Research question 3: How do the actors influence and claim authority in decision-making concerning reindeer husbandry?
Discussion – revisiting the research questions
8.3.1 The art of governing - techniques of power
As outlined in Chapter 6, the state has for many decades been worried about too many reindeer and too many herders in Sámi reindeer pastoralism – especially in Finnmark.
Hence, new policies were introduced in the late 1970s to transform reindeer husbandry into a more economically efficient industry. In the 1990s, sustainability became a second objective of the policies. The idea was that rationality and
sustainability would be achieved through standardised herd structures and slaughter strategies, centralised marketing, professionalised herders and proper reindeer numbers. Informed by the concept of governmentality, the study identified four techniques of power used in the state governance of Sámi reindeer husbandry to shape a desired behaviour among the herders: Discipline, neoliberal governing, sovereign power, and governing according to truth (Foucault, 2008; Fletcher, 2010) (see also Paper 3). These techniques of power are distinct but interrelated concepts that might compete, conflict or complement one another within different contexts. Commonly, the state’s techniques of power are presented as apolitical measures to ensure a rational and sustainable reindeer husbandry.
Discipline is an approach that seeks to stimulate an internalisation of social norms, ethical standards and specific practices through participation, education and capacity building. The study identified many examples of governance through discipline. The training, guidance and advice provided by the Reindeer Husbandry Administration are examples of governing based on discipline. While LMD and Reindriftsforvaltningen (2007) claim that the 2007 Reindeer Act increased the herders’ scope for internal self-governance (internt selvstyre), government officials still developed the template for the internal management plans (bruksregler), the guidelines for planning sustainable reindeer numbers and land use, and the indicators and targets to be used in the planning and monitoring of Sámi reindeer husbandry. I have observed a number of seminars and conferences hosted by LMD and targeting reindeer herders where keynote speakers – usually a person outside the reindeer-herding community – lecture about optimal carcass weights and reindeer numbers and rational herding practices.
The information the speakers presented was usually based on equilibrium thinking;
Discussion – revisiting the research questions
the agendas rarely included the alternative pastoralist perspectives, and little time was given for discussing the lectures.
Representation is another disciplining technique: The so-called ‘co-management’
boards introduced by the 1978 Reindeer Act gave pastoralists “increased responsibility and influence” (LD, 1976, p. 54) by including them in the body responsible for interpreting, applying and enforcing the policy regulations (Paine, 1994). As described in Section 6.4.3, the National Reindeer Husbandry Board consists mainly of herders; however, LMD appoints the majority of the members. In the 2008–
2015 destocking process in Finnmark, I found that the herder representatives appointed by the state voted differently than the representatives appointed by the Sámi Parliament. The former group tended to vote for a reindeer number in line with the recommendation of the Reindeer Husbandry Administration, but the latter group tended to vote for the reindeer number proposed by the herding district. Herders from both groups told me that they felt pressure from LMD to support the proposal
presented by the Administration.
There are many examples of participatory ad hoc working groups with mandates to assess different aspects of reindeer pastoralism, but government officials always establish the working groups (though the NRL appoints the herder representatives), define the scope and premise of the work – that is, what should be included and left out of the discussion – and organise seminars to inform the discussions of the group members. Furthermore, a government official acts as secretary to the working group, writing up the minutes and end reports. The reports from these ad hoc working groups are submitted to LMD, who interprets and uses them as they see fit. Examples of such ad hoc groups are the committee that reviewed the 1978 Reindeer Act and suggested changes to the policies in 2001, the working group to develop indicators and criteria for sustainable reindeer numbers in 2008, and the working group assessing ways to strengthen the capacity with reindeer husbandry to self-government (selvstyre) and internal control (internkontroll) (see NOU, 2001; LMD, 2008a; Landbruksdirektoratet, 2016b).
