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• ensure functioning of the USSCP;

• notify civil protection command units and forces;

• notify population;

• manage rescue activities;

• define boundaries of emergency zone;

• conduct humanitarian operations beyond the borders of Ukraine, etc.

The Commission is headed by the Prime Minister of Ukraine, his First Deputy is Vice Prime Minister – Minister on regional development, Deputy Head is Chairman of the State Service of Ukraine on Emergencies and is responsible for management of activities on mitigation of emergency consequences.

Among the members of the Commission, there are Minister of Defense, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Energy, Minister of Health, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Infrastructure, Chairman of the SNRIU, Chairman of the Security Service, other ministers and chairpersons.

One of the documents that regulate interaction of the central executive power bodies in case of a radiological emergency is Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NP 306.5.01/3.083-2004). The document was developed in accordance with the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministries of

Ukraine, approved by the joint order of the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine and the Ministry for Emergencies. The document was registered in the Ministry of Justice in 2004; first revision of the document was done in 2010. This document addresses peculiarities of emergency planning and response to radiation emergencies.

According to Cabinet Resolution "On Approving the Statute of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine" No. 363 dated 20 August 2014 [29], the SNRIU performs the following functions in the sphere of emergency preparedness and response:

• exercises the powers of the competent authority for emergency notification and reporting under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident;

• coordinates the activities of central and local executive authorities responsible for nuclear and radiation safety according to the legislation;

• manages the creation and performance of the functional subsystem for nuclear facility safety of the unified state system for civil protection;

• early notifies via mass media on radiation accidents at the territory of Ukraine and abroad, if transboundary spreading of radioactive substances is probable;

• is the only communication point under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Convention on Notification and Convention on Assistance);

• provides international exchange of operational information on nuclear events within the international nuclear and radiological event scale.

The Information and Emergency Center (IEC) was established to support the above SNRIU functions.

In the structure of the USSCP, the IEC is the executive unit of the functional subsystem “Nuclear Facility Safety”. (According to Cabinet Resolution “On Approval of the Procedure for State Supervision over Compliance with Nuclear and Radiation Safety Requirements” No. 824 dated 09 January 2014 [57], the SNRIU is the regulatory authority of the stated functional subsystem).

During daily activities, the information is collected and analyzed in the IEC related to operation state of the facilities, which regard to a hazard category defined in the IAEA requirements [58].

According to the decision of the SNRIU Chairperson, the IEC is activated in case of an emergency and should submit the information on the event to SNRIU management, the Cabinet and certain central executive bodies, notify the IAEA in accordance with the requirements of the Convention on Notification, and inform the public and the mass media.

The creation of a backup IEC has been under consideration for several years to support the SNRIU emergency response functions if the main IEC becomes unavailable. The concept for backup IEC has not been implemented to date. In conditions of the extraordinary events and external aggression against Ukraine, this increases risks that the SNRIU may lose emergency response capabilities in compliance with current legislation and international obligations (for more detail, see Section 8.3, issue 8.3.1, and Section 4.2).

According to Presidential Decree No. 139/2015 dated 12 March 2015, the Resolution of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine “On Additional Measures for Strengthening the National Security of Ukraine” was put in force on 18 February 2015 [60].

Among other tasks, the Presidential Decree of Ukraine charges the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to revise and approve new model regulations on functional and territorial subsystems of USSCP and regulations on the procedure of notification on emergency threat or initiation and communication in the sphere of civil protection.

Implementation of the above task is intended to decrease risks of failure to ensure coordination within USSCP and necessitates the central executive authorities to revise their own documents regulating activities under USSCP (for more detail, see Section 8.3, issue 8.3.3).

In this regard, SNRIU should promptly develop a new revision of the following documents:

• Provisions on the functional subsystem of the unified state system for prevention and response to natural or man-made emergencies “Nuclear Facility Safety” approved by SNRIU Ordinance No. 16 of 20 January 2009;

• Response plan of the functional subsystem of the unified state system for prevention and response to natural or man-made emergencies “Nuclear Facility Safety” approved by SNRIU Ordinance No. 93 of 16 July 2010.

These documents should be revised considering the requirements of the new standard provisions on USSCP functional subsystem, and changes in the features of threats and USSCP increased preparedness mode introduced in Ukraine on 26 January 2015.

The National Action Plan [61] upon results of stress tests for Ukrainian NPPs envisages a series of measures particularly to develop the Concept of the Unified Automated Radiation Monitoring System (UARMS).

The action plan to develop the Unified ARMS for the period to 2015 was approved by the Order of the Cabinet No. 44-r of 25 January 2012. UARMS Concept Revision 1 was developed in 2012;

however, this Concept has not been completed for many reasons.

In order to coordinate actions on radiation monitoring and appropriate decision-making at the state level, it is necessary to complete UARMS Concept development, prepare terms of reference for UARMS development, and develop a draft Cabinet Resolution on approval of provisions on UARMS (for more detail, see Section 8.3, issue 8.3.4).

The above documents should be developed considering the recommendations of the mission of NATO Advisory Support Team as of 2014 to determine the role of RODOS center in the state emergency response system.

The above-mentioned mission of NATO Advisory Support Team as of 2014 proposed also to improve SNRIU emergency response system through creation of a backup IEC.

5.2 Provisions on Emergency Response Infrastructure

The IEC is currently located on premises of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine in the center of Kyiv. Under conditions of a large-scale emergency caused also by civil unrest or terrorist acts, there is a threat that the IEC will not be able to perform its tasks, including international obligations of Ukraine.

It is proposed to create a special infrastructure that can be used for the needs of the backup IEC in case of an emergency on the one hand, and as a laboratory base of the regulatory authority in normal daily activities, on the other hand.

SNRIU has a mobile radiological laboratory RanidSONNI and a fleet of portable devices that can be used for qualitative measurements of low-active samples taken at environmental objects, if stationary biological shielding is available.

Figure 4.1 – Measurements using RanidSONNI mobile radiological laboratory

The SNRIU does not have currently its own room for maintenance of equipment and RanidSONNI vehicle or special room for stationary laboratory equipment.

The lack of appropriate conditions for operating the RanidSONNI mobile radiological laboratory

involving radiation contamination, loss of radiation sources and threats of terrorist attacks using radioactive sources (for more detail, see Section 8.3, issue 8.3.2).

In establishing the backup IEC, the requirements should be considered for available

communication, lighting, ventilation and air conditioning, uninterruptable power and heat supply, workplaces of specified group of experts, sanitary and other conditions for day and night personnel staying. It is also necessary to create conditions to obtain the measurement data of RanidSONNI mobile radiological laboratory in the backup IEC in real-time mode.

In order to take these measures and harmonize the Ukrainian regulatory framework with the IAEA safety standards, WENRA reference levels, new EU/Euratom Directives and HERCA initiatives in terms of coordination of national procedures in responding to remote nuclear or radiological situations, SNRIU considers it necessary to perform a comprehensive analysis of the national legislation regarding regulation/specification of the requirements relating to emergency preparedness and response to nuclear and radiation accidents as the first stage, namely:

• Law of Ukraine “On Public Protection against Ionizing Radiation”;

• Law of Ukraine “On Health and Epidemiological Wellbeing of the Public”;

• Law of Ukraine “On Nuclear Energy Use and Radiation Safety” [5];

• Radiation Safety Standards of Ukraine [61];

• Basic Health and Radiation Safety Rules of Ukraine [63].

The Ukrainian legal framework will be harmonized with international requirements within

implementation of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine, signed in June 2014. In particular, according to Cabinet Resolution No. 110-r dated 18 February 2105, a number of regulations is to be developed, approved and introduced in order to implement provisions of the Council Directive 59 up to the end of 2018.

In particular, the following issues should be specified, revised and harmonized with the IAEA standard [64]:

• Improvement of the national procedures for emergency preparedness.

• Requirements for the structure and contents of emergency preparedness and response plans according to threat category.

• Updating of the national plan of response to radiation accidents considering the concept for planning preventive measures.

• Harmonization of the criteria related to protective means in case of an emergency with neighboring countries, particularly Belorussia (for RNPP).

• Assessment of on-site and off-site emergency preparedness: roles and functions of the operator, regulatory authorities, local governments, procedures of their efficient interaction to minimize effects of an accident and eliminate its consequences.

• Licensee’s responsibility for timely response, emergency mitigation and protection of the public beyond NPP site.

6 Radioactive waste management and