Environmental valuation

How we value the environment has an important bearing on how we use it. Since the beginning of time humans have lived in, off and with nature. Today, most natural resources are subject to restrictions by state and private actors or community networks, and these institutions influence how we value our surroundings. In modern times, putting a price on certain types of ecosystem services has been dominating the Western institutional way of valuing the environment. The trading of carbon-dioxide emissions under the Kyoto Protocol is an eminent example of this type of valuation mechanism, typical of the field of environmental economics. As stated by Chee, neoclassical economics – on which the field of environmental economics rests – is about allocating scarce natural capital as efficiently as possible in order to satisfy human needs or desires (2004:551). It encompasses an instrumental view on nature, in which the environment is valued according to its provision of something else that is valuable to humans – such as food, clothing, housing etc. This is contrary to the intrinsic approach to nature, where the environment is considered as valuable in itself (ibid.). Recently, the field of neoclassical economics has grown to recognise the non-use, indirect use and existence value of ecosystem services (ibid.:553). Existence value refers to the wish of preserving certain species or environmental services if their continued existence generates welfare for human beings, and implies that any source of welfare can be

substituted by alternative sources of welfare in a trade-off between the continued existence of the species/ecosystem service and other things that provide the same utility (ibid.) As such, nature is still perceived as a commodity that can be traded on the market.

The valuing of environmental goods and services is, however, not only about restricting human use of these resources. It is also about choosing between different, and often conflicting, ethical and practical principles. As stated by Vatn, market-based calculations are not able to capture all of nature’s value dimensions (2000:496). Certain aspects of the environment are incommensurable, with ethical concerns offering a good example of this incommensurability (ibid.:496). For instance, many people consider nature to be a part of the human heritage. Consequently, we have a moral and ethical obligation not to degrade it beyond repair (ibid.:500). The commodification of natural goods and services furthermore ignores the functional aspects of environmental goods – meaning something that offers us important, but largely invisible services (Vatn 2000:498). In line with resilience thinking, the environment consists of a number of processes and feedback loops that all contribute to the system’s internal and external balance. One cannot simply remove parts of this system and place it within the confines of the market while leaving other parts out, because the totality of the environment is worth more than its individual components (Vatn 2000:10-11).

Both Vatn and Chee find the solution to these valuation issues in the design of institutions. In keeping with Vatn, the interdependency that exists across individuals in the natural system necessitates some sort of social process to determine our values and preferences (2000:505).

Vatn does not, however, specify how this social process or institution is to be constructed, other than pointing out that is should “be formulated in a way consistent with this insight”

(ibid.). Chee, on the other hand, proposes to replace the top-down and technocratic economical approach to environmental valuation with a participatory approach focusing on uncertainty, context, deliberation, negotiation, value formation, risk assessment and reconciliation (2004:559). This deliberative process should, according to Chee, include mechanisms in which people are allowed to express their views on what sort of ecosystems they want. It should also facilitate learning about the issue at stake, and potential outcomes associated with the different options presented. Furthermore, the process must encourage discussion, deliberation and negotiation over trade-offs and evaluate options with the aim of finding compromise solutions (ibid.).

Environmental valuation is thus a subjective undertaking, and in line with the above discussion I have chosen to define it as “the process of determining the human impact on non-human life that rests on either instrumental and economic considerations, or intrinsic and socially constructed ethical, moral and cultural beliefs, or both.” Valuing the environment according to the second part of this definition poses a significant challenge to the present managerial standing on natural landscapes. If valuation is seen as something belonging to the self, imbued with ethical concerns and dilemmas, it no longer makes sense to trade environmental services on a market or to place the valuation task within the confines of the state. Neither the market nor the state is able to fully capture all the value dimensions of a certain ecosystem or landscape because these institutions are located at the outskirts of people’s everyday interplay with nature. Putting it simply, valuation is reduced to either a mathematical calculation or a political trade-off performed by a restricted number of

“objective” actors. Rather, and as recommended by Vatn and Chee, valuing the environment beckons more local self-governance and participatory forums where ethical and cultural concerns are brought to the fore by the people who interact with nature, and where complex solutions to complex issues can be discussed, negotiated and compromised. In Greenland, the task of environmental valuation is, as we shall see, very much left up to private companies and state bureaucracy. Mining companies looking for a license to operate usually hire a consultant firm to evaluate the environmental consequences of a proposed project in accordance with technical government guidelines, and these consequences are subsequently analysed by “independent experts” and government bureaucrats. Before approval, the technical reviews are presented to the public who are given the chance to comment on them.

As I will return to in the analysis, the democratic aspect of this participatory process is problematic on several accounts and does not leave room for alternative cultural and moral interpretations of the value of the Greenlandic environment. The process of valuation is furthermore related to the previously discussed concepts of sustainable development and sacrifice zones. Whenever Greenlandic decision-makers are calculating the worth of protecting the country’s natural resources, they must compare it to the worth of not protecting these resources. Should a certain geographical area be conserved in order to promote sustainable development, or should it be opened up to industrial activities in order to promote the struggling economy? This is of course a rather basic representation of the issue at stake, and the task of valuation also depends on how the decision-maker in question understands sustainability versus sacrifice. For instance, if sustainable development is simply seen as not degrading an ecosystem beyond the point where it is no longer able to maintain its vital

functions, the outcome – both economic and ecological – will be quite different than if sustainable development is defined as maintaining an ecosystem within its present state.

However, the process of valuation cannot be fully appreciated without recognising the conflict that often arises between protection – traditionally understood as sustainable development – and economic exploitation – often understood as sacrificing.