Discussion – revisiting the research questions
Neoliberal governing provides incentive structures that skew human practices and behaviour in a certain direction, particularly a direction that focuses on maximising individual benefit. The subsidies provided by the Reindeer Agreement are an example of neoliberal governing. The Agreement text and outreach activities motivate
pastoralists through economic awards to adopt a specific herd structure and slaughter strategy, and a certain distribution of reindeer among the pastoralists within a herding unit. The Reindeer Agreement encourages the pastoralists to concentrate on producing meat, while the responsibility for slaughtering, processing, trading and marketing is transferred from the pastoralists themselves to certified slaughterhouses and the Norwegian meat cooperative (Sagelvmo, 2004; ES Reinert, 2006). As already
mentioned, quantitative indicators (such as carcass weights, upper reindeer numbers, production rate, and the monetary value of the meat sold to a certified slaughterhouse) are used to determine whether a herding group will receive subsidies or not. Over the last 40 years, since the introduction of incentives for calf meat production, more and more herding groups have adapted their herding practices to gain access to the subsidies. During the interviews, however, the herders explained that this type of production would not be economically viable without state support. Many of the pastoralists referred to calf harvesting as ‘Norwegian’ reindeer husbandry (Paper 3).
Because many herding groups have become economically dependent on the state subsidies, they now continue practices they do not believe in.
ES Reinert (2008, p. 192) argues that the state regulations “made the Saami herders retrogress economically into a colonial-type situation”. He claims that the rigid price structure was not well suited to a meat production system regulated by weather patterns and nature (ES Reinert, 1997). When production fell in the 1990s, the demand for reindeer meat was higher than the supply but prices did not rise accordingly, and the herders’ income was halved (ES Reinert, 2008, p. 193). The Norwegian government officials responded to the situation by giving a grant per kilogram of meat produced.
However, the grants were only given to those who sold their reindeer to the certified slaughterhouses. According to ES Reinert (2008, p. 194), the grant system forced most
Discussion – revisiting the research questions
herders to sell their animals at an artificially low price, while the relatively well-off herders could sell to the unofficial street market at a much higher price. ES Reinert (2008, p. 197) concludes: “The Saami herders were economically ‘primitivized’ by having the increasing returns activities that add value to their raw materials taken away from them, subsequently to be put ‘on the dole’. Such internal welfare colonialism in Norway has its parallels on a huge scale on the African continent.”
Sovereign power is the top-down construction of rules through laws and regulations, and the threat of punishment if rules are not obeyed. Within the state governance of reindeer husbandry, the certification of slaughterhouses, internal management plans (bruksregler), the concession system, and the sanctions described in the 2007 Reindeer Act are examples of sovereign power.
The concession system introduced a new administrative and legal hierarchy in the Sámi pastoralist community and gave privileges and obligations to some individuals.
The concession holder receives and distributes state subsidies within the herding unit;
the concession holder has the right to determine who the members of the unit are and how many reindeer each individual unit member may possess, and he/she is
responsible for submitting annual reports on the state of the herding unit. Herders that I interviewed argued that by giving concession holders the authority to make decisions about the reindeer of others, the 1978 and 2007 Reindeer Acts challenge traditional decision-making within the siida where everyone who owns reindeer has a say (Paper 3).
The 2007 Act empowered government officials to use economic sanctions towards pastoralists that did not follow the regulations (Riksrevisjonen, 2012). The state can reduce or refuse to issue subsidies to herding units that do not have an approved internal management plan or do not operate within the defined targets for production (described in the Reindeer Agreement) and to issue fines to units that are not
following the destocking decisions.
Discussion – revisiting the research questions
Governing according to truth is an approach that fosters a specific understanding of rational behaviour as prescribed by a religion or particular conceptions of the nature and order of the universe. Repeated public presentations in government reports, at conferences and in the media confirm and maintain the state definition of rational reindeer husbandry. Hence, the state presentation of what reindeer husbandry is and ought to be has become a commonly acknowledged truth in Norwegian society. The herders’ ability to influence this established truth is limited by their ability to present their alternative perspectives and knowledge systems (papers 1 and 3). The
domination of the state’s truth further marginalises the herders’ alternative ways of understanding reindeer husbandry and how the reindeer and pastures should be governed. (See Section 8.2.3 on the domination of the state narrative.)
Like Berkes (2008, p. 258), my research found that in public decision-making, the pastoralists’ know-how was marginalised by “the assumption that the professional expert knows best”. According to Flyvbjerg (1998, p. 117), it “is not whether one or the other interpretation is ‘correct’ or ‘true’ but which party can put the greatest power behind its interpretation”. Robbins (2012, p. 219) reflects a similar view and with reference to Foucault he states that power precedes knowledge and together the two establish truth.
8.3.2 The art of being governed
Despite the 40 years of rationalisation policies, the state’s concern about too many reindeer in Finnmark persists (see Landbruksdirektoratet, 2017a; Prop. 92 S, 2017–
2018); and throughout the years, there has been both open and hidden resistance against the state’s rationalisation measures. The herders are a heterogeneous group of individuals. They operate in different ecological landscapes, relate to different socio-economic contexts, and have different personal needs and aspirations. They therefore respond in different ways to the regulations and use different approaches to maintain or gain control over their own livelihoods.
Discussion – revisiting the research questions
I found many examples of hidden resistance – what Scott refers to as “the weapons of the weak” (JC Scott, 1985) – among reindeer herders (Paper 3). One pastoralist told me a story of how her family had hindered an official count of their reindeer in 1956. She explained that the state used aerial photos to count the number of animals in the herds on the tundra and that her relatives had hidden reindeer in the neighbouring valley.
Another example is how herders obstruct decision-making processes by not complying with deadlines. After the National Reindeer Husbandry Board proposed herd reduction plans at the beginning of 2013, pastoralists I interviewed stated that they would not act upon the decisions – they said they would sit on the fence and wait for the next move from the state.
Sometimes, pastoralists act as if they have complied with state policies, but use their own reasoning for explaining their actions, or ignore the intention of a regulation and find a way to take advantage of the situation, for instance with calf harvesting (see Section 8.1.1). Calf harvesting is a practice that many pastoralists view very negatively.
They state that they have now become dependent on the state subsidies for calf production. One of them explained that in this subsidy system, he could also generate an income by slaughtering the smallest calves that were unlikely to outlast the winter.
Other pastoralists maintain traditional governance structures in the shadow of the state. A pastoralist explained that it was common for herding groups to keep two sets of management plans for reindeer-herding: one plan was intended for the state, which included only a minimum of information; and another, ‘real’ plan was drawn up that suited the siida needs and was not shared with government officials. Similarly, pastoralists told me that many herding groups operate with two different types of leaders. One is an elected leader of the district board, who is often a person with the capacity to deal with the state’s reporting requirements and the technical terminology used in the reports. The real leader of the herding group – the chief – is a person with deep knowledge and experience of practising reindeer husbandry. The chief is not elected; their role continues as long as they are regarded as one of the most trusted and respected among the siida members. MN Sara (2009, p. 153) explains that “the
Discussion – revisiting the research questions
siida, and its use of traditional herding knowledge, has […] been living its own life alongside, and often in conflict with, official accounts and decisions”.
These examples come from accounts that pastoralists shared in an interview setting. I have not heard them tell the same stories in public. The transcripts containing criticism of the decision-makers have been hidden from the same decision-makers.
These ‘offstage’ presentations can be very different from the pastoralists’ public presentation. The lack of open resistance could create an impression of support of the state governance of reindeer husbandry. According to JC Scott (1985), this is a convenient strategy by actors who realise that they have to continue dealing with the dominant actor, one way or the other.
Another form of hidden transcript that I identified during my research was criticism disguised as folktales. I have observed seminars and conferences, with both state representatives and herders present, where Sámi keynote speakers have referenced Sámi folktales to bring their messages across. One of these speakers told a story about Stallo. In Sámi folklore, Stallo is a large villain, half human and half devil, who hates and terrorises people. Because Stallo is also clumsy and stupid, humans can gain control over him (J Turi, 2011 [1910]). The keynote speaker told a story claiming that Stallo is still present in Sápmi; that he uses different tools to control and oppress the Sámi, and therefore the Sámi have to find their own techniques to fight back. Though the speaker never articulated it, it was obvious that the Stallo in his story was the Norwegian state.
The pastoralists are not the only actor with hidden transcripts. Government officials present different stories depending on the audience they address. Officials’ accounts about the destocking process in West Finnmark between 2011 and 2013 vary. In January 2011, for instance, LMD revoked decisions made by the National Reindeer Husbandry Board on upper reindeer numbers for several herding districts and requested decisions that would further lower the number of stocks. In January 2013, LMD instructed the Reindeer Husbandry Board to decide on the size of annual
Discussion – revisiting the research questions
destocking for the herding districts without an approved reduction plan. Then, at a conference co-hosted by LMD and the NRL in August 2012, a government official claimed in her presentation that LMD had no other role in the destocking process than to oversee that the policy decisions were complied with. The government official argued that the herding groups controlled and decided on most issues related to reindeer husbandry, including setting upper reindeer numbers. Furthermore, in one of my interviews with government officials, I was told that pastoralists control most of their livelihood and that there is probably no other business with more
self-governance than reindeer husbandry. However, when the Minister of Agriculture and Food addressed the Parliament seven months earlier – away from the direct
observation of the herding community – he emphasised LMD’s strong and direct involvement in the destocking process in West Finnmark (Innst. 103 S, 2012–2013).
Also, in an interview with the office of the auditor-general, the staff commended LMD for interfering in the decision-making.
Not all resistance to state decision-making is hidden; there are many examples of open confrontation. One of the best-known Sámi cases is the Alta River protest movement during the late 1970s and early 1980s against the flooding of the Sámi village Máze and a substantial amount of reindeer pasture. The construction site was blocked by protesters; three Sámi men tried to blow up a bridge; there was a hunger strike; there were demonstrations outside the Parliament; a group of Sámi women occupied the office of the Prime Minister, and a plea was sent to the United Nations. Less spectacular examples are public protests expressed through conventional and social media, public meetings and festivals against human activities that affect reindeer husbandry negatively. To protest against the state conservation of large carnivores, pastoralists document these animals’ behaviour and the damage they cause through posting photos and videos on Facebook of reindeer hurt or killed by carnivores.
In 2017, the Supreme Court considered two disputes between reindeer pastoralists from West Finnmark and the regional government in one case and the state in the other. In the first legal case – referred to as the Reinøy case – a herding district claimed
Discussion – revisiting the research questions
that the Troms County approval of an infrastructure development was illegal as there had been no proper impact assessment of the development plans. The herders claimed that an environmental impact assessment would show that the plans would have severe effects on their reindeer husbandry. The pastoralists won in the district court, but the Troms County appealed and won in the court of appeal. The pastoralists requested the supreme court to examine the dispute, but the case was dismissed by the majority of the judges (three out of five) (Norges høyesterett, 2017a).
The second dispute – often referred to as the Jovsset Ánte Sara case – is described in Section 6.6. While the Reinøy case attracted attention by local and regional media, the Jovsset Ánte Sara case became known far beyond the Norwegian borders. Sámi reindeer herders, politicians, and artist used the case to draw attention to state violation of Sámi rights and the continued, covert Norwegianisation of the Sámi. One of the most spectacular awareness-raising actions was an art installation – a curtain made of 400 reindeer skulls with bullet holes – displayed outside the Parliament in the heart of Oslo just before Christmas.
8.4 Consequence of the state governance for Sámi pastoralism