question, let us begin by asking why Husserl claims that the possibility of positing adequately given objects in a rational way is unmysterious, which, as we have seen, he does.

Note first that, on Husserl’s view, adequate givenness is sufficient for apodictic givenness, where an object is apodictically given just in case it is reflectively recognizable as guaranteed to be actual or have being (cf. VIII 35; I 55 f.). Thus, for instance, in the case of properly immanent objects, Husserl attributes what he regards as their indubitable being precisely to their being adequately given:

What is properly immanent qualifies as indubitable, precisely because it does not present anything else, does not “mean” anything “beyond” itself, because what is here meant is also fully and wholly adequately selfgiven (II 5/3).

And he says of immanent perception that it guarantees the being of its object on account of the fact that the latter is adequately given, or given as an “absolute self”, as he puts it here:

Every perception of something immanent necessarily guarantees the existence of its object. If the reflective grasping directs itself on my experience, then I have grasped an absolute self, whose existence is not negatable—that is, the insight that it does not exist is in principle impossible; it would be a countersense to regard it as possible that an experience that is given in this way does not exist (III/1 96/100).

His justification for the claim is, very roughly, that if an object is adequately given, it cannot come to be bodily selfgiven in a different way, or come to be seen as not capable of being so given at all. And, assuming, as he

does, that bodily selfgivenness is the “originary”, or most fundamental, mode of givenness of intentional objects, he takes this to mean that the object must then be actual (cf. VIII 31 ff.).²⁶

Now, assuming, as Husserl does, that an object’s being adequately given can provide a motive for positing it, the claim that adequate givenness is sufficient for apodictic givenness suggests a reason why the possibility of positing intuitionally immanent objects in a rational way should be readily intelligible. For, since the adequate givenness of an object must, necessarily, be reflectively accessible, the claim would imply that any positing of an adequately given object that is motivated by its adequate givenness will, thereby, be

motivated by a reflectively accessible item that guarantees the being of that object. And, given that rational positings are positings motivated by Husserlian justificatory grounds—that is, reflectively accessible and being-indicative motives for positing—it is hard to see what could provide a clearer instance of rational positing than such a positing. For what could be a better example of a Husserlian justificatory ground than a reflectively accessible item that indicates the being of an object in the sense of guaranteeing it (cf. III/1 317)?

However, Husserl does not only claim that adequate givenness is sufficient for apodictic givenness. He also, as a rule, claims that it is necessary (VIII 35).

And this suggests a reason why the possibility of positing intuitionally

transcendent objects in a rational way should not be readily intelligible. For it implies that, unlike positings of intuitionally immanent objects, positings of intuitionally transcendent objects cannot, in principle, be motivated by the reflectively recognizable guaranteed being of the objects posited. And this may be seen to make it unclear how such positings could still be rational in Husserl’s sense. For what could serve as their motivating justificatory grounds? How, or in what sense, can a reflectively accessible item indicate the being of an object when it cannot do so in the sense of guaranteeing it?

26 Bodily selfgivenness is the most fundamental mode of givenness of intentional objects in the sense that whereas it is not dependent on any other mode of givenness for its possibility, all other modes is thus dependent on it: The givenness of an object as “presentiated” depends on the possibility of objects being bodily selfgiven since such givenness has the inherent character of being a modification of bodily selfgivenness (III/1 233). And the givenness of an object as represented by another object depends on the possibility of bodily selfgivenness since the representing object must, ultimately, be either a bodily selfgiven or a presentiated one (cf. III/1 234).

That this is, in fact, the supposed reason why the possibility of rational positings of intuitionally transcendent objects should be problematic is also suggested in a more direct way by the texts. Thus, for instance, in the context of discussing the justificatory force of perception of physical objects, or “outer perception” (äussere Wahrnehmung), which Husserl takes to be a form of immediate rational cognition whose objects can never be apodictically given, he writes:

If immediate experiential cognition (in the form of perception and, thereby, immediate cognition of any kind whatsoever) were such an absolutely clear and indubitable grasping of a being-in-itself that every doubt as to whether … the cognized does not exist would be fully non-sensical and excluded, then everything would be in order. So, to the extent that cognition leads back to absolute

selfgivenness, which excludes every doubt as non-sensical, is it no mystery [Rätsel]. This requirement the cognition of nature [Naturerkenntnis] does not satisfy (XXXVI 46).

And again:

The absolute givenness is essentially unproblematic precisely in the sense of the problem of transcendence. Positing of a factual existent that is not given itself in the absolute sense is enigmatic just because it is not given itself. If we possess and if we apprehend something itself without going beyond what is truly given itself in our meaning, stating and judging, then it makes no sense to doubt (X

352/363).

On the present construal, the possibility of positing intuitionally transcendent object in a rational way is problematic because intuitionally transcendent objects cannot be apodictically given, and because positings of such objects cannot, therefore, be motivated by their reflectively recognizable guaranteed being. And this is to say that, construed as the problem of intuitional transcendence, the problem of transcendence amounts to the problem of how positings based on grounds that fail to recognizably guarantee the being of the objects posited can still be rational, or how grounds of this kind can still constitute justificatory grounds. It is, in other words, to say that the problem amounts to what could be called the problem of the possibility of defeasible cognition, in the sense of rational positings based on defeasible justificatory grounds—grounds that fail to recognizably guarantee the being of the objects for which they constitute grounds—or the problem of the possibility of grounds of this kind.

How does the problem of intuitional transcendence relate to the problem of defeasible cognition? In most of the relevant texts, Husserl in effect takes the problems to be equivalent, arguing, as he there does, that adequate givenness is not just sufficient, but necessary for apodictic givenness (cf. VIII 35). For this view entails that all and only intuitionally transcendent cognitions are

defeasible. At least one text suggests a different answer, however. In

Cartesianische Meditationen he denies that adequate givenness is necessary for apodictic givenness (I 55). And this entails that at least some intuitionally transcendent cognitions are indefeasible, and hence that the problem of intuitional transcendence and the problem of defeasible cognition are not equivalent after all.

For this reason, and because the problem of defeasible cognition in any case constitutes the core of the problem of intuitional transcendence, as we have seen, I take this problem to represent Husserl’s ultimate specification of the problem of transcendence. I now want to consider some aspects of the problem as so specified.