The CO2-tax has been the main policy instrument in Norwegian climate policy since the beginning of the 1990s. In 2007, the CO2-tax covered 52 per cent of Norway’s total greenhouse gas emissions, and 68 per cent of Norway’s total CO2-emissions (Ministry of the Environment 2007: 47)1. Hence, one third of Norway’s total CO2-emissions were exempted from the CO2-tax.
Table 1 CO2-tax rates for 2007
NOK per l/Sm3/kg NOK per tonne CO2
Petrol 0,80 345
Mineral oil 0,54
– light oil, diesel 203
– heavy oil 172
Mineral oil, reduced rate 0,28
– light oil, diesel 105
– heavy oil 89
Inland/onshore use of gas
– natural gas 0,47 201
– LPG 0,60 200
Continental shelf 0,80
– light oil, diesel 300
– heavy oil 255
– natural gas 342
Source: Ministry of the Environment 2007: 47.
1 - St.meld. nr. 34 (2006-2007)
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The CO2-tax is, however, varying greatly. Table 1 shows that the petroleum industry paid between NOK 255 and NOK 342 per tonne CO2 on emissions from the continental shelf in 2007. Also emissions from petrol are highly taxed, while emissions from inland use of gas are taxed by NOK 200 per tonne CO2. In contrast, producers of aluminium, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, iron and steel (energy intensive industries) pay less than NOK 10 per tonne CO2-equivalents in 2006 (SSB 2009).
3.1 The CO2-tax is introduced
In 1990 the Syse Government, a centre-right minority coalition consisting of the Conservative Party, the Norwegian Christian Democratic Party and the Centre Party, proposed a CO2-tax covering mineral oil and gasoline (Kasa 2000: 107). The same year the Brundtland Government, a one-party minority government established by the Labour Party, proposed to extend the CO2-tax to also cover CO2-emissions from coal, petrol and petroleum production on the Norwegian continental shelf (Ministry of Finance 1990).2
Table 2a Party representation in the Norwegian parliament 1989-2009. The number of mandates in Parliament.
Party 1989-1993 1993-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005 2005-2009
The Progress Party
(FrP) 21 6 20 24 38
The Conservatives
(H) 37 28 22 38 23
Labour
(Ap) 62 67 65 43 61
Centre Party
(Sp) 11 31 11 10 11
The Norwegian Christian Democratic Party
(KrF) 14 13 25 22 11
The Liberal Party
(V) 1 6 2 10
Socialist Left Party
(SV) 18 13 9 23 15
Others 2 6 7 3
165 165 165 165 169
2 Ot.prp. nr. 17 (1990-1991)
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Table 2b Norwegian governments from 1989-2009. The number of mandates in Parliament.
Governments 1989-1993 1993-1997 1997-2001 2001-2005 2005-2009
Syse
The energy intensive industries opposed the proposal and argued that a CO2-tax would lead to a significant loss of jobs without having any environmental effect at all (Nilsen 2000: 108).
Their argument was heard, and this industry was exempted from the tax that was adopted in 1990 and implemented in 1991 (Bang 2004; Kasa and Malvik 2000; Nilsen 2001). The exemption was given in spite of the fact that the energy intensive and export oriented industries in Norway were responsible for 40 per cent of the CO2 emissions at the time the tax was introduced (Alfsen 1999). These industries’ membership in policy networks that included key government bodies contributes to explain their influence in this case (Kasa 2000; Kasa and Malvik).
In contrast, the petroleum industry did not succeed in preventing the imposition of the CO2-tax in 1990. It is a common view that this failure was due to lack of lobbying in the early phase of the policy making process (Bang 2004; Kasa and Malvik 2000; Nilsen 2000; Reitan 1998). However, OLF was founded in 1989 and has been a very active participant in climate politics since its establishment. Moreover, the petroleum industry was part of another important policy network that included key governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Since 1990, there have been several attempts to extend the CO2-tax to sectors not covered by the initial tax.
5 3.2 The Green Tax Commission 1996
In 1996 the Green Tax Commission was about to propose a CO2-tax on emissions from the energy intensive industries (Kasa 2000; Kasa and Malvik 2000).
However, when the NHO representative in the Commission realised that the majority of the Commission’s members supported an extension of the CO2-tax, she leaked the proposal to the media (Kasa and Malvik 2000). The proposal was stopped before it was submitted. Later it turned out that Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Prime Minister representing Labour, had instructed the members of the Commission representing Ministry of Finance and Ministry of the Environment to vote against a CO2-tax on emissions from the energy intensive industries (Kasa 2000).
Compared to the proposed CO2-tax for other sectors, energy intensive industries were offered a reduced tax rate of NOK50 per tonne CO2. Nevertheless, the energy intensive industries strongly opposed the proposal and once again PIL succeeded in avoiding the tax. In this decision, PIL and NHO demonstrated that they had attentive contacts at the very highest political level.
3.3 The 1998 Bondevik I-proposal: CO2-tax on energy intensive industry
The report of the Green Tax Commission was submitted to the Ministry of Finance in June 1996, and was followed up by a governmental white paper two years later. In April 1998, the Bondevik I Government, a minority coalition consisting of the Norwegian Christian Democratic Party, the Centre Party and the Liberal Party, proposed to extend the CO2-tax by including the energy intensive industries in the CO2-tax regime (Ministry of Finance 1998).3 While the Green Tax Commission proposed a CO2-tax on emissions from energy-intensive industries at NOK 50 per tonne CO2, the Bondevik I government proposed a somewhat higher tax at NOK 100 per tonne CO2. Since the Green Tax Commission’s proposal Norway had signed the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted at the third meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the climate convention in Kyoto in 1997, and the Bondevik I Government argued that the tax proposed by the Green Tax Commission was too low to implement Norway’s international emissions reduction commitment (Ministry of Finance 1998). While the tax rate was increased, it was nevertheless lower than, for instance, the tax on petrol (NOK 365 in 1996), light mineral oil (NOK 160 in 1996) and off shore oil production (NOK 320 in 1996) . Moreover, the Bondevik I Government did not only propose a reduced tax, it also proposed to compensate the energy intensive industries until the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. The compensation covered taxes on emissions from coal used for processes in the metallurgical industries and was supposed to be gradually reduced from the year the Kyoto Protocol was ratified. The compensation arrangement was set to expire in 2010 (Ministry of Finance 1998).
The proposal also included a CO2-tax on mineral oil products. Hence, the following new sectors were to be covered by the tax: aviation, national shipping of goods, fisheries, the supply fleet, pulp and paper and fish meal industries. The proposal also included a reduced
3 St.prp. nr. 54 (1997-1998).
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CO2-tax on coal and coke in the sectors of cement and leca production and coal and coke for process purposes. Hence, the on-shore industries – including the energy intensive industries - were to be taxed.
NHO, including OLF and PIL, participated in the formal hearing process prior to the introduction of the proposal. NHO and PIL were clearly against the proposed CO2-tax until an international climate change agreement was reached and other countries also introduced a CO2-tax. They emphasised that a unilateral CO2-tax would imply costs that in effect forced the industry to move their activity to countries without similar regulations. Thus, they argued, while a unilateral CO2-tax would have significant economic and societal effects, it would have no environmental effects. Given that the Bondevik I Government indeed proposed both a reduced tax rate and compensation for energy intensive industries, the industries succeeded in extracting regulatory concessions. Still, this was unacceptable to the energy intensive industry and when the proposal was introduced, NHO and PIL launched a lobbying campaign directed at the Norwegian Parliament:
While the energy intensive industries could no longer prevent the green tax issue from becoming a parliamentary issue, they still controlled important power resources that could be employed in the parliamentary contest. The industries launched a vigorous lobbying campaign against political parties and their Parliament members (Kasa 2000: 114).
In addition to NHO, PIL lobbied with local and regional branches of the trade union (Kasa 2000: 114). They directed their lobbying activities at the three largest political parties in the Parliament; the Labour Party (largest), “the anti-tax right-wing Progress Party” (second largest) and the Conservative Party (third largest) (ibid.).
PIL’s counter-proposal to the CO2-tax was the establishment of a Norwegian emissions trading scheme with free emissions allowances to the energy intensive industries.
This implicit subsidy had several advantages for the emission-intensive industry. A free or cheap quota for CO2-emissions would be more permanent than a direct subsidy to cover tax expenses, and it would not emerge as an explicit subsidy in public budgets. The costs would instead be carried permanently by other economic sectors, which would have to pay higher prices for their quotas (Kasa 2000:
115).
PIL’s proposal got support (Kasa 2000), and in June 1998 the Bondevik I proposal was rejected by a majority of the Norwegian Parliament (i.e., the Labour Party, the Conservative Party and the Progress Party). Instead the Parliament decided to appoint an expert committee on a national emissions trading scheme. The committee – “the Quota Commission” - was appointed in September 1998. With this outcome of the Bondevik I proposal, the energy intensive industries had avoided the CO2-tax yet again.
